Pippy v. Winslow

125 P. 298, 62 Or. 219, 1912 Ore. LEXIS 134
CourtOregon Supreme Court
DecidedJuly 9, 1912
StatusPublished
Cited by32 cases

This text of 125 P. 298 (Pippy v. Winslow) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Oregon Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pippy v. Winslow, 125 P. 298, 62 Or. 219, 1912 Ore. LEXIS 134 (Or. 1912).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Bean

delivered the opinion of the court.

The contract contains 12 articles and refers to 151 specifications which are made a part thereof. These specifications were prepared in the city of San Francisco by J. E. Kafft, architect. As the materials manufactured in Portland differed in style and size from that in the former city where the plans were drawn, changes therein were necessitated. Therefore 27 alterations were agreed upon and attached as addenda to the specifications. After-wards numerous other alterations in the building were agreed to. Some were made by the contractors and approved by the owner and his architect. In regard to others there is" contention. In fact, the plans were changed to such an extent that they became of little value as a guide in the performance of the work. To begin with, they were something like a ready-made suit of clothes which does not fit. The owner of the building was an old, experienced contractor and carpenter and understood that part of the construction. No doubt he could express orally what he desired, better than in writing. In discussing the changes, as the work progressed, there were sometimes misunderstandings as to [222]*222what the owner directed. The record contains 860 pages of typewritten testimony and 43 exhibits. Apparently the circuit court heard the testimony with very careful attention. Experts were called, who examined the building and enlightened the court with their knowledge and experience. After a hearing of some length, the court allowed $252.90 of the $412.40 claimed, for extra labor and materials, deducted the sum of $189.20 for defective work and materials, and rendered a decree in favor of plaintiffs for $5,406.70 with interest, $250 attorney’s fees, and $1.60 for recording the lien. The defendant claims that he was damaged in the sum of $3,919.15 on account of the defects and failure to construct the building according to the contract, and furthermore that plaintiffs are not entitled to a lien.

The voluminous record and the many items in dispute render it impracticable to refer in detail to each matter. The controversy reminds us of a case involving domestic difficulties. About the last of August, when the building was advanced as far as the plastering, the contractors and the owner quarreled in regard to the construction of the front porch columns. Since that time the difficulties and differences have apparently increased. We approach the solution of this difficult question having in mind the following general rules.

1. The substantial performance of a contract like the one in question permits only such omissions and deviations as are inadvertent and unintentional, are not due to bad faith, do not impair the structure as a whole, can be conveniently remedied, and may, without injustice, be paid for by deductions from the contract price.

2. Where the contractor fails to perform a considerable part of the work required by the contract, his failure, irrespective of whether his intentions were good or bad, constitutes a bar to his enforcement of a lien for the work performed. If the defects show that the contractor per[223]*223formed the work in a slovenly and improper manner, not conforming substantially with the plans and specifications and thereby defeating the intentions of the parties to have the work done in a particular manner, the contractor, unless there has been a waiver, cannot enforce a lien. The willful omission, though in an unimportant respect, will preclude the assertion of a lien by him. The spirit of the contract should be faithfully observed, though the letter thereof fail. 20 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law (2 ed.) 367; Glacius v. Black, 50 N. Y. 145 (10 Am. Rep. 449) ; Anderson v. Petereit, 86 Hun 600 (33 N. Y. Supp. 741) ; Perry v. Quaekenbush, 105 Cal. 299 (38 Pac. 740).

3. In a suit by a contractor to enforce a mechanic’s lien, the burden of proof is upon him to show a substantial compliance with the contract, as modified and changed from time to time. Adams v. MacKenzie, 59 Or. 89 (114 Pac. 460).

4. A court of equity, in adjusting such differences, should be governed mainly by consideration of right and justice between the parties. It cannot disregard legal right but must follow the law. It may, however, allow something for what is deemed insufficient work, while granting a decree for the amount found equitably due. Heberlin v. Wendt, 99 Ill. App. 506; Burn v. Whittlesey, 2 MacArthur (D. C.), 189.

5. Under the circumstances of this case, that part of the building which passed under the inspection of Mr. Winslow, the owner, and Mr. Tobey, the architect, and was approved by them in good faith, expressly or by implication, was not open to objection by them after-wards, and plaintiffs may recover therefor. Vanderhoof v. Shell, 42 Or. 578, 587 (72 Pac. 126) ; Wildey v. Fractional School District Number 1 of Paw Paw and Antwerp, 25 Mich. 419. Mr. Winslow, being a contractor of many years’ experience, practically superintended the [224]*224construction for some time, and under such circumstances, the right of objection should have been exercised promptly. Ashland Lime, Salt & Cement Company v. Shores, 105 Wis. 122 (81 N. W. 136).

6. When the architect is, by the building contract, made the sole arbiter between the parties of matters concerning the material and character of the work, has knowledge of such, and does not object at the time, it will be an approval of the same, which cannot be renounced to the injury of the contractors. The exercise of his judgment on such matters will be binding on both parties in the absence of fraud being pleaded and proved. Wright v. Meyer (Tex.) 25 S. W. 1122.

7. Where the owner orders changes made in the construction of a building, although the contract provides that no extra work shall be allowed except on a written order, if such work be done at the instance of the owner, for which a benefit is derived, it must be regarded as an independent contract for which a recovery may be had. Escott & Son v. White, 10 Bush (Ky.) 169; Baum v. Covert, 62 Miss. 113.

8. A written contract may be changed verbally at the pleasure of the parties to the agreement. Cooke v. Murphy, 70 Ill. 96; Munroe v. Perkins, 9 Pick. (Mass.) 298 (20 Am. Dec. 475).

9. It is asserted by plaintiffs that Mr. Winslow, in the early part of the work, stated that there would be some changes in the plans and specifications which would be met with a “give and take” on both sides, and that it was under this arrangement that several of the changes were made for which there was no additional charge by the contractors and no allowance made to the owner. They also assert that defendant was a nervous wreck' and hard to please. It appears that he had retired from business.

Referring to some of the testimony in regard to the substantial completion of the building, Mr. W. F. Tobey, [225]

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Pacific Erectors, Inc. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.
655 P.2d 613 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1982)
B & D Investment Corp. v. Petticord
617 P.2d 276 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1980)
Welch v. Webb
615 P.2d 391 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1980)
Gates v. Boothby
596 P.2d 579 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1979)
Sutherlin Fabrication Co. v. Lincoln Construction Co.
588 P.2d 36 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1978)
American Petrofina Co. of Texas v. D & L Oil Supply, Inc.
583 P.2d 521 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1978)
Ralph Allen, Inc. v. Lumpkin
566 P.2d 872 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1977)
Devlin v. Milwaukee Covenant Church
557 P.2d 647 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1976)
Heinkel v. City of Corvallis
510 P.2d 579 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1973)
Shepherd v. Gass
488 P.2d 1180 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1971)
Mathis v. Thunderbird Village, Inc.
389 P.2d 343 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1964)
MacKey v. Eva
328 P.2d 66 (Idaho Supreme Court, 1958)
Culver v. RENDAHL ET UX
318 P.2d 275 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1957)
A. S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co.
144 N.E.2d 371 (New York Court of Appeals, 1957)
Koch v. Rice
237 P.2d 494 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1951)
Ward v. TOWN TAVERN
228 P.2d 216 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1951)
Lease v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co.
185 F.2d 570 (Ninth Circuit, 1950)
Gillis v. Gillette
184 F.2d 872 (Ninth Circuit, 1950)
Gabriel v. Corkum
196 P.2d 437 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1948)
Southeast Portland Lumber Co. v. Corey
42 P.2d 931 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1935)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
125 P. 298, 62 Or. 219, 1912 Ore. LEXIS 134, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pippy-v-winslow-or-1912.