Stevens v. Tomlin

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedAugust 24, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-05898
StatusUnknown

This text of Stevens v. Tomlin (Stevens v. Tomlin) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Stevens v. Tomlin, (E.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -------------------------------------------------------x ANDREW STEVENS,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER - against - 23-CV-5898 (PKC) (LB)

MATTSON TOMLIN,

Defendant. -------------------------------------------------------x PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge: On July 31, 2023, pro se Plaintiff Andrew Stevens filed this action against Defendant Mattson Tomlin. (Compl., Dkt. 1, at 1.) On August 15, 2023, Plaintiff filed an Amended Complaint. (Am. Compl., Dkt. 4.) Plaintiff alleges copyright and plagiarism claims against Defendant and seeks monetary damages. (Id. at 4–5.) The Court grants Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). (Dkt. 2.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the action with leave to amend within 30 days. BACKGROUND Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is bare and provides only a few sentences about his allegations. First, he lists his basis for jurisdiction as: “plagiarism of screenplay” and “copyright infringement.” (Dkt. 4, at 4.) Next, he explains that “[his] script is no longer valuable and its concepts, story line, characters, plot [sic].” (Id. at 5.) Lastly, as relief, he requests “millions of dollars in a movie that used my contents of my screenplay, without my consent.” (Id. at 6.) LEGAL STANDARD Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court must dismiss an IFP action if the complaint “is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). Specifically, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In addressing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court “accept[s] as true all factual allegations and draw[s] from them all reasonable

inferences; but [it is] not required to credit conclusory allegations or legal conclusions couched as factual allegations.” Hamilton v. Westchester County, 3 F.4th 86, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2021). Courts “liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants, reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Bertin v. United States, 478 F.3d 489, 491 (2d Cir. 2007)). In addition, the Court should generally not dismiss a pro se complaint without granting the plaintiff leave to amend. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). DISCUSSION Plaintiff’s sparse allegations suggests he is attempting to state a claim arising under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. To establish copyright infringement under the Copyright Act, “two elements must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of

constituent elements of the work that are original.” Arista Recs., LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 117 (2d Cir. 2010); see also Reed Elsevier, Inc. v. Muchnick, 559 U.S. 154, 163 (2010) (copyright holders are generally required to register their works prior to suing for infringement); Webb v. Stallone, 555 F. App’x 31, 32 (2d Cir. Feb. 3, 2014). A certificate of registration from the United States Register of Copyrights constitutes prima facie evidence of the valid ownership of a copyright. See 17 U.S.C. § 410(c); Jorgensen v. Epic/Sony Recs., 351 F.3d 46, 51 (2d Cir. 2003). Furthermore, a plaintiff must establish that “(1) the defendant has actually copied the plaintiff’s work; and (2) the copying is illegal because a substantial similarity exists between the defendant’s work and the protectible elements of plaintiff’s.” Peter F. Gaito Architecture, LLC v. Simone Dev. Corp., 602 F.3d 57, 63 (2d Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). Even liberally construing Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, he has failed to allege any specific facts against Defendant Mattson Tomlin, let alone a copyright infringement claim.

Pursuant to Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must provide a short, plain statement of claim against each defendant named so that they have adequate notice of the claims against them. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (Rule 8 “demands more than an unadorned, the- defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.”). A pleading that only “tenders naked assertions devoid of further factual enhancement” will not suffice. Id. (internal citations and alterations omitted). To satisfy this standard, a complaint must at a minimum “disclose sufficient information to permit the defendant ‘to have a fair understanding of what the plaintiff is complaining about and to know whether there is a legal basis for recovery.’” Kittay v. Kornstein, 230 F.3d 531, 541 (2d Cir. 2000) (citation omitted). “When a complaint fails to comply with these requirements contained in Rule 8, the district court has the power, on motion or sua sponte, to dismiss the

complaint or to strike such parts as are redundant or immaterial.” Chapman v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 558 F. Supp. 3d 45, 48 (E.D.N.Y. 2021) (citations and brackets omitted). Here, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts against Defendant and also fails to allege facts to support a copyright infringement claim. See Sharp v. Patterson, No. 03-CV-8772 (GEL), 2004 WL 2480426, at *12 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 3, 2004) (“[I]n light of this Court’s understanding of the principle enshrined in Rule 8—namely, to provide defendants fair notice of the claims against them—a plaintiff suing for copyright infringement may not rest on bare-bones allegations that infringement occurred. Rather, [he] must identify the ‘specific original work [that] is the subject of the claim’ as well as ‘by what acts’ the defendant infringed the copyright.” (citations omitted)). Therefore, Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). CONCLUSION For the reasons explained above, Plaintiff’s action is dismissed for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Arista Records, LLC v. Doe 3
604 F.3d 110 (Second Circuit, 2010)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Webb v. Stallone
555 F. App'x 31 (Second Circuit, 2014)
McLeod v. the Jewish Guild for the Blind
864 F.3d 154 (Second Circuit, 2017)
Hamilton v. Westchester Cnty.
3 F.4th 86 (Second Circuit, 2021)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)

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Stevens v. Tomlin, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/stevens-v-tomlin-nyed-2023.