F. H. McGraw & Co. v. United States

130 F. Supp. 394, 131 Ct. Cl. 501, 1955 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 121
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedApril 5, 1955
DocketNo. 49237
StatusPublished
Cited by78 cases

This text of 130 F. Supp. 394 (F. H. McGraw & Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
F. H. McGraw & Co. v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 394, 131 Ct. Cl. 501, 1955 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 121 (cc 1955).

Opinion

Whitaker, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The plaintiff, F. H. McGraw and Company, alleged eight causes of action in its petition, but in its proposed findings before the Commissioner and its argument before the court it urges only two grounds for recovery: one is to recover damages for itself and its subcontractors for an alleged breach of contract arising out of a stop order issued by the Veterans Administration; the other is to recover increased wages for itself and its subcontractors which were paid under authorization of the Wage Adjustment Board.

The plaintiff entered into a standard form of contract with the United States through the Veterans Administration on February 8, 1945, for the construction of certain additions to the Veterans Hospital in Dearborn, Michigan. The original contract price was $3,000,947.00. The work was to be completed within 400 days after notice to proceed. Notice to proceed was given on February 21, 1945, thus fixing the date for the completion of the work as March 28, 1946. The Veterans Administration (hereinafter referred to as the VA) accepted the work as substantially complete on January 30,1948. The work performed by the plaintiff and its subcontractors actually consumed 1073 days instead of the 400 days as contemplated under the original contract. The contracting officer found that the plaintiff was not responsible for any of this delay. He granted extensions of time to cover this extra period and assessed no liquidated damages against the plaintiff.

Under the contract plaintiff agreed to construct two buildings known as units “B” and “C,” which were ten-story [504]*504wings of the main hospital building; a separate three-story building known as Building No. 19; two connecting corridors; and some alterations to the boiler house building. As originally designed, the first six floors of unit “B” were to consist of office space, and the remaining four floors of general hospital space; unit “C” was to consist entirely of general hospital space and facilities; and building No. 19 was designed as the kitchen building.

1. Although plaintiff had great difficulty manning the job from its inception due to the general shortage of construction workers, which was aggravated by the removal of wage controls on non-federal work when the war ended about six months after the work started, it had fully manned it by the spring of 1946 and work was then in full progress. Then, on August 23,1946, the VA issued a stop order suspending forty to fifty per cent of the work on unit “B” and 20 to 30 per cent of the work on unit “C,” until certain contemplated changes could be decided on. On August 27, 1946, it issued a supplemental stop order suspending all work on building No. 19. The stop order and supplement thereto (hereinafter referred to as the stop order) are set forth in finding 24.

This stop order, which emanated from the VA central office, was issued without consultation with the VA’s representatives on the project or with the plaintiff to determine its wisdom or advisability. Upon receipt of the stop order the plaintiff immediately notified the VA that compliance with it would result in the loss of a substantial part of the labor force which had been so difficult and so expensive to obtain and that it would be time-consuming and expensive to reman the job and would adversely affect the job progress and costs; nevertheless, plaintiff on August 30, 1946, ceased operations in the areas believed to be affected by the stop order. Plaintiff’s work on the project was 66.5% complete at that time.

The areas in units “B” and “C” which were affected by the stop order were not at all clear. The stop order suspended all work on the first, third and tenth floors of unit “B” and all work south of designated columns on all floors of unit “B”; all work on the third floor of unit “C”, and all [505]*505work north of designated columns on the second, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth floors of unit “C”; but in order to determine where work could safely proceed in other areas, it was necessary to know what the changes were and to have the mechanical drawings, so that the mechanical trades could determine how the stopping of all work on certain floors and in certain areas would affect their work on other floors and in other areas.

The preliminary prints of the revised drawings indicating proposed changes were sent to the plaintiff on September 6, 1946, with instructions to proceed with the work in unaffected areas. However, the preliminary prints showed that the proposed changes, which were extensive and complicated, would materially affect and curtail the work of the mechanical trades, and thus the finishing trades, in the so-called “unrestricted” areas. For example: In unit “B” where the work was stopped completely on the first, third and tenth floors and in areas south of designated columns on all the floors, the prints indicated that a morgue and embalming rooms and general office space and handicraft workshops were to be installed on the first floor; a patients’ dining room, serving kitchens, dishwashing rooms, offices, and three wards, on the third floor; an operating suite, on the tenth floor; and various other changes, on the remaining floors. The mechanical installation necessary to service the proposed accommodations, such as plumbing, heating, and wiring, originated in the basement of the building and obviously each floor through which they were required to go was affected by the changes.

It was not until October 1,1946, that plaintiff received the drawings and specifications covering the proposed changes. Plaintiff was requested to submit a detailed proposal covering the cost of the proposed changes. On October 8, 1946, the VA’s senior project manager visited the project, and after discussing plaintiff’s rough estimate of the costs of the proposed changes, advised plaintiff that the estimate was greater than the funds available and that it would be necessary to revise the proposed changes. On November 13,1946, plaintiff received new drawings and revised specifications. These new drawings and specifications, which were modified on Novem[506]*506ber 14, 1946, became the final changes. Plaintiff submitted its proposal on or about January 7,1947, and the VA gave the plaintiff notice to proceed on the changes on January 29,1947, thereby lifting the 159-day partial stop order.

On December 2,1947, Change Order “XX” was issued increasing the contract price by $403,245.41, which represented the contracting officer’s equitable adjustment for the changes made by the new drawings and specifications. This did not include any amount for damages for delay because the contracting officer and head of the department stated that they had no authority to award damages.

The plaintiff contends that the changes were beyond the scope of the contract and that the VA’s stoppage of the work, together with its failure to promptly decide on the changes to be made, was a breach of its contract. The defendant contends that since the VA reserved the right under Article 3 of the contract to make changes in the drawings and specifications within the general scope thereof at any time, and also reserved the right under section 3(h) of the specifications to suspend any portion of the contract work, the partial stop order and delay incident thereto was not a breach of the contract.

The changes made under change order “XX” were within the general scope of the contract. Although the changes were extensive, they were not so extensive as to be a cardinal change. See

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Bluebook (online)
130 F. Supp. 394, 131 Ct. Cl. 501, 1955 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 121, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/f-h-mcgraw-co-v-united-states-cc-1955.