20-1058-pr Hamilton v. Westchester Cnty., et al.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
August Term 2020
(Argued: January 8, 2021 Decided: June 30, 2021)
Docket No. 20-1058-pr
DAVONTE HAMILTON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
WESTCHESTER COUNTY, RAUL ULLOA, Medical Director, JOSEPH K. SPANO, Westchester County Department of Corrections Commissioner, FRANCIS DELGROSSO, Assistant Warden, KARL VOLLMER, Assistant Warden, LEANDRO DIAZ, Acting Deputy Commissioner, CORRECT CARE SOLUTIONS, LLC,
Defendants-Appellees.
ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
Before: CALABRESI, RAGGI, AND CHIN, Circuit Judges.
Appeal from an opinion and order of the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York (Román, J.), dismissing an inmate's claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42
U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. The district court dismissed the disabilities claim solely on the basis
that the inmate's injuries, which were temporary in nature, did not qualify as a
"disability" under the statute.
AFFIRMED in part, VACATED in part, and REMANDED.
TAMARA LIVSHIZ, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen & Katz, New York, New York (Samuel Weiss and Kelly Jo Popkin, Rights Behind Bars, Washington, D.C., and Brooklyn, New York, on the brief), for Plaintiff- Appellant.
JUSTIN R. ADIN, Deputy County Attorney, for John M. Nonna, Westchester County Attorney, White Plains, New York, for Defendants-Appellees Westchester County, Joseph K. Spano, Francis Delgrosso, Karl Vollmer, and Leandro Diaz.
PAUL A. SANDERS, Barclay Damon LLP, Rochester, New York, for Defendants-Appellees Correct Care Solutions, LLC, Raul Ulloa, and Westchester County.
CHIN, Circuit Judge:
In 2018, while incarcerated at the Westchester County Jail (the "Jail"),
plaintiff-appellant Davonte Hamilton dislocated his knee and tore his meniscus
2 when he stepped on crumbled concrete in the recreational yard. Proceeding pro
se, Hamilton filed suit in the Southern District of New York, bringing claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
(the "ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., against defendants-appellants Westchester
County (the "County") as well as certain County officials, Joseph K. Spano,
Francis Delgrosso, Karl Vollmer, and Leandro Diaz (together with the County,
the "County defendants"), and Correct Care Solutions, LLC ("CCS") and Dr. Raul
Ulloa (together with CCS, the "medical defendants"), alleging deliberate
indifference and failure to accommodate his disabilities.
Both sets of defendants filed motions to dismiss Hamilton's claims
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district
court (Román, J.) granted the motions. As relevant here, in dismissing
Hamilton's ADA claim against the County, the district court held that Hamilton
had only alleged the existence of temporary injuries and thus had not plausibly
alleged a "qualifying disability under the ADA." J. App'x at 29. The district court
did not reach any of the other elements of Hamilton's ADA claim.
As discussed more fully below, we conclude that the district court
erred in categorically excluding short-term injuries from qualifying as a
3 "disability" under the ADA. Accordingly, we VACATE the district court's
opinion and order to the extent it dismisses Hamilton's ADA claim against the
County, we REMAND for further proceedings as to that claim only, and we
AFFIRM the dismissal of all other claims. 1
BACKGROUND
The following facts are drawn from Hamilton's complaint, and are
assumed to be true. See Ricci v. Teamsters Union Local 456, 781 F.3d 25, 26 (2d Cir.
2015).
On August 21, 2018, while playing basketball in the recreational
yard at the Jail, Hamilton stepped onto a crumbled piece of concrete, dislocating
his knee and tearing his meniscus. On August 27, 2018, Hamilton received
medical attention at the Westchester Medical Center (the "Medical Center"),
which provided him with a "knee stabilizer" and recommended that he receive
an "immediate MRI." J. App'x at 49. Ulloa, the medical director of CCS, the
contractor responsible for treating Hamilton at the Jail, disregarded the
recommendation, causing Hamilton's injury to "settle." Id. Ulloa and CCS
1 In his briefs on appeal, Hamilton makes clear that he is pursuing his appeal only as to his ADA claim against the County.
4 replaced his knee stabilizer with an elastic ace bandage, which failed to keep
Hamilton's knee in alignment, resulting in "severe pain." Id.
On or about August 28, 2018, Hamilton filed a grievance about the
dilapidated condition of the courtyard with "Sergeant Hollis." Id. at 54. Sergeant
Hollis accepted Hamilton's grievance regarding the courtyard but did not timely
respond, prompting Hamilton to file an appeal with the Jail's "grievance
coordinator, which was never answered or responded to." Id. While the Jail
closed the courtyard where Hamilton's injury occurred, it did not repair the
courtyard floor, which had been in disrepair "for an extended duration (30
years)." Id. at 45.
After his injury, Hamilton had to use crutches, and felt both
numbness and throbbing pain as he navigated the Jail with his "wobbling" knee.
Id. at 50. Because standing caused "excruciating pain" even with crutches,
Hamilton had difficulty moving around his housing unit and his own cell,
which, like the courtyard, had cracked and damaged concrete flooring. Id.
Because his housing unit lacked accessibility ramps and was accessible only
through stairs, he could not go outside for recreational activities after his injury.
5 Inside the housing unit, inmates also needed to climb over a two-
and-a-half-foot step to get into the shower stalls. This caused Hamilton
"excruciating pain" when getting in and out of the shower. Id. at 46. Once inside
the stalls, it was "physically impractical" for Hamilton to clean himself, as he had
to stand with his crutches in the shower, which lacked mats to provide traction
on the slippery floors or benches or rails to assist disabled individuals. Id. The
showers also emitted heat and steam, which lingered in the housing unit due to
inadequate ventilation. The trapped humidity made it difficult for Hamilton to
breathe and covered the ceilings, including Hamilton's cell ceiling, in
condensation that caused rusty water to fall on inmates' bodies, beds, and
personal items.
"[T]hrough [Hamilton's] grievances, and other grievances filed for
similar/identical claims or concerns," the County was on notice of: (1) the
damaged flooring in the courtyard, (2) the poor conditions of the housing unit "1-
East" (poor ventilation, damaged flooring, lack of benches or shower rails to
assist disabled inmates), and (3) the two-and-a-half-foot step into the slippery
shower stalls. Id. at 49.
6 On or about September 4, 2018, Hamilton attempted to file a
grievance with "Sergeant Kitt" about the heat, ventilation, and condensation in
the housing unit, but Sergeant Kitt refused to accept Hamilton's grievance and
instead stated, "I'm sick of you f---ing crybabies this is jail handle it." Id. at 48.
Hamilton was also subjected to strip searches after two family visits,
including a September 5, 2018 visit. Because the strip-search area did not have a
bench or rails for an inmate to use while undressing and dressing, Hamilton had
to stand on his injured knee, causing him "severe" and "excruciating pain." Id. at
46-47.
On September 9, 2018, Hamilton, proceeding pro se, filed the instant
suit. On February 24, 2020, the district court granted the state defendants' and
medical defendants' motions to dismiss Hamilton's claims. The district court's
sole basis for dismissing Hamilton's ADA claim against the County was that
Hamilton had "not plausibly alleged a qualifying disability under the ADA,"
because temporary disabilities -- such as Hamilton's injuries -- "do not trigger the
protections of the ADA." J. App'x at 29. The district court dismissed Hamilton's
complaint without prejudice, giving him until March 27, 2020 to file an amended
complaint, failing which the claims would be "deemed dismissed with
7 prejudice." J. App'x at 30. Hamilton did not file an amended complaint. This
appeal followed. 2
On December 11, 2018, Hamilton was relocated to the Queens
Private Detention Center in Jamaica, New York.
DISCUSSION
I. Standard of Review
"We review a district court's grant of a motion to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6) de novo." Dane v. UnitedHealthcare Ins. Co., 974 F.3d 183, 188 (2d Cir.
2020). "To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face." Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). "We accept as true
all factual allegations and draw from them all reasonable inferences; but we are
2 The district court did not enter a separate judgment dismissing the action as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(a). When a judgment is required to be set out in a separate document but is not, judgment is deemed entered 150 days after the entry of the dispositive order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 58(c)(2)(B). Despite the lack of a judgment, this Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal of the opinion and order, which was a "final decision" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291. See Leftridge v. Conn. State Trooper Officer No. 1283, 640 F.3d 62, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2011) (concluding that this Court has jurisdiction to review a "final decision" -- "one which ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judgment" (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945) (emphasis omitted)).
8 not required to credit conclusory allegations or legal conclusions couched as
factual allegations." Id. (citation and alterations omitted).
II. Applicable Law
In 1990, Congress enacted the ADA "to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities" and "to provide clear, strong, consistent,
enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals with
disabilities." 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1)-(2). "The Act's first three titles prohibit
discrimination against individuals with disabilities 'in three major areas of public
life': employment and hiring (Title I); public services, programs, and activities
(Title II); and public accommodations (Title III)." Tardif v. City of New York, 991
F.3d 394, 403 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 516-17
(2004)).
Title II, at issue here, provides that "no qualified individual with a
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or
be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or
be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. "To
establish a claim under Title II, a plaintiff must demonstrate '(1) that she is a
9 qualified individual with a disability; (2) that she was excluded from
participation in a public entity's services, programs or activities or was otherwise
discriminated against by a public entity; and (3) that such exclusion or
discrimination was due to her disability.'" Tardif, 991 F.3d at 404 (quoting Davis
v. Shah, 821 F.3d 231, 259 (2d Cir. 2016)). A plaintiff may base a Title II claim "on
any of three theories of liability: disparate treatment (intentional discrimination),
disparate impact, or failure to make a reasonable accommodation." Id.; see Dean
v. Univ. at Buffalo Sch. of Med. & Biomedical Scis., 804 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2015). 3
In reviewing a reasonable accommodation claim, "we ask whether a
plaintiff with disabilities 'as a practical matter' was denied 'meaningful access' to
services, programs or activities to which he or she was 'legally entitled.'" Wright
v. N.Y.S. Dep't of Corr., 831 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). In
conducting this "fact-specific" review for reasonableness, we keep in mind that
the "hallmark of a reasonable accommodation is effectiveness," and that "a
reasonable accommodation need not be perfect or the one most strongly
3 "The ADA defines 'discriminate' as, inter alia, 'not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . unless [the defendant] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on' its operations." Id. (ellipsis in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)).
10 preferred by the plaintiff, but it still must be effective." Id. (internal quotation
marks, brackets, and citations omitted).
As relevant to Hamilton's reasonable accommodation claim against
the County, the term "public entity," defined to include "any State or local
government" and "any department, agency, . . . or other instrumentality of a
State," 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1), also "includes state prisons," United States v. Georgia,
546 U.S. 151, 154 (2006) (citing Pa. Dep't. of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 210
(1998)). Accordingly, "[a] reasonable accommodation must provide effective
access to prison activities and programs," and "overcome structural impediments
and non-trivial temporal delays that limit access to programs, services, and
activities." Wright, 831 F.3d at 73. As the district court noted, applying the prima
facie elements of a Title II claim noted above to the prison context, "[a]n
incarcerated plaintiff asserting a claim under the ADA must allege that he is a
'qualified individual with a disability,' 42 U.S.C. § 12131, who 'was denied the
opportunity to participate in or benefit from [the prison administration's]
services, programs, or activities or [the prison administration] otherwise
11 discriminated against him by reason of his disability.'" J. App'x at 27-28
(alterations in original) (quoting Wright, 831 F.3d at 72).
For purposes of determining whether an ADA plaintiff is a
"qualified individual with a disability," 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2), the ADA defines
"disability" to include, inter alia, "a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities," Woolf v. Strada, 949 F.3d 89,
93 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)). 4
The definition of "disability" under the ADA was previously
interpreted narrowly. See Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184,
197-98 (2002) (The terms "major" in "major life activities" and "substantially" in
"substantially limits" "need to be interpreted strictly to create a demanding
standard for qualifying as disabled. . . . The impairment's impact must also be
permanent or long term."); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 487 (1999)
("[T]he ADA's coverage is restricted to only those whose impairments are not
mitigated by corrective measures."). In 2008, however, Congress passed the
ADA Amendments Act (the "ADAAA"), Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553,
4 Here, Hamilton alleged an "actual disability" under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), as opposed to having a "record of such an impairment" or "being regarded as having such an impairment," under § 12102(1)(B) and § 12102(1)(C), respectively.
12 which broadened the definition of "disability" under the ADA. As this Court has
noted, "[t]he principal purpose of the ADAAA was to overrule the Supreme
Court's arguably narrow interpretation of what constitutes an ADA-qualifying
disability set forth in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., and Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky.,
Inc. v. Williams, and to make clear that the substantial-limitation requirement in
the definition of 'disability' is not an exacting one." Woolf, 949 F.3d at 94
(footnotes omitted) (citing the ADAAA, Pub. L. No. 110-325, § 2(b), 122 Stat.
3553, 3554).
With this purpose in mind, the ADAAA instructs that "[t]he term
'substantially limits' shall be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to
the maximum extent permitted by the terms of the ADA," and "is not meant to be
a demanding standard." 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(d)(1)(i). Relatedly, the term
"substantially limits" is to be interpreted and applied to require a lower degree of
functional limitation than the standard required prior to the ADAAA. 28 C.F.R.
§ 35.108(d)(1)(vi). As relevant here, "major life activities" expressly include
standing, walking, bending, and caring for oneself. 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(c)(1)(i).
The ADAAA also relaxed the temporal requirements for
establishing a "disability." As set forth in the implementing regulations, for
13 purposes of an actual disability claim, a "disability" shorter than six months in
duration now can be actionable under the ADA. 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(d)(ix) (noting
that an impairment "lasting or expected to last less than six months can be
substantially limiting . . . for establishing an actual disability or a record of a
disability"); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) (stating that the definition of disability
"shall be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals . . . to the maximum
extent permitted"); 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(d)(1)(ii) (stating that "the threshold issue of
whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity should not
demand extensive analysis," and that the "primary object of attention in cases
brought under title II of the ADA should be whether public entities have
complied with their obligations and whether discrimination has occurred, not the
extent to which an individual's impairment substantially limits a major life
activity").
While several of our sister circuits have acknowledged and applied
the relaxed temporal requirements after the ADAAA's enactment in precedential
opinions -- holding that transitory impairments lasting or expected to last less
than six months can qualify as disabilities under the ADA -- we have not
addressed the issue in a precedential opinion. In Parada v. Banco Industrial De
14 Venezuela, C.A., we recognized that following the enactment of the ADAAA, for
purposes of establishing a disability under the ADA, the term "substantially
limits" should now "be construed broadly in favor of expansive coverage, to the
maximum extent permitted." 753 F.3d 62, 68 n.3 (2d Cir. 2014) (quoting 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(j)(1)(i)). We did not specifically address, however, the temporal
expansion of coverage following the ADAAA's enactment. Compare id., with
Mancini v. City of Providence by & through Lombardi, 909 F.3d 32, 40-41 (1st Cir.
2018) (holding that post-ADAAA, temporary injuries "last[ing] fewer than six
months" can comprise qualifying impairments under the ADA), and Summers v.
Altarum Inst. Corp., 740 F.3d 325, 329 (4th Cir. 2014) (explaining that the ADAAA
sought to override the Supreme Court's "strict construction of the term 'disability'
[that] suggested that a temporary impairment could not qualify as a disability
under the Act"), and Gogos v. AMS Mech. Sys., Inc., 737 F.3d 1170, 1172-73 (7th Cir.
2013) (noting that post-ADAAA, the ADA now covers impairments "lasting six
months or less"). We do so now.
III. Application
Here, Hamilton alleges that following his knee injury on August 21,
2018, he suffered excruciating pain while daily navigating the Jail on crutches,
15 climbing over a two-and-a-half-foot step to take showers in a slippery stall
without railings, and being subjected to strip searches after family visits without
benches or rails to assist him during undressing and dressing.
We do not reach the question of whether Hamilton plausibly alleges
a qualifying disability under the ADA. We conclude only that Hamilton’s claim
could not be dismissed as a matter of law simply because the injury causing
these limitations was temporary. In reaching that conclusion, we join the First,
Fourth, and Seventh Circuits in holding that under the expanded definition of
"disability" under the ADAAA, which now covers impairments "lasting or
expected to last less than six months," 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(d)(ix), a short-term
injury can qualify as an actionable disability under the ADA. 5 In other words, a
plaintiff's actual disability claim under the ADA does not fail solely because he
failed to "state that his [disability] will be permanent or chronic . . . [or] indicate
the duration or long-term impact of his impairment such that the Court may
infer that his injury was not temporary." J. App'x at 29.
5 See Mancini, 909 F.3d at 40 ("[A] cognizable impairment may last fewer than six months as long as it is sufficiently severe" (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Summers, 740 F.3d at 330 n.2, 332 (holding that the ADAAA "imposes no . . . durational requirement for 'actual' disabilities" but referencing previous Fourth Circuit decision recognizing that "a minor lifting restriction . . . was not severe enough to constitute a disability even under the ADAAA's liberal new standard").
16 The County argues that "[t]he post-2008 law in this Circuit is
consistent in holding that the ADA's 'substantial limitation' component is
generally not met where an impairment is entirely short term." County Br. at 8.
In doing so, the County relies on this Court's non-precedential rulings in Francis
v. Hartford Bd. of Educ., 760 F. App'x 34 (2d Cir. 2019) (summary order), and De La
Rosa v. Potter, 427 F. App'x 28 (2d Cir. 2011) (summary order), as well as several
district court decisions.
Quite apart from the fact that they are summary orders and
therefore not binding, the County reads too much into the Francis and De La Rosa
summary orders. Francis relied on De La Rosa, which was decided after the
ADAAA's enactment, to reject the appellant's argument that circuit precedent
regarding temporary impairments should be reconsidered following the
ADAAA. See Francis, 760 F. App'x at 36 n.1. Unlike the present case, however,
De La Rosa was about whether the plaintiff was "perceived . . . as disabled and
discriminated against . . . on that basis," and not about whether the plaintiff "was
actually disabled." De La Rosa, 427 F. App'x at 29 (emphases added); compare 42
U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A), with 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(C). Unsurprisingly, De La Rosa did
not discuss the ADAAA's explicit changes to the temporal requirements --
17 making temporary injuries actionable -- for establishing an actual disability claim
under the ADA, as Hamilton asserts here.
Indeed, even after the ADAAA's enactment, "[a]n individual is not
'regarded as having [a disability]' if the public entity demonstrates that the
impairment is, objectively, both 'transitory' and 'minor,'" with "transitory"
statutorily defined as "lasting or expected to last six months or less." 28 C.F.R. §
35.108(f)(2) (emphasis added). This is directly opposite to the relaxed temporal
requirements for actual disability and "record of" disability claims under 42
U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A)-(B), which now explicitly include "transitory" impairments
as actionable impairments for those prongs. 28 C.F.R. § 35.108(d)(1)(ix).
Therefore, this Court's summary orders in De La Rosa and Francis, while issued
after the ADAAA's enactment, are inapposite to the present appeal and our
analysis of the ADAAA's relaxed temporal requirements for establishing an
actual disability claim under the ADA.
Of course, we agree with the County's assertion that "[w]hile an
impairment lasting less than six months can constitute a disability since the 2008
amendments, it obviously does not follow that such an impairment will
constitute a disability." County Br. at 6-7 (emphases in original). But the district
18 court's error here was to dismiss Hamilton's ADA claim solely because he had
failed to plead that "his injury was not temporary." J. App'x at 29. The district
court did not acknowledge the possibility that a temporary injury can constitute a
qualifying disability, as long as the requirements of the ADA are met.
In its brief on appeal, the County repeatedly emphasizes that
Hamilton's injury had lasted only nineteen days when he filed his complaint,
arguing in essence that even if temporary injuries can qualify, a nineteen-day
injury is too short-term to qualify. The statute does not suggest that there is any
duration that is too short, but in any event, we need not decide if there is merit to
that view of the law, for the County's suggestion that Hamilton suffered only a
nineteen-day injury is disingenuous. Indeed, the complaint alleged that
Hamilton sustained a dislocated knee and torn meniscus, he suffered from
excruciating pain, his injuries were not properly treated, and he was placed in
situations where his injuries were aggravated. These circumstances permit the
plausible inference that Hamilton’s injuries were ongoing and likely to last
significantly longer than nineteen days. See Torn Meniscus, CLEVELAND CLINIC,
https://my.clevelandclinic.org/health/diseases/17219-torn-meniscus (last visited
June 18, 2021) ("More serious meniscus tears may not heal on their own . . . . If
19 you have surgery to repair a torn meniscus, your knee should be fully recovered
after a few months of physical therapy." (emphases added)).
Because the district court based its dismissal of Hamilton's ADA
claim against the County only on the threshold issue of whether his injuries were
temporary, we do not reach the other aspects of Hamilton's ADA claim.
Likewise, we do not reach the County's argument that, putting aside the issue of
duration, Hamilton failed to plausibly plead a qualifying disability. We leave it
to the district court to address these issues in the first instance.
We do, however, reject the County's alternative argument that
Hamilton failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. We agree with the
district court that Hamilton plausibly alleged that exhaustion was not
meaningfully available to him. See Williams v. Corr. Officer Priatno, 829 F.3d 118,
123-24 (2d Cir. 2016).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the district court's opinion and order
is VACATED to the extent it dismissed Hamilton's ADA claim against the
County, the matter is REMANDED for further proceedings as to that claim only,
and the dismissal of all other claims is AFFIRMED.