Knotts v. United States

121 F. Supp. 630, 128 Ct. Cl. 489, 1954 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 139
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJune 8, 1954
DocketNo. 50215
StatusPublished
Cited by143 cases

This text of 121 F. Supp. 630 (Knotts v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Knotts v. United States, 121 F. Supp. 630, 128 Ct. Cl. 489, 1954 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 139 (cc 1954).

Opinion

WhitakeR, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff alleges, that she was illegally discharged from her position with the National Labor Relations Board and she sues for the salary of which she was thereby deprived.

. The decisions of this court are uniform in holding that it will not review on the merits a removal of a Government employee where it appears that the procedural requirements prescribed by statute have been complied with, and where there is no showing that the action was taken maliciously or in bad faith. But we have also said that if it appears that an employee was discharged, not for the good of the service, but from motives of malice or for any reason other than for the good of the service, the discharge was unlawful and the employee is therefore entitled to recover the salary he would have earned had he not been illegally discharged.

We stated the reason for this in Gadsden v. United States, 111 C. Cls. 487, 489-490:

On the other hand, if the administrative officer did not act in good faith, if he in fact did not discharge the em[491]*491ployee for a cause that would promote the efficiency-of the service, but if, on the other hand, he was motivated alone by malice toward the employee, there would seem to be but little doubt that the employee’s rights under the Act of 1912 have been violated. That Act says, “that no person in the classified civil service of the United States shall be removed therefrom except for such cause as will promote the efficiency of said service.” If, as a matter of fact, he was removed not for a cause that promoted the efficiency of the service, but maliciously, merely because his superior did not like him, or merely because he wanted his job for some friend of his, then obviously the employee’s discharge was wrongful and illegal and, therefore, he is entitled to recover whatever loss he may have suffered thereby.
In innumerable cases it has been held that where discretion is conferred on an administrative officer to render a decision, this decision must be honestly rendered, and that if it is arbitrary or capricious, or rendered in bad faith, the courts have power to review it and set it aside. This court has this question presented to it constantly in cases arising under Government contracts, -where the contracting officer and the head of the department are given the power to render final decisions on questions of fact. Both this Court and the Supreme Court have many times held that if the decision is arbitrary or capricious or so grossly erroneous as to imply bad faith, it will be set aside. See e. g. Burchell v. Marsh, 17 How. 344, 349; Kihlberg v. United States, 97 U. S. 398; United States v. Gleason, 175 U. S. 588, 602; Ripley v. United States, 223 U. S. 695, 701.
The court will hot substitute its judgment for that of the administrative officer, but the employee nevertheless has the right to the honest judgment of the administrative officer. If that officer does not render an honest judgment but acts arbitrarily, capriciously or maliciously, then undoubtedly the rights of the employee have been violated.
The plaintiff in this case alleges that he was discharged “without cause, wrongfully, illegally and maliciously.” If he was discharged maliciously and without cause, then he has been deprived of the rights which the Act of 1912 gave him, and he is entitled to maintain this suit under section 145 of the Judicial Code (sec. 250, Title 28, U. S. C.) which gives this court power to render judgment upon a claim “founded upon * * * any law of Congress.”

[492]*492Our task in this case, therefore, is to determine whether or not plaintiff was discharged for the good of the service, "or arbitrarily, or capriciously, or maliciously.

Personnel disputes are hard to resolve. In undertaking to do so, we start out with the presumption that the official acted in good faith. We are always loath to find to the contrary, and it takes, and should take, well-nigh irrefragable proof to induce us to do so. In this case, however, we have reluctantly come to the conclusion that plaintiff’s superiors in discharging her were motivated, not by the good of the service, but by personal animus. In arriving at this conclusion we have not only considered the Commissioner’s reports, and the briefs and argument of counsel, but we have read the testimony in the case, and considered the exhibits.

We are particularly impressed with plaintiff’s testimony. It was straightforward, frank, without any effort to evade, and not intemperate. It “stood up” on cross-examination. On the stand she showed no passion, but was at all times courteous and ladylike, even under rigid cross-examination by Government counsel. We did not see her on the stand, but the Commissioner who did see her confirms our impression.

She was employed by the National Labor Relations Board on November 24, 1947, as a Classification Analyst on a- probational basis. Upon the expiration of six months, her employment became permanent. Her superior was:. Mrs;-Barbara Amerman, who was the only other employee of the National Labor Relations Board engaged in this work.'

When the Taft-Hartley Act [61 Stat. 136] was passed, it was- thought necessary to employ an additional analyst on a temporary basis to help classify the additional personnel to be employed to administer this Act. Mrs. Charlotte Gable was employed in March or April 1948. This woman — and this we regard of especial significance, in the light of what followed — was a personal friend of Mrs. Amerman’s, the chief of the section. This fact was made known at the time to Mrs. Amerman’s superiors, Mr. Shover and Mr, Shaw.

Mrs. Amerman and the plaintiff shared, an office on the seventh floor of the N. L. R. B. building until . Mrs, Gable [493]*493was brought into the Classification Section. At that time, the plaintiff’s desk was moved to the third floor where "a desk was also provided for Mrs. Gable. Within a short time, however, Mrs. Gable moved back to the seventh floor with Mrs. Amerman, leaving the plaintiff alone in the room on the third floor. From then on the work which had been previously assigned to plaintiff was gradually taken away from her and turned over to Mrs. Gable, until finally plaintiff was left with no work to do. From then on she was completely ignored by her superior, Mrs. Amerman, except for one interview now to be related.

Plaintiff was employed on November 24, 1947, by the National Labor Relations Board on a probational basis, subject to audit of her personnel file by the Civil Service Commission. After a six months’ trial period, her appointment became permanent. But in August or September 1948 it came to the attention of the Civil Service Commission that plaintiff had been separated from her former position with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation because she had abandoned her position; and, upon learning this, the Commission on September 7, 1948, notified the National Labor Relations Board that for this reason it would be necessary for plaintiff to fill out another form in which she should explain or justify the reason for her separation from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
121 F. Supp. 630, 128 Ct. Cl. 489, 1954 U.S. Ct. Cl. LEXIS 139, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/knotts-v-united-states-cc-1954.