Oliver-Finnie Co. v. United States

150 Ct. Cl. 189
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJune 8, 1960
DocketNo. 473-53
StatusPublished
Cited by24 cases

This text of 150 Ct. Cl. 189 (Oliver-Finnie Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Oliver-Finnie Co. v. United States, 150 Ct. Cl. 189 (cc 1960).

Opinion

LaRamoee, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This action arises out of a contract between the plaintiff and the Army Quartermaster Corps, involving the assembly of combat rations (hereinafter referred to as C rations) for the Armed Forces during the Korean conflict. Plaintiff seeks damages under alternative theories of breach of contract, or termination of the original written contract giving rise to an implied contract. The defendant has counterclaimed for the value of certain Government-furnished components allegedly lost or damaged by the plaintiff during the performance of the contract in excess of contract tolerances.

After a protracted trial, a commissioner of this court has submitted 171 findings of fact to the court, to which the plaintiff has briefly excepted, and to which the defendant has filed voluminous exceptions. The trial transcript is 2,883 pages long, and there are over 200 exhibits in this case. To discuss each exception in this opinion would require an unwarranted expenditure of time and printing expense. We have, however, carefully considered each exception presented by an exhaustive study of the exception in light of the testimony and exhibits, and we conclude that the trial commissioner’s findings are almost fully supported by the evidence. Where an exception was deemed to be well taken, either in whole or in part, the finding was accordingly changed.

On April 26, 1951, plaintiff entered into a contract with the defendant, as of April 4, 1951, whereby it was to receive $347,633 for assembling 4,420,000 C rations, using components and packaging materials, substantially all of which were to be furnished by defendant. The Government entered into independent contracts with various manufacturers and suppliers relative to these components and items. At about the same time plaintiff’s contract was awarded, similar contracts, under the same procurement directive, were awarded to some six other firms. In all, 38 million rations were to be assembled under the directive.

[192]*192The delivery schedule provided for the delivery of 20 percent of the completed rations on or before June 30,1951, and 20 percent monthly thereafter, to and including October 1951.

The Government-furnished property (hereinafter referred to as GFP) was scheduled for delivery to the contractor’s plant at 12yz percent on or before May 20, 1951, and. 1214 percent semimonthly thereafter until September 5, 1951. By June 5,1951, almost one-third of all components required for assembly under plaintiff’s contract had been shipped to plaintiff by the Government suppliers.

On June 5, 1951, the contracting officer, pursuant to instructions from Washington, sent plaintiff the following “stop-order.”

Bequest that no action be taken to begin final assembly until further notice. Sub-assemblies can be started when you desire.

On June 15, 1951, plaintiff was advised that the tentative earliest starting date for final assembly would be July 16. On July 9, plaintiff was authorized to commence final assembly on July 16.

On July 10,1951, the plaintiff wrote the contracting officer giving notice of a claim for adjustment and advising that such claim would be submitted as soon as costs were ascertainable. No price adjustment was agreed upon during the performance of the work.

On January 7, 1952, prior to the completion of the C ration assembly, the plaintiff submitted to the contracting officer a claim for $144,233.30 as increased costs resulting from the delay of 56 days by the stop-order, and the defective components furnished by the Government. On April 25, 1952, plaintiff submitted its revised claim for $448,270.01 with detailed schedules covering excess costs claimed.

On July 20, 1953, plaintiff filed its petition in this court. Eleven days later, the successor contracting officer issued his findings of fact, and thereafter plaintiff filed a perfunctory appeal to the Secretary of the Army, but took no action on this appeal.

A more detailed account of the facts relative to each facet of the case will appear in context. The questions [193]*193presented in the case are: (1) Whether the stop-order of June 5, 1951, was justified under the circumstances; (2) Whether the stop-order was a termination in whole or in part of the contract, or whether it constituted a breach of the original contract.; (3) If plaintiff is entitled to recover, should recovery be based on its theory of termination and implied contract, or on its theory of breach of contract; (4) Whether the plaintiff has failed to exhaust its administrative remedies; (5) Whether plaintiff is liable to defendant on the counterclaims; (6) Whether the decision of the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals on the infestation claim is supported by substantial evidence, and whether the evidence adduced at the trial de novo here substantially supports that determination; (7) If plaintiff is entitled to recover, in what amount and on which items should recovery be granted.

It is clear, and the defendant admits as much at page 11 of its brief, that if the stop-order was unjustified, it was a breach of the contract and plaintiff is entitled to such damages as flowed from it.

The procurement directive pursuant to which plaintiff’s contract was let, was issued on February 13,1951. The contract was dated April 26,1951, and entered into as of April 4, 1951.

The first delivery was to be made by the plaintiff on or before June 30. The delivery of components began to arrive at plaintiff’s plant by the end of April 1951. By June 5, 1951, almost one-third of all components required for assembly under plaintiff’s contract had been shipped by suppliers under contracts with the Chicago Depot Quartermaster’s Purchasing Division. By this date, substantial shipments (38 percent of the overall meat components) had been made for 10 of the 11 items of canned meat components specified in the contract. The only meat component that had not been shipped was hamburgers and gravy. The first shipment of this item wras made July 16, and was not received until July 25.

On June 2, 1951, the following telegram was sent from the Office of the Quartermaster Corps in Washington to the [194]*194Chicago Quartermaster Depot, through which the contract in question had been let:

Confirming instructions given this date to Colonel Hirschhorn and Captain Brines. Due to difficulties in procurement of canned meats and the inability of this office to effect an immediate solution for the supply thereof, it is desired that you take immediate action to reset the assembly program for operational rations so as to begin on or about 16 July. The date to be variable as found best suited to the supply of components. If adequate arrangements can be concluded in the near future for the supply of operational meats you will be advised accordingly. Colonel Hirschhorn has been furnished with data regarding supply position of the QMC with regard to operational rations. Purpose of furnishing this data is to assure you that at present ample supplies are on hand to meet commitments for the immediate future. General Feldman and Colonel Hollis have approved the above plan.

The stop-order was issued pursuant to the above telegram. There was, in fact, no shortage of slaughter cattle during the period of plaintiff’s contract. The Army did not procure any of the meat for canners who were supplying the canned meat components for plaintiff’s contract.

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Bluebook (online)
150 Ct. Cl. 189, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/oliver-finnie-co-v-united-states-cc-1960.