Vacated and remanded by published opinion. Senior Judge HAMILTON wrote the opinion, in which Senior Judge ELLIS joined. Judge NIEMEYER wrote a dissenting opinion.
OPINION
HAMILTON, Senior Circuit Judge:
The Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) imposes a mandatory minimum fifteen-year sentence on felons who unlawfully possess, among other things, firearms, and who also have three or more previous convictions for committing certain drug crimes or “violent felon[ies].” 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). In United States v. James, this court held that a South Carolina failure to stop for a blue light violation, S.C.Code Ann. § 56-5-750(A), constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA. 337 F.3d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir.2003). The principal issue presented in this appeal is whether the test we applied in James for determining when a crime constitutes a violent felony under the ACCA survives the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Begay v. United States, — U.S. -, 128 S.Ct. 1581, 170 L.Ed.2d 490 (2008). We conclude that it does not.
I
The relevant facts of this case are not in dispute. On January 23, 2006, a federal grand jury sitting in the Western District of North Carolina charged Ralph Roseboro with violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), which prohibits felons from possessing, among other things, firearms. On June 29, 2006, a jury convicted Roseboro of this offense.
In preparation for sentencing, a probation officer prepared a presentence investigation report (PSR). The probation officer calculated Roseboro’s Base Offense Level to be 14, United States Sentencing Commission, Guidelines Manual (USSG), § 2K2.1(a)(6). Two levels were added because the firearm Roseboro possessed was stolen. Id. § 2K2.1(b)(4). Because Rose-boro possessed the firearm in connection with another felony offense, namely, burglary, Roseboro’s Offense Level was increased by four more levels. Id. § 2K2.1(b)(5). Finally, because the probation officer determined that Roseboro obstructed justice, Roseboro’s Offense Level was increased by two more levels, id. § 3C1.1, resulting in a Total Offense Level of 22. The Total Offense Level of 22, when coupled with a Criminal History Category VI, produced a sentencing range of 84 to 105 months’ imprisonment.
Both the government and Roseboro filed objections to the PSR. The government objected to the PSR on the basis that it did not reflect that Roseboro was an Armed Career Criminal under the ACCA. Section 924(e)(1) provides:
[A] person who violates section 922(g) of this title and has three previous convictions ... for a violent felony ... committed on occasions different from one another, such person shall be ... imprisoned not less than fifteen years.
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The term “violent felony” is defined as any crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year that either “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another,” id. § 924(e)(2)(B)®, or “is burglary, arson, or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” Id. § 924(e) (2) (B) (ii). According to the gov[229]*229ernment, Roseboro’s three prior South Carolina failure to stop for a blue light convictions were violent felonies because each of those convictions involved conduct that presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.1
Roseboro objected to the PSR on the basis that the § 2K2.1(b)(4) and § 2K2.1(b)(5) enhancements were not warranted. Consequently, Roseboro urged the probation officer to reduce his Total Offense Level by 6 levels, resulting in a Total Offense Level of 16, which when coupled with a Criminal History Category VI, resulted in a sentencing range of 46 to 57 months’ imprisonment.
Roseboro also objected to the government’s suggestion that he was an Armed Career Criminal. According to Roseboro, under the categorical approach, he was not eligible for any of the career offender enhancements (Armed Career Criminal or Career Offender) because none of his South Carolina failure to stop for a blue light violations were either a crime of violence or a violent felony.2
The probation officer sided with the government and concluded that Roseboro was an Armed Career Criminal based on his conclusion that Roseboro’s three South Carolina failure to stop for a blue light convictions were violent felonies. The effect of this conclusion had a significant impact on Roseboro’s sentencing range. The PSR’s recommended sentencing range moved from 84 to 105 months’ imprisonment (Total Offense Level of 22/Criminal History Category VI) to 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment (Total Offense Level of 34/Criminal History Category VI).
In preparation for sentencing, both the government and Roseboro filed sentencing memorandums. Roseboro argued, among other things, that his three prior South Carolina failure to stop for a blue light convictions were not violent felonies because the offenses did not “categorically meet the definition of a violent felony as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).” In response, the government contended that the issue was controlled by our decision in James, where we held that a South Carolina failure to stop for a blue light violation was a violent felony because the offense involved “the potential for serious injury to another.” 337 F.3d at 391.
[230]*230At sentencing, in arguing against the conclusion that he was an Armed Career Criminal, Roseboro rested on his pleadings and made a variety of arguments to the district court, all of which were rejected. Agreeing with both the probation officer and the government that Roseboro was an Armed Career Criminal, the district court calculated Roseboro’s sentencing range to be 262 to 327 months’ imprisonment. In sentencing Roseboro, the district court expressly considered the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and sentenced Roseboro to the low end of the sentencing range, 262 months’ imprisonment.
Roseboro noted a timely appeal.
II
A
In James, we addressed the question of whether a South Carolina failure to stop for a blue light violation was a violent felony under the ACCA. In resolving this question, we first determined that, under South Carolina law, a failure to stop for a blue light violation was a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. 337 F.3d at 390 (noting that a violation of § 56-5-750(A), first offense, is punishable by a term of imprisonment of up to three years). After examining the elements of a South Carolina failure to stop for a blue light violation, we determined that the offense did not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person. Id. Consequently, we turned to whether a South Carolina failure to stop for a blue light violation otherwise involved conduct that presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another person. Id. In assessing this question, we applied a “ ‘categorical approach, whereby the court looks only at the fact of conviction and the statutory definition of the offense, and not to the underlying facts of a specific conviction.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Thomas, 2 F.3d 79, 80 (4th Cir.1993)).3 Under this approach, we asked whether the statute at issue “ ‘proscribe^] generic conduct with the potential for serious physical injury to another.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Custis, 988 F.2d 1355, 1363 (4th Cir.1993)); see also United States v. Hairston, 71 F.3d 115, 118 (4th Cir.1995) (holding that any escape, even an escape by stealth, created a serious potential risk of physical injury to another and, therefore, an escape offense, however effected, is a violent felony under [231]*231§ 924(e)(l)(B)(ii)). In concluding that a South Carolina failure to stop for a blue light violation posed a potential for serious physical injury to another, we stated:
Applying the categorical approach, we find that failing to stop for a blue light generally proscribes conduct that poses the potential for serious injury to another.
Most cases of failing to stop for a blue light involve the deliberate choice by the driver to disobey the police officer’s signal. This disobedience poses the threat of a direct confrontation between the police officer and the occupants of the vehicle, which, in turn, creates a potential for serious physical injury to the officer, other occupants of the vehicle, and even bystanders.
James, 337 F.3d at 390-91.
If the analysis set forth in James is controlling, the outcome of this case is straightforward. Unquestionably, under James, Roseboro’s three prior South Carolina failure to stop for a blue light violations are violent felonies. The question we must address is whether the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay fundamentally altered the § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) inquiry such that the test applied in James does not control the outcome of this case. To answer this question, we need to turn to the Supreme Court’s decision in Begay.
In Begay, the Supreme Court addressed whether the offense of driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) was a violent felony under the ACCA. The DUI statute at issue in Begay was out of the State of New Mexico, which made it a crime to “ ‘drive a vehicle within [the] state’ if the driver ‘is under the influence of intoxicating liquor’ (or has an alcohol concentration of .08 or more in his blood or breath within three hours of having driven the vehicle resulting from ‘alcohol consumed before or while driving the vehicle’).” 128 S.Ct. at 1584 (quoting N.M. Stat. §§ 66-8-102(A) and (Q). In determining whether a New Mexico DUI offense was a violent felony under the ACCA, the Court considered the offense “generically,” id.; that is, the Court applied the categorical approach by examining the statute “in terms of how the law defines the offense and not in terms of how an individual offender might have committed it on a particular occasion.” Id.
In examining the New Mexico DUI statute in the generic sense, the Court first observed that the offense did not have as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person under § 924(e)(2)(B)(i). Id. Critically, the Court assumed that the Tenth Circuit was correct in concluding that “DUI involves conduct that ‘presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another’ ” under § 924(e) (2) (B) (ii), noting that DUI is an “extremely dangerous crime.” Id. Nevertheless, the Court concluded that a DUI offense fell outside of § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s otherwise clause because the offense was “simply too unlike the provision’s listed examples for us to believe that Congress intended the provision to cover it.” Id.
In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court observed that § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) listed the types of crimes (burglary, arson, extortion, or crimes involving the use of explosives) that fell within the statute’s scope. Id. at 1585. According to the Court, the presence of burglary, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives indicated that the statute only covered “similar crimes, rather than every crime that ‘presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.’ ” Id. (quoting § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)). The Court reasoned that, if Congress meant to cover all crimes that posed a serious potential risk of physical injury to another, it was “hard to see why it would have needed to [232]*232include the examples at all.” Id. The Court also reasoned that, if Congress meant § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) to include all crimes that pose risk, it would not have included § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), because a crime that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against another person is likely to create a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Id.
The Court in Begay also rejected the notion that Congress included the examples in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) for quantitative purposes, e.g., intending them to “demonstrate no more than the degree of risk sufficient to bring a crime within [§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s] scope.” Id. The Court reasoned that, if Congress intended to focus solely on the degree of risk involved, it would have “chosen examples that better illustrated the ‘degree of risk’ it had in mind.” Id.
In light of these considerations, and to give effect to every clause and word in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court concluded that the examples in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) should be read as limiting the crimes that the statute covers to crimes that are roughly similar, in kind as well as in degree of risk posed, to the examples themselves. Id. The Court also observed that its reading of the statute was supported by § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s legislative history. Id. at 1585-86.
Turning to the question of whether a New Mexico DUI offense was similar in kind as well as in degree of risk posed to the listed examples in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court first observed that a New Mexico DUI offense was different from the enumerated crimes in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) in one critical respect. Id. at 1586. The enumerated crimes in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) “all typically involve[d] purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct.” Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). According to the Court, the enumerated crimes, which are all committed with purpose, violence, and aggression, made it more likely that the defendant would use a firearm during the commission of a later offense. Id.
In contrast to the enumerated crimes in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court observed that a DUI offense typically did not involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct. Id. Rather, the Court observed that a DUI offense was more comparable to a strict liability crime, because to prove a DUI offense, the prosecution need not prove any criminal intent at all. Id. at 1586-87. In other words, while a drunk driver may consume alcohol on purpose and perhaps later drive under the influence of that alcohol on purpose, the prosecution is not required to prove that the defendant committed the crime purposefully or deliberately because the offense can be committed accidentally or negligently. Id. at 1587.
The fact that a DUI offense can be committed accidentally or negligently played a critical role in the Court’s decision. The Court observed that the ACCA focused on “the special danger created when a particular type of offender — a violent criminal or drug trafficker — possesses a gun.” Id. Which defendants are violent depends on their prior crimes. The more serious the prior crime, the greater the threat the defendant poses when he later possesses a firearm. Id. As the Court observed:
In this respect — namely a prior crime’s relevance to the possibility of future danger with a gun — crimes involving intentional or purposeful conduct (as in burglary and arson) are different than DUI, a strict liability crime. In both instances, the offender’s prior crimes reveal a degree of callousness toward risk, but in the former instance they also [233]*233show an increased likelihood that the offender is the kind of person who might deliberately point the gun and pull the trigger.
Id.
Thus, the line drawn in the sand by the Court in Begay was that prior crimes that involved purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct increased the likelihood that a defendant would use a gun during the commission of the later offense, while a prior crime that did not involve purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct did not increase such a likelihood. To view the matter any differently, the Court observed, would bring a host of crimes into § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s rubric that “though dangerous, are not typically committed by those whom one normally labels ‘armed career criminals.’ ” Id. (citing Ark.Code Ann. § 8 — 4—103(a)(2)(A)(ii) (which applies to reckless polluters); 33 U.S.C. § 1319(e)(1) (which applies to individuals who negligently introduce pollutants into the sewer system); 18 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (which applies to individuals who recklessly tamper with consumer products); and 18 U.S.C. § 1115 (which applies to seamen whose inattention to duty causes serious accidents)).
In making this distinction between offenses that are purposeful, violent, and aggressive on the one hand, and offenses that do not involve one of these attributes on the other hand, the Court recognized that a defendant with a history of DUI may later pull a firearm’s trigger. Id. at 1588. Indeed, the defendant in Begay, in committing his § 922(g)(1) offense, pointed a rifle at his sister and pulled the trigger several times, but the rifle would not fire. United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 965 (10th Cir.2006). However, this fact was not enough to sway the Court from holding that
for purposes of the particular statutory provision before us, a prior record of DUI, a strict liability crime, differs from a prior record of violent and aggressive crimes committed intentionally such as arson, burglary, extortion, or crimes involving the use of explosives. The latter are associated with a likelihood of future violent, aggressive, and purposeful “armed career criminal” behavior in a way that the former are not.
Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1588.
B
The Supreme Court’s test applied in Begay is markedly different than the test we applied in James. Under James, an offense presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another if the offense conduct had the potential for serious physical injury to another. 337 F.3d at 390. The Supreme Court in Begay, however, explicitly rejected this inquiry as outcome determinative, observing that the proper inquiry involved far more than an analysis of the risk associated with the prior crime. Begay, 128 S.Ct. at 1584 (where the Court assumed that the Tenth Circuit was correct in concluding that “DUI involves conduct that ‘presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another’ ”); id. at 1587 (“The dissent’s approach, on the other hand, would likely include these crimes within the statutory definition of ‘violent felony,’ along with any other crime that can be said to present ‘a serious potential risk of physical injury.’ .... And it would do so because it believes such a result is compelled by the statute’s text.... But the dissent’s explanation does not account for a key feature of that text — namely, the four example crimes intended to illustrate what kind of ‘violent felony’ the statute covers.”); id. at 1589 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“There is simply no basis (other than the necessity of resolving the present case) for holding that [234]*234the enumerated and unenumerated crimes must be similar in respects other than the degree of risk that they pose”). Rather, the proper inquiry focuses on the similarity between the prior crime and the enumerated crimes in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), asking whether the prior crime involved purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, which would demonstrate a likelihood that the defendant would use a firearm during the commission of a crime. Id. at 1585-88. In James, we neither compared the similarity between a South Carolina failure to stop for a blue light violation to the enumerated crimes in § 924(e)(2) (B)(ii), nor asked whether the South Carolina statute at issue involved purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct. Because we are now bound to apply the Begay framework, the test we espoused in James is no longer controlling. See Scotts Co. v. United Indus. Corp., 315 F.3d 264, 271 n. 2 (4th Cir.2002) (“[A] panel of this court cannot overrule, explicitly or implicitly, the precedent set by a prior panel of this court. Only the Supreme Court or this court sitting en banc can do that.”) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
C
In assessing whether a South Carolina failure to stop for a blue light violation constitutes a violent felony under § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), per Begay, we must first determine whether the statute at issue involves purposeful, violent, and aggressive conduct, such that the offense can be found similar to the enumerated crimes in § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). South Carolina Code § 56-5-750(A) provides:
In the absence of mitigating circunu-stances, it is unlawful for a motor vehicle driver, while driving on a road, street, or highway of the State, to fail to stop when signaled by a law enforcement vehicle by means of a siren or flashing light. An attempt to increase the speed of a vehicle or in other manner avoid the pursuing law enforcement vehicle when signaled by a siren or flashing light is prima facie evidence of a violation of this section. Failure to see the flashing light or hear the siren does not excuse a failure to stop when the distance between the vehicles and other road conditions are such that it would be reasonable for a driver to hear or see the signals from the law enforcement vehicle.
S.C.Code Ann. § 56-5-750(A).
The South Carolina Supreme Court, and for that matter this court in James, has indicated that, in a § 56-5-750(A) prosecution, the State must prove the following elements: “(1) that the defendant was driving a motor vehicle; (2) that he was driving it on a road, street or highway of this State; (3) that he was signaled to stop by a law-enforcement vehicle by means of a siren or flashing light; and (4) that he did not stop.” State v. Hoffman, 257 S.C. 461, 186 S.E.2d 421, 425 (1972); see also James, 337 F.3d at 390. These four elements appear to be routinely used in § 56-5-750(A) prosecutions in South Carolina state courts. See Judge Ralph King Anderson, Jr., South Carolina Request For Charge — Criminal, § 2-60 (2007).
In order for the State to satisfy the first two of these four elements, the State must show that the defendant was driving a motor vehicle on a road, street, or highway in South Carolina. The third element requires the State to show that the law enforcement officer signaled the defendant to stop. The final element requires the State to prove that the defendant did not stop after he was signaled by the law enforcement officer to do so.
[235]*235From the above elements, it is clear that, to prove a § 56-5-750(A) violation, the State does not have to prove that the defendant acted with criminal intent. Indeed, we implicitly recognized this fact in James, where we observed that “[m]ost cases of failing to stop for a blue light involve the deliberate choice by the driver to disobey the police officer’s signal.” 337 F.3d at 391. It follows from our use of the words “[m]ost cases” that some South Carolina failure to stop for a blue light violations involve conduct where the defendant does not make a deliberate choice to avoid the pursuing law enforcement officer; rather, he fails to stop on account of some negligent act.
More telling, the elements as set forth by the South Carolina Supreme Court simply do not require that the defendant act either willfully or knowingly. The absence of either a willful or knowing requirement strongly suggests that the South Carolina legislature intended a violation to rest in the event that the defendant acted either recklessly or negligently. See State v. Ferguson, 302 S.C. 269, 395 S.E.2d 182, 184 (1990) (holding that S.C.Code Ann. § 44-53-370, which provides in relevant part that it is unlawful for any person to manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance, was not a strict liability crime; rather, the State was required to prove the defendant was at least criminally negligent); State v. Jenkins, 278 S.C. 219, 294 S.E.2d 44, 45-46 (1982) (“By failing to include ‘knowingly’ or other apt words to indicate criminal intent or motive, we think the legislature intended that one who simply, without knowledge or intent that his act is criminal, fails to provide proper care and attention for a child or helpless person of whom he has legal custody, so that the life, health, and comfort of that child or helpless person is endangered or is likely to be endangered, violates § 16-3-1030 of the Code.”).
To be sure, § 56-5-750(A) unquestionably covers both intentional and unintentional conduct, as the word “fail,” unlike the word “refuse,” can refer to both intentional and unintentional acts. For example, a defendant can violate the statute by intentionally failing to stop. In the event the State shows that the defendant intentionally failed to stop by attempting to avoid the law enforcement vehicle by speeding up (or in some other manner), the State enjoys the rebuttable presumption that the defendant violated the statute. See S.C.Code Ann. § 56-5-750(A) (“An attempt to increase the speed of a vehicle or in other manner avoid the pursuing law enforcement vehicle when signaled by a siren or flashing light is prima facie evidence of a violation of this section.”). However, when the defendant negligently fails to stop, say, because he was wearing headphones through which he played music on his Ipod too loudly, the State does not enjoy this presumption, but the State still is free to prove the defendant violated the statute, even though the defendant failed to stop simply because of his own negligent behavior.4
Moreover, § 56-5-750(A) stands in stark contrast to the South Carolina statute governing resisting arrest, and numerous state statutes governing failing to stop for a blue light. South Carolina’s resisting arrest statute clearly requires the defendant to knowingly and willfully resist the arrest. See S.C.Code Ann. § 16-9-320(A) [236]*236(defining resisting arrest as “knowingly and wilfully ... resisting] an arrest”), Laws from over forty states clearly require that the failure to stop for a blue light violation be purposeful.5 Section 16-[239]*2399-320(A) of the South Carolina Code and the vast majority of failure to stop for blue light laws from across the Nation strongly suggest that the South Carolina legislature easily could have required a § 56-5-750(A) violation to be premised only upon a showing that the defendant acted purposefully, but chose not to do so.
Like South Carolina, other states permit a failure to stop for a blue light violation to rest on proof that the defendant acted negligently. See, e.g., Mass. Gen. Laws Chapter 90 § 25 (“Any person who, while operating or in charge of a motor vehicle, ... shall refuse or neglect to stop when signaled to stop by any police officer who is in uniform or who displays his badge conspicuously on the outside of his outer coat or garment, ... shall be punished by a fine of one hundred dollars.”); Vt. Stat. Ann. Title 23 § 1133(a) (“No operator of a motor vehicle shall fail to bring his or her vehicle to a stop when signaled to do so by an enforcement officer.”).
In State v. Roy, 151 Vt. 17, 557 A.2d 884 (1989), the Vermont Supreme Court dealt with a similar statute to the one before this court. Under Vermont law, a person is prohibited from failing to stop a motor vehicle when signaled to do so by a law enforcement officer. Id. at 889. The defendant argued that the State of Vermont was required to prove that he had knowledge that he was being signaled to stop by a law enforcement officer displaying a flashing light and sounding a siren. Id. The Roy court rejected this contention, concluding that Vermont’s failure to stop for a blue light statute was a strict liability crime. Id. at 890. In so holding, the Roy court principally relied on the Vermont legislature’s failure to include an intent element in the statutory definition. Id. at 889-90.
Although the government openly conceded in its brief that § 56-5-750(A) was a “strict liability-like” statute, Appel-lee’s Br. at 22, in other submissions to this court, it suggested that the phrase “[i]n the absence of mitigating circumstances” in § 56-5-750(A) indicates that the South Carolina legislature intended § 56-5-750(A) to cover only knowing and willful acts. The problem for the government’s position is the phrase “[i]n the absence of mitigating circumstances” allows for a defense to both intentional and unintentional (negligent) conduct. For example, if a defendant intentionally avoids stopping once signaled to do so, a mitigating circumstance may be his reasonable belief that he was being pursued by somebody other than a law enforcement officer. Cf. Va. Code Ann. § 46.2-817(A) (“It shall be an affirmative defense ... if the defendant shows he reasonably believed he was being pursued by a person other than a law-enforcement officer.”); see also South Carolina Department of Public Safety, General Highway Safety, Advice For Driving on South Carolina Roads, available at http://www.schp.org/general_ hwy_tips.pdf (“How to verify that you’re being pulled over by a law enforcement officer: Look for a flashing blue light and try to identify the driver and ascertain that he/she is wearing a uniform. Make sure that the vehicle is marked properly identifying it as a police vehicle. If it is not, the officer should turn on his interior light and make it known to you that he is a police officer. Pull over to the right side of the road when you feel it is safe to do so.”). At the same time, our Ipod defendant would be free to assert as a mitigating circumstance that the road conditions were such that a reasonable driver would [240]*240not have heard the law enforcement officer’s siren or seen his blue lights, notwithstanding his negligent conduct. See 5.C.Code Ann. § 56-5-750(A) (“Failure to see the flashing light or hear the siren does not excuse a failure to stop when the distance between the vehicles and other road conditions are such that it would be reasonable for a driver to hear or see the signals from the law enforcement vehicle.”). We can think of other examples where the presence of a mitigating circumstance might excuse the defendant’s intentional and unintentional conduct. But such further examples would only belabor the point. We are dealing with what essentially is a categorically overbroad statute, allowing conviction for both intentional and unintentional conduct. Because it is not clear from the record whether Roseboro’s § 56-5-750(A)’s convictions involve intentional or unintentional conduct, a remand is appropriate to allow for the district court to consult such additional materials as may be appropriate under Taylor and Shepard and determine from those materials whether these convictions involved intentional violations of § 56-5-750(A). See United States v. Williams, 537 F.3d 969, (8th Cir.2008) (vacating, post-Begay, defendant’s auto theft conviction and remanding to allow district court to consider permissible materials to determine whether the defendant’s conviction was a crime of violence). In the event the consultation of these additional materials establishes that Roseboro’s convictions involved intentional violations of § 56-5-750(A), the district court would be free to conclude that the convictions are violent felonies under § 924(e) (2) (B) (ii). The intentional act of disobeying a law enforcement officer by refusing to stop for his blue light signal, without justification, is inherently an aggressive and violent act, see United States v. Spells, 537 F.3d 743, 752 (7th Cir.2008) (holding, post-Begay, knowingly and intentionally fleeing (with the use of a vehicle) from a law enforcement officer is a purposeful, aggressive, and violent act), and, therefore, a violent felony under the ACCA.6
[241]*241D
We also note that our decision today is consistent with decisions from our sister circuits. These decisions make clear that when a statute does not require deliberate or purposeful conduct, a conviction under such a statute will not be considered a violent felony under the ACCA or a crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines. For example, in United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347 (11th Cir.2008), the district court sentenced the defendant as a Career Offender based, in part, on his prior Florida conviction for carrying a concealed weapon. Id. at 1348. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, but the Supreme Court vacated the defendant’s sentence and remanded the case for further consideration in light of Begay. Id. On remand from the Supreme Court, the Archer court held that the defendant’s Florida conviction for carrying a concealed weapon was not a crime of violence and, therefore, the defendant was not a Career Offender under the Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 1349-52.
In applying Begay, the Archer court assessed whether carrying a concealed firearm is similar in kind and degree to the crimes of burglary of a dwelling, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives. Id. at 1350. The court noted that the Florida statute at issue prohibited a person from carrying a concealed firearm on or about his person. Id. In so noting, the court concluded that carrying a concealed weapon did not involve the aggressive and violent conduct that the Supreme Court noted was inherent in the crimes of burglary of a dwelling, arson, extortion, and crimes involving the use of explosives. Id. at 1351. The Archer court observed that “[bjurglary of a dwelling, arson, extortion, and the use of explosives are all aggressive, violent acts aimed at other persons or property where persons might be located and thereby injured.” Id. In contrast, the court observed that “[cjarrying a concealed weapon, however, is a passive crime centering around possession, rather than around any overt action.” Id.
With regard to whether the Florida crime at issue involved purposeful conduct, the Archer court observed that carrying a concealed weapon under Florida law did not necessarily involve purposeful conduct. Id. Rather, the court noted that specific intent was not an element of the crime. Id. This lack of specific intent made carrying a concealed weapon more similar to the DUI in Begay. Id. Finally, the court noted that its conclusion was supported by the fact that carrying a concealed weapon was not universally considered violent by other states, id., and the fact that the commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines specified that a crime of violence did not include the unlawful possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. Id. at 1352.
In United States v. Herrick, 545 F.3d 53, 54-55 (1st Cir.2008), the First Circuit addressed the question of whether a violation of Wisconsin’s motor vehicle homicide statute, which required a determination that the accused was criminally negligent, constituted a crime of violence under USSG § 4B1.2. After applying the Begay framework, the court concluded that Wisconsin’s vehicular homicide statute was not a crime of violence under USSG § 4B1.2, [242]*242even though the statute at issue required that the defendant should realize his conduct creates a substantial and unreasonable risk of death or great bodily harm to another. Id. at 59-60. The court reasoned that, although the crime of vehicular homicide was violent, it was neither purposeful nor aggressive. Id.
In United States v. Gray, 535 F.3d 128 (2d Cir.2008), the court addressed whether the New York crime of reckless endangerment in the first degree constituted a crime of violence under USSG § 4B1.2. Id. at 131-32. The court concluded that the statute, which provided that a defendant was guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, the defendant recklessly engaged in conduct which created a grave risk of death to another person, did not so constitute a crime of violence, reasoning that “[r]eckless endangerment on its face does not criminalize purposeful or deliberate conduct.” Id. at 132.
When the violent and aggressive offense involves purposeful or deliberate conduct, the offense will be found by our sister circuits to be a violent felony or a crime of violence. For example, in United States v. Williams, 529 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2008), the court addressed whether, post-Begay, the crime of transporting a minor for prostitution was a crime of violence under USSG § 4B1.2. In holding that the crime at issue was a crime of violence, the court noted that the crime of transporting a minor for prostitution involves purposeful conduct where the defendant is aware of the risks that the prostituted minor will face. Id. at 7. The court also observed that the defendant “may well use force to ensure the minor’s compliance; but it is even more likely, and fully foreseeable, that the ‘clients’ will endanger the minor’s safety in various ways.” Id. The court concluded that the crime of transporting a minor for prostitution fell “readily ... within ... the Court’s trio of adjectives,” noting that it was “surpassingly difficult to see how burglary could be treated as a violent crime yet child trafficking exempted.” Id.
In Spells, the defendant challenged his designation as an Armed Career Criminal under § 924(e), arguing that his prior conviction in Indiana state court for fleeing a law enforcement officer in a vehicle did not fall within § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii)’s ambit. 537 F.3d at 747. In applying Begay, the Spells court rejected the defendant’s argument. Id. at 752-53. In so doing, the court relied on the fact that the Indiana statute at issue required the defendant to knowingly and intentionally flee from a law enforcement officer. Id. at 752. According to the Spells court, the knowledge and intent component of the Indiana statute “en-sur[ed] that the law is only violated when an individual makes a ‘purposeful’ decision to flee from an officer.” Id. The court further observed that intentionally fleeing from a law enforcement officer is inherently aggressive. Id. Finally, the Spells court noted that a person with a prior conviction for fleeing from a law enforcement officer in a vehicle has a greater likelihood of using a firearm if he were to possess a firearm during the commission of fleeing from a law enforcement officer in a vehicle offense. Id.
As these cases illustrate, in cases where the § 56-5-750(A) violation is unintentional, the violation is akin to the violations in Archer, Herrick, and Gray, which were found not to be crimes of violence. When the § 56-5-750(A) violation is intentional and without justification, the violation is analogous to the Spells failure to stop for a blue light violation, which was found by that court to be a violent felony. Because it is not clear from the record whether Roseboro’s § 56-5-750(A)’s convictions in[243]*243volve intentional or unintentional violations, we are constrained to vacate Rose-boro’s sentence and remand the case to the district court for resentencing.7
Ill
For the reasons stated herein, the judgment of the district court is vacated and the case is remanded for resentencing.
VACATED AND REMANDED