Litchfield Manufacturing Corp. v. United States

338 F.2d 94, 167 Ct. Cl. 604, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 136
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedOctober 16, 1964
DocketNo. 453-56
StatusPublished
Cited by29 cases

This text of 338 F.2d 94 (Litchfield Manufacturing Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Litchfield Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, 338 F.2d 94, 167 Ct. Cl. 604, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 136 (cc 1964).

Opinion

Laramore, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court;

Lynch Brothers, Incorporated,1 (hereinafter called Lynch or plaintiff), was the low bidder on a contract with defendant through the Navy Department Aviation Supply Office, for the furnishing of some 10,135 fuel tanks, for use on various aircraft, at the unit price of $113.67 or a total of $1,152,045.45. The contract was awarded to plaintiff on April 13, 1950, and was terminated for default by the contracting officer on October 24, 1950, on the ground [607]*607that plaintiff had so failed to make progress as to endanger performance of the contract.2

The contract provided for desired delivery dates, the first being 120 days after date of the contract and continuing at intervals, the last being 381 to 410 days after the date of the contract.3 The contract also provided for the furnishing by the govermnent of a substantial amount of defendant-owned tooling and dies.4 At the time the instant contract was awarded to plaintiff, this government-owned equipment was located at the plants of three government contractors who were producing for defendant the same type of tanks [608]*608which plaintiff was to supply. Under the contract, the tooling and dies were to be delivered by defendant to plaintiff at or near plaintiff’s plant in Pine Meadows, Connecticut, for use in connection with the work to be performed. The contract did not specify any particular dates upon which delivery of the tooling and dies were to be made. However, it contained a clause which provided for an equitable adjustment under the “Changes” provision of the contract in case that the tanks could not be produced without the government-furnished material.5 There is no dispute in this case that the tanks could not be produced without the government-furnished tools and dies and this fact was known by the plaintiff and defendant. As stated earlier, at the time the contract was awarded to the plaintiff, a vast majority of the necessary tooling was still in use by the various government contractors. Plaintiff was completely unaware of this, although this fact was known to defendant. It was not until July that the last of the necessary tooling was delivered to plaintiff — almost four months after the contract was entered into.

In this case, plaintiff seeks to recover $76,496.11,6 as compensation for the wrongful termination for default by defendant of its contract.7 Plaintiff contends that its inability to perform the contract stems from the fact that defendant unduly delayed in delivering the government-owned tooling and dies to be used as government-furnished materials in connection with the work to be performed under the contract. Consequently, plaintiff, in effect, argues that since its inability to perform under the contract is due to causes beyond its control, the termination for default is to be converted pursuant to paragraph (g) of section 15 of the contract into a [609]*609“Termination at the Option of the Government” 8 and, as such, it is entitled to recover what amounts to termination costs.9 Defendant, on the other hand, contends that even if there was an imreasonable delay on the part of the government (which it denies) plaintiff’s failure to perform under the contract does not stem from the alleged delay but ivas attributable to its inability to obtain the necessary financing which in turn was due to its poor financial position. To this plaintiff replies that its inability to get the necessary financing was due to the worsening of its financial position occasioned by the government’s failure to supply the necessary tooling, since during this period the plant was practically idle, resulting in unproductive overhead. Defendant has asserted a counterclaim to recover its excess costs incurred by reason of the repurchase of the contract.

There are certain factors present in this case which clearly bring into focus the legal and factual questions which, we think, are controlling in this case. It is clear from the entire record that at the time defendant terminated plaintiff’s right to proceed under the contract for default, plaintiff was not in a position to complete performance under the contract.10 It is also clear that plaintiff’s inability to perform under the contract was ultimately due to its failure to obtain the neces[610]*610sary financing.11 However, it is equally clear to us as plaintiff contends that defendant unreasonably delayed in delivering the government-famished material without which plaintiff could not start production under the contract. In this respect we note that the government did not supply plaintiff with all of the necessary tooling until four months after the contract was awarded to plaintiff, although on repeated occasions plaintiff notified defendant that it needed prompt delivery of the tooling. Defendant knew or should have known that the necessary tooling would not be available within a reasonable time after the contract award, since this same tooling was still in use by the other government contractors. Furthermore, the defendant has not shown any outside intervening factor which prevented it from a prompt delivery. Under such circumstances, we think that defendant negligently failed to famish the required materials in time so that plaintiff could economically perform the contract. This, we think, constitutes a breach on the part of the government of its obligation under section 25 of the contract. See Peter Kiewit Sons’ Co., Inc. v. United States, 138 Ct. Cl. 668, 674-675, 151 F. Supp. 726, 731 (1957) and cases cited therein.12 Cf. Commerce International Co., Inc. v. United States, this day decided ante, p. 529. The defendant cannot cure its breach here by the simple expedient of extending the time of delivery.- William Cramp & Sons v. United States, 41 Ct. Cl. 164 (1906) reversed on other grounds, 206 U.S. 118 (1907). Whether it constitutes a material breach converting the termination for default to [611]*611one for convenience, depends on whether or not plaintiff was ready, willing and able to perform the contract when the breach occurred. See Donnell-Zane Co. v. United States, 75 Ct. Cl. 368 (1932); Brundage v. United States, 66 Ct. Cl. 708 (1929). The answer to this, we think, depends on whether or not plaintiff could have obtained the necessary financing at the time the alleged breach occurred.

The financial ability and capacity of a contractor to perform a government contract is generally a matter within his control and responsibility. Therefore, inadequate financial resources which lead to a default in performance of the contract do not generally excuse nonperformance and as a result the government is absolved of any liability under the contract. See McBride & Wachtel, Government Contracts, § 36.20. However, financial ability to perform a government contract does not mean that the contractor must have on hand adequate cash to pay for the entire cost of performance. Nor can we require the small government contractor to have at its disposal the same financial resources as the giant industrial institution.

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Bluebook (online)
338 F.2d 94, 167 Ct. Cl. 604, 1964 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 136, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/litchfield-manufacturing-corp-v-united-states-cc-1964.