Hunt & Willett, Inc. v. United States

351 F.2d 980, 168 Ct. Cl. 256
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedDecember 11, 1964
DocketNo. 376-58
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 351 F.2d 980 (Hunt & Willett, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hunt & Willett, Inc. v. United States, 351 F.2d 980, 168 Ct. Cl. 256 (cc 1964).

Opinion

Davis, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Standing squarely on the record made before the Claims and Appeals Board of the Corps of Engineers (except as to the amount of recovery), the plaintiff-contractor; insists that it is entitled to equitable adjustments under the Changed Conditions and Changes articles , of its contract, as well as remission of liquidated damages assessed against it for unexcused delay in completion. The contract, made in 1951-1952 with the Corps of Engineers after open bidding, was for construction, of the intake structure and outlet diversion at the Lucky Peak Dam, near Boise, Idaho. The price was $396,610, and the work was to be finished not later than 150 calendar days after receipt of the notice to proceed (January 14, 1952). Plaintiff’s work was the third of five separate phases composing the overall project; the first two units had previously been accomplished by other contractors, and two later phases were to follow.'

Of plaintiff’s various claims connected with this contract only three are presented in this suit. Each of these three items was decided adversely to the contractor, on the merits, by the Claims and Appeals Board. Plaintiff’s position is that the Board misconstrued the contract and failed to follow the overwhelming evidence which should have compelled the Board to uphold the claims under the Changes, Changed Conditions, and Liquidated Damages provisions of the contract. Our Trial Commissioner has found the Board correct in its legal interpretations and adequately supported in its factual findings.

[259]*259I

The unique aspect of this case — tried and reported by the Commissioner before the decision in United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963) — is the parties’ reversal-of-roles with respect to the introduction of de novo evidence in this court. Except on the issue of damages (which the Board had not tried or decided since it ruled in favor of defendant), plaintiff offered only the administrative record and objected to the Government’s presentation of any new evidence not directed strictly to the amount of damages. Over these objections, the Government introduced much de novo evidence, some of which admittedly bore on the issue of liability. The plaintiff now argues that the Commissioner’s findings are wholly vitiated because he took account of this additional evidence. The defendant’s answer is that, although some of the Commissioner’s subsidiary findings may rest in minor part on de novo evidence, all of his major and dispositive findings are properly grounded in the administrative record. For this reason, the Government does not press us to revise all the findings to conform only to the materials before the Board (although it does not formally recede from its general position that the Board alone can take evidence).

We need not decide, in this case, whether and to what extent we can follow the course taken in Stein Bros. Mfg. Co. v. United States, 162 Ct. Cl. 802, 337 F. 2d 861 (1963), and later decisions1 of considering de novo evidence on the issue of the acceptability of administrative findings made under the contract. With keen foresight, the Commissioner has made separate and distinct findings — as to each of the three claims presented by plaintiff and on all major factual issues — first, on the basis of a review of the Board record [260]*260alone, and, second, on tbe 'basis of the entire record in this court including the new evidence. As will appear in Part II of this opinion, we agree with these findings of the Commissioner and therefore determine that the Board’s crucial findings are sufficiently sustained by the record before it, as well as by the court record. Whatever be the correct position on de novo testimony in this case, the plaintiff cannot prevail. We therefore do not undertake the laborious task of reviewing each and every subsidiary finding to make sure that it rests, or can rest, solely on the Board record. Since our conclusions and critical findings are all supported both by the Board proceedings and by the judicial record, it is unnecessary and useless to borrow trouble by engaging in the burdensome process of combing each of the preliminary findings.2 Cf. Hoffman v. United States, 166 Ct. Cl. 39, 49-52, 340 F. 2d 645 (1964).

We are the less hesitant to reject plaintiff’s invitation to undertake that troublesome but needless chore since plaintiff has not helped us by filing proper exceptions to the Commissioner’s findings. The court’s rules contemplate that the parties will except to each finding with which they disagree and will give appropriate record references for each exception. See former Rules 45 (c) and (e), and 46 (c), and present Rules 5T (c) and (f), and 58(c). Decisions implementing those rules have refused to take account of general exceptions which fail to give us the help of pinpointing the alleged error or of isolating the particular part of the record on [261]*261which the exception relies.3 Instead of commenting on the Commissioner’s findings individually and in detail, the plaintiff has simply set forth its own extended narrative version of the facts, appending for good measure the complete findings it proposed to the Commissioner. Exceptions of this type impose too great a burden on the court to separate, for itself, the wheat from the chaff. The defendant has given us, finding by finding, a tabulation of the extent to which the Commissioner’s findings are supported (in the defendant’s eyes) by the administrative record, but the plaintiff has not provided any comparable aid. Plaintiff, therefore, has no standing to insist that each and every one of our findings on liability reflect only the evidence in the Board record.

II

A. The first claim relates to the crumbling of the hill rising over plaintiff’s work-place. Above and about the floor of the intake channel and the tunnel entrance, around which plaintiff’s job was centered, there arose a steep semi-circular slope, man-made, composed of jointed and fractured basalt. During performance this slope raveled considerably so that, from time to time, pieces of rock fell down into the working area in sufficient quantities and force to endanger the workmen below. To protect its employees plaintiff had to undertake scaling operations — in which skilled workmen suspended on the slope pry or wedge loose of potentially loose rock from the surface — much more extensively than it had contemplated. Meanwhile, the contract work had to be suspended. Claiming that the raveling anticipated by the parties was minor and that the excessively raveled condition of the slope which was encountered in performance was aii unknown and unusual physical condition, plaintiff sought an increase in cost under Article 4, Changed Conditions (finding 10), for the additional scaling, the incidental delay, and the loss of efficiency. The Claims and Appeals Board [262]*262denied this claim, although it did allow the costs of recuperating from sudden large rock slides which occurred on May 8, 1952.

The Board’s determination had both legal and factual components.

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351 F.2d 980, 168 Ct. Cl. 256, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hunt-willett-inc-v-united-states-cc-1964.