Hargrave v. United States

130 F. Supp. 598, 132 Ct. Cl. 73, 1955 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 132
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedApril 5, 1955
DocketNo. 48899
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 130 F. Supp. 598 (Hargrave v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hargrave v. United States, 130 F. Supp. 598, 132 Ct. Cl. 73, 1955 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 132 (cc 1955).

Opinion

LaRamoke, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs’ petition is filed in two counts; the first count alleging a Lucas Act1 claim, and the second count claiming damages for breach of contract arising from an airport construction project at Enid, Oklahoma.

The second amended petition herein was signed by F. M. Hargrave, d/b/a Hargrave Construction Company, for use and benefit of L. B. Fugitt and Carroll Johnston d/b/a Kanotex Construction Company, and two surety companies. Hargrave has no financial interest in any of the claims made.

[76]*76On March 26,1943, Hargrave entered into a contract with the United States to furnish materials and perform certain construction work at the site of the Enid, Oklahoma, Municipal Airport. This field was to be used by the Air Force as a military field and the construction work included grading, paving, drainage facilities, the building of one new runway, and the lengthening of the other two existing runways, as well as the construction of several taxiways. On March 23,1943, two days before he signed the prime contract, Hargrave entered into subcontracts with A. J. Spicer, sole trader, d/b/a Kanotex Construction Company, for the performance of the work under four items of the contract including the grading, removing and stockpiling of existing blended rock asphalt wearing course, removal of existing gravel base course, laying selected material, and the gravel base course. Fugitt and Johnston were in no way parties to this contract.

Shortly after Spicer entered into subcontracts with Har-grave, Spicer entered into a partnership agreement with Fugitt and Johnston. Spicer contributed his subcontract to this partnership. However, within a few weeks Spicer left the partnership and the subcontract work was from that time all carried out by Fugitt and Johnston, and neither Har-grave nor the defendant was informed that Spicer was not interested in the said subcontract. Hargrave was never informed by Spicer, either orally or in writing, that Spicer had assigned his subcontract to Fugitt and Johnston.

The subcontract work was completed on November 13, 1943, and final payment was signified by a release executed August 12,1944, which reserved Kanotex’s claim. There is no evidence that Fugitt and Johnston have ever asserted any claim or suit against Hargrave.

Ooumb 1

Upon the close of plaintiffs’ proof relative to count 1, defendant moved pursuant to Kule 49 (b)2 for a dismissal of that count on the ground that plaintiffs had never made a valid request for relief under the Lucas Act, supra. The [77]*77commissioner of this court made detailed findings of fact and filed a report recommending that defendant’s motion be granted. On the basis of those findings (11 through 21) and our review of the record, we accept the recommendation of the commissioner and dismiss plaintiffs’ claims under count 1 of the petition on the ground that plaintiffs had never filed with the appropriate department a valid request for relief under the Lucas Act, supra. Throughout all negotiations, plaintiffs believed and asserted that the Government, as of right, owed them the amounts claimed. Recovery under the Lucas Act requires that the written request for relief must be such as to apprise the Government that the claim being made was one for extralegal relief outside of any contractual obligation. Fogarty v. United States, 340 U. S. 8; Lawrance Aeronautical Corporation v. United States, 127 C. Cls. 714. Plaintiffs have not met that requirement.

Count %

Under plaintiffs’ breach of contract count, plaintiffs allege five breaches by the Government. For the purpose of this opinion we will refer to each alleged breach separately.

The first is for damages for delay allegedly caused by the Government’s refusal to set stakes for two weeks at the beginning of the contract work.

The record shows that Mr. Russell, dirt foreman for Kanotex, “admitted Kanotex was not delayed because of lack of stakes.”

Section 1-17 (b) of the specifications provided that the Government would furnish “limit marks reasonably necessary for the conduct of the work,” and further provided:

The contractor shall exercise proper precaution to verify the figures shown on the drawings before laying out any part of the work, and will be held responsible for any errors therein that might have been avoided. He shall promptly inform the contracting officer of any errors or discrepancies he may discover in the drawings and specifications, in order that the proper corrections may be made.

Pursuant to these provisions the Government sent a survey party to the site “about two weeks before the prime contract was let to Hargrave” so that “grading cuts and fills” could [78]*78be measured as provided for in the specifications. Wfien the Goverment’s surveyors were about half finished with their cross sectioning, a Mr. Hill, also a surveyor, and a representative of Kanotex arrived on the site to check the elevations for the plaintiffs. He found little or no discrepancies between the results of his work and those obtained by the defendant’s survey party and, after working and checking for about 10 days, Mr. Hill accepted the defendant’s results. These actions were, thus, in strict conformance with the contract specifications.

On the question of whether plaintiffs were “delayed about two weeks by the defendant’s refusal to set grading stakes,” the evidence shows that the fact is that stakes were not set because it took Mr. Hill that long to check and accept the results of defendant’s survey party. Kanotex had a right to send Hill to the site to check the defendant’s survey results, but this action was taken for the convenience and benefit of Kanotex, and it is not established that defendant’s actions delayed the plaintiffs to any appreciable extent or caused them any damage.

The defendant’s survey party finished its cross sectioning April 2, 1943, while Hill did not leave the site until after that date.

Thus, if there was a delay it was caused by the action of plaintiff Kanotex and not the defendant, and plaintiffs are not entitled to recover on this item of the claim.

The second claim is for overhaul resulting from excess grading not shown on the original plans.

On June 14, 1943, a change order entitled “Modification No. 1” was issued, under article 3 of the prime contract, ordering that the “performance of the work” be adjusted or revised so as to give effect to new grading plans which showed the increased excavation. There was no reference in the modification to payment for overhaul on account of any excess grading. Instead the modification expressly stated that “it is further understood and agreed that all other terms and conditions of said contract shall be and remain the same.” The effect of this language was to provide payment at only the contract price of $0.342 for the excess excavation. This modification, with its absence of any provision for pay[79]*79ment for overhaul, would normally be conclusive except that plaintiff insists that Modification No. 1 was not accepted and signed until the area engineer stated that signing it would not jeopardize the pending claim for overhaul.

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Bluebook (online)
130 F. Supp. 598, 132 Ct. Cl. 73, 1955 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 132, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hargrave-v-united-states-cc-1955.