Wright v. Terrinoni

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. New York
DecidedMarch 9, 2023
Docket1:23-cv-00856
StatusUnknown

This text of Wright v. Terrinoni (Wright v. Terrinoni) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Wright v. Terrinoni, (E.D.N.Y. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK -------------------------------------------------------------X GARFIELD W. WRIGHT,

Plaintiff, MEMORANDUM & ORDER -against- 23-CV-856 (PKC) (VMS)

GARY G. TERRINONI, VASANTHA K. KONDAMUDI, SAM J. AMIFAR, ROBERT AULICINO, STACY A. FRIEDMAN, JUDY McLAUGHLIN, GUY MENNONNA, LENNY H. SINGLETARY, III, SHARON WICKES, ARMAND P. ASARIAN, JOHN J. FERRARA, KIM C. FLODIN, JAMES GASPERINO, LEONID GORELIK, SHARON M. LAWSON- DAVIS, DEAN LINDSEY, KAREN MILANO, DONALD P. MINARCIK, DEBORAH NIEDERHOFFER, EGONDU ONUOHA, AILEEN TANAFRANCA, JOHN WALSH, PAUL Y. WONG, TOM FOLEY, and FRANKY GOLDSBERRY,

Defendants. -------------------------------------------------------------X PAMELA K. CHEN, United States District Judge:

On February 1, 2023, pro se Plaintiff Garfield W. Wright, formerly employed at the Brooklyn Hospital Center, filed this action against Defendants alleging employment discrimination based on his religious beliefs pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e—2000e-17. (Complaint (“Compl.”), Dkt. 1, at ECF1 1–13.) Plaintiff seeks $2 million in damages, back pay, and reinstatement. (Id. at ECF 18.) The Court grants Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). For the reasons set forth below, the Court dismisses the complaint with leave to amend within 30 days. BACKGROUND

1 Citations to “ECF” refer to the pagination generated by the Court’s CM/ECF docketing system and not the document’s internal pagination. 1 Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully terminated when he elected due to his religious beliefs not to comply with a Covid-19 vaccine mandate imposed by his employer, the Brooklyn Hospital Center, and his employer failed to grant him a religious exemption from the mandate. (Dkt. 1, at ECF 15, 25.) On November 17, 2022, the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (“EEOC”) issued a Dismissal and Notice of Rights. (Id., at ECF 20.) STANDARD OF REVIEW Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), a district court must dismiss an IFP action if the complaint “is frivolous or malicious; fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To avoid dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In addressing the sufficiency of a complaint, a court “accept[s] as true all factual allegations and draw[s] from them all reasonable inferences; but [it is] not required to credit conclusory allegations or legal

conclusions couched as factual allegations.” Hamilton v. Westchester Cnty., 3 F.4th 86, 90–91 (2d Cir. 2021). Courts “liberally construe pleadings and briefs submitted by pro se litigants, reading such submissions to raise the strongest arguments they suggest.” McLeod v. Jewish Guild for the Blind, 864 F.3d 154, 156 (2d Cir. 2017). In addition, the Court should generally not dismiss a pro se complaint without granting the plaintiff leave to amend. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000). DISCUSSION Title VII prohibits an employer from discriminating against any individual with respect to “compensation, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s 2 race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a)(1). To establish a Title VII claim, a plaintiff must show that he is a member of a protected class, that he was qualified for the position, and that he suffered an adverse employment action under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. See Ruiz v. County of Rockland, 609 F.3d 486, 492 (2d Cir.

2010). “[A]t the initial stage of the litigation . . . the plaintiff does not need substantial evidence of discriminatory intent,” and need only “sustain a minimal burden of showing facts suggesting an inference of discriminatory motivation.” Littlejohn v. City of New York, 795 F.3d 297, 311 (2d Cir. 2015) (emphasis in original); see also Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 84 (2d Cir. 2015) (“[A] plaintiff need only give plausible support to a minimal inference of discriminatory motivation.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Nevertheless, “a discrimination complaint . . . must [still] at a minimum assert nonconclusory factual matter sufficient to nudge its claims across the line from conceivable to plausible to proceed.” EEOC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. and N.J., 768 F.3d 247, 254 (2d Cir. 2014) (alterations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Title VII does not provide for individual liability; rather, only the employer may be named. Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 221 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Before reaching the substance of [Plaintiff’s] Title VII claim for unlawful termination, we note that individuals are not subject to liability under Title VII.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). Here, Plaintiff has only named individual defendants and has not named his employer, the Brooklyn Hospital Center, as a defendant. Plaintiff’s complaint is therefore dismissed against each individual Defendant for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). CONCLUSION

3 Accordingly, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s complaint, filed in forma pauperis, for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). In light of Plaintiff’s pro se status, the Court grants Plaintiff thirty (30) days from the entry of this Memorandum & Order to amend his complaint to name the proper defendant.

The amended complaint must include a short and plain statement of facts sufficient to support a plausible claim that his employer discriminated against him in violation of Title VII. Plaintiff must also attach the EEOC Dismissal and Notice of Rights letter to the amended complaint. If Plaintiff elects to file an amended complaint, it must be captioned “Amended Complaint” and bear the same docket number as this Memorandum & Order: No. 23-CV-856 (PKC) (VMS). The amended complaint shall replace the original complaint. That is, the amended complaint must stand on its own without reference to the original complaint.

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Related

Coppedge v. United States
369 U.S. 438 (Supreme Court, 1962)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Ruiz v. County of Rockland
609 F.3d 486 (Second Circuit, 2010)
McLeod v. the Jewish Guild for the Blind
864 F.3d 154 (Second Circuit, 2017)
Hamilton v. Westchester Cnty.
3 F.4th 86 (Second Circuit, 2021)
Cuoco v. Moritsugu
222 F.3d 99 (Second Circuit, 2000)
Patterson v. County of Oneida
375 F.3d 206 (Second Circuit, 2004)
Littlejohn v. City of New York
795 F.3d 297 (Second Circuit, 2015)
Vega v. Hempstead Union Free School District
801 F.3d 72 (Second Circuit, 2015)

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Bluebook (online)
Wright v. Terrinoni, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/wright-v-terrinoni-nyed-2023.