Williams v. United States

127 F. Supp. 617, 130 Ct. Cl. 435, 1955 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 43
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJanuary 11, 1955
DocketNo. 50403
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 127 F. Supp. 617 (Williams v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Williams v. United States, 127 F. Supp. 617, 130 Ct. Cl. 435, 1955 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 43 (cc 1955).

Opinion

JoNes, Chief Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This case involves a contract between the plaintiffs and the defendant for the construction of a paved road at Fairbanks, Alaska. The facts have been set out in detail in our findings and will be referred to only to the extent necessary for an understanding of the issues which gave rise to the suit.

The principal issue has to do with the amount of borrow material which was excavated by the plaintiffs and put in place on the road. The contract provided for payment for the borrow material at $1.29 per cubic yard and the payment for hauling the material beyond a certain distance at a unit price of 32 cents per cubic-yard mile. The borrow material yardage to be paid for was to be measured in its original position in the borrow pit, which yardage was to be computed by the average end area method, and the overhaul item was to be paid upon the measurement of material in its original position times the overhaul distance in miles and fractions thereof. In other words, an important consideration in determining the amout due the plaintiffs was a determination of the amount of borrow material in its original position.

The face of the quarry rose from a flat surface at a steep, thought not vertical, angle. The average end area method contemplated that surveys be made of the vertical profile of the quarry at frequent intervals along its face, both at the beginning and at the end of the quarrying operations. The extent to which the profile upon final survey had receded from its original position would then be the basis for measuring the amount of material that had been removed from the quarry. At or about the time the plaintiffs began work a survey was made of the quarry. After some 30 or 40 percent of the excavation work had been completed, a slide occurred at the quarry in which a large amount of material moved downward and outward toward the base line where the plaintiffs were operating. The amount of material moved was estimated by a witness for the defendant as from 30,000 to 50,000 [439]*439cubic yards, and by witnesses for the plaintiffs as from 200,000 to 400,000 cubic yards. A fair statement from tlie evidence would be that defendant’s witness was too conservative and the estimates of plaintiffs’ witnesses excessive. Whatever may be the correct amount, when we consider that the total amount of material moved, as computed by plaintiffs, was 99,592 cubic yards and that 34,596 had been removed at the time of the slide, the possible effect of such a slide on the computation of material in place by the average end area method can be seen.1 Not only did material come into the area from outside for which no cross section had been prepared, hut also certain points on the original survey were wiped out.

After the contract was completed the contracting officer caused a final survey to be made and on a comparison of that survey with the original survey computed the borrow material excavated as 69,349.7 cubic yards. During the course of the contract- plaintiffs had been paid for this item on a truck-measurement basis, on which basis the borrow material removed had been computed at 99,592 cubic yards, that is, some 30,000 more than the contracting officer computed on the average end area method. The plaintiffs took an appeal from that decision of the contracting officer to the Commissioner of Roads for Alaska, the designated representative [440]*440of the head of the department, who affirmed the decision of the contracting officer. This suit followed.

When this case was tried and when a report thereon was filed by the commissioner, the last word on the question of the finality of the decision of the head of the department had been stated by the Supreme Court in United States v. Wunderlich, 342 U. S. 98, in which the Court said that a decision made by the head of the department under the “Disputes” clause of a government contract was final and conclusive unless fraud on his part was alleged and proved. The commissioner found that fraud, as measured by the formula set out by the Supreme Court in that decision, had not been established by the plaintiffs. However, after the report had been filed, the Congress passed and the President signed Public Law 356, 83d Congress, 2d Session, which provided that the decision of the head of any department or agency in any contractual dispute shall not be final and conclusive where “the same is fradulent or capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence.” [68 Stat. 81.]

We are satisfied from the evidence and have found as a fact that the decision of the head of the department was not supported by substantial evidence. In reaching this conclusion we have considered the evidence on both sides in order to determine whether it appears that the evidence in support of the administrative decision can fairly be said to be substantial in the face of opposing evidence. See Willapoint Oysters v. Ewing, 174 F. 2d 676, certiorari denied, 338 U. S. 860. In a recent decision by the Supreme Court, Universal Camera Corp v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U. S. 474, 487, the Court made the following statement with respect to the rule relating to substantiality of evidence to support an administrative decision:

Whether or not it was ever permissible for courts to determine the substantiality of evidence supporting a Labor Board decision merely on the basis of evidence which in and of itself justified it, without taking into account contradictory evidence or evidence from which conflicting inferences could be drawn, the new legislation [Administrative Procedures Act and Taft-IIart-ley Act] definitively precludes such a theory of review [441]*441and bars its practice. The substantiality of evidence must take into account whatever in the record fairly detracts from its weight. This is clearly the significance of the requirement in both statutes that courts consider the whole record.

The fact that there is evidence, considered of and by itself, to support the administrative decision is not sufficient where there is opposing evidence so substantial in character as to detract from its weight and render it less than substantial on the record as a whole.

As we view the evidence, it is difficult to see how it could be said that there was substantial evidence to support the decision made by the contracting officer and the head of the department in the face of the opposing evidence. What these administrative officials tried to do was to compute the amount of borrow material removed by the use of a method which had been made impossible of accurate application because of the slide which had occurred. It is true that the contract provided for the use of this method but only as a means of determining the amount of material removed for which the plaintiffs were to be paid. The real question was how much material had been removed. Not only were some of the original survey elevations wiped out but also substantial amounts of material came from outside into the area where the plaintiffs were working and from which material had been removed. These factors contributed to errors in comparing the original survey with the final survey for the purpose of a comparison of the material removed.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
127 F. Supp. 617, 130 Ct. Cl. 435, 1955 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 43, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/williams-v-united-states-cc-1955.