JAMES C. HILL, Circuit Judge:
This Court is not unanimous in its resolution of the two issues presented. All of us agree on the resolution of the issue presented in Part I. However, in Part II, Judges Brown and Randall concur with Judge Hill dissenting.1
This litigation over conditions at Mississippi’s Parchman Penitentiary began in 1971. In 1974 we affirmed the district court’s finding that various practices existing at Parchman violated the constitutional rights of inmates. 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974). The succeeding 5 years of litigation primarily involved the issue of attorneys’ fees. In our most recent consideration of this case we affirmed awards of attorneys’ fees plus expenses in favor of the plaintiffs and reversed the district court’s order denying fees for appellate proceedings. 559 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1977). On January 25, 1979, the district court entered an order reaffirming its original award and awarding fees for appellate work. Two aspects of that order are now challenged by the defendants. First, the order directs that Mississippi’s Auditor and Treasurer be added as defendants and that the other defendants submit a requisition to the Auditor for the issuance of a warrant upon the Treasurer to satisfy the judgment out of funds appropriated for the operation of Parchman or out of any other funds subject to the control of the Treasurer. Second, the order adds, to the principal amounts owing for attorneys’ fees and other costs, post-judgment interest at the rate of 8% per annum.2
I. The Directive to Pay
Defendants contend that . the district court acted outside the scope of its authority in ordering the State Auditor to issue a warrant upon the State Treasurer and ordering the State Treasurer in turn to satisfy the judgment. We are directed to several provisions of the Mississippi Code which limit the authority of the State Treasurer to disburse state funds. In particular, Miss. Code Ann. § 11-45-5 (1972) prohibits the satisfaction of any judgment against the State “except by an appropriation therefor by the legislature.” 3 The district court’s order, it is urged, is contrary to the laws of Mississippi and requires the State Auditor and the State Treasurer to violate these valid laws. Thus, we are urged to hold that, unless the Mississippi statutes are declared unconstitutional, these plaintiffs must simply wait until the State voluntarily satisfies the judgment.4
The awards which the district court has ordered the defendants to satisfy out of [1271]*1271state funds were made pursuant to the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fee Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988. In providing statutory authority for the award of attorneys’ fees to successful civil rights claimants, Congress was acting pursuant to the enforcement powers conferred on it by Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-94, 98 S.Ct. 2565, 2575-76, 57 L.Ed.2d 522 (1978). Hutto made it clear that, by exercising its power under Section 5, Congress successfully abrogated the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.5 Thus, it is now beyond dispute that a federal district court has the authority to order that attorneys’ fees be paid out of a state’s treasury. The defendants do not disagree. Their position is, in effect: you can order us to pay, but you can’t make us pay if we don’t want to.
Neither Hutto nor the legislative history of the Act address the question of how to make an unwilling state or its officials satisfy a judgment for attorneys’ fees. This is not surprising however, for it has never been the practice of Congress, when providing a statutory basis for the recovery of money damages or costs including attorneys’ fees, to specify in the same legislation the appropriate means of enforcing the judgment. In all likelihood, Congress assumed it was unnecessary to consider the subject because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contains a provision for the execution of district court judgments, Fed.R. Civ.P. 69, and a provision authorizing the court to appoint an individual to do any act on behalf of a party who has refused to comply with the judgment himself, Fed.R. Civ.P. 70. We have been cited to no authority, nor have we found any, to indicate that these statutes do not apply to a state and its officials. Cf. Gary W. v. State of Louisiana, 601 F.2d 240, 246 (5th Cir. 1979). In addition, “[a] federal court’s interest in orderly, expeditious proceedings,” Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. at 696, 98 S.Ct. at 2577, justifies any reasonable action taken by the court to secure compliance with its orders. In Hutto, the Court remarked: “[A] federal court may treat a State like any other litigant when it assesses costs,” 437 U.S. at 696, 98 S.Ct. at 2577, and “[w]hen a State defends a suit for prospective relief, it is not exempt from the ordinary discipline of the courtroom,” id. at 695-96 n. 24, 98 S.Ct. at 2576 n. 24. We think this is adequate support for the proposition that, where a state expresses its unwillingness to comply with a valid judgment of a federal district court, the court may use any of the weapons generally at its disposal to ensure compliance. “[Fjederal courts are not reduced to issuing [judgments] against state officers and hoping for compliance.” Id. at 690, 98 S.Ct. at 2574. Only when the district court’s response to the recalcitrance of a litigant is so inappropriate under the circumstances as to amount to an abuse of discretion will the Court of Appeals intervene. Here, the district court acted well within its authority to ensure compliance with its lawful orders. If statutory authority is needed for the court’s actions, it may be found in Fed.R.Civ.P. 70.6 The defend[1272]*1272ants have made it abundantly clear that they intend to resist the judgment until the bitter end. Given such obstinance, we think it beyond peradventure that the remedy fits the wrong.
We recognize that our discussion thus far does not directly address the defendants’ argument that they cannot be required to violate the laws of Mississippi. The defendants misconceive the issue. As Judge Rubin of this Court, sitting by designation in Gary W. v. State of Louisiana, 441 F.Supp. 1121 (E.D.La.1977), responded when recently confronted with the identical argument: “The issue here is not one of judicial confrontation with the state. It is one of implementation of a Congressional mandate.” Id. at 1125 (emphasis added). The italicized words provide the key. Congress has declared that states and their officials who violate federal civil rights laws must reimburse the successful plaintiff for costs incurred in seeking redress. To strike down the order in this case because it conflicts with the laws of Mississippi would be no different than reversing a bare judgment for attorneys’ fees. In either case, we would be allowing the state, by legislative action, to recloak itself with the Eleventh Amendment immunity which Congress has chosen to remove. Such a result would be contrary to the command of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.7
II. Interest on the Awards8
Defendants challenge the authority of the District Court to add post-judgment interest on attorneys’ fees and out-of-pocket costs. We believe that interest was properly awarded on attorneys’ fees but not on costs.
A.
Defendants vigorously contend that under this Court’s decision in Carpa, Inc. v. Ward Foods, Inc., 567 F.2d 1316 (5th Cir. 1978), we are precluded from awarding interest on attorney’s fees and costs under the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fee Awards Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (hereafter referred to as § 1988 or the Act).9 Despite Judge Hill’s strong expressions, see (dissent), pp. 1283-1284, we fully subscribe to principles of stare decisis and recognize that a decision by one panel of this Court is binding on other panels. E. g., Trunkline Gas Co. v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 608 F.2d 582, 583 (5th Cir. 1979). But we are convinced that Carpa is not controlling on the question before us and we have not been unfaithful to it in deciding the way we do.
In Carpa, this Court held that under 15 U.S.C.A. § 15 (hereafter referred to as § 15), interest on attorneys’ fees cannot be recovered. Section 15 provides: “Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws . . shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney’s fee.” The Court’s holding was a very narrow one. As the Court stated: “Our holding that attorneys’ fees in antitrust cases are not to bear interest implies nothing whatsoever about the propriety of interest on attorneys’ fees authorized by other statutes.” 567 F.2d at 1323 (emphasis [1273]*1273added). This language suggests in clear and unmistakable terms that each attorneys’ fees statute must be carefully analyzed to determine whether interest should be awarded.
The Court in Carpa gave two reasons which together led to its conclusion. First, the Court pointed out that attorneys’ fees are defined under § 15 as part of costs and that costs do not bear interest. Second, the Court emphasized the existence of treble damages under § 15 and suggested that the need for interest on attorneys’ fees was therefore less critical in the anti-trust context than in other contexts.
In analyzing Carpa, Judge Hill in dissent reads the case as relying exclusively on the definition of attorneys’ fees as part of costs. See (dissent), p. 1282. Since § 1988 also defines attorneys’ fees as part of costs, see note 2, supra, Judge Hill reasons ipso facto that interest on attorneys’ fees under § 1988 is not recoverable.
In our view, this reading of Carpa is misplaced, since it completely overlooks the Court’s repeated emphasis on the treble damages provision in § 15. For instance, the Court in Carpa stated:
In the absence of further Congressional guidance, and in light of the fact that the provision of treble damages as well as attorneys’ fees in the antitrust laws affords sufficient scope to the remedial purposes of encouraging private enforcement of the antitrust laws and facilitating the procuring of legal services,5 we see no basis for stretching the applicable statutory language to provide interest on the award of attorneys’ fees to successful antitrust plaintiffs.
567 F.2d at 1322-23 (emphasis added). The footnote accompanying this passage elaborated:
5. We note in this regard that the treble damage provisions of the antitrust laws were designed in part to help finance litigation expenses in private antitrust suits. By creating the possibility of size-able damage awards, Congress encouraged attorneys to try antitrust cases on a contingent fee basis.
Id. at 1323 n. 5. Later, the Court reemphasized:
The language and history of a given statute might suggest that the public purposes underlying the statutory authority for attorneys’ fees would be materially advanced by allowance of interest, and the absence of a treble damage provision which complements the attorneys’ fee provision would also require consideration.
Id. at 1323 (emphasis added).
The Carpa Court’s instruction to consider carefully the characteristics of the precise statute at issue would be completely undercut by Judge Hill’s view that Carpa was based exclusively on the definition of attorneys’ fees as part of costs. In our view, Carpa permits — indeed, compels — a comprehensive analysis of the statute at issue. With that in mind, § 1988 should be carefully analyzed.
B.
Section 1988 was enacted by Congress in 1976 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U.S. 240, 95 S.Ct. 1612, 44 L.Ed.2d 141 (1975), which held that only Congress, not the Courts, could determine which laws were important enough to justify the awarding of attorneys’ fees under the “private attorney general” principle. The Act is farreaching. It applies to suits for equitable relief or damages under the following statutes: 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981, forbidding discrimination by Government officials and private persons in contractual relations and used frequently to challenge discrimination in employment and use of recreational facilities; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1982, forbidding discrimination in real estate transactions; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983, prohibiting denial of constitutional and civil rights by persons acting under color of state law; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1985, dealing with conspiracies to deny persons equal protection of the laws; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1986, providing a cause of action against certain individuals having power to prevent violations of § 1985 but [1274]*1274who do not do so; 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d, et seq., prohibiting discrimination based on race, color, or national origin in federally funded programs; and 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681, et seq., prohibiting discrimination based on sex, blindness, or visual impairment in the use of federal funds in certain educational programs. The Act also authorizes attorneys’ fees for prevailing taxpayers in civil suits by or on behalf of the United States under the Internal Revenue Code.
As the legislative history of § 1988 makes clear, Congress believed that the awarding of attorneys’ fees is critical to the enforcement of the civil rights laws. The House Report, H.Rep.No.1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (House Report), states: •
The effective enforcement of Federal civil rights statutes depends largely on the efforts of private citizens. Although some agencies of the United States have civil rights responsibilities, their authority and resources are limited. In many instances where these laws are violated, it is necessary for the citizen to initiate court action to correct the illegality. Unless the judicial remedy is full and complete, it will remain a meaningless right. Because a vast majority of the victims of civil rights violations cannot afford legal counsel, they are unable to present their cases to the courts. In authorizing an award of reasonable attorney’s fees, [the proposed legislation] is designed to give such persons effective access to the judicial process where their grievances can be resolved according to law.
Id. at 1. Similarly, the Senate Report, S.Rep.No.94-1011, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (Senate Report), reprinted in [1976] U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 5908 (hereafter referred to as U.S.C.C.A.) states:
In many cases arising under our civil rights laws, the citizen who must sue to enforce the law has little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. If private citizens are to be able to assert their civil rights, and if those who violate the Nation’s fundamental laws are not to proceed with impunity, then citizens must have the opportunity to recover what it costs them to vindicate these rights in court.
Id. at 2, USCCA at 5910. The Senate Report also quotes with approval the following language from the Supreme Court’s opinion in Newman v. Piggie Park, 390 U.S. 400, 402, 88 S.Ct. 964, 966, 19 L.Ed.2d 1263, 1265-66 (1968):
When a plaintiff brings an action under [Title II] he cannot recover damages. If he obtains an injunction, he does so not for himself alone but also as a “private attorney general,” vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority. If successful plaintiffs were routinely forced to bear their own attorneys’ fees, few aggrieved parties would be in a position to advance the public interest by invoking the injunctive powers of the Federal courts. Congress therefore enacted the provision for counsel fees [42 U.S.C.A. § 2000a-3(b)] to encourage individuals injured by racial discrimination to seek judicial relief under Title II.
Senate Report at 3, USCCA at 5910:
Very similar ideas were expressed at the debates on the legislation. As Congresswoman Holtzman stated:
Plaintiffs who suffer discrimination and other infringements of their civil rights are usually not wealthy people. The organizations who have helped them bring their cases are frequently not well financed. The Justice Department does not have the resources to bring suit for every civil rights violation. Thus, many people, deprived of their civil rights, may not as a practical matter be able to do anything about it. It is not right to deny people who cannot afford to pay attorneys’ fees the availability of justice through our courts.
122 Cong.Rec. H 12164 (daily ed. Oct. 1, 1976). And Congressman Seiberling, the original sponsor of legislation permitting the awarding of attorneys’ fees in civil rights cases, stated:
If the law does not authorize the awarding of attorneys’ fees in meritorious civil rights cases, many potential [1275]*1275plaintiffs will be deterred from bringing deserving cases to remedy violations of the Constitution, especially those cases in which the appropriate relief is primarily equitable or injunctive rather than monetary.
Id. at H 12165.
Recognizing Congress’ clear signals to apply the Act “broadly to achieve its remedial purpose,” Mid-Hudson Legal Services, Inc. v.G & U, Inc., 578 F.2d 34, 37 (2d Cir. 1978), Courts have taken an extremely liberal view on nearly every interpretative question that has arisen thus far under § 1988. For example, the Courts have held that when a party files a case under a federal statute covered by § 1988 and also files a pendent state claim which is dispositive, the Act nonetheless entitles the prevailing party to attorneys’ fees. See, e. g., Seals v. Quarterly County Court, 562 F.2d 390 (6th Cir. 1977); Bond v. Stanton, 555 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1977). Similarly, although the Act provides that the Court “in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party [attorneys’ fees]” (emphasis added), Courts have held that unless the awarding of such fees would, because of special circumstances, be unjust, attorneys’ fees should be awarded to the prevailing party as a matter of course. See, e. g., Iranian Students Association v. Edwards, 604 F.2d 352 (5th Cir. 1979); Sethy v. Alameda County Water District, 602 F.2d 894 (9th Cir. 1979); Wharton v. Knefel, 562 F.2d 550 (8th Cir. 1977); Brown v. Culpepper, 559 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1977). Furthermore, it has been consistently held that the Act is to be retroactively applied. Gore v. Turner, 563 F.2d 159 (5th Cir. 1977); Bond v. Stanton, supra. And Courts have held that a party need not win on every issue to be a “prevailing party” under the Act. See, e. g., Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1979); Brown v. Culpepper, supra. See generally Lipson, Beyond Alyeska—Judicial Response to the Civil Rights Attorneys’ Fees Act, 22 St. Louis U.L.J. 243 (1978).
While admittedly the Courts in the cases just cited had somewhat more guidance from the legislative history than we have here, we believe that a liberal reading of the Act is also appropriate with respect to the awarding of interest on attorneys’ fees. We do not mean to suggest that Congress explicitly intended that interest on attorneys’ fees be awarded. Congress probably never specifically considered the question.10 On the other hand, we do not believe that Congress intended to bar recovery of interest on attorneys’ fees. And the awarding of interest is entirely consistent with the purpose of the Act: to ensure effective enforcement of the civil rights laws.11
[1276]*1276In analyzing the nature of the interest award, it must be understood that the awarding of interest is in no sense a windfall. Because a dollar today is worth more than a dollar in the future, “the only way [a party] can be made whole is to award him interest from the time he should have received the money.” Louisiana & Arkansas Railway Co. v. Export Drum Co., 359 F.2d 311, 317 (5th Cir. 1966). Indeed, this case dramatizes the need for interest on attorneys’ fees if the attorneys for the prevailing party are to be adequately compensated. Most of the fees at issue in this case were awarded in 1973. Because of inflation, these awards are worth far less today than they were seven years ago. Had the awards been made in 1973, the attorneys could have been drawing interest on that amount for the last seven years.12
The appropriateness of awarding interest on attorneys’ fees in the civil rights context becomes even clearer when § 1988 is examined in light of the precise considerations expressed in Carpa. As stated above, Car-pa relied on the existence of treble damages and on the definition of attorneys’ fees as part of costs. Section 1988 is distinguishable on both bases.
First, there are no treble damage provisions under any of the civil rights statutes covered by § 1988. Indeed, as the legislative history discussed above emphasizes, many of the litigants in civil rights cases have little or no money with which to hire a lawyer. Frequently the litigant is unable to obtain any damages under the applicable statute but can seek only injunctive or declaratory relief. In Senate debate on the legislation, Senator Kennedy drew a sharp distinction between the civil rights and anti-trust contexts:
The lawyer who undertakes to represent a client alleging a violation of the civil rights statutes covered by this bill faces significant uncertainty of payment, even where he has a strong case. For there is often important principles to be gained in such litigation, and rights to be conferred or enforced, but just as often no large promise of monetary recovery lies at the end of the tunnel. So civil rights cases — unlike tort or antitrust cases■ — do not provide the prevailing plaintiff with a large recovery from which he can pay his lawyer. That is why Congress has already decided in many recent civil rights laws to include provisions for recovery of attorneys’ fees, in order to insure that the rights guaranteed by the laws are not lost through the inability of those who are supposed to benefit to obtain judicial enforcement of those rights.
122 Cong.Rec. S 17052 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1976) (emphasis added). We can think of no type of litigation where “the absence of a treble damage provision which complements the attorneys’ fee provision,” Carpa, supra, 567 F.2d at 1323, is more significant than in the civil rights context.
Second, while it is true that § 1988 also defines attorneys’ fees as part of costs, see note 9, supra, the legislative history makes clear that this was done for one reason and one reason only: to ensure that the Eleventh Amendment is no bar so that these fees are recoverable against Government officials acting in their official capacity. As this Court stated in Morrow v. Dillard, 580 F.2d 1284, 1299 n. 18 (5th Cir. 1978):
The Senate Report contemplated that by defining fees as costs there would be no problem in awarding fees against State officers acting in their official capacities
See Senate Report at 5, USCCA at 5913; House Report at 7. In the anti-trust context, by contrast, the Court in Carpa could point to nothing to explain Congress’s inclu[1277]*1277sion of attorneys’ fees as part of costs. Certainly Congress was not trying to make clear that attorneys’ fees could be assessed against state and local Governments, since Congress intended that the anti-trust laws be inapplicable to suits against Government entities.13
Thus, in analyzing § 1988 and its inclusion of attorneys’ fees as part of costs, Congress’ concern about the possible immunity of Government officials must be kept clearly in mind. This fact rebuts the assumption of Judge Hill that Congress intended to define attorneys’ fees as part of costs for all purposes.
To read Carpa as Judge Hill does would be to place Congress in a no win situation. If Congress specifies attorneys’ fees as part of costs, then interest cannot be awarded, and in cases such as this, attorneys’ fee awards will be inadequate. On the other hand, if Congress does not specify attorneys’ fee awards as part of costs, it runs the risk that such fees will not be assessed against Government officials acting in their official capacity.
In addition, Judge Hill’s view — that Car-pa requires rejection of interest on attorneys’ fees whenever they are defined as part of costs — would foreclose the possibility of recovering interest on attorneys’ fees under a variety of other statutes. As of 1977, there were at least 75 statutes enacted by Congress authorizing attorneys’ fees. See Berger, Court Awarded Attorneys’ Pees: What Is “Reasonable”? 126 U.Pa.L. Rev. 281, 303-04 n. 104 (listing statutes).14 [1278]*1278A large number of these statutes define attorneys’ fees as part of costs. See, e. g., Federal Contested Elections Act, § 17, 2 U.S.C.A. § 396; Freedom of Information Act Amendments, § 1(b)(2), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552(a)(4)(E); Privacy Act of 1974, § 3, 5 U.S.C.A. § 552a(g)(2)(B); Government in the Sunshine Act, § 3(a), 5 U.S.C.A. § 552b(i); Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Improvement Act, § 110(d), 15 U.S.C.A. § 2310(d); Civil Rights Act of 1964 §§ 204, 706, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000a-3(b), 2000e-5(k). We cannot believe that the Court in Carpa, with its emphatic language that each act must be carefully considered, intended to decide the question of interest on attorneys’ fees with respect to these and many other statutes.15
In sum, we believe that § 1988 should be liberally construed to permit the awarding of interest on attorneys’ fees.16 [1279]*1279Such a liberal approach finds general support both in the legislative history of § 1988 and in the various cases interpreting it. Nor do we believe that Carpa compels a contrary result. Because the Carpa decision was a very narrow one, and because the decision today is likewise a very narrow one, we disagree with Judge Hill’s suggestion ((dissent), p. 1283) that to award interest on attorneys’ fees under § 1988, en banc reconsideration of Carpa is essential. With twenty-five Judges on this Court, it hardly serves good sound administration of justice to call an en banc session to reconsider a narrow decision arising under the antitrust laws that is readily distinguishable from the facts presented here.
Accordingly, we affirm that part of the District Court’s opinion holding that Appellees are entitled to interest on the initial award of $41,750 for attorneys’ fees and on the supplemental award of $2,562.50 for time spent on appeal. We also hold, however, that the District Court erred in awarding interest on the out-of-pocket costs of $10,986.05. See supra at 1270 n. 2.17
Conclusion
This case has flip-flopped from the District Court to this Court to the District Court and to this Court again for almost a decade. In 1972, the District Court held that the operation of Parchman Penitentia[1280]*1280ry infringed upon the constitutional rights of its inmates. 349 F.Supp. 881 (N.D.Miss. 1972). We affirmed the District Court. 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974). In 1973, the District Court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs, and we affirmed. 489 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1973). Two Supreme Court cases, Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974), and Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, supra, led this Court (sitting en banc) to vacate and remand for reconsideration of attorneys’ fees in light of these cases. 522 F.2d 81 (5th Cir. 1975). The District Court reassessed attorneys’ fees, 70 F.R.D. 341 (N.D. Miss.1976), and this Court affirmed the judgments (but reversed the denial of attorneys’ fees for appellate proceedings and remanded on that question). 559 F.2d 244 (5th Cir. 1977). In the 1977 Fifth Circuit case, we remarked: “This is, we hope, the last appearance of this lengthy litigation challenging prison conditions in the Mississippi State Penitentiary.” 559 F.2d at 241.
But the last appearance it was not. The defendants tried one last desperate effort: they refused to pay over the attorneys’ fees, raising Eleventh Amendment arguments that, as Part I points out, are so clearly meritless as to be frivolous. Yet, recognizing that they were bound to lose on those arguments, the defendants also challenged the awarding of interest on attorneys’ fees and out of pocket costs. By Part II, the Court now rejects the argument that interest on attorneys’ fees was not proper.18
And we once again express our hope that with this opinion,19 the long history of this litigation involving conditions at the Mississippi State Penitentiary has come to an end.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.