Satellite Electric Company v. John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy

105 F.3d 1418, 41 Cont. Cas. Fed. 77,037, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1613, 1997 WL 33964
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
DecidedJanuary 30, 1997
Docket96-1135
StatusPublished
Cited by23 cases

This text of 105 F.3d 1418 (Satellite Electric Company v. John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Satellite Electric Company v. John H. Dalton, Secretary of the Navy, 105 F.3d 1418, 41 Cont. Cas. Fed. 77,037, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1613, 1997 WL 33964 (Fed. Cir. 1997).

Opinion

FRIEDMAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

The Eichleay formula is used to determine a government contractor’s damages reflecting unabsorbed home office overhead when the government delays work on the contract indefinitely but requires the contractor to remain available to resume work immediately on the government’s instruction. The Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals denied the contractor’s claim for Eichleay damages *1420 because the government had shown that the delay did not prevent the contractor from taking on additional work or reallocating its resources. We affirm.

I.

The Navy awarded the appellant Satellite Electric Company (“Satellite”) a contract to install a power supply system. Twice during the performance of the contract the Navy required Satellite to stop performance because of the Navy’s inability to provide two items that the contract required it to supply: batteries and an induction coil. The first period of suspension of work lasted 82 days, and the second period lasted 146 days. See Appeal of Satellite Elec. Co., A.S.B.C.A. No. 46935, 95-2 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶ 27,883 at 139,-084-085, 1995 WL 518722 (Aug. 29, 1995). Satellite was required to remain on “standby” during suspension of work, i.e., to be available to resume work promptly upon the government’s instruction. See Appeal of Satellite Elec., 95-2 B.C.A. at 139,089. Both suspensions of work occurred after Satellite had completed 96.7 percent of the contract.

Throughout the periods of suspension, Satellite bid on new contracts. Satellite bid on approximately 30 projects during the first period, and on 19 during the second period. Satellite obtained only two contracts. Satellite’s inability to obtain new contracts resulted partially from limitations in its bidding bond, unrelated to the contract, that restricted the number and type of contracts upon which it could bid, and partially from economic conditions that made it difficult to bid competitively for new contracts. See id.

As we describe in part II below, Eichleay damages are calculated by multiplying the daily amount of the contractor’s unabsorbed home office overhead allocated to the particular contract by the number of days for which work was suspended. After two evidentiary hearings, the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (Board) denied the contractor’s claim for Eichleay damages. See id. The Board held that Satellite had established the first two elements of the Eichleay formula: (1) “a government-imposed delay” and (2) the contractor being on “standby” status during that delay. “There is no question that appellant was on standby for a period of 228 days for delays attributable to the Government.” Id. The Board further held, however, that the government had carried its burden of rebutting that prima facie case by showing that “the contractor did not suffer or should not have suffered any loss because it was able to either reduce its overhead or take on other work during the delay.” Id. The Board ruled that the evidence on which Satellite relied “does not show an inability to take on additional work for any reason attributable to the Government” and that “[tjhere must be an impairment of a contractor’s ability to take on other work that is attributable to the Government-caused delay to be reimbursed for the period of delay under the Eichleay formula.” Id.

II.

A. In Eichleay Corp., A.S.B.C.A. No. 5183, 60-2 B.C.A. (CCH) ¶2688, 1960 WL 538 (July 29, 1960), aff'd on recons., 61-1 B.C.A. ¶ 2894, 1960 WL 684 (Dec. 27, 1960), the Board approved, as “a realistic method of allocation of continuing home office expenses” “incurred during a period of suspension of work” when it was not practical for the contractor to undertake the performance of other work which might absorb them, the following computation, which has become known as the Eichleay formula. It involves:

an allocation of the total recorded main office expense to the contract in the ratio of contract billings to total billings for the period of performance. The resulting determination of a contract allocation is divided into a daily rate, which is multiplied by the number of days of delay to arrive at the amount of the claim.

Eichleay, 60-2 B.C.A. at 13,574.

This court implicitly approved the Ei-chleay formula, apparently for the first time, in Capital Electric Co. v. United States, 729 F.2d 743 (Fed.Cir.1984), in which the General Services Board of Contract Appeals had rejected the formula. Since then this court has considered the Eichleay formula in a number of cases in which it has explained and developed the conditions for applying the formula. See, e.g., Interstate Gen. Gov’t Contractors v. *1421 West, 12 F.3d 1053 (Fed.Cir.1993); Wickham Contracting Co. v. Fischer, 12 F.3d 1574 (Fed.Cir.1994).

The three elements necessary to recover Eichleay damages are: (1) a government-imposed delay occurred; (2) the government required the contractor to “stand by” during the delay; and (3) while “standing by,” the contractor was unable to take on additional work. Interstate, 12 F.3d at 1056. In 1995, in Mech-Con Corp. v. West, 61 F.3d 883, 886 (Fed.Cir.1995), this court reaffirmed these elements but shifted the burden of production on the third element to the government:

[W]hen a contractor can show that the government required a contractor to remain on “standby” and the government imposed delay was “uncertain,” the contractor has established a prima facie case of entitlement to Eichleay formula damages. The burden then shifts to the government to present rebuttal evidence or argument showing that the contractor did not suffer or should not have suffered any loss because it was able to either reduce its overhead or take on other work during the delay.

Mech-Con, 61 F.3d at 886. Despite the shift in the burden of production, the contractor must nevertheless “establish ... (3) that it was unable to take on other work.” Altmayer v. Johnson, 79 F.3d 1129, 1133 (Fed.Cir.1996).

The court also has explained the rationale for the Eichleay formula. “Home office overhead costs are those [costs] that are expended for the benefit of the whole business, which by their nature cannot be attributed or charged to any particular contract.”

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105 F.3d 1418, 41 Cont. Cas. Fed. 77,037, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 1613, 1997 WL 33964, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/satellite-electric-company-v-john-h-dalton-secretary-of-the-navy-cafc-1997.