Potter v. United States

167 Ct. Cl. 28, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 116, 1964 WL 8681
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 17, 1964
DocketNo. 517-59
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 167 Ct. Cl. 28 (Potter v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Potter v. United States, 167 Ct. Cl. 28, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 116, 1964 WL 8681 (cc 1964).

Opinion

Dureee, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit for damages plaintiffs claim for the alleged wrongful termination for default of their right to deliver revolvers, handcuffs and bullets under a contract with the General Services Administration.

In 1956, GSA issued an inquiry for bids to prospective suppliers for items to be used by the Civil Police Administration Program in Vietnam. Plaintiffs, doing business as Potter’s Camera Store, submitted a bid. The bid specified a delivery date 120 days after execution of the contract. On October 3,1956, Contract GS-OOP-22465-ICA was entered into by plaintiffs and defendant. Under the contract, plaintiffs were to supply defendant several items including 2,000 “Ruby Extra” Gabilondo revolvers, 100 dozen handcuffs, and 500 cases of 38 special match bullets, 2,000 per case. The delivery date specified in the contract was 60 days after the execution date of the contract. The contract stipulated that the Spanish revolvers be comparative in quality and performance to Smith & Wesson Model 38 revolvers, or plaintiffs were to supply Smith & Wessons at the same price.

Plaintiffs delivered all the items covered by the contract except the revolvers, bullets and handcuffs. On January 17, 1957, the contracting officer terminated plaintiffs’ right to proceed with delivery of the revolvers and handcuffs since plaintiffs failed to deliver on or before January 15, 1957.

On February 13, 1957, the contracting officer terminated plaintiffs’ right to proceed with delivery of the bullets since plaintiffs had failed to deliver on or before January 25,1957. [30]*30Plaintiffs appealed the contracting officer’s determination to the Board of Review of GSA. The Board approved the contracting officer’s actions on December 18, 1957, and its action was in turn approved by the Administrator on December 31,1957.

THE REVOLVERS

As to the revolvers, plaintiffs advance two arguments that seem to be mutually exclusive. First, plaintiffs argue that the rejection of the Gabilondo revolvers on qualitative grounds was improper since no adequate comparative testing was ever performed. Second, and alternatively, plaintiffs argue that if the rejection of the Gabilondo revolvers was correct, the lateness of the rejection mandated that plaintiffs be given reasonable time to procure and substitute Smith & Wessons.

The trial commissioner has found that no adequate comparative tests were run on the Gabilondo revolvers. PIow-ever, the record is clear that even had the Gabilondo revolvers been acceptable to defendant, plaintiffs could not have delivered on time. Well in advance of the execution of the contract, on August 22, 1956, plaintiffs were apprised by Gabilondo that “* * * we should not be able to give you a prompt delivery for the whole lot of 2,000 revolvers cal. 38 5" barrel.” Again, in September, after some communication with both Gabilondo and the United States Consul in Spain concerning delivery of sample revolvers plaintiffs were informed by the Consul that “* * * because of prior commitments for the same type of pistol, they [Gabilondo] would need a minkrmm of from eight (8) to twelve (12) months to complete your order * * [Emphasis added.] Notwithstanding this information, plaintiffs contracted with defendant on October 3 to supply 2,000 revolvers within 60 days even though they had not yet placed a firm order with Gabilondo.

On October 11, 1956, eight days after the contract was executed, plaintiffs again received a letter from Gabilondo which again stipulated that:

In regard to delivery, we are not able to supply the 2.000 revolvers in less than 8 months after the order is [31]*31firmly [sic] placed, and partial shipments must be allowed. [Emphasis added.]

Plaintiffs never placed a firm order with Gabilondo for the revolvers until January 6, 1957, and, as subsequent events bear out, it was not until June 21, 1957, that Gabilondo informed plaintiffs that it had “* * * ready for immediate [sic] shipment the first lot of 1,000 only “iujbx extra” revolvers * * [Emphasis added.] Had plaintiffs chosen to rely on the quality of the Gabilondo revolvers, they would still have to demonstrate their willingness, readiness and capacity to perform the contract before recovery could be had. United States v. Penn Foundry & Mfg. Co., 337 U.S. 198 (1949). See also Carnegie Steel Co. v. United States, 240 U.S. 156, 164 (1916) where the Supreme Court pointed out “* * * the very essence of the promise of a contract to deliver articles is ability to 'procure or make them.” [Emphasis added.] Not only did plaintiffs fail to prove their willingness, readiness and capacity to deliver the Gabilondo revolvers on the due date (or even within a reasonable time after the due date and after the test results were known), but there is affirmative evidence in the record which indicates that plaintiffs did not have the capacity to deliver the revolvers Since there is no showing that plaintiffs could have performed the contract, it is unnecessary for us to consider the question of comparative testing and the correctness of the contracting officer’s action in reliance on those tests.

Plaintiffs’ second argument is that the lateness of defendant’s rejection of the Gabilondo revolvers mandated a reasonable extension of time to enable substitution of the required Smith & Wessons. To place this argument in a chronological frame of reference, we again point out that the due date on this 60-day contract was December 3, 1956. The tests were begun on December 11th, and plaintiffs were notified that the Gabilondo revolvers were unacceptable on December 20. Plaintiffs’ right to proceed was terminated on January 17,1957. Defendant concedes that the contracting officer did waive the first delivery date (December 3). But defendant argues that by this waiver, the Government did not surrender its right to take delivery of the revolvers in a reasonable time. Plaintiffs’ retort that the question of [32]*32what constitutes a reasonable time “is generally dependent on the facts.” This is true. Consequently, we will review the pertinent facts here present to ascertain the reasonableness of the substitution time allowed plaintiffs. The contract had a 60 calendar-day duration. The parties agreed that upon rejection of the Gabilondo revolvers plaintiffs would supply Smith & Wessons. No provision for extending the due date in the event substitution became necessary was included in the contract. Both parties must have understood that under the express terms of the contract, the due date governed delivery of either the Gabilondo or the Smith & Wesson revolvers. Due to delay in testing, the Government waived the due date. Plaintiffs were informed on December 20th that the substitution of Smith & Wessons was required. In that communication, plaintiffs were reminded that:

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
167 Ct. Cl. 28, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 116, 1964 WL 8681, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/potter-v-united-states-cc-1964.