Farina Bros. v. Commonwealth

257 N.E.2d 450, 357 Mass. 131, 1970 Mass. LEXIS 794
CourtMassachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
DecidedApril 2, 1970
StatusPublished
Cited by11 cases

This text of 257 N.E.2d 450 (Farina Bros. v. Commonwealth) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Farina Bros. v. Commonwealth, 257 N.E.2d 450, 357 Mass. 131, 1970 Mass. LEXIS 794 (Mass. 1970).

Opinion

Reardon, J.

Farina Brothers Co., Inc. sought damages in a petition brought under G. L. c. 258 for an alleged breach of a contract which it had with the Commonwealth. The petition, as amended, advanced six claims. The case was referred to, and heard by, an auditor with findings of fact not final. Thereafter the case was heard before a judge of the Superior Court who made findings and rulings in favor of the petitioner. A motion by the Commonwealth to strike portions of the auditor’s report was denied. A total finding of $512,471.91 was made in favor of the petitioner. The Commonwealth comes here on an outline bill of exceptions based upon its claim of exceptions to the court’s findings and rulings and to the denial of its motion to strike portions of the auditor’s report.

The Commonwealth acting through its Department of Public Works (Department) awarded to Farina Brothers Co., Inc. (contractor) on September 6, 1955, a contract in the sum of approximately $5,250,000 for the elimination of railroad grade crossings by construction of a tunnel and the relocation of railroad tracks in the center of the main business section of the city of Salem. The contract documents (all prepared by the Department) included the Standard Specifications for Highways and Bridges, 1953 edition (Blue Book), plans relating to the grade crossing elimination and [133]*133special provisions. The work was to be completed within 720 days from September 6, 1955. This termination date was extended six times, the actual completion date being November 20, 1959.

The contract required performance without interruption of railroad traffic, the demolition of buildings, the removal of a stone arch tunnel, the construction of a box tunnel structure, the relocations of the sewer and water systems, and construction of a station platform, a pedestrian overpass, retaining walls, and certain other items of a complex and difficult nature. Payment was to be made to the contractor in accordance with the provisions of the contract dealing with various items of work at unit prices. The project area was divided into four zones.

The petition stated six claims.

Claim A was based upon (1) the alleged delay on the part of the Commonwealth in the release of the buildings for demolition, (2) the delay in the relocation of the railroad tracks, allegedly the fault of the Commonwealth, and (3) the liability of the Commonwealth stemming from the engineer’s refusal to “close down the job” or reschedule the work.

Claim B related to a subsoil condition not foreseen by the engineer in which it was necessary to engage in unforeseen excavation and to install a crushed stone and pipe subdrain.

Claim C related to the alleged failure of the Commonwealth to cause certain high tension lines over the construction site to be relocated, with consequent additional expense to the contractor in its work.

Claim D was based on extra cost for substituting steel “H” piles instead of wooden piles in Zone B of the construction.

Claim E was for the fair value of the steel left in place at Zone B consequent upon the change from wooden to steel piles. This claim was alternative to Claim D.

Claim F was based on a charge to the contractor for a loan of 572 tons of steel from the Department. The alleged understanding was that any steel not incorporated in [134]*134the work by the contractor would be returned to the Department and that the steel not returned would be substituted by payment for the actual cost of the steel not returned. The contractor claims the Department has taken an excessive credit out of the payment due to it.

The disposition of these claims by the auditor and the trial judge was as follows:

Claim Auditor’s Finding Court’s Finding

A $276,233.53 $276,233.53

(plus interest) 110,877.38 interest

B For respondent For respondent

C $ 21,030.57 $ 37,281.90

14,964.58 interest

D $ 35,972.60 $ 35,972.60

(plus interest) 14,439.04 interest

E $ 31,575.85 For respondent

(plus interest)

F $ 16,200.62 $ 16,200.62

(plus interest) 6,502.62 interest

The contractor seeks entry of judgment in accordance with the findings of the trial judge on claims A, C, D and F, with interest from November 10, 1957. We shall deal with these claims seriatim.

Claim A. Before the work commenced the contractor studied the project and proposed a work schedule covering twenty-seven categories of construction operations which was approved approximately on the day of the award of the contract as the result of conversation with the commissioner of the Department. Subsequently, on September 9, 1955, the contractor submitted an “operational procedure of its work to the Chief Engineer who approved it.” A subsequent bar graph work progress schedule was approved by the engineer late in November of 1955. The work commenced in mid-October of 1955 when the contractor began underpinning buildings. Difficulty arose within several months when the contractor was slowed up in its work by the failure [135]*135of the Department to make land takings and release certain buildings in the path of construction for demolition. Excavation for the tunnel construction commenced but was brought to a halt by the failure of the railroad to remove its tracks.

As the delays occurred the contractor engaged in a series of fruitless conferences wherein it was shuttled between the resident engineer, district highway engineer, and the right-of-way division of the Department. It requested permission of the resident engineer and the chief engineer “to shut down the job until the railroad work was completed and the buildings [were] released for demolition,” which permission was refused. “[T]he contractor was ordered to continue to work wherever and however it could be done under threat that if . . . [it] shut the job down, the Chief Engineer would default the contractor and bring in . . . [its] bonding company.” The relocation of the railroad tracks which was to be completed by March 22, 1956, was not actually completed until August 6, 1956. These delays produced the claims which the contractor has made in which it states that it had deployed its labor, equipment and materials, and upon which the judge and the auditor found that the “unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious acts of the Commonwealth in refusing to grant extensions of time or to reschedule the work to be performed” gave rise to a cause of action. Without further elaborating upon the facts relative to these claims it suffices to say that the conduct of the Department and its representatives in dealing with this contractor as disclosed by the record does not commend itself to the court. We must determine the liabilities on the contracts which governed the parties.

The gravamen of the contractor’s claim is that the delay in track removal and the building demolition entitled it to an order by the engineer which would permit it to stop work or to modify its progress or to extend the time for the completion of its work. It is further claimed that the engineer’s refusal, under threats of default and notification to the contractor’s bonding company, to permit the contractor tQ [136]*136stop its work was unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious conduct which would entitle the contractor to recover damages under art. 58 of the Blue Book.1

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
257 N.E.2d 450, 357 Mass. 131, 1970 Mass. LEXIS 794, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/farina-bros-v-commonwealth-mass-1970.