Commerce International Co. v. United States

167 Ct. Cl. 529
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedOctober 16, 1964
DocketNo. 287-55
StatusPublished
Cited by25 cases

This text of 167 Ct. Cl. 529 (Commerce International Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Commerce International Co. v. United States, 167 Ct. Cl. 529 (cc 1964).

Opinion

Davis, Judge,

delivered tbe opinion of the court:

This is a breach-of-contract suit charging defendant with unreasonable delay in supplying parts and drawings, and in failing to permit the prompt commercial purchase of parts when none were available in Government stores. Plaintiff is said to have suffered over $1,650,000 in damages because of defendant’s improper delay.1

In 1950, the Army prepared to let a contract for the rebuilding of some 50O' M36 90mm. motor gun carriages (tanks) which were believed needed to meet the emergency of the Korean hostilities. The vehicles were in a poor state, having been left in the open since World War II. Plaintiff had had some previous experience in rebuilding tanks and was one of five companies asked to submit bids. As plaintiff’s representative, Mr. Ambrose Cates (who had been in charge of the earlier “rebuild” operations) spent two weeks at Rock Island Arsenal, in Illinois, inspecting some of the M36 tanks located there, meeting with Army representatives, and familiarizing himself with the work in order to prepare a bid; the contract specifications were not yet completed. Agents of the other companies did the same. Four concerns submitted bids on November 30,1950, and plaintiff was found to be the low bidder. A pre-award survey was made, by Army officials acompanied by Cates, of the facilities at Cramp Shipyard (at Philadelphia) which plaintiff had an option to sublease and where it proposed to perform. The [533]*533report made to the Government confirmed the suitability of the premises for conducting the “rebuild” operation and plaintiff received a notice of award dated December 28,1950. The contract was not formally executed until sometime in March 1951.

Although the specifications had still not been fully readied at the time of the award, the notice directed plaintiff to proceed with the work “in order that the delivery schedule outlined in your proposal may be strictly maintained.” The contract called for the rebuilding of 581 M36 tanks to be delivered by the contractor to the Government in accordance with the following schedule:2

April 1951_ 75
May 1951_100
June 1951_100
July 1951_125
August 1951_125
September 1951_ 56

Among other things, the Government was to supply reconditioned engines and 90mm. guns for all of the tanks. In addition, at the contractor’s written request, the Government was to furnish, “to the extent available from its existing stores,” parts and materials “which have been declared unserviceable by the Contracting Officer or which after inspection were found to be missing from the vehicles.” If such replacement items could not be furnished, the contractor, when directed by the Contracting Officer in writing, was to manufacture or purchase the parts and would be reimbursed its actual costs in an aggregate not exceeding $500,000.3 There was also the normal clause permitting extensions of time if the Government’s failure to supply parts and materials caused delay in the work.

At the outset of performance, in early January 1951, plaintiff had basically to start from scratch in organizing an operational physical plant and production line. It had a nucleus of only three men (management or administrative [534]*534personnel) in Philadelphia and had yet to hire a full complement of administrative and production employees. It also had to exercise its option on the Cramp Shipyard facilities and to prepare the premises for receiving and storing tanks, parts, and equipment.- All of this plaintiff says was accomplished in time to complete the rebuilding on schedule were it not for government-caused delays. Completion, originally set for September 1951, did not come until September 1952.4 From December 28,1950 (notice of award) to December 15, 1951,5 plaintiff finished the rebuilding of 261 tanks; then, because the Government could not for a time supply further engines and guns, the work was suspended until March 15, 1952; operations resumed thereafter and were continued in an orderly and prompt fashion. This history of performance is divided by the parties into three periods. The “first phase” was from January 1951 until suspension; then came the “suspension period” (from December 15, 1951, until March 15, 1952); finally, there was the “second phase” from March 15, 1952, until completion in September 1952. Plaintiff makes no claim for delay (or other damages) during the second phase (except that which may have been an after-effect of the three-month suspension from December 15,1961, to March 15, 1952). Defendant, on its part, does not contest liability for damages during the suspension period. The main battleground is the first phase, during which plaintiff claims, and defendant denies, that undue Government delay caused the considerable loss which the contractor incurred on this contract.

This claim has not been administratively considered on its merits. Although plaintiff did apply to the Contracting Officer for compensation, the claim was denied without any consideration on the ground that it was outside agency jurisdiction as a demand for unliquidated damages. Plaintiff’s petition was then filed in this court, the case tried, the Trial Commissioner’s findings reported, and the briefs and exceptions filed, without any objection by the defendant to the [535]*535trial and determination of the case in this court and without any suggestion of the need for administrative proceedings. After the filing of the Commissioner’s report and of all the exceptions and briefs, but 'before the oral argument, the defendant for the first time moved for a stay to permit the parties to have the issues determined administratively, citing United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709 (1963). Plaintiff opposed the motion and it was denied (before argument) without prejudice. The point was again raised at the argument. We reject it. Whatever might have been the defendant’s right to seek administrative determination of the facts if the issue had been timely raised, we hold, as we have before, that in this case defendant waived any such right by making its first move too late. WPC Enterprises Inc. v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 1, 8, 323 F. 2d 874, 878 (1963); Stein Bros. Mfg. Co. v. United States, 162 Ct. Cl. 802, 805-7, 337 F. 2d 861, 862-63 (1963); Wingate Construction Co. v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 131, 139 (1964).

As the case comes to us, the overriding issue is whether defendant should be held responsible for expenses said to have been caused plaintiff by the alleged failure of the Government, during the first phase of performance (December 28, 1950-December 15, 1951), to be reasonably prompt in (i) furnishing parts available from Government stores, (ii) making known its inability to supply such parts so that plaintiff could procure them elsewhere, (iii) furnishing drawings necessary for such outside procurement of parts, and (iv) facilitating such outside procurement. It is settled, of course, that mere delay, per se, incident to the Government’s making work or material available to a contractor is not compensable, in a claim for breach of contract, without a specific warranty.

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Bluebook (online)
167 Ct. Cl. 529, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/commerce-international-co-v-united-states-cc-1964.