Kremer v. United States

88 F. Supp. 740, 116 Ct. Cl. 358, 1950 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 91
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedMarch 6, 1950
DocketNo. 47373
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 88 F. Supp. 740 (Kremer v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Kremer v. United States, 88 F. Supp. 740, 116 Ct. Cl. 358, 1950 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 91 (cc 1950).

Opinion

JONES, Chief Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a suit for damages in connection with a construction contract.

The Kremer Construction Company, a partnership, under date of July 15,1942, entered into a contract with the defendant to furnish the materials and perform the work for construction of Artillery Booster Load Lines “It” and “S” at the Sangamon Ordnance Plant, Illiopolis, Illinois. For convenience the partnership will be referred to as plaintiff, notwithstanding the death of one of the partners, and the joining of his wife, the executrix of his estate, as one of the parties.

The lines were to be units consisting of 13 buildings each. The cost was to be $408,000, which was increased by change orders in the sum of $24,518.

The buildings varied from a gate house, which was a one-room guard shelter, to a building 61'6" x 60'.

There were at the time several other similar alphabetical lines that had been and were being constructed by other companies. Notice to proceed with the work on Line S was given on July 18,1942, and on Line B on August 1,1942.

There were some extensions of time and the lines were completed within the specified period as extended.

Some of the other construction companies had already completed similar contracts prior to the time plaintiff’s construction began. Others were constructing them at the same time, and one contract was begun subsequent to the beginning of plaintiff’s contract.

The work was to be conducted under the general direction of the James Stewart Corporation and Fugard, Olsen, Ur-bain and Neiler, Architect-Engineer-Manager, hereinafter referred to as the AEM, as representative of the contracting officer.

First claim: Prior to bidding on the project, the contractor had written AEM, on July 6, 1942, asking for drawings showing the plans for mechanical work.1 It also made an [379]*379oral request after the execution of the contract, but such plans were never furnished. Lay-out drawings of Lines E and S were furnished to the contractor. They indicated main water lines and water installations entirely surrounding the E and S areas with a single entrance to each building. The defendant’s assigned reason for not furnishing the mechanical drawings was that plaintiff’s contract did not call for mechanical construction and as this was a war manufacturing enterprise it was necessary to withhold such plans for security reasons.

Other contractors were digging trenches in various parts of the area involved. The usual procedure is to open the trenches progressively, install the services promptly and backfill promptly so that the work of the contractors may be coordinated so as not to interfere unduly with each other.

On the question of whether this was done the testimony is conflicting. The trenches were six to eight feet from the buildings and at many points the dirt as excavated was thrown toward rather than away from the building. During the time the trench work was in progress and before the completion of the mechanical installations a strike was called by the mechanical men, including steamfitters and plumbers. The strike lasted about two weeks, during which time the trenches were open, some of them remaining open for some time thereafter.

The contractor made complaint to superintendents or foremen supervising the trench work and also to the contracting officer and the AEM that the trench work was interfering with its work. On the other hand, the defendant made numerous complaints that the contractor’s work was not being adequately supervised and that it was not properly manned with labor.

The specifications provided that the contractor should receive the concrete in an accessible location in hoppers which were to be provided by the contractor. There was considerable discussion between the contractor and the AEM as to whether the concrete was delivered at such locations as could be considered accessible, and also as to whether the method of digging the trenches and piling up the dirt interfered unreasonably with the contractor’s work.

There is no doubt the contractor’s work was made more [380]*380difficult by this condition. It was compelled, in addition to the concrete, to unload a considerable amount of other building material, such as lumber, trusses, siding and roofing beyond the trenches and haul them over as needed alongside the building where such materials were to be used.

However, the record fails completely to show how much additional labor the contractor was obliged to obtain on account of transporting materials across the trenches on runways instead of by trucks, or what amount of additional expense the contractor incurred because of the open trenches.

Since the contractor had visited the site it had knowledge that other contract work, both of the kind which it was doing and mechanical work as well, was to be done during the same period, and it is doubtful under the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United States v. Foley, 329 U. S. 64, whether plaintiff would be entitled to recover even if it had been able to show definitely what damages and expenses had been caused by the work of the other contractors. However, it is not necessary to determine this point since the testimony offered in proof of the amount of damages, if any, is wholly insufficient.

It may be added that this work was done in the early part of the war when conditions militated against the contractor as well as against the Government in its effort to carry out the over-all war preparations.

Second claim: The second part of plaintiff’s petition involves a claim for damages for delays which it alleges the Government caused.

In the first place, the contractor claimed that it was delayed by the failure of the defendant to promptly provide the location for the buildings to be constructed. The contract drawings did not show the exact location for the buildings. It was necessary that the contractor be furnished a bench mark and location lines before it could commence work. Prior to signing the contract Mr. Kremer, the contractor’s representative, was on the site with the construction superintendent of AEM who informed Mr. Kremer that the necessary locations would be given within a day or two.

On July 18,1942, the defendant gave the contractor notice to proceed. The contractor had its superintendent on the site July 20,1942, prepared to proceed with the work. However, [381]*381the locations were not furnished to the contractor until July 25,1942, a delay of six days during which time the contractor was prevented from proceeding with the foundation work for the buildings.

The contractor made written request for a six-day extension of the time for completion, which the contracting officer denied, but which on appeal was allowed.

The record does not disclose whether the contractor had any men other than the superintendent of construction on the job during that six-day period.

There was also a claim for delay in the furnishing of reinforcing steel. The contractor made request on the defendant for such steel for the building foundations. The defendant did not have the steel on hand and there was material delay before it was received by the contractor.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Lichter v. Mellon-Stuart Company
193 F. Supp. 216 (W.D. Pennsylvania, 1961)
Hargrave v. United States
130 F. Supp. 598 (Court of Claims, 1955)
Dubois Const. Corp. v. United States
98 F. Supp. 590 (Court of Claims, 1951)
Long v. United States
102 F. Supp. 134 (D. Montana, 1951)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
88 F. Supp. 740, 116 Ct. Cl. 358, 1950 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 91, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/kremer-v-united-states-cc-1950.