G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States

160 Ct. Cl. 1
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJanuary 11, 1963
DocketNo. 56-59
StatusPublished
Cited by53 cases

This text of 160 Ct. Cl. 1 (G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
G. L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 160 Ct. Cl. 1 (cc 1963).

Opinion

Davis, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:1

This case, which involves claims totaling $5,156,144.50,2 grew out of the deactivation of Fort Polk, Louisiana, by the Department of the Army in 1958. At the time when the decision to deactivate Fort Polk was made, a large housing project, which was to consist of 2,000 dwelling units for the use of military personnel at Fort Polk, was being constructed ’tinder a contract that had previously been made by the Corps of Engineers pursuant to the provisions of the Cape-hart Act.3 The housing contract was terminated by the Corps of Engineers on February 5,1958, after which numerous claims for damages were submitted to the Government. Most of the claims (from a numerical standpoint) were settled administratively; and the claims asserted in the present litigation remain for disposition because the particular claimants and the administrative agency could not agree on the amounts due the claimants. This suit therefore involves only the residue of the claims.

I

An unusual feature of the case is that the financial interests of the plaintiff, a joint venture consisting of eight individuals operating under the name of G. L. Christian and Associates, were not affected in any way by the termination [5]*5of the Fort Polk housing contract. In order to explain this anomalous situation, the events that transpired in connection with the making of the contract will be summarized in some detail.

Pursuant to an invitation for bids issued by the District Engineer in charge of the Galveston District of the Corps of Engineers, the plaintiff, on November 16, 1956, submitted a bid on the construction of the Fort Polk housing project under the Capehart Act. The plaintiff’s bid consisted of a basic bid plus certain added items. The District Engineer determined that the plaintiff was qualified by experience and financial responsibility to construct housing under the Cape-hart Act, and that its bid was the lowest acceptable bid submitted in response to the invitation. The plaintiff’s bid was thereupon accepted by the District Engineer in his capacity as contracting officer for the Government. The acceptance was in the form of a “letter of acceptability” dated December 17,1956.

After its bid for the construction of the Fort Polk housing project was accepted, the plaintiff approached the H. B. Zachry Company in about January 1957 and endeavored to interest that company in forming a joint venture with the plaintiff to construct the project. Zachry was not interested in forming a joint venture with the plaintiff, and so informed it. However, Zachry did indicate a possible interest in obtaining an assignment of the Fort Polk housing project from the plaintiff and handling the job in its entirety. After further discussion, the plaintiff granted Zachry an option to acquire the plaintiff’s entire interest in the Fort Polk project for $250,000.

Following these negotiations between the plaintiff and Zachry, the latter approached the Centex Construction Company, Inc., in about February 1957, and proposed that Centex enter into a joint venture with Zachry for the construction of the Fort Polk project. Both Zachry and Centex, which were highly competent construction companies with extensive experience in large-scale enterprises, made estimates regarding the prospective cost of constructing the project and the probable margin of profit in the job, under the price fixed in the plaintiff’s bid and in the letter of acceptability. Upon [6]*6.the basis of these calculations, Zachry and Centex concluded that the project was feasible and potentially profitable. Consequently, they decided to take over the Fort Polk housing job from the plaintiff and construct the project as a joint venture.

In furtherance of the decision made by Zachry and Cen-tex, Zachry exercised its option to acquire the Fort Polk project from the plaintiff for $250,000. A document on this matter was signed by Zachry and the plaintiff on March 14, ,1957. This document provided that the consideration of '$250,000 was to be paid by Zachry to the plaintiff as follows: $100,000 was to be paid “in cash upon approval by the proper .governmental agencies of this assignment,” an additional :$75,000 was to be paid within 9 months, and the final installment of $75,000 was to be paid within 18 months. The document declared that, on the basis of such consideration, “Assignors [the plaintiff] hereby assign, transfer, set over .and deliver unto H. B. Zachry Company all of their respective rights, titles and interest held or claimed by Assignors or either of them in and to” the Fort Polk housing job.

A written agreement for the construction of the Fort Polk housing project as a joint venture was entered into by Zachry ,and Centex on April 9, 1957. This agreement provided (among other things) that Centex would be the managing member of the joint venture and would be in charge of the ■construction of the project; that such funds as might be required by the joint venture for construction would be ■advanced in the proportions of one-third by Zachry and two-thirds by Centex; and that the profits (or losses) resulting from construction would be shared by the joint venturers in the proportions of one-third to Zachry and two-thirds to Centex.4

Information regarding the existence of the agreements between the plaintiff and Zachry and between Zachry and •Centex was furnished to the District Engineer by the attorney for Centex-Zachry at a conference in Galveston. The District Engineer orally expressed approval of the plan for the takeover of the Fort Polk housing job by Centex-Zachry from the plaintiff. It was agreed at the conference that [7]*7the takeover would be accomplished by means of a formal assignment of the Fort Polk housing contract (when made) from the plaintiff to Centex-Zachry. Subsequently, however, higher authority in the Department of the Army took the position that a housing contract under the Capehart Act ■could not be assigned.5 Thereupon, another conference was held in Galveston between the attorney for Centex-Zachry and the District Engineer. At this conference, it was agreed (subject to the approval of higher authority in the Department of the Army) that the transfer of the Fort Polk housing job to Centex-Zachry would be accomplished by means of a subcontract from the plaintiff to Centex-Zachry that would cover the entire job.

After the approval of higher authority in the Department of the Army was obtained with respect to the plan for the transfer of the Fort Polk housing work from the plaintiff to Centex-Zachry by means of a subcontract covering the entire project, a document entitled “Agreement to Sub-Contract with Irrevocable Power of Attorney Attached” was entered into between the plaintiff and Centex-Zachry on June 27, 1957. .The agreement stated that the plaintiff relinquished “all its right, title and interest in and to the proposed contract” for the construction of the Fort Polk housing project; that Centex-Zachry “hereby assumes all of the rights and obligations of G.L. Christian and Associates under the Letter of Acceptability * *. * and the proposed contract, and further agrees to relieve and save harmless the said G. L. Christian and Associates from its obligations and responsibilities set forth in said Letter of Acceptability * * * and in the proposed contract”; and that Centex-Zachry “hereby covenant and agree to at all times save harmless and keep indemnified the said G. L.

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160 Ct. Cl. 1, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/g-l-christian-associates-v-united-states-cc-1963.