Farnsworth & Chambers Co., Inc. v. The United States

346 F.2d 577, 171 Ct. Cl. 30, 1965 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 118
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJune 11, 1965
Docket276-60
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 346 F.2d 577 (Farnsworth & Chambers Co., Inc. v. The United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Farnsworth & Chambers Co., Inc. v. The United States, 346 F.2d 577, 171 Ct. Cl. 30, 1965 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 118 (cc 1965).

Opinion

DAVIS, Judge. 1

This is a claim for $71,168.26 based upon extra work required under a construction contract because of an allegedly unforeseen “changed condition” not indicated by the contract documents or a reasonable pre-award survey of the area. Plaintiff contracted with the Corps of Engineers, in February 1954, to build the power house for the Old Hickory Dam on the Cumberland River near Nashville, Tennessee. Part of the work required the completion and dewatering of a cofferdam enclosing the place where the power house was to be located. 2 Meeting great difficulty in pumping water out of the cofferdam area, plaintiff attributed most of the trouble to a large but' unknown subterranean cavern which, in its view, was allowing water to rush back into the cofferdam area in opposition to the pumping. Considerable work had to be done to stem this flow back into the cofferdam. An equitable adjustment was sought from the contracting officer under the Changed Conditions article, 3 but was denied. On appeal, the Corps of Engineers Claims and Appeals Board ruled (in January 1960) that the contractor had failed to prove the existence of a. cavern or channel sufficiently large to cause the difficulty of which plaintiff complains; the Board thought, in addition,, that the leakage from the cofferdam was probably due to plaintiff’s faulty work, as well as to flows through an adjacent timber crib (for which the plaintiff had already been compensated in a prior-proceeding). This suit followed.

The first question is whether a large opening in the bed of the river (a crevice, cavern, channel, trench, or hole) — if one was encountered — would constitute a changed condition for which an equitable adjustment could be sought. 4 *580 In this agreement, as in most construction contracts, one test of a changed condition is whether the contractor met “an unknown subsurface condition differing materially from that shown by the drawings, specifications and borings, and one which could not have reasonably been anticipated from a study of the drawings, specifications and borings, or by an examination of the site?' General Casualty Co. v. United States, 127 F.Supp. 805, 812, 130 Ct.Cl. 520, 532, cert. denied, 349 U.S. 938, 75 S.Ct. 783, 99 L.Ed. 1266 (1955); Shepherd v. United States, 113 F.Supp. 648, 654, 125 Ct.Cl. 724, 737 (1953). We read the administrative record as compelling the conclusion that this test was satisfied. The great weight of the evidence is that the core borings gave the plaintiff no adequate reason to believe that a large water-bearing opening underlay the edge of the cofferdam area to be dewatered; all the indications were, rather, that the leakage to be expected would be within normal range and could be handled by an ordinary program including grouting. See the testimony of Mr. Mitchell; the detailed testimony of Dr. Wheeler; and the testimony of Dr. Philbrick at Tr. 145, 148-49, 153. 5 A trench or opening of large magnitude would obviously multiply the expected difficulties of dewatering — by creating a considerable passageway for the water to continue to return to the cofferdam area in force — and would thus constitute a “changed condition” against which the contractor was not supposed to insure by loading his bid. 6 See, e. g., Joseph Meltzer, Inc. of New Jersey v. United States, 77 F.Supp. 1018, 1019-1020, 111 Ct.Cl. 389, 478-481 (1948); Shepherd v. United States, supra. The contractual requirement that plaintiff make its own in *581 vestigation of the site does not obliterate the Changed Conditions clause, nor did this requirement obligate bidders to discover, at their peril, subsurface conditions hidden by the river’s water and thus unavailable to any reasonable preaward inspection. See Fehlhaber Corp. v. United States, 151 F.Supp. 817, 825, 138 Ct.Cl. 571, 583-585, cert. denied, 355 U.S. 877, 78 S.Ct. 141, 2 L.Ed.2d 108 (1957); Kaiser Industries Corp. v. United States, Ct.Cl., 340 F.2d 322, 329-330 decided Jan. 22, 1965; Loftis v. United States, 76 F.Supp. 816, 825-826, 110 Ct.Cl. 551, 627-629 (1948). From its knowledge of the prior experience of the dam contractor for the Old Hickory Dam project (see fns. 2 and 5, supra), the defendant may have acquired some special knowledge or apprehension causing its representatives to believe that "anything” might happen in plaintiff’s powerhouse area, but this special knowledge or feeling was not communicated to plaintiff which had no such reason to be fearful. Cf. John A. Johnson Contracting Corp. v. United States, 132 F. Supp. 698, 702, 132 Ct.Cl. 645, 653-655 (1955).

The next question is whether plaintiff properly invoked the Changed Conditions article. A few days after it began to have reason to believe that there was some large underwater passage or connection between the cofferdam area and the rest of the river, the plaintiff wrote to the defendant, on August 10, 1954, making a claim under the contract for a changed condition in general terms. The letter said that “we refer specifically to the area adjacent to downstream cofferdam Cell No. 5. This area is also in the immediate vicinity of your indicated test boring No. 95.” Plaintiff did not mention a large cavern, channel, trench, crevice or hole, nor did it specify the dimensions of the opening which its witness later brought out at the Board hearing. Defendant’s position is that this notice was inadequate because not enough detail was given. Since the contracting officer and the Board both considered the claim on its merits, it may well be that the latter part of the Changed Conditions clause (see fn. 3, supra) precludes the defendant from now relying on lack of proper notice. 7 In any event, we hold that the notice was sufficient. 8 Under this Changed Conditions article, the defendant has the duty, once notice is given, to investigate the existence, nature, extent, and validity of the contractor’s claim. It is not necessary that the allegedly new condition be set forth specifically and in detail. It is enough if the Government knows that the contractor is claiming such a condition in a certain area; no formal or technical requirements have been imposed. See General Casualty Co. v. United States, supra, 127 F.Supp. at 812-813, 130 Ct.Cl. at 533-534; Shepherd v. United States, supra, 113 F.Supp. at 650-652, 125 Ct.Cl. at 729-730, 731-732. The contracting officer in this case could not have been unaware that the plaintiff was referring to an underwater condition, at or near cofferdam Cell D-5, which caused water to flow back into the cofferdam with considerable force; the plaintiff had been struggling with the problem of gross leakage for several days and the defendant’s representatives had been attributing the trouble to plaintiff’s faulty work. Plaintiff was obviously saying, in its written claim of August 10th, that the fault was not its, but an unforeseen and unforeseeable condition in the bed of the river near the edge of the cofferdam. The Government therefore had adequate notice that something in the physical conditions was claimed to be amiss.

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Bluebook (online)
346 F.2d 577, 171 Ct. Cl. 30, 1965 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 118, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/farnsworth-chambers-co-inc-v-the-united-states-cc-1965.