Wilco Floor Service, Inc. v. United States

197 Ct. Cl. 902, 1972 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 36, 1972 WL 20794
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMarch 17, 1972
DocketNo. 157-68
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 197 Ct. Cl. 902 (Wilco Floor Service, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wilco Floor Service, Inc. v. United States, 197 Ct. Cl. 902, 1972 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 36, 1972 WL 20794 (cc 1972).

Opinion

Per Curiam

: This case was referred to Trial Commissioner Louis Spector with directions to make findings of fact and recommendation for conclusions of law under the order of reference and Rule 134(h). The commissioner has done so in an opinion and report filed on July 22, 1971. Exceptions to the commissioner’s opinion, findings of fact and recommended conclusion of law were filed by plaintiff, defendant urged the court to enter judgment in accordance with the commissioner’s report and the case has been submitted to the [906]*906court on oral argument of counsel and the briefs of the parties. At the oral argument, plaintiff withdrew its exception to finding 111 and limited its claim to the five other categories listed in finding 95.

The court understands the trial commissioner’s report as appraising all the damages properly recoverable by plaintiff for defendant’s breach of the contracts of February 1,1963 and July 22,1963, not as automatically limiting the recovery to the amount contemplated by the July 22nd contract. After careful consideration, and with due regard to the weight to be given a trial commissioner’s findings, the court is unable to say that Commissioner Spector was wrong in his evaluation of the damages and the court places its decision on this paragraph as well as the commissioner’s report.

Since the court agrees with the commissioner’s opinion, findings of fact and recommended conclusion of law, as hereinafter set forth, it hereby adopts the same, together with the foregoing paragraph, as the basis for its judgment in this case. Therefore, plaintiff is entitled to recover $7,260 and judgment is entered for plaintiff in that amount.

OPINION OF COMMISSIONER

Spector, Commissioner: For a better understanding of the facts hereinafter summarized, it is necessary to explain at the outset that this unfortunate lawsuit appears to have resulted from the coming together of a small well-intentioned but unsophisticated contractor, and the TJ.S. Department of Labor at a time when the latter agency was also relatively unsophisticated in public contract procedures and in the general subject matter of the contracts hereafter described. Also lacking was a clear understanding by the parties of what was being procured.

This action for breach of contract has heretofore been the subject of an “Order of the Commissioner on the Issue of Plaintiff’s Entitlement to a Trial” filed May 13, 1969, and affirmed by the court July 3,1969. Thereafter, following pretrial proceedings in the course of which plaintiff’s prayer for relief was increased from $30,000 to $78,000, a trial of the issues was conducted commencing March 31, 1970. The find[907]*907ings of fact which follow were developed following that trial, and their examination is essential to an understanding of the “Ultimate Findings and Conclusions” and the “Becom-mended Conclusion of Law” appearing at the end thereof.

Based upon a full review of the record, and for the reasons set forth in the aforementioned “Ultimate Findings and Conclusions,” it has been determined that plaintiff is entitled to recover, that the amount of such recovery should be seven thousand two hundred sixty dollars ($7,260), and that judgment should be entered for plaintiff in that amount.

FINDINGS oe Fact

1. This is an action for breach of contract under the Tucker Act (28 U.S.C. § 1491), upon a “claim against the United States founded * * * upon any express or implied contract with the United States * * *.”

2. In its answer defendant interposed an affirmative defense to the effect that the U.S. Department of Labor had “rendered a decision on the matters arising out of the contract” and that it is “final and binding on the Court and the parties.” Alternatively, defendant asserted in its answer that “if and to the extent it should be deemed, for any reason whatsoever, that the aforesaid decision is not final and binding, and/or further evidentiary proceedings are required in this case, defendant avers that such further proceedings must be returned to the proper administrative body for resolution thereof and that in no case can there be de novo proceedings of any kind, or in any manner, in this Court; and that, in the event such administrative proceedings are deemed necessary, proceedings in this Court should be suspended and the matter returned to the administrative agency in order to permit further administrative proceedings to take place.”

3. On January 6, 1969, plaintiff petitioned the court for accelerated consideration of its case because it dated back to a contract or contracts executed in 1963, severe financial strain had ensued, and plaintiff’s Negro leadership had been unable to acquire sufficient financial backing to rehabilitate plaintiff.

4 Following a pretrial conference, it was concluded that counsel would file memoranda and briefs on the threshold [908]*908issues raised by tlie above-described affirmative defense interposed by defendant. For the purpose of resolving that threshold issue only, it was established that the parties had entered into a so-called “Contractual Agreement,” February 1,1963, hereinafter described in greater detail and referred to as the “February 1 agreement.” It was entered into following passage in late 1962 of the Manpower Development and Training Act, Public Law 87-415,76 Stat. 23, to develop a cooperative on-the-job training program (hereinafter OJT) for the hardcore unemployed. Under the agreement, plaintiff was to be paid “for reasonable and allowable training costs” incurred in the operation of the approved OJT project provided that “requests for payment shall be properly made and supported by the OJT Facility and that such costs are in conformity with the schedule of allowable costs contained hi the OJT Project Plan (s) attached hereto.”

5. The February 1 agreement does not contain the standard “Disputes” article generally found in Government contracts. Nor does it contain the standard clauses entitled “Suspension of Work” or “Termination for Convenience of the Government” found in many Government contracts. It did, however, contain the following paragraph :

III. This agreement may be amended by mutual consent. It may he sus fended or terminated by the OJT Facility upon 30 days notice to the Secretary or by the Secretary for cause if, after notice and opportunity to be heard, including an opportunity to demonstrate compliance and malee restitution, a determination of failure by the OJT Facility to adhere to the requirements of the Act or to the provisions of this agreement shall be made. [Emphasis supplied.]

6. In opposition to the above-described affirmative defense of defendant, plaintiff alleged that in reliance on its February 1 agreement, it mobilized personnel, materials, equipment, and space, organized itself, and disengaged from other business activities. On July 22,1963, the parties, in implementation of the February 1 agreement, entered into a further agreement (hereinafter called the “July 22 contract”) where-under, for the consideration of $7,260 plaintiff was to conduct a specific OJT project for 6 weeks from August 19, 1963 to [909]*909September 27, 1963. The consideration above-stated was presumably estimated because the July 22 contract lat'er provided that:

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Bluebook (online)
197 Ct. Cl. 902, 1972 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 36, 1972 WL 20794, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wilco-floor-service-inc-v-united-states-cc-1972.