TJOFLAT, Chief Judge:
This case arises out of the construction of a Marriott Corporation hotel in Orlando, Florida. Marriott, the appellee, acted as both the owner and general manager of the project. In that capacity, Marriott contracted with Dasta Construction Company, the appellant, to perform certain portions of the work. After the hotel was built, Marriott brought this suit in the district court to recover payments it had made on Dasta’s behalf to Dasta subcontractors and suppliers. Dasta counterclaimed, contending that Marriott not only had failed to carry out its contractual obligations, but also had interfered with Dasta’s performance. A jury found for Marriott on its claims and awarded Marriott the sums it had paid Dasta subcontractors and suppliers. On the counterclaim, the jury found for Dasta and awarded it $4,659,390.90. The district court subsequently granted Marriott’s motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, dismissing Das-ta’s counterclaim on the merits and limiting Marriott’s award to its costs of action. Dasta now appeals, seeking reinstatement of the jury’s verdict. Finding no merit in any of Dasta’s arguments, we affirm.
I.
In early 1982, Marriott began construction on an elaborate resort complex, or “mega hotel,” in Orlando, Florida.1 The Marriott Orlando World Resort (“Resort”) was to contain fourteen different building segments, including a twenty-eight story guest tower; numerous convention rooms, restaurants, and ballrooms; and several outbuildings for swimming pools, golf courses, and tennis courts. Due to the size and complexity of Marriott’s undertaking — at the time of completion, the Resort was the largest building in terms of square footage in the state of Florida — construction was divided into several distinct projects requiring the coordination of numerous contractors and subcontractors.
Dasta became involved with the Resort in 1983, approximately one year after construction began. At that time, Dasta was one of the five largest building contractors in Kansas City, Missouri, specializing in all types of commercial and industrial construction and handling an average annual contract volume of between $20 and $30 million. Vincent [1060]*1060Dasta, the company’s president and chairman of the board, possessed advanced degrees in civil engineering and business administration as well as more than twenty-five years of experience in the construction business.
Dasta first learned of the Marriott Resort project through William Hall, the owner of another Kansas City contracting company, Hall-Missouri. Although Dasta had never performed any work for Marriott,2 Hall-Missouri had worked on three Marriott hotel construction projects and was familiar with Marriott’s building practices.3 Hall approached Dasta and suggested that the two contractors join forces to solicit work on the Resort. The combination was advantageous for both companies as Dasta possessed the size and experience to handle the large-scale Resort contracts, while Hall-Missouri offered a history of successful working relations with Marriott. In fact, it appeared doubtful that either company would have been capable of winning a contract for the Resort on its own.
On May 4, 1984, Marriott invited Dasta and Hall-Missouri to submit competitive bids for the exterior skin and drywall work on the Resort’s guest tower. The majority of the exterior skin work consisted of affixing layers of stucco, plaster, and water-proofing onto the cement block walls of the guest tower. The drywall work consisted of the application of drywall boards and finishing materials to the guest tower’s ceilings and inner walls. Case Concrete Contractors had already begun to construct the concrete walls that would provide the basis for the exterior skin at the time that Dasta and Hall-Missouri became involved in the Resort bidding process.
The bid invitation packages for the Resort’s exterior skin and drywall projects each contained a set of architectural drawings, a set of plans and specifications, and a list of general conditions that defined the nature of the potential relationship between Marriott and Dasta. The drawings and specifications included in the Resort bids were only between 50 and 80 percent complete,4 however, because the Resort was being built on a “fast track” basis. Under the fast track method, construction on a building begins before a final set of fully coordinated plans is completed. Rather, the architectural plans and specifications are designed and modified as the building’s actual construction progresses. The advantage of the fast track method, as opposed to building from plans completed at the outset, is that it enables construction to begin at a much earlier stage in the project. The method’s disadvantage results from increased difficulty in scheduling and coordinating the project since the construction progress schedule must be modified to account for constant plan changes. Notwithstanding these difficulties, however, Marriott had employed fast track construction in a number of prior, albeit smaller, hotel construction projects, including the three on which Hall-Missouri had been involved.
In May 1984, after reviewing the bid documents, Vincent Dasta and William Hall conducted pre-bid investigations of the project site in Orlando. During their visit, both men inspected the work in progress, reviewed the project paperwork, and engaged in “fairly lengthy discussion and specific discussion about the sequencing and scheduling of the work” to be done by Dasta. William Hall also participated in a critical series of special planning sessions hosted by Marriott. At these meetings, which lasted several days and which all of the contractors then working on the Resort attended, Marriott and the contractors engaged in detailed discussions about the current state of the Resort construction and the projected construction schedule. At the conclusion of these sessions, an outside planning consultant (who also attended the meetings) converted the [1061]*1061information from the meetings into the Resort’s Critical Path Method (“CPM”).
According to the trial testimony of both Dasta and Marriott, a CPM is a standard construction device used to “plan the activities of a construction project in a logical orderly sequencing manner citing durations for the different activities from the beginning of the job to the end.” A CPM is created by dividing the entire project into discrete and quantifiable steps; in turn, each step is allotted an estimated time for completion. Ultimately, each step is arranged into a chronological sequence, thus revealing the anticipated length and structure of the entire construction schedule. In addition to serving as a roadmap for the contractors to determine when and where their work fits into the overall construction sequence, the CPM also assists contractors in assessing their hiring and material purchasing needs.
On June 1, 1984, Dasta and Hall-Missouri (hereinafter referred to jointly as “Dasta”) submitted bids under the Dasta moniker for both the exterior skin and drywall contracts. Dasta priced the exterior skin contract on enough “manpower to accomplish that work on an eight-hour day 40-hour basis and be done on time,” and submitted the successful low bid price. Dasta was awarded that contract, but failed to win the drywall contract.
Shortly after submitting its bids, Dasta received a copy of the CPM developed at the planning meetings. The CPM essentially restated the scheduling information that Dasta had received during the site visit; Dasta anticipated that the exterior skin work would commence in mid-July 1984 and continue in a logical fashion for fifteen months before concluding in September 1985. The CPM also stated that it was “for [Dasta’s] use in scheduling and determining crew sizes and work areas as per General Conditions of the Specifications item 6A [and 6]C, page 5.”5
According to Vincent Dasta, the company concluded that the CPM “was a good schedule and adequate to accomplish the exterior skin work in an efficient, production-type manner, working normal hours with optimum crew sizes.” On July 2,1984, Dasta formally contracted with Marriott to perform the exterior skin work for a lump sum price of $3,109,850. All of the documents from the original bid package — including the drawings, specifications, and general conditions— were incorporated into the final contract.
In mid-July, Dasta’s construction team arrived at the project site and learned that construction was operating at least five months behind schedule. The delay was caused by the “extremely poor quality” of Case’s concrete work, which contributed to a concrete collapse in the Resort’s tower area in mid-May. The defective concrete work was of particular concern to Dasta since much of its exterior skin work had to be placed directly onto Case’s concrete work, such that any problems with the concrete would translate directly into problems with the exterior skin. Although Dasta had planned “to be working full force” immediately upon arrival at the construction site, the defective concrete prevented it from doing so. Dasta related these concerns to Marriott, which in turn assured Dasta that Case was going to fix the defective work and that Dasta should not worry because Dasta was “not going to be responsible for [any other contractor’s problems].”
[1062]*1062In addition to the faulty concrete, Dasta experienced a number of other difficulties and delays during the prosecution of its contractual obligations. First, Marriott’s fast track approach resulted in frequent and significant modifications to both the architectural plans and the progress schedule. These modifications prevented Dasta from proceeding in the orderly sequence that was anticipated by the original CPM, thereby causing Dasta to incur significant additional costs due to inefficiency and under-utilized labor. In total, Marriott issued hundreds of changes to the Resort’s drawings and progress schedule.6
Second, Marriott’s failure to provide adequate vertical transportation and safety measures placed Dasta further behind schedule. Naturally, Dasta’s performance on the upper tower areas depended upon its ability to get men and materials up to its work areas. Dasta’s efforts were hampered, however, by a shortage of elevators and hoists and by Marriott’s use of the lifts. When Dasta offered to bring, its own hoist onto the construction site to increase efficiency, Marriott refused to allow it. Dasta experienced similar delays due to Marriott’s belated erection of a safety net required by Occupational Safety and Health Act standards (to catch debris falling from work being done on the tower’s upper levels). Although the original progress schedule anticipated that Dasta would begin the tower work upon its arrival in July, Dasta was unable to begin until January 1985, when Marriott finally put up the net.
Despite these indications that performance of its contractual obligations might be more difficult than it originally believed, Dasta gradually undertook greater responsibility on the Resort project. In October 1984, after Case repeatedly failed to correct its faulty concrete work, Marriott and Dasta agreed that Dasta would perform' the repairs. Das-ta submitted unit prices for the repair work, and Dasta and Marriott drafted a written “Change of Contract” order to encompass the additional work. The procedure for handling the change of contract was provided for in the General Conditions of the original exterior skin contract.7- Dasta also accepted other work assignments from Marriott that were unrelated to Dasta’s base contract work and that resulted in more than twenty separate Changes of Contract, increasing Dasta’s total compensation by $3,255,591.75.
Moreover, in January 1985, roughly six months after Dasta began working at the Resort, Dasta submitted another competitive bid for the Resort’s non-tower drywall contract. Again, Dasta priced its bid on a logical and orderly “production-type manner, working normal hours;” on January 15, Marriott awarded the contract to Dasta for a [1063]*1063lump sum price of $1,749,050. Although the drywall contract was a separate contract, its terms and conditions were identical to the exterior skin contract, and both parties treated the two contracts as one at all times.8
On January 23,1985, one week after Dasta entered into the drywall contract, Marriott hosted a second CPM session. At the meeting, Marriott proposed advancing the Resort completion date by three months, to April 1, 1986. Each contractor was represented at the meeting (including William Hall for Das-ta) and each contractor agreed to the acceleration.9 As a result, the new CPM was immediately put into effect, and Dasta continued to perform its contract work.
It eventually became clear, however, that Dasta was not up to the task.. In February 1986, as the Resort’s completion date drew near, cost overruns resulting from the delays in the Resort progress schedule caused Das-ta to run out of money. As a consequence, Dasta could no longer compensate its subcontractors and suppliers. Vincent Dasta met with Marriott on February 3 to discuss “the additional costs Dasta was incurring due to disruption, acceleration, overtime work, increased crew sizes, etc.” At that time, Marriott told Mr. Dasta that the important thing was to get the Resort completed in time and that afterwards Marriott would discuss a fair and reasonable settlement. According to Dasta, Marriott instructed Dasta to submit a formal “efficiency claim”10 for its additional costs. Dasta relied on Marriott’s assurances and borrowed more than $1.5 million in order to meet its contractual obligations.
Notwithstanding the additional borrowed funds, Dasta remained unable to pay all of its suppliers and subcontractors; accordingly, Marriott made several payments on behalf of Dasta. On February 28,1986, under Dasta’s direction, Marriott paid $292,000 directly to Dasta’s subcontractors and suppliers and subtracted an equal amount from the outstanding balance due Dasta on the contracts. Furthermore, on September 24, 1986, after Dasta had left the work site and the Resort was opened to the public, Marriott was forced to make additional payments to Dasta subcontractors and suppliers in order to discharge certain liens that they had recorded against the Resort. The suppliers and subcontractors filed the liens because Dasta had neglected to pay them for services rendered at the Resort.
At approximately the same time, Dasta presented the efficiency claim that Marriott had invited it to submit at the February 3 meeting. Dasta sought several million dollars as compensation for the additional costs it incurred in performing the contract work.11
[1064]*1064II.
Rather than negotiate or pay Dasta’s claim, Marriott filed this suit in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida. In its complaint, Marriott sought, first, indemnification from Dasta for the sums it had paid to satisfy the mechanics’ liens filed against the Resort by Dasta subcontractors and suppliers, and, second, a declaration that it was not liable for the amount of Dasta’s efficiency claim.
On November 4, 1986, Dasta answered Marriott’s complaint and filed a counterclaim for $3,933,502.20. In these pleadings, Dasta advanced several theories of law to support its position that it owed Marriott nothing for the sums Marriott had purportedly paid on Dasta’s behalf and that it was entitled to recover the damages sought. Among other things, Dasta alleged that (1) at the time Dasta bid the contracts, Marriott misrepresented both the progress of the overall construction and the terms and conditions of Dasta’s undertaking, misrepresentations that induced Dasta substantially to underbid the job; and (2) Marriott breached the contracts by unduly delaying Dasta’s performance.12 At the pre-trial conference, the district court reduced Dasta’s numerous theories of recovery to a claim for breach of contract.
The case was tried to a jury. After eight days of trial, the jury found, by special verdict, that Marriott was entitled to recover the $369,402.02 it had paid Dasta suppliers and subcontractors and that Dasta was entitled to recover $2,452,311.00, the unpaid balance due on the contracts, and $2,207,079.90,’ the damages Dasta suffered by reason of Marriott’s deliberate interference with Dasta’s performance of the contracts, along with accumulated interest.
Marriott thereafter moved for either judgment n.o.v.13 or, in the alternative, a new trial. The court gave Marriott judgment, set aside the jury’s verdict for Dasta, and awarded Marriott the sum of $369,402.02. In an opinion accompanying its ruling, the court observed that there was no evidence that Marriott had committed the contractual breaches Dasta had alleged or that Marriott had interfered, in violation of its contractual duty to the contrary, with Dasta’s performance of the contract work.
III.
Dasta asks us to reinstate the jury’s verdict and to direct the district court to enter judgment in conformance therewith, or, alternatively, to order a new trial. According to Dasta, the district court properly submitted its breach of contract claim to the jury; the court erred, however, when it held, on motion for judgment n.o.v., that the contract documents precluded Dasta’s recovery. Whether the contracts precluded Dasta’s claims for the additional and unanticipated expenses it incurred in performing the work is a pure question of law, to be answered by examining the language of the contracts themselves.14 Zaklama v. Mount Sinai [1065]*1065Medical Ctr., 906 F.2d 650, 652 (11th Cir.1990). Whether Marriott fraudulently or negligently misrepresented the progress of the overall construction of the Resort or the terms and conditions of Dasta’s undertaking, however, are questions of fact, to be answered by examining the evidence adduced at trial in the light most favorable to Dasta. See, e.g., Norton v. Snapper Power Equip., 806 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir.1987).
Our analysis of the contract documents in this case leads us to the inescapable conclusion that Dasta has no claim, under those documents, for the injuries it purportedly suffered at the hands of Marriott. Our analysis of the evidence leads us to the identical conclusion: Dasta has no claim under any of the theories of recovery it advances.
A.
The Resort, although not an unique undertaking for Marriott, represented one of Marriott’s largest and most ambitious construction projects. Inherent in the scale and complexity of the project was the potential for delay in the various phases of its construction. This potential was enhanced by Marriott’s use of the fast track construction method, such that construction began with neither a final set of plans and specifications nor a firm progress schedule or completion date. Presumably, contractors involved with the Resort project made provision for the risks presented by such contingencies in two ways: first, by setting their bid prices high enough to absorb the “additional costs” they might incur in performing the work (including the costs Dasta seeks to recover in this case); and, second, by negotiating contract terms and conditions designed to minimize such costs. In the present case, the parties thoroughly addressed and allocated the risks of delay inherent in the Resort project.
In the General Condition entitled PROGRESS SCHEDULE, which the parties incorporated into their contracts, Marriott “specifically reserve[d] the right to modify the progress schedule as required by conditions of the work,” while Dasta, for its part, “agree[d] to comply with the progress schedule established by the Owner, or any revision thereof.” General Condition 6A.15 Further, General Condition 6C provided that:
[sjhould the Contractor fail to comply with the progress schedule, or in the Owner’s opinion, otherwise fail, refuse or neglect to supply a sufficient amount of labor or material in the prosecution of the Work, Owner shall have the right to (1) direct Contractor to furnish such additional labor and/or materials as may, in the Owner’s opinion, be required to comply with the progress schedule or otherwise diligently prosecute the work, or (2) furnish such additional labor and/or materials as may be required to comply with said schedule. Any costs incurred by Owner pursuant to the exercise of its rights under this paragraph shall be borne by the Contractor and shall not increase the Contract Sum.
(Emphasis added.) In addition to the foregoing, Article III, section 3.1 of both the exterior skin and the drywall contracts, entitled TIME OF COMMENCEMENT AND COMPLETION, reiterated Marriott’s right to modify the progress schedule:
TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE OF THIS AGREEMENT. The Owner may sustain financial loss if the project or any part thereof is delayed because the Contractor fails to perform any part of the work in accordance with the contract documents, including, without limitation, a failure to comply with the schedule for this project, or any revision thereof, established by Owner. The Contractor shall begin the work at the time directed by the Owner [1066]*1066and perform its obligations under this agreement with diligence and sufficient manpower to maintain the progress of the work as scheduled by Owner, without delaying other contractors or areas of work. At the request of the Owner, the Contractor shall perform certain parts of the work before other parts, add extra manpower, or order overtime labor in order to comply with the schedule (or any revision thereof), all without any increase in the contract sum.
(Emphasis added.) Finally, in Article III, section 3.2, Dasta certified that “the required materials and manpower [would be] available to prosecute the work in accordance with such schedule.” In short, Marriott had complete discretion to adjust the schedule as well as to demand that Dasta comply with such adjustments without additionally compensating Dasta.
In arriving at its bid prices, Dasta had the opportunity to account for Marriott’s broad powers, as well as to compensate itself for the risk of delay, by increasing its prices fairly to reflect the risks it was assuming. Article V, section 5.2, addressing the Contract Sum, specifically advised Dasta that its price should include “all increases in costs, foreseen or unforeseen, including ... labor and materials” and that “[a]ll loss or damage arising from any of the work through unforeseen or unusual obstructions, difficulties or delays which may be encountered in prosecution of the work, or through the action of the elements shall be borne by Contractor.” Under this pricing arrangement, known as lump sum pricing, Dasta bore the risks associated with underestimating its price or failing to account for unexpected additional costs.16 At the same time, however, Dasta would reap all of the benefits of any cost savings, in the event that the Resort was completed at an earlier date, or in a more efficient manner, than originally anticipated.
Dasta was familiar with this form of contract pricing. Dasta was also aware of both the potential for delay in this project and the fact that it would not be entitled to demand additional compensation for delay from Marriott upon completion. Despite this knowledge, Dasta priced its contracts under the unrealistic expectation that there would be no modifications to the progress schedule and that the work would be prosecuted, according to Vincent Dasta, “in an efficient production-type manner, working normal hours with optimum crew sizes.”
Notwithstanding that Dasta, in formulating its bid prices, failed to protect itself from the delays occasioned here, it still protected itself, in the contracts, against unforeseen delays beyond its control, including those caused by the “act or neglect” of Marriott or Marriott’s subcontractors or from “changes ordered in the scope of the work.” A provision in the contracts, known as a “no damage for delay” clause, gave Dasta the specific right to seek an extension of its time for performance in the event of delay; Dasta, [1067]*1067as consideration for this right, agreed not to seek damages for such delay. The no damage for delay clause, located in General Condition Item 7A, states as follows:
If the Contractor is delayed at any time in the progress of the Work by any act or neglect of Owner or by any contractor employed by Owner, or by changes ordered in the scope of the Work, or by fire, adverse weather conditions not reasonably anticipated, or any other causes beyond the control of the Contractor, then the required completion date or duration set forth in the progress schedule shall be extended by the amount of time that the Contractor shall have been delayed thereby. However, to the fullest extent permitted by law, Owner and Marriott Corporation and their agents and employees shall not be held responsible for any loss or damage sustained by Contractor, or additional costs incurred by Contractor, through delay caused by Owner or Marriott Corporation, or their agents or employees, or any other Contractor or Subcontractor, or by abnormal weather conditions, or by any other cause, and Contractor agrees that the sole right and remedy therefor shall be an extension of time.17
In order to receive an extension of time, however, Dasta was obliged to present Marriott with a legitimate request for an extension of time.18 In addition to the no damage for delay clause located in General Condition Item 7A, the contracts between Marriott and Dasta contained an independent clause, General Condition Item 7B, that required Dasta to submit a written request detailing the cause and length of the delay, as well as the length of the requested extension.19 The condition also required that the request be submitted within seven days of the commencement of the delay.
The utility of a written request, or its functional equivalent, is that it would have provided Marriott with a meaningful opportunity to evaluate the legitimacy of Dasta’s claim, and to determine whether Dasta’s request should be honored or rejected. This notice requirement was particularly important because Dasta was only entitled to recover damages if Marriott’s refusal to grant a time extension was wrongful. See Pertun, 918 F.2d at 919-20 (refusing to enforce no damage for delay clause where owner prevented request for extension by wrongful and premature termination of contract).
Finally, assuming arguendo, that Dasta made a legitimate request for an extension of time, as required under the contracts in this case, and that Marriott subsequently refused to grant the extension, Florida law would not permit the no damage for delay clause to bar Dasta’s recovery if the delays were occasioned by Marriott’s fraud, concealment, or active interference with Das-[1068]*1068ta’s performance under the contract. Seminole, 828 F.2d at 675; see also Southern Gulf, 238 So.2d at 459 (no damage for delay clause ineffective where delay is knowing and sufficiently egregious); McIntire v. Green-Tree Communities, Inc., 318 So.2d 197, 199-200 (Fla. 2d Dist.Ct.App.1975) (delay clause ineffective where “circumstances which caused the delay were brought about by [owner] and were even foreseen but concealed by [owner] when the contract was made”). These exceptions to the no damage for delay clause are premised upon an “implied promise and obligation not to hinder or impede performance.” Newberry Square Dev. Corp. v. Southern Landmark, Inc., 578 So.2d 750, 752 (Fla. 1st Dist.Ct.App.1991).
Thus, under the terms of the contracts, Marriott had absolute authority to modify the construction schedule, while Dasta was obligated to abide by Marriott’s instructions. Although these terms may seem one-sided, Dasta was aware of these provisions at the time it bid the contracts, and had the opportunity to increase its proposed contract prices to account for the risks it would be assuming. Dasta failed to seize upon this opportunity, and, in hindsight, made a pair of improvident bargains from which we are powerless to grant relief. It is not the function of the courts to “rewrite a contract or interfere with the freedom of contract or substitute their judgment for that of the parties thereto in order to relieve one of the parties from the apparent hardship of an improvident bargain.” Steiner v. Physicians Protective Trust Fund, 388 So.2d 1064, 1066 (Fla. 3d Dist.Ct.App.1980) (quoting Beach Resort Hotel Corp. v. Wieder, 79 So.2d 659, 663 (Fla.1955)).
B.
It is unnecessary to determine whether Marriott actively interfered with Dasta’s performance, because Dasta waived the application of the no damage for delay clause by failing to make a proper request for an extension of time as required by the contracts.20 At trial, Vincent Dasta testified, on direct examination, as follows:
Q: Now Mr. Dasta, at any time in the course of this job did you personally submit a written request to Marriott for an extension of time?
A: No, only verbal.
Q: To your knowledge, did Bill Hall [Das-ta’s project executive] or Ed Matthews [Dasta’s project manager] submit a written request for an extension of time?
A: They may have. I don’t have direct knowledge of it.
Q: Do you recall ever seeing [a] written request for an extension of time?
[1069]*1069A: I may have recalled seeing one, yes, but I can’t tell you when I saw it or when it was written. But, I may have.
Obviously, this testimony was insufficient to demonstrate that Dasta presented Marriott with a written request for an extension of time.21 Moreover, none of Dasta’s verbal communications to Marriott was sufficient to constitute the functional equivalent of a written request for an extension of time. Vincent Dasta testified that he and other Dasta employees “made numerous verbal comments, notices, however you want to call them or portray them” that Dasta was being delayed by the conditions of the job. The exchanges referred to by Dasta, however, amounted to little more than grumblings and complaints by Dasta that were met with generalized assurances from Marriott that Dasta would not be held responsible for any delays. In these exchanges, Dasta did not identify, with any degree of particularity, the cause or the length of any of its alleged delays. As such, these comments and notices by Dasta were legally insufficient to activate the protection of the no damage for delay clause.22
Dasta argues that it never requested an extension because Marriott had indicated that “no extensions of time were to be given on this job.” Despite the knowledge that Marriott had adopted a position that was wrongful under the conduct, Dasta failed to take any affirmative steps toward enforcing its legitimate contractual right to request an extension. Instead, Dasta decided to accept Marriott’s generalized statements because, according to Vincent Dasta, it “relied on another portion of the contract which specifically states that there is a trust and confidence relationship between parties and that ... both parties have to have mutual trust and confidence in each other.”
We are not persuaded by Dasta’s explanation.23 In the face of a clear contractual provision directly addressing its right to relief in the given situation,24 Dasta, in light of its sophistication and experience, simply was not permitted to rely on general notions of good faith and mutual fair dealing. Moreover, there is no indication that Marriott’s actions were wrongful or in bad faith. Although Dasta might have been entitled to an extension of time if it was in fact delayed by Marriott’s actions, Marriott had a contractual right to engage in the course of conduct it pursued. Despite Dasta’s complaints to the contrary, the exercise of a legitimate contrac[1070]*1070tual right simply does not amount to a wrongful act.25 This fact, along with Dasta’s failure to request any extensions of time, is fatal to Dasta’s claim for damages due to delay, “impact,” and “inefficiency.”26 In short, the contracts defined the only remedy available to Dasta, and Dasta failed to pursue that remedy.
IV.
The final issue for our determination concerns Dasta’s claim of entitlement to the outstanding amounts on its contracts with Marriott. Although the jury found that “the amount of the unpaid contract balance that Dasta is entitled to recover” is $2,452,311.00, the parties agree that the actual amount owed Dasta on the contracts totals $509,-358.49. Also undisputed is the fact that Das-ta expressly authorized Marriott to reduce the amount owed under the contracts to reflect the $292,000 in payments that Marriott made directly to Dasta subcontractors and suppliers. Thus, both parties agree that the final amount left owing Dasta on the contracts totals $217,358.49.27
In addition to the $292,000 in payments credited by Dasta, however, Marriott demonstrated at trial that it paid an additional $278,114.2828 directly to Dasta subeontrae-[1071]*1071tors and suppliers in order to extinguish liens placed on the Resort after Dasta failed to compensate them for their work on the project. Marriott asserts, and the district court found, that this amount should be applied as a set-off to the outstanding contract balances owed to Dasta. We agree.
According to General Condition Item 25, Dasta agreed not to permit its subcontractors and suppliers to place any liens on the Resort property. Moreover, “in the event that any such hen shall be filed, [Dasta] agrees to take all steps necessary and proper for the release and discharge of such hen ... and in default of performing such obhgation, agrees to reimburse the Owner, on demand, for all monies paid by Owner in releasing, satisfying, and discharging of such hens.”
Accordingly, Dasta was obhgated bo remove ah mechanics’ hens placed on the Resort by its supphers and subcontractors. Dasta failed to abide by this provision, and because the additional amounts paid by Marriott exceed the outstanding balances owed Dasta, Marriott is entitled to set-off the entire remaining amount of the outstanding contract balances.29
V.
Dasta’s failure to comply with the contractually-provided measures for rehef bars Das-ta from recovering for its delay, impact, and inefficiency damages. Dasta also cannot recover its outstanding contract balances because those amounts wére offset by payments made by Marriott on Dasta’s behalf. Accordingly, the district court’s grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.