Justice RICE
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
Petitioner, Welby Gardens, appeals the court of appeals reversal of the Board of Assessment Appeals (BAA) classification of its greenhouse properties. Welby Gardens Co. v. Adams County Bd. of Equalization, 56 P.3d 1121 (Colo.App.2002). The BAA concluded that Petitioner’s greenhouse met the statutory definition of a “farm” and therefore should be classified as agricultural land. The court of appeals reversed, concluding that the definition had not been satisfied and therefore Petitioner’s land should not be classified as agricultural. We granted certiorari and now hold that Petitioner’s greenhouse properties do not meet the statutory definition of a “farm.” The court of appeals opinion is affirmed.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner, Welby Gardens, disputes the 1999 property tax classification of its greenhouse properties. The issue for our review is whether the property, which has been classified as “all other agricultural” property, should have been classified as agricultural land.1
There are three parcels of land at issue. Two parcels and a portion of the third are covered by numerous greenhouse buildings. The greenhouses provide a fully-enclosed, climate-controlled environment for the cultivation of various vegetables, flowers, and fruiting plant starts. None of the plants are grown in the soil of the land itself, but rather are grown in containers which sit on top of the ground. Typically, the soil in the containers is purchased from outside sources; it is not derived from the property. In fact, Petitioner concedes that the growth of the plants does not in any way depend on the location of the greenhouses on that particular piece of property. All the factors which typically affect the productivity of agricultural land, including temperature, humidity, and soil quality, are completely regulated and controlled in the greenhouse environment.
For tax year 1999, the Adams County assessor classified the three parcels of land as residential and “all other agricultural property.” Petitioner, arguing that the land should have been classified as agricultural, appealed to the Adams County Board of Equalization. The Board affirmed the assessor’s determination. Next, Petitioner appealed to the state Board of Assessment Appeals. The BAA disagreed with the county’s position and held that the land located under the greenhouses should be classified as agricultural.2 On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the BAA and held that the greenhouse land was properly classified as “all [994]*994other agricultural property.” We granted certiorari to resolve the question of whether greenhouse property may be classified as agricultural land.
II. ANALYSIS
In Colorado, owners of agricultural land receive favorable tax treatment. While other types of land are valued using one of three appraisal methods, the cost approach, the market approach, and the income approach, the value of agricultural land is determined “solely by consideration of the earning or productive capacity” of the land. Colo. Const. art X, § 3(l)(a). In addition, agricultural equipment, at least to the extent it is classified as personal property and not fixtures, is exempt from taxation. Colo. Const. art X, § 3(l)(c); see also Del Mesa Farms v. Bd. of Equalization, 956 P.2d 661 (Colo.App.1998) (discussing the distinction between agricultural personal property and fixtures). Thus, the combination of these two provisions — the favorable valuation on the land itself and the tax exempt status of agricultural equipment — results in a far lower tax burden on owners of agricultural land.
The question before this court is whether Petitioner’s land should be classified as agricultural. “Agricultural land” is defined, in relevant part, as a “parcel of land ... that was used the previous two years and presently is used as a farm or ranch ....”§ 39-l-102(1.6)(a)(I), 11 C.R.S. (2002). A “farm,” in turn, is defined as a “parcel of land which is used to produce agricultural products that originate from the land’s productivity for the primary purpose of obtaining a monetary profit.” § 39-1-102(3.5) 11 C.R.S. (2002). Hence, our task is to determine whether Petitioner’s property qualifies as a “farm.”
There is no dispute that Petitioner’s property meets at least part of the definition of a farm. First, Petitioner’s products are undoubtedly “agricultural products” as that term is defined in the statute. See § 39-1-102(1.1), 11 C.R.S. (2002) (agricultural products include, among other things, plant products in a “raw or unprocessed state” produced through the science of horticulture). In addition, the primary purpose of the greenhouse facility is to obtain a monetary profit. Therefore, only one phrase of the “farm” definition requires our attention: whether the plants produced in the greenhouse “originate from the land’s productivity.” § 39-1-102(3.5), 11 C.R.S. (2002).
Petitioner argues that the phrase, “originate from the land’s productivity” should be construed broadly. Because the land provides a location for the greenhouse buildings, the products grown within the buildings “originate from the land’s productivity.” On the other hand, Respondent contends that a plain language interpretation of the phrase, “originate from the land’s productivity,” requires some connection or nexus between the agricultural products grown at the site and the soil itself.
We hold that the plain language of the statute requires some nexus between the agricultural product produced on the land and the land itself. The mere placement of a building on the land is not a sufficient connection to satisfy this statutory mandate. To inform our opinion, we first consider the plain language of the statute and hold that the phrase, “originate from the land’s productivity,” requires some connection, or nexus, between the agricultural product and the land such that the agricultural product arises from the land’s productivity. The placement of a building on the land, by itself, is insufficient to furnish this connection. We further explore the substantial legislative history regarding the passage of this statute but uncover nothing which compels us to deviate from the plain language of the statute. Finally, we decline Petitioner’s invitation to infer intent based on legislative inaction. The court of appeals’ decision is affirmed.3
[995]*995A. Plain Language
In any statutory interpretation, our task is to determine and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. James E. Freemyer, P.C. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 32 P.3d 564 (Colo.App.2000). A tax statute is no different than any other statute; it must be construed as a whole in order to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts. Bell & Pollock, P.C. v. City of Littleton, 910 P.2d 69 (Colo.App.1995). In construing a statute, interpretations that render statutory provisions superfluous should be avoided. Indus. Claim Appeals Office v. Orth, 965 P.2d 1246, 1254 (Colo.1998).
The statutory language “originate from the land’s productivity” is clear and unambiguous. In order to qualify as a farm, there must be some connection between the agricultural product and the productivity of the land which is being valued. Specifically, the connection is that the agricultural product must “originate” from the land’s productivity. “Originate” has a commonly understood definition, namely, to “give rise to.” Websters Third New International Dictionary 1592 (1986). Thus, the land’s productivity must give rise to the agricultural product.
The question, therefore, is whether the placement of a building on the land, by itself, provides a sufficient connection such that the land may be said to have “given rise to” the plants grown within the building. We believe it does not. Were we to hold that the placement of a building is sufficient connection, the phrase “originate from the land’s productivity” would have essentially no meaning. If these plants — which are grown in a fully enclosed, climate-controlled building and never touch the soil of the subject land satisfy this requirement, we cannot envision any plant product that would not.
We need not, however, attempt to decipher the meaning of the phrase, “originate from the land’s productivity,” in all possible circumstances. The facts which are necessary to satisfy this statutory requirement will inevitably fluctuate based upon the specific type of agricultural operation at issue. This case requires nothing more than to determine whether a building, by itself, provides sufficient connection to the land to satisfy the statute. We conclude it does not. We leave the precise contours of the phrase open to future interpretation by the Division of Property Taxation, the courts, and perhaps, to further guidance from the legislature.
Since the General Assembly included the requirement that the products must “originate from the land’s productivity,” the phrase must have some meaning. We hold that the phrase, “originate from the land’s productivity,” requires some connection, or nexus, between the agricultural product and the land such that the agricultural product arises from the land’s productivity. This nexus must be more substantial than merely providing a location for the placement of a structure in which agricultural products are produced.
B. Legislative History
Since we have concluded that the plain language of the statute is clear, we need not consider other interpretive aids. See City of Westminster v. Dogan Constr. Co., 930 P.2d 585 (Colo.1997) (where a statute is unambiguous, there is no need to resort to a consideration of legislative history). Nonetheless, because of the quantity of legislative discussion surrounding the passage of this statute, we explore the legislative history and conclude that our plain language interpretation is consistent with the legislative intent.
Senate Bill 6, enacted by the General Assembly in 1983, created the definitions we interpret today. The original bill, as introduced in the Senate, defined a farm narrowly to ensure, at least in part, the exclusion of a greenhouse operation from the meaning of the term:
“Farm” means a parcel of land the soil of which is tilled and cultivated for the primary purpose of raising, harvesting, and selling crops or for the primary purpose of feeding, breeding, and selling livestock or livestock products and which parcel of land is in a natural environment and is subject to the elements of nature.
[996]*996S.B. 6, 54th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo.1983) (original bill as introduced in the Senate).4
However, the Senate Finance Committee, concerned that the phrase, “subject to the elements of nature,” would inappropriately exclude legitimate agricultural pursuits, amended the definition of a “farm” to broaden its coverage:
“Farm” means a parcel of land which is used for the primary purpose of growing, raising, and harvesting agricultural products for the primary purpose of obtaining a monetary profit.
S.B. 6, 54th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo.1983) (referred to the Senate Committee of the Whole on Mar. 3, 1983). In addition, the definition of “agricultural products” was significantly expanded to include all the sort of products grown inside greenhouses:
“Agricultural and livestock products” means plant or animal products in a raw or unprocessed state and owned by the grower or producer thereof which are derived from the science and art of farming, ranching, agriculture, horticulture, floriculture, animal husbandry, or forestry.
Id. Thus, when the bill was referred to the full Senate, it was clearly the intent of the finance committee that a greenhouse would qualify as a farm.
During debate before the Senate, the definitions were amended to exclude a typical greenhouse, in which flowers or other nonfood products were grown, from being classified as agricultural land. Specifically, the definition of “agricultural products” was changed to exclude flowering and ornamental plants grown in a structure:5
“Agricultural and livestock products” means plant or animal products in a raw or unprocessed state and owned by the grower or producer thereof which are derived from the science and art of agriculture defined as farming, ranching, animal husbandry, and horticulture not to include flowering or ornamental plants grown in a structure.
See S.B. 6, 54th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo.1983) (passed by the Senate on Mar. 25, 1983). Thus, as the bill existed upon passage by the Senate, a greenhouse qualified as a farm only to the extent it did not produce “flowering or ornamental plants.”
As the bill made its way through the House of Representatives, the greenhouse issue again triggered significant debate. The House Finance Committee amended the definition of a “farm” by inserting the word “tilled”:
“Farm” means a parcel of land which is tilled for the primary purpose of growing, planting, and harvesting agricultural products for the primary purpose of obtaining a monetary profit.
See Hearing on S.B. 6 Before the House Finance Comm., 54th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (April 18, 1983). In addition, a new definition of “agricultural products” was created:
“Agricultural and livestock products” means plant or animal products in a raw or unprocessed state which are derived from the science and art of agriculture. “Agriculture”, for the purposes of this subsection (1.1), means farming, ranching, animal husbandry, and horticulture.
Id. The Property Tax Administrator, Mary Ann Maurer, explained that the purpose of the changed definitions was to ensure that retail greenhouse operations would not qualify as agricultural land because “they do not [997]*997plant. All they do is grow and sell.” Id. (statement of Mary Ann Maurer). The committee unanimously approved the amended definitions and the bill was sent the full House where it was passed without any relevant changes. Therefore, as the bill existed upon passage by the House, a greenhouse operation did not qualify as a farm unless the soil under the greenhouse was itself tilled and planted.
Because the two versions of the bill differed, a conference committee was created to fashion a compromise. The committee quickly focused on the primary difference between the House and Senate versions of the bill, namely, that the House version required that a “farm” be a parcel of land which is “tilled,” while the Senate version only required that the land be “used.” The committee members were split, with four members favoring the House version and two favoring the Senate version. A motion to adopt the broad Senate definition was rejected four to two, but the two who opposed the House definition refused to allow the bill to proceed with the word “tilled” in the definition. See Hearing on S.B. 6 Before the Conference Comm., 54th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (May 17, 1983). Finally, after considerable discussion and debate, an amendment was proposed to remove the word “tilled” and to insert the requirement that the product “originate from the land’s productivity.”6 The committee adopted the amendment by a vote of four to two and then unanimously voted to report the bill to both houses.7 The committee’s new definition of “farm” read:
“Farm” means a parcel of land which is used to produce agricultural products that originate from the land’s productivity for the primary purpose of obtaining a monetary profit.
See S.B. 6, 54th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo.1983) (First Report of the Conference Committee).
Later that day, both the House and the Senate adopted the conference committee report and enacted the bill. In the House, Representative Heim, one of the three House members of the conference committee, explained that the new definition of a “farm,” required “a direct nexus ... between something that is grown or raised, and the land on which it is grown and raised.” Debate on S.B. 6 Before the House of Representatives, 54th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (May 17, 1983) (statement of Rep. Heim). Following Representative Heim’s remarks, the House adopted the conference committee report and passed the bill by a vote of 62-3.
In the Senate, the disagreement in the conference committee quickly became evident. Senator Beatty, one of the senators on the conference committee, stated that the “farm” definition crafted by the conference committee was a broad one. In his view, “every agricultural product originates in some form from the land’s productivity.” Debate on S.B. 6 Before the Senate, 54th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (May 17, 1983) (statement of Senator Beatty). On the other hand, Senator Stewart, another senator who served on the conference committee, argued that the definition of “farm” was intended to be read narrowly. He claimed that the language in the definition of “farm” referred to “the productivity of the soil itself, or the land itself, and not of improvements thereon.” Debate on S.B. 6 Before the Senate, 54th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (May 17, 1983) (statement of Senator Stewart). Without further clarification, the Senate adopted the conference committee report and passed the bill.
While we cannot discern any uniform legislative intent based solely on these proceedings, we do gain two significant insights. First, we note that a broad definition of the [998]*998term “farm,” which would require nothing more than the “use” of the parcel of land to produce agricultural products, was explicitly considered, and rejected, by the conference committee. Thus, the phrase “originate from the land’s productivity” must mean something more than the mere surface use of the land.
Second, the focus of the inquiry is on that particular land’s productivity, not the productivity of land in general. A member of the conference committee first suggested that the definition of “farm” be amended by adding the phrase, “originate from land’s productivity.” Hearing on S.B. 6 Before the Conference Committee, 54th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (May 17, 1983). After some discussion, this phrase was amended by adding the article “the,” thus clarifying that the focus should be on that particular parcel, not the productivity of land in general.
Our review of this legislative history does not provide any convincing evidence that the General Assembly intended a greenhouse to qualify as a farm. To the extent any indication of legislative intent can be derived from this examination of the legislative history, it supports a plain language interpretation that the statute requires some nexus between the agricultural product and the productivity of the subject land.
C. Legislative Inaction
Petitioner finally contends that the court of appeals and the Division of Property Taxation have both adopted a broad interpretation of the term “farm” which would include greenhouses. Petitioner then argues that since the General Assembly has not amended the statute to explicitly adopt a narrower interpretation of the term, we should infer that, despite the plain language of the statute, the General Assembly has implicitly approved a broader interpretation of the statute by its failure to amend the statute. We disagree.8
Petitioner places heavy reliance on the court of appeals’ decision in Morning Fresh Farms, Inc. v. Weld County Bd. of Equalization, 794 P.2d 1073 (Colo.App.1990) and the legislature’s failure to amend the statute thereafter. In that case, Morning Fresh Farms argued that its egg production facilities were an agricultural use. The facilities, built on forty acres of a larger 800-aere farm, were entirely self-contained and provided an environment in which none of the hens ever touched the ground. Only a small amount of the feed for the hens was grown on the farm. Nonetheless, the court of appeals concluded that the parcel should be classified as a farm. Id. at 1074. Tracking the language of the definitions of a “farm” and “agricultural product,” the court noted that eggs are an “animal product” in a “raw or unprocessed state” and that they were sold for a monetary profit. Id. Hence, it concluded that the land under the egg production facilities was agricultural land.
Petitioner’s reliance on the Morning Fresh Farms case and the legislature’s failure to amend the statute thereafter is misplaced. The holding in Morning Fresh Farms was not nearly as broad as Petitioner contends in that the court did not purport to address any circumstance other than that particular egg production facility. Contrary to Petitioner’s argument, the court of appeals did not simply disregard the requirement that the agricultural product “originate from the land’s productivity,” but rather, it specifically concluded that under the facts of that case, the eggs “emanate from the productivity of this farm’s land.”9 Id. at 1075. “Emanate” is a syn[999]*999onym for “originate,” the word used in the statute. See Rogets II: The New Thesaurus 316 (1980). Thus, there is nothing inconsistent between the Morning Fresh Farms holding and our plain language understanding of the statute. To the extent Morning Fresh Farms can be read as holding that the mere presence of a building, without more, provides sufficient connection to meet the requirement that the product “originate from the land’s productivity,” we decline to follow it. Given the limited scope of the court’s decision, we would not expect the legislature to amend the statute one way or another in response.
Three subsequent court of appeals eases applied the Morning Fresh Farms decision to similar egg production facilities. See Del Mesa Farms v. Bacus, No. 99CA0527 (Colo.App. Feb. 24, 2000); Del Mesa Farms v. Hall, No. 98CA1611 (Colo.App. Aug. 12, 1999); Del Mesa Farms v. Bd. of Equalization, 956 P.2d 661 (Colo.App.1998) (collectively, “DeZ Mesa Farms cases”). In each case, the court concluded that the egg production facilities met the statutory definition of a farm. Once again, we do not assign any significance to the fact that the legislature did not subsequently amend the statute in response to these eases.
First, we note that two of the cases on which Petitioner relies were not selected for publication and therefore have no value as precedent. See C.A.R. 35(f). It is not surprising that the General Assembly did not amend the statute in response to these two cases.
In the only reported case, Del Mesa Farms v. Montrose County Board of Equalization, 956 P.2d 661 (Colo.App.1998), the issue was limited to whether the taxpayer’s egg production equipment should be classified as personal property or fixtures. The court did not analyze the meaning of a farm other than to simply cite Morning Fresh Farms for the proposition that egg production facilities may qualify as a farm. Id. at 663. Because of the limited scope of the opinion, the lack of legislative response is not extraordinary.10
In addition to the court of appeals decisions, Petitioner argues that the Division of Property Taxation has adopted a broad interpretation of the term “farm.” Since the General Assembly has not amended the statute in response to this interpretation, Petitioner contends that it must approve of the Property Tax Administrator’s view. Again, we disagree.
The Property Tax Administrator is required to prepare and publish a land valuation manual to assist county assessors in classifying and valuing land for property tax. See § 39-2-109(l)(e), 11 C.R.S. (2002). Throughout the 1980s and 90s, this manual specifically listed a greenhouse among several types of property which did not meet the definition of a farm or ranch. See, e.g., 3 Assessors Reference Library: Land Valuation Manual at 5.29 (rev.1/89) (“Examples of ‘all other agricultural property’ include apiaries (bee farms), dairies, feedlots, mushroom farms, poultry farms, and greenhouses, among others.”). In fact, the county assessor who performed the appraisal of Welby Gardens in 1999 was required to adhere to the manual and classify the greenhouse as “all other agricultural property.” See Huddleston v. Grand County Bd. of Equalization, 913 P.2d 15 (Colo.1996) (property tax administrator’s manuals are binding on county assessors). In 2000, the manual was amended to clarify that certain previously excluded properties — dairies, hog farms, and poultry farms may — be classified as a farm. 3 Assessors Reference Library: Land Valuation Manual at 5.14 to 5.17 (rev.3/00). Notably, a greenhouse continued to be classified as “all other agricultural property.” Id. In 2001, the manual was again amended and this time the entire list of excluded properties, including greenhouses, was deleted. See 3 Assessors Reference Library: Land [1000]*1000Valuation Manual at 5.15 (rev.7/01). Rather than providing a list of “all other agricultural property,” the manual now urges county assessors to consider the decisions of the court of appeals—Morning Fresh Farms and the Del Mesa Farms cases—in classifying agricultural land.
Petitioner contends we should infer that the General Assembly agrees with the Property Tax Administrator’s interpretation simply because the General Assembly has not chosen to amend the definition of a “farm.” We are not persuaded. First, we note that the amendment to the Assessors Reference Library is very recent in that only two years have passed since the change was adopted. See Pueblo Bancorporation v. Lindoe, Inc., 63 P.3d 353, 368 (Colo.2003) (noting that four years was too short a period of time to infer intent through legislative inaction). Prior to that time, the Land Valuation Manual specifically prohibited a greenhouse from being classified as a farm.
In addition, the Property Tax Administrator did not use its special expertise to provide any new insight into the meaning of a “farm.” Instead, the Land Valuation Manual simply refers assessors to the four court of appeals opinions on the subject. To the extent we disagree with the court of appeals interpretation of a “farm,” that disagreement extends to the adoption of that interpretation by the Property Tax Administrator. While we may defer to an administrative agency’s interpretation of a statute, we “are not bound by an agency decision that misapplies or misconstrues the law.” El Paso County Bd. of Equalization v. Craddock, 850 P.2d 702, 704-05 (Colo.1993).
In sum, we cannot say with any certainty that the General Assembly’s inaction signals its tacit approval of the premise that greenhouses should be included in the definition of a “farm.” See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 175, n. 1, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989) (“It is ‘impossible to assert with any degree of assurance that congressional failure to act represents’ affirmative congressional approval of the Court’s statutory interpretation.”) (quoting Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 671-672, 107 S.Ct. 1442, 94 L.Ed.2d 615, (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)). Without contrary evidence of legislative intent, we are compelled to follow the plain meaning of the statute. The phrase “originate from the land’s productivity” requires some nexus between the agricultural product and the land on which the product was produced. In this case, that nexus is lacking.
III. CONCLUSION
We hold that the products grown within Petitioner’s greenhouse do not “originate from the land’s productivity.” As such, the land does not satisfy the statutory definition of a “farm” and consequently, does not qualify as agricultural land. The opinion of the court of appeals is affirmed.
Justice KOURLIS dissents, Chief Justice MULLARKEY and Justice HOBBS join in the dissent.