United States v. Smith & Co.

12 Ct. Cust. 384, 1924 WL 26617, 1924 CCPA LEXIS 95
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedNovember 28, 1924
DocketNo. 2322
StatusPublished
Cited by42 cases

This text of 12 Ct. Cust. 384 (United States v. Smith & Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
United States v. Smith & Co., 12 Ct. Cust. 384, 1924 WL 26617, 1924 CCPA LEXIS 95 (ccpa 1924).

Opinion

Hatfield, Judge,

delivered tbe opinion of the court:

The merchandise involved in this appeal consists of embroidered fiouncings or embroideries in the form of fiouncings.

The case was submitted to the Board of General Appraisers on the record, the appraiser’s report, and a stipulation entered into by counsel.

The invoice describes the-merchandise as “embroidered cotton cloth.”

[385]*385The appraiser's report reads as follows:

The merchandise in question consists of embroideries in the form of insertings, allovers, edgings, flouncings, etc., composed of cotton. It was returned for duty at 90 per cent ad valorem under the eo nomine provision for such merchandise in paragraph 1430 of the act of 1922.

The pertinent part of the stipulation reads as follows:

It is hereby stipulated and agreed between counsel that the sample herewith marked “20” correctly represents the merchandise invoiced as “embroidered cotton cloth,” including the width of the merchandise as imported, and that same may be received in evidence and marked “Exhibit 1.” * * *

The question presented by the record for consideration by this court involves the construction of paragraph 1430 of the tariff act of 1922, to determine whether embroideries in the form of flouncings or embroidered flouncings are properly classifiable as “flouncings” under the first part of that paragraph, or as “embroideries not specially provided for,” or “fabrics or articles embroidered in any manner,” in the latter part thereof.

Paragraph 1430 of the tariff act of 1922 reads as follows:

Pae. 1430. Laces, lace window curtains, burnt-out laces and embroideries capable of conversion into burnt-out laces, nets and nettings, embroidered or otherwise, veils, veilings, flouncings, all-overs, neck rufflings, flutings, quillings, ruchings, tuckings, insertings, galloons, edgings, trimmings, fringes, gimps, ornaments; braids, loom woven and ornamented in the process of weaving, or made by hand, or on any braid machine, knitting machine or lace machine; and all fabrics and articles composed in any part, however small, of any of the foregoing fabrics or articles; all the foregoing, finished or unfinished (except materials and articles provided for in paragraphs 920, 1006, 1404, 1406, and 1424 of this Act), by whatever name known, and to whatever use applied, and whether or not named, described, or provided for elsewhere in this act, when composed wholly or in chief value of yarns, threads, filaments, tinsel wire, lame, bullions, metal threads, beads, bugles, spangles, or products of cellulose provided for in paragraph 1213 of this Act, 90 per centum ad valorem; embroideries not specially provided for, and all fabrics and articles embroidered in any manner by hand or machinery, whether with a plain or fancy initial, monogram, or otherwise, or tamboured, appliqued, scalloped, or ornamented with beads, bugles, or spangles, or from which threads have been omitted, drawn, punched, or cut, and with threads introduced after weaving to finish or ornament the openwork, not including straight hemstitching; all the foregoing, finished or unfinished, by whatever name known, and to whatever use applied, and whether or not named, described, or provided for elsewhere in this Act when composed wholly or in chief value of yarns, threads, filaments, tinsel wire, lame, bullions, metal threads, beads, bugles, spangles, or products of cellulose provided for in paragraph 1213, 75 per centum ad valorem.

The Government contends that the eo nomine provision for “flouncings,” contained in the first part of paragraph. 1430, supra, is more specific than the provision for “embroideries not specially provided for, and all fabrics and articles embroidered in any manner” contained in the latter part of the paragraph, and that the mer[386]*386chandise is therefore properly dutiable under the eo nomine provision for flouncings at 90 per cent ad valorem.

The importers contend that the special provision in the first part of the paragraph for “embroideries capable of conversion into burnt-out laces,” and the modifying clause “embroidered or otherwise” applying specially to “nets and nettings,” and to no other article or fabric enumerated therein, exclude all other embroideries and embroidered articles and fabrics therefrom, under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

It is claimed that the merchandise is described in the latter part of the paragraph by the language “embroideries not specially provided for,” and “ all fabrics and articles embroidered in any manner.”

It is denied by the importers that the question of relative specificity is involved in the case, for the reason that embroidered flouncings are not covered by the first part of the paragraph. However, should it be determined that the question of relative specificity is involved in the case, the importers contend that the merchandise is more aptly and specifically described in the latter part of paragraph 1430, supra, by the provisions for “embroideries not specially provided for” and “all fabrics and articles embroidered in any manner” * * *.

The Board of General Appraisers held that the merchandise was more specifically provided for in the latter part of paragraph 1430, supra, by the language “all fabrics and articles embroidered in any manner, * * * by whatever name known,” and were properly dutiable at 75 per cent ad valorem.

It is an established policy in tariff legislation and one usually adhered to by Congress in enacting tariff schedules, that articles of luxury shall be subjected to higher rates of duty than those articles classed as necessary to the ordinary comforts of life; that more expensive articles of the same class, that is, those in a more advanced state of manufacture, shall be subjected to higher rates of duty, than those less advanced. —Movius v. Arthur (95 U. S. 144, 147); United States v. Riggs (203 U. S. 136); United States v. Wells, Fargo & Co. (1 Ct. Cust. Appls. 158, 164, 165; T. D. 31211).

In the construction of a statute and in the interpretation of the words and phrases therein, this policy should be considered, together with other rules of statutory construction, the ultimate purpose being to ascertain the legislative intent.

It has been said in effect by this court, that where language used to express the legislative intent warrants an interpretation entirely in accord with such policy, it should receive such an interpretation.—United States v. Grasselli Chemical Co. (5 Ct. Cust. Appls. 320, 322; T. D. 34527).

That Congress has authority to make exceptions to such policy is evident, and where language is used which will not warrant an inter[387]*387pretation in accord with, the usual policy governing tariff legislation, obviously it should not receive "such an interpretation. We may assume that Congress, acting upon information considered by it sufficient, which may not be available to this court, intended to make an exception to such general policy.

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12 Ct. Cust. 384, 1924 WL 26617, 1924 CCPA LEXIS 95, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/united-states-v-smith-co-ccpa-1924.