Estate of Casper v. Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Co

2016 COA 167, 421 P.3d 1184

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: November 17, 2016
• Docket: 14CA2423
• Status: Published

Opinion

COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2016COA167

Court of Appeals No. 14CA2423 Pueblo County District Court No. 12CV740 Honorable David W. Crockenberg, Judge

Estate of Michael Dean Casper, by and through Nick Casper, personal representative,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.

Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Company, an Illinois corporation,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division II Opinion by JUDGE HARRIS Webb and Ashby, JJ., concur

Announced November 17, 2016

Levin Rosenberg PC, Bradley A. Levin, Nelson A. Waneka, Denver, Colorado; Keating Wagner Polidori Free PC, Zachary C. Warzel, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee

Hall & Evans, LLC, Kevin E. O’Brien, Alan Epstein, Malcolm S. Mead, Cristin J. Mack, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 Under Colorado law, the death of a plaintiff in a personal

injury action extinguishes his entitlement to recover noneconomic

and punitive damages. But what happens when the plaintiff dies

after those damages have been awarded by a jury but before the

district court has entered a judgment? This question had never

been answered in Colorado.

¶2 Michael Dean Casper bought a cancer insurance policy from

defendant, Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Company (GTL); when

he was diagnosed with cancer seven months later, GTL refused to

pay his claims. Casper sued GTL for breach of contract, bad faith

breach of an insurance contract, and statutory unreasonable denial

of benefits. A jury awarded him more than $4,500,000 in punitive

and other noneconomic damages.

¶3 The trial court immediately entered an oral order making the

verdict a judgment. But Casper died nine days later, before the

court had reduced its oral order entering judgment to a written

judgment as required by C.R.C.P. 58. After resolving attorney fees

and interest issues, the court entered a signed and dated written

judgment in favor of plaintiff, the Estate of Michael Dean Casper

1 (the Estate), in the amount of $1,997,996.40, nunc pro tunc to the

date of verdict.

¶4 GTL says that as a matter of law the delay in entering the

written judgment means that under the Colorado survival statute,

§ 13-20-101, C.R.S. 2016, the Estate is entitled only to the $50,000

awarded as economic damages for the breach of contract claim. We

disagree. Because the verdict resolved the merits of the case, and

judgment would necessarily follow, the survival statute did not

extinguish Casper’s right to damages. We therefore affirm the

judgment.

I. Background

¶5 Casper bought a “First Diagnosis” cancer insurance policy in

August 2010. According to his testimony, he was sold the policy by

Joanna Gaylord, a door-to-door insurance salesperson who worked

for Platinum Supplemental Insurance, Inc. (Platinum), an agency

with exclusive rights to sell GTL’s policy. Casper listened to

Gaylord’s presentation but expressed concern about his ability to

qualify for benefits, based on prior arterial blockages in his legs.

Gaylord assured him that, as long as he had not been diagnosed

with, or been advised to seek treatment for, AIDS, cancer, a heart

2 attack, or a stroke, he would be covered by the policy. Casper

answered truthfully that he had not been diagnosed with or advised

to seek treatment for any of those conditions. He filled out the

application, authorized GTL to obtain ten years’ of medical records,

and agreed to monthly electronic premium payments. A month

later, GTL approved his application.

¶6 In March 2011, Casper was diagnosed with prostate cancer.

He submitted claims to GTL, which denied them. According to page

twelve of the policy, cancer was not a covered condition “when

advice or treatment is received . . . prior to the Effective Date, and

such advice or treatment results in the First Diagnosis of Cancer.”

GTL maintained that Casper had received such advice, in

connection with his treatment for a non-cancerous condition

involving an enlarged prostate, which had ultimately resulted in the

detection of Casper’s prostate cancer.

¶7 In 2012, Casper sued GTL for breach of contract, bad faith

breach of insurance contract, and unreasonable denial of benefits

in violation of sections 10-3-1115 and -1116, C.R.S. 2016. He also

sued, but then settled with, Gaylord and Platinum on claims for

3 negligent misrepresentation and fraud based on their role in

marketing the policy on behalf of GTL.

¶8 Trial was originally scheduled to begin in February 2014. But

in October 2013, the court, on its own motion, reset the trial to July

2014.

¶9 During trial, the court directed a verdict for Casper on his

breach of contract claim, finding that the exclusion provision was

ambiguous and, therefore, as a matter of law, the policy had to be

construed as covering Casper’s cancer. On July 15, 2014, the jury

returned a verdict in favor of Casper on all claims. It awarded

Casper $50,000 for breach of contract, $50,000 for unreasonable

denial of benefits, $150,000 in economic damages for bad faith

breach of the contract, $550,000 in noneconomic damages for bad

faith breach of the contract, and $4,000,000 in punitive damages.1

¶ 10 Because Casper was in hospice care by then, his lawyer

requested that the court immediately enter judgment on the verdict

to avoid any limitation on recovery under Colorado’s survival

1 The parties later agreed that the economic damages awards for the breach of contract, bad faith breach of an insurance contract, and statutory unreasonable denial of benefits claims were duplicative and that economic damages totaled $50,000.

4 statute. The court attempted to oblige, announcing that it was

entering judgment. It directed the clerk to receive and enter the

verdict in the court registry. Then it entered an unsigned minute

order reflecting that it had ordered judgment to be entered.

¶ 11 When Casper died nine days later, GTL moved to set aside the

verdict in part and to limit the recoverable damages. It argued that

because attorney fees and prejudgment interest had not been

determined and statutory caps had not been applied, Casper had

died before final judgment had been entered. Thus, according to

GTL, the statutory bad faith denial of benefits claim was

extinguished, as was Casper’s entitlement to recover noneconomic

and punitive damages. GTL requested that the court enter final

judgment on the breach of contract claim in the amount of $50,000.

In the alternative, GTL requested that the court impose statutory

caps on the noneconomic and punitive damages.

¶ 12 Casper’s attorneys, in the meantime, moved to substitute the

Estate as plaintiff, and then they requested an award of attorney

fees under section 10-3-1116 and prejudgment interest to July 15,

2014, the date the court had orally entered judgment.

5 ¶ 13 The district court denied GTL’s motion to set aside the verdict,

ruling that the survival statute was not implicated because Casper

had died after entry of judgment on the verdict. It did, however,

grant GTL’s motion to enforce the statutory caps on damages.

¶ 14 On October 30, 2014, after reducing the noneconomic and

punitive damages pursuant to statutory caps and awarding

approximately one-third of the fees requested by Casper’s attorneys,

the district court entered an amended final judgment, nunc pro

tunc to July 15, 2014, in favor of the Estate in the amount of

$1,997,996.40.

¶ 15 On appeal, GTL contends that the district court erred by

failing to vacate all of the damages (with the exception of the

$50,000 breach of contract damages), by characterizing the

attorney fees awarded under section 10-3-1116 as compensatory

damages for purposes of calculating punitive damages, by failing to

further reduce the attorney fees award, and by instructing the jury

on an insurance regulation related to the standard of care for the

sale and marketing of insurance policies. We take up each of these

contentions, reject them, and therefore affirm.

6 II. Colorado’s Survival Statute

¶ 16 At common law, claims based on personal torts abated upon

the death of either party. To ameliorate the harsh effects of this

rule, Colorado, like most other states, enacted a survival statute in

the late 1800s. Its current iteration — section 13-20-101 —

provides:

All causes of action, except actions for slander or libel, shall survive and may be brought or continued notwithstanding the death of the person in favor of or against whom such action has accrued, but punitive damages shall not be awarded nor penalties adjudged after the death of the person against whom such punitive damages or penalties are claimed; and, in tort actions based upon personal injury, the damages recoverable after the death of the person in whose favor such action has accrued shall be limited to loss of earnings and expenses sustained or incurred prior to death and shall not include damages for pain, suffering, or disfigurement, nor prospective profits or earnings after date of death. An action under this section shall not preclude an action for wrongful death under part 2 of article 21 of this title.

¶ 17 GTL contends that because Casper died before a final,

appealable judgment was entered, the Estate may recover only the

$50,000 awarded as economic damages.

7 A. Standard of Review and Principles of Interpretation

¶ 18 Resolution of this case turns on the interpretation of a statute,

an issue of law subject to de novo review. Kyle W. Larson Enters.,

Inc. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2012 COA 160M, ¶ 9.

¶ 19 Our primary task when construing a statute is to ascertain

and give effect to the legislature’s intent based on its chosen

language. Young v. Brighton Sch. Dist. 27J, 2014 CO 32, ¶ 11; see

also State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 502 (Colo. 2000) (“Legislative

intent is the polestar of statutory construction.” (quoting Schubert v.

People, 698 P.2d 788, 793 (Colo. 1985))). We give words and

phrases their plain and ordinary meanings, and we read the statute

as a whole, giving consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all

of its parts. Young, ¶ 11. We must choose a construction that

serves the purpose of the legislative scheme and avoids absurd

results. Town of Erie v. Eason, 18 P.3d 1271, 1276 (Colo. 2001).

¶ 20 If the statutory language is unambiguous, we apply it as

written. Reno v. Marks, 2015 CO 33, ¶ 20. If a statute is

ambiguous, however, we may consider indicia of legislative intent

such as the object to be attained, the circumstances under which

the statute was enacted, the common law, and the consequences of

8 a particular construction. § 2-4-203, C.R.S. 2016; see also State

Eng’r v. Castle Meadows, Inc., 856 P.2d 496, 504 (Colo. 1993)

(listing indicators of legislative intent). “Because we also presume

that legislation is intended to have just and reasonable effects, we

must construe statutes accordingly and apply them so as to ensure

such results.” Castle Meadows, Inc., 856 P.2d at 504; see also § 2-

4-201(1)(c), C.R.S. 2016.

B. Discussion

¶ 21 The survival statute sets forth a broad rule, with two

exceptions. As relevant here, all causes of action survive the death

of a party. But, neither punitive damages nor penalties shall be

“awarded” or “adjudged” after the death of a party,2 and in personal

injury cases, the damages “recoverable” after the death of the

2 The statute prohibits the award of punitive damages or penalties “after the death of the person against whom such punitive damages or penalties are claimed,” § 13-20-101, C.R.S. 2016 (emphasis added), but the supreme court has interpreted this limitation on damages to apply not just when the tortfeasor dies, but also when the plaintiff dies. See Kruse v. McKenna, 178 P.3d 1198, 1200 (Colo. 2008); see also Warren v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 05-cv-01891-PAB-MEH, 2011 WL 1103160, at *9 (D. Colo. 2013 Mar. 24, 2011) (Although the statutory language appears to bar recovery of punitive damages or penalties only after the death of the tortfeasor, “[t]his interpretation of the statute . . . has been foreclosed by the Colorado Supreme Court.”).

9 plaintiff are limited to economic damages suffered before death and

shall not include noneconomic damages or future earnings. § 13-

20-101.

¶ 22 GTL maintains that the survival statute precludes recovery of

punitive or noneconomic damages if the plaintiff dies before his

claims merge into a final judgment, an event that prevents

abatement. And, it argues, the judgment that was entered in July

2015, days before Casper’s death, was not final because it did not

include an award of attorney fees or prejudgment interest.

Therefore, the jury’s award of damages became a nullity when

extinguished by Casper’s death nine days later.

¶ 23 We agree with GTL that, as a general matter, claims merge

into a judgment and a judgment does not abate, even if the cause of

action would not have survived the party’s death. Ahearn v. Goble,

90 Colo. 173, 176, 7 P.2d 409, 410 (1932). And, neither the court’s

oral pronouncement nor the minute order constituted a “judgment”

within the meaning of C.R.C.P. 58(a) because the rule requires

entry of a written, dated, and signed judgment. But we do not

believe that these propositions lead inexorably to a conclusion that

the survival statute precludes recovery of punitive and other

10 noneconomic damages if the plaintiff dies after the verdict is

returned but before judgment is entered. We conclude that, based

on the language, history, and purpose of the statute, the legislature

did not intend to draw such a bright line between verdict and

judgment. Rather, in our view, one naturally leads to the other, so

that a party who survives to verdict and obtains an entitlement to a

judgment may recover punitive and other noneconomic damages,

regardless of whether the party is alive when the resulting judgment

is entered.

¶ 24 To begin, the statute does not set the date of judgment as the

time when a claim for noneconomic damages is no longer subject to

abatement. Nor does it mention the date of verdict. Some other

states’ survival statutes do explain more explicitly when the party’s

death extinguishes a right to recover damages. See, e.g., Cal. Prob.

Code § 573 (West 1991) (“Where a person having a cause of action

dies before judgment, the damages recoverable . . . are limited to

the loss or damage the decedent sustained or incurred prior to

death, including any penalties or punitive or exemplary damages

. . . but not including any damages for pain, suffering, or

disfigurement.”) (repealed 1992); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 41.100 (2016)

11 (“[W]hen a person who has a cause of action dies before judgment,

the damages recoverable by the decedent’s executor . . . include all

losses or damages which the decedent incurred or sustained before

the decedent’s death, including any penalties or punitive and

exemplary damages . . . and damages for pain, suffering or

disfigurement . . . .”); Or. Rev. Stat. § 121.010 (1964) (“An action for

a wrong shall not abate by the death of any party, after a verdict

has been given therein, but the action shall proceed thereafter in

the same manner as in cases where the cause of action survives.”)

(repealed 1965).

¶ 25 The General Assembly’s decision to forego an explicit selection

of either the date of verdict or the date of judgment as the

controlling date for survival purposes shows that it did not consider

the distinction relevant. The General Assembly has distinguished

between the verdict and the judgment in a number of other

statutes. See, e.g., § 8-2-203, C.R.S. 2016 (“[T]he verdict of the jury

and the judgment of the court shall specify the amount of damages

awarded to each person . . . .”); § 13-64-205, C.R.S. 2016 (setting

forth the procedure to determine “what judgment is to be entered on

a verdict requiring findings of special damages”); § 38-1-113, C.R.S.

12 2016 (“The court shall cause the verdict of the jury and the

judgment of said court to be entered upon the records of said

court.”). Thus, had the General Assembly intended to bar a party’s

recovery of noneconomic damages in the event of death after the

verdict but before judgment, it could have said so. See Specialty

Rests. Corp. v. Nelson, 231 P.3d 393, 397 (Colo. 2010) (“[T]he

General Assembly’s failure to include particular language is a

statement of legislative intent.”).

¶ 26 Turning to the language that does appear in the survival

statute, we conclude that it supports an interpretation that survival

to verdict suffices for a party to recover noneconomic damages.

With respect to punitive damages, the statute instructs that a

plaintiff cannot be “awarded” punitive damages after his death or

the death of the tortfeasor. Because punitive damages are awarded

by the jury, an “award” of punitive damages necessarily occurs at

the time of the verdict. See § 13-21-102, C.R.S. 2016 (jury may

award exemplary damages in addition to actual damages).

Accordingly, the legislature’s choice of the word “awarded” indicates

that a punitive damages award is not extinguished if the plaintiff

dies after a verdict is returned. See People v. Guenther, 740 P.2d

13 971, 976 (Colo. 1987) (In construing a statute, the court assumes

that the legislative choice of language is a “deliberate one calculated

to obtain the result dictated by the plain meaning of the words.”).

¶ 27 Though the General Assembly used another term —

“recoverable” — when referring to other types of noneconomic

damages, we do not read the statute as imposing different rules

depending on the type of noneconomic damages at issue. In other

words, we do not believe that the legislature intended to allow a

party to recover punitive damages if he survived to verdict, but to

allow recovery of other noneconomic damages only if he survived to

entry of judgment. The creation of separate standards within the

same provision of a statute would be unusual enough that we

would expect the legislature to delineate that distinction more

explicitly. And, if the statute creates a single standard, we believe

that the word “awarded” is a more clear description of the relevant

event than the word “recoverable.”

¶ 28 Even so, because the language could reasonably be interpreted

to support both Casper and GTL, we conclude that the statute is

ambiguous. Thus, we must look to other tools of statutory

construction to ascertain legislative intent.

14 ¶ 29 Under the common law of England, causes of action did not

abate upon the death of a party once a verdict was returned as long

as the judgment followed within a prescribed period of time. See,

e.g., Isley’s Case (1589) 74 Eng. Rep. 172 (K.B.) (where the plaintiff

died after verdict but before judgment was entered, cause of action

was not abated but instead judgment related back to date of

verdict); see also 17 Car. 2 c. 8 (1665) (“[I]n all Actions Personall (’)

Reall or mixt the death of either partie betweene the Verdict and the

Judgement shall not hereafter be alleadged for Error soe as such

Judgement be entred within Two Termes after such Verdict.”);

Skidaway Shell-Road Co. v. Brooks, 77 Ga. 136, 138 (1886) (under

English common law, return of a verdict before the death of a party

prevented abatement). In other words, because the judgment

followed from the verdict, the verdict was ordinarily sufficient to

prevent abatement.

¶ 30 GTL points out that while Colorado adopted the common law

of England, it did not adopt statutes enacted after 1607. See § 2-4-

211, C.R.S. 2016. But under the common law, as well as the pre-

1607 statutes that codified it, the death of a party after verdict did

not result in an abatement of the claims.

15 ¶ 31 C.R.C.P. 58(a) also codifies this concept. Under the rule,

“upon a general or special verdict of a jury, or upon a decision by

the court, the court shall promptly prepare, date, and sign a written

judgment.” Rule 58(a), then, contemplates that the verdict and

judgment go hand in hand. And C.R.C.P. 54(f) instructs that “[i]f a

party dies after a verdict or decision upon any issue of fact, and

before judgment, the court may, nevertheless, render judgment

thereon.” This rule confirms that, once a verdict is returned, the

judgment shall follow, even if the party dies before judgment is

entered. See Bates v. Burns, 274 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah 1954)

(interpreting equivalent rule and concluding that the plaintiff’s

action did not abate where the plaintiff died after verdict but before

judgment because purpose of rule is to “preserve the verdict until a

judgment can be entered thereon”).

¶ 32 A number of courts share our view that once the merits of the

case have been decided by a verdict and the plaintiff is entitled to a

judgment, the action or claim for damages will not abate, even if

judgment has not been entered at the time of the party’s death.

¶ 33 In Tunnell v. Edwardsville Intelligencer, Inc., 252 N.E.2d 538

(Ill. 1969), for example, the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff

16 on his defamation action. The court entered judgment

notwithstanding the verdict for defendant and plaintiff appealed,

but while the appeal was pending, the plaintiff died. After reversal

by the court of appeals, the defendant objected to reinstatement of

the verdict, arguing that the defamation claim did not survive the

plaintiff’s death. The Illinois Supreme Court disagreed, holding that

an action does not abate when the plaintiff dies after obtaining a

verdict in his favor:

What is significant in such cases, in our opinion, is not any metaphysical notion of merger of the cause of action into the verdict, but rather the circumstance that all factual questions had been resolved before the plaintiff died. . . . The present case was ripe for judgment when the plaintiff died, and the appellate court properly held that his death did not abate the action.

Id. at 541.

¶ 34 An analogous situation arose in Reed v. United States, 891

F.2d 878 (11th Cir. 1990). In that case, the parents of a child who

was born with birth defects asserted negligence claims against the

government under the Federal Tort Claims Act. The parties reached

a settlement; shortly thereafter, the lawyer for the government

notified the plaintiffs that the settlement had been approved. The

17 following day, the government’s lawyer prepared a stipulation and

sent it to the plaintiffs’ lawyer for signature. The child had died,

however, the day before, just after the parties had confirmed

approval of the settlement. The government attempted to withdraw

from the settlement, contending that, under Florida’s survival

statute in effect at the time, the negligence action abated upon the

child’s death.

¶ 35 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s enforcement

of the agreement. It reasoned that the period between settlement

and final judgment was similar to the period between verdict and

judgment because, in both situations, the dispute had been

“conclusively resolved.” Id. at 881-82; Variety Children’s Hosp., Inc.

v. Perkins, 382 So. 2d 331 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (cause of action

does not abate during period between verdict and judgment). The

settlement entitled the plaintiffs to a judgment and, thus, the cause

of action did not abate between settlement and final judgment. Id.

at 882; see also Parker v. Parker, 319 A.2d 750, 751 (N.J. Super. Ct.

App. Div. 1974) (husband’s death after resolution of parties’ dispute

but before judgment did not abate divorce action because trial court

had “made a definitive adjudication of the controversy, reflecting its

18 conclusive determination that each party be granted a divorce”);

Garrett v. Byerly, 284 P. 343, 358 (Wash. 1930) (concluding that

cause of action does not abate when party dies after the verdict

because party is “entitled to a judgment” at the time of his death

(quoting Fitzgerald v. Stewart, 53 Pa. 343, 346 (1866))); Wilson v.

Coop. Transit Co., 30 S.E.2d 749, 753 (W. Va. 1944) (negligence

claim did not abate where the plaintiff died after verdict but before

entry of judgment).

¶ 36 Undaunted, GTL contends that Casper was not entitled to a

“final judgment” at the time of his death because the court had not

yet computed attorney fees and prejudgment interest. To be sure,

when attorney fees and prejudgment interest constitute

compensatory damages — as they do in this case — a final,

appealable judgment cannot be entered until the calculations are

complete. See Grand Cty. Custom Homebuilding, LLC v. Bell, 148

P.3d 398, 400-01 (Colo. App. 2006). But that does not mean that

the court could not enter a judgment pursuant to C.R.C.P. 58(a)

before it performed the calculations necessary to enter an amended

judgment that would be final and appealable under C.R.C.P. 54(a).

A “final judgment” is simply a type of judgment from which an

19 appeal may lie. See C.R.C.P. 54(a) (“‘Judgment’ as used in these

rules includes a decree and order to or from which an appeal lies.”);

C.R.C.P. 58 (“The term ‘judgment’ includes an appealable decree or

order as set forth in C.R.C.P. 54(a).”); see also Musick v. Woznicki,

136 P.3d 244, 251 (Colo. 2006) (distinguishing judgments from

final, appealable judgments under C.R.C.P. 54); cf. In re Estate of

Becker, 32 P.3d 557, 559-60 (Colo. App. 2000) (judgment in

dissolution of marriage case could have been entered after initial

hearing, even though court had not yet ruled on child custody

issues). We therefore reject GTL’s argument that Casper’s claim

abated merely because he was not entitled to a final, appealable

¶ 37 Here, entry of judgment under C.R.C.P. 58(a) was surely

proper, as the jury had returned a general verdict. Indeed, the

dispute had been fully and finally resolved, all issues of liability had

been determined, and the jury had awarded all damages based on

the evidence presented at trial. See, e.g., Kaufman v. Herrman, 748

So. 2d 310, 312 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (The personal injury

action did not abate upon death of the plaintiff before entry of

judgment because the “dispute in this case had been conclusively

20 decided in favor of [plaintiff] by the rendition of the verdict prior to

[plaintiff’s] death.”).3

¶ 38 In any event, we are not persuaded that the General Assembly

intended the extinguishment of a jury verdict to turn on whether

attorney fees are characterized as costs or compensatory damages,

particularly where the legislature itself created the special remedy

that allows for reimbursement of attorney fees. Under GTL’s

reasoning, its own egregious conduct in unreasonably denying

benefits (which turns attorney fees otherwise treated as costs into

compensatory damages) would cause the delay that then renders

the jury’s award of noneconomic damages unrecoverable. We

3 The Estate contends that, not only was it entitled to a judgment after the jury verdict under C.R.C.P. 58, but that judgment was actually entered at this time because, when the court entered its later written judgment, it did so nunc pro tunc to the date of the verdict. “Nunc pro tunc judgments operate retrospectively and are given the same force and effect as if entered at the time the court’s decision was originally rendered.” Dill v. County Court, 37 Colo. App. 75, 76 541 P.2d 1272, 1273 (1975). However, a court may only enter a judgment nunc pro tunc to a date on which the judgment legally could have entered. Robbins v. A.B. Goldberg, 185 P.3d 794, 797 (Colo. 2008). Because we conclude that the judgment legally could have entered on the date of the verdict, we agree with the Estate that judgment was validly entered nunc pro tunc to that date. But this conclusion is not necessary to the resolution of the Estate’s claim: even if the court had not entered the judgment nunc pro tunc, Casper’s claim would not have abated because he was entitled to a judgment.

21 decline to read the survival statute to require that result. Castle

Meadows, Inc., 856 P.2d at 504 (court should construe a statute in

a way that promotes the just and reasonable result the legislature

surely intended).

¶ 39 Finally, our interpretation of the statute advances its overall

goal of preserving claims and remedies. GTL says that we should

construe the statute in favor of abatement. But the supreme court

has explained that the statute indicates “an intention to create

remedies rather than to kill or suppress them.” Publix Cab Co. v.

Colo. Nat’l Bank of Denver, 139 Colo. 205, 220, 338 P.2d 702, 710

(1959).

¶ 40 For these reasons, we conclude that the claims for

noneconomic damages, including punitive damages, did not abate

upon Casper’s death.

III. Attorney Fees and Costs Under Section 10-3-1116

¶ 41 Under section 13-21-102(1)(a), the amount of “actual

damages” awarded to a plaintiff determines the amount of punitive

damages the plaintiff may recover. GTL asserts that attorney fees

and costs awarded by the trial court under section 10-3-1116 do

not constitute actual damages. Thus, GTL contends that the

22 district court erred when calculating both actual and punitive

damages. We disagree.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 42 Although we typically review a district court’s decision to

award attorney fees for an abuse of discretion, we review the legal

conclusions that provided the basis for that decision de novo.

Jorgensen v. Colo. Rural Props., LLC, 226 P.3d 1255, 1259 (Colo.

App. 2010); see also Sch. Dist. No. 12 v. Sec. Life of Denver Ins. Co.,

185 P.3d 781, 787 (Colo. 2008). And because the district court

awarded attorney fees pursuant to section 10-3-1116(1), we also

review its interpretation of this statute de novo. Kisselman v. Am.

Family Mut. Ins. Co., 292 P.3d 964, 969 (Colo. App. 2011).

¶ 43 Our ultimate task when examining statutes is to give effect to

the intent of the legislature, as expressed through the plain

language of the statute. Kyle W. Larson Enters., Inc., ¶ 10. Even

so, we may still examine legislative history when there is

substantial legislative discussion that bolsters our plain language

interpretation. Kisselman, 292 P.3d at 972; see Welby Gardens v.

Adams Cty. Bd. of Equalization, 71 P.3d 992, 995 (Colo. 2003)

23 (discussing legislative history despite concluding that “the plain

language of the statute is clear”).

¶ 44 Pursuant to section 10-3-1116, the district court awarded

attorney fees and costs as part of the Estate’s actual damages.

Relying on Hall v. American Standard Insurance Co. of Wisconsin,

2012 COA 201, which determined that attorney fees are damages

(but did not specify whether they were actual, i.e., compensatory,

damages), the district court concluded that attorney fees and costs

were a component of actual damages and not a penalty, as GTL

asserted.

¶ 45 We agree with the district court and conclude that under the

plain meaning of section 10-3-1116, reasonable attorney fees and

court costs in this context are actual damages and do not constitute

penalties or other types of damages. Hall, ¶ 20. Although Hall does

not explicitly say that such damages constitute “actual damages,”

we find Hall’s analysis and reasoning lead to that conclusion.

¶ 46 Section 10-3-1116, which became effective August 5, 2008,

concerns “[r]emedies for unreasonable delay or denial of [insurance]

benefits.” The language provides, in pertinent part, that “[a] first-

24 party claimant . . . whose claim for payment of benefits has been

unreasonably delayed or denied may bring an action . . . to recover

reasonable attorney fees and court costs and two times the covered

benefit.” § 10-3-1116(1); Kisselman, 292 P.3d at 967. Additionally,

subsection (4) provides that the “action authorized in this section is

in addition to, and does not limit or affect, other actions available

by statute or common law, now or in the future.” § 10-3-1116(4).

¶ 47 The plain language of the statute lists two components of

recovery: “reasonable attorney fees and court costs” and “two times

the covered benefit.” § 10-3-1116(1); see also Hall, ¶ 20. Unlike

other statutes permitting the recovery of attorney fees, such as

sections 13-40-123, 24-34-402.5(2)(b)(I), and 38-33.3-123(1)(c),

C.R.S. 2016, section 10-3-1116 does not separate or place in a

distinct subsection the provision providing for the recovery of

attorney fees and costs. Hall, ¶¶ 13, 20. This structure evinces the

legislature’s intent to make the award of attorney fees and costs a

primary remedy, and not an additional or ancillary remedy. See id.;

compare § 13-40-123 (separating and distinguishing attorney fees

and costs from other “recover[able] damages”), with § 10-3-1116(1)

25 (listing nothing to recover other than “reasonable attorney fees and

court costs and two times the covered benefit”).

¶ 48 Further, “[c]lassification of attorney fees as either costs or

damages depends on context, and turns on the nature of the

requested attorney fees in a particular case.” Hall, ¶ 15. When

attorney fees and costs are part of the substance of the lawsuit,

that is, when they are the “legitimate consequences” of the tort or

breach of contract sued upon, attorney fees are clearly damages.

Id. at ¶¶ 15, 20 (quoting Ferrell v. Glenwood Brokers, Ltd., 848 P.2d

936, 941 (Colo. 1993)). Accordingly, we agree with Hall’s conclusion

that attorney fees and costs are “a ‘legitimate consequence’ of

bringing. . . an action to remedy an insurer’s unreasonable

conduct” and that this interpretation “is consistent with the

statutory authorization” in section 10-3-1116. Id. at ¶ 20; see also

Stresscon Corp. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., 2013 COA 131,

¶¶ 119-20 (relying on Hall to conclude attorney fees are damages

under section 10-3-1116), rev’d on other grounds, 2016 CO 22M.

Thus, under section 10-3-1116, attorney fees and costs are actual

damages. Cf. Bunnett v. Smallwood, 793 P.2d 157, 160 (Colo. 1990)

(Attorney fees are not considered “actual damages” when “they are

26 not the legitimate consequences of the tort or breach of contract

sued upon.” (quoting Taxpayers for the Animas-LaPlata Referendum

v. Animas-LaPlata Water Conservancy Dist., 739 F.2d 1472, 1480

(10th Cir. 1984))); see Ferrell, 848 P.2d at 941-42 (attorney fees

should be considered actual damages when they are part of the

substance of the lawsuit); Double Oak Constr., L.L.C. v. Cornerstone

Dev. Int’l, L.L.C., 97 P.3d 140, 150 (Colo. App. 2003) (Attorney fees

are actual damages when “but for defendants’ obdurate conduct,

plaintiff would not have incurred attorney fees in pursuing its

judgment.”).

¶ 49 True enough, this interpretation of section 10-3-1116 is a

departure from the common law rule that attorney fees are not

recoverable as damages for a first-party insurance bad faith claim.

See Bernhard v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 915 P.2d 1285 (Colo. 1996).

But when the General Assembly enacted this statute it created “a

new private right of action for insureds in addition to and different

from a common law bad faith claim.” Kisselman, 292 P.3d at 975.

In stating that the “action authorized in this section is in addition to

. . . other actions available by statute or common law,” § 10-3-

1116(4), the statute makes clear that it imposes upon insurers

27 additional liabilities and provides for additional means of recovery

for plaintiffs. See Kisselman, 292 P.3d at 972-73.

¶ 50 Despite this language, GTL contends that Bernhard should

control, and to hold otherwise would create a conflict between

Bernhard and the statute. We perceive no conflict.

¶ 51 While, under Bernhard, attorney fees in this case would not be

considered actual damages, it is axiomatic that the legislature can,

and frequently has, abrogated various common law tort doctrines.

Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Martin, 209 P.3d 185, 187 (Colo. 2009); see,

e.g., Fibreboard Corp. v. Fenton, 845 P.2d 1168, 1176 (Colo. 1993)

(recognizing the legislature’s abrogation of the common law rule

that the release of one tortfeasor operated to release all tortfeasors

from liability for the same tort).

¶ 52 Section 10-3-1116 was enacted nearly twelve years after

Bernhard was announced; Bernhard simply has no bearing on how

attorney fees should be treated under a later-enacted statute that

explicitly departs from the common law. And the court in Bernhard

expressly recognized that deviations from the common law rule

preventing the recovery of attorney fees as damages could be

properly established by the legislature; it merely concluded that at

28 that time — before the enactment of section 10-3-1116 — the

legislature had not yet created such an exception. 915 P.2d at

1288 (“Permitting Bernhard to recover attorney fees would

represent the creation of a new exception to the American rule: a

function better addressed by the legislative than the judicial branch

of government.”).

¶ 53 Thus, because section 10-3-1116 created a new statutory right

of action separate and apart from common law bad faith claims,

Bernhard, which discusses common law bad faith claims, is not

dispositive. Kisselman, 292 P.3d at 975; see also Vaccaro v. Am.

Family Ins. Grp., 2012 COA 9M, ¶ 35 (“As the Kisselman division

observed, common law bad faith precedent is helpful, but not

dispositive, when interpreting a statutory right of action expressly

intended to apply ‘in addition to . . . other actions available by

statute or common law.’” (quoting § 10-3-1116(4))).

¶ 54 Moreover, following Bernhard would be contrary to the clear

intent of the legislature. Section 10-3-1116 expanded the causes of

action against insurance companies and provided for additional

remedies. Kisselman, 292 P.3d at 972-73. It is clear from both the

plain meaning of the statute and the legislative history behind it

29 that the legislature intended to carve out exceptions to the common

law, including an exception to the common law rule that attorney

fees were not recoverable as actual damages. Id.; see § 10-3-

1116(1). The legislature made clear that insureds should not be

forced to sue their insurers to obtain the benefit of their bargain.

Thus, the General Assembly departed from the common law to

enact new protections for individuals that would permit the

recovery of reasonable attorney fees and court costs as actual

damages. See Kisselman, 292 P.3d at 972-73.

¶ 55 GTL further contends that, even if Bernhard does not control,

attorney fees and costs are a penalty, and not damages, because

section 10-3-1116 is penal in nature. Thus, GTL argues, attorney

fees and costs cannot be included in the calculation of actual

damages.

¶ 56 But we disagree that the statute is penal and instead conclude

that section 10-3-1116 is remedial in nature. See Stresscon Corp.,

¶ 121. In Stresscon, a division of this court determined that the

attorney fees under section 10-3-1116 were damages, not costs,

and “this request for damages is part of a remedial statutory

scheme.” Id. at ¶ 121. After examining the legislative history and

30 comparing the statute to other similar statutory schemes, the

division concluded that “section 10-3-1116 was enacted as a

remedial measure, intended ‘to curb perceived abuses in the

insurance industry.’” Id. at ¶ 124 (quoting Kisselman, 292 P.3d at

976). Thus, the fee-shifting component of the statute has a

“compensatory purpose” and is not a penalty. Id. at ¶ 122.

¶ 57 Even assuming some aspect of the statute is penal, GTL’s

argument is too broad: statutes may be both remedial and penal in

nature. See Moeller v. Colo. Real Estate Comm’n, 759 P.2d 697, 701

(Colo. 1988). Although section 10-3-1116 may be penal in the

sense that the General Assembly intended for it to punish

insurance companies and deter them from unreasonably denying

the claims of their insureds, see Kisselman, 292 P.3d at 972, the

penal nature of the statute only manifests itself in the ability to

recover two times the amount of the covered benefit. See Gerald H.

Phipps, Inc. v. Travelers Prop. Cas. Co. of Am., Civ. A. No. 14-CV-

01642-PAB-KLM, 2015 WL 5047640, at *2 (D. Colo. Aug. 27, 2015)

(noting that the ability to recover “two times the covered benefit . . .

reflects the imposition of a penalty”). But this double recovery has

no bearing on whether the attorney fees and costs are a penalty and

31 therefore not actual damages. Cf. Moeller, 759 P.2d at 701 (“When

a statute is both remedial and penal in nature, the remedial and

penal elements are separated and the appropriate standard is

applied to each.”).

¶ 58 Although section 10-3-1116 does not explicitly label attorney

fees and costs as “actual damages,” we conclude that the statute

intended to classify them as actual or compensatory damages.

Thus, the district court did not err in its calculation of both actual

and punitive damages.

IV. Supplemental Award of Attorney Fees and Costs

¶ 59 GTL next asserts that the district court erred by not reducing

by two-thirds the supplemental request for attorney fees. We

disagree.

A. Additional Background

¶ 60 Casper’s attorneys filed two requests for fees. In their first

motion, they sought $396,180 in fees, plus a lodestar enhancement

of fifty percent, for a total of $594,270, as well as costs in the

amount of $57,840.55. They later filed a supplemental fee request,

seeking an additional $123,925 in post-trial fees and $15,105.24 in

costs.

32 ¶ 61 GTL opposed both fee requests. Regarding the initial fee

request, GTL asserted that no fees were recoverable, but, at most,

Casper’s lawyers could recover only those fees attributable to the

statutory unreasonable denial of benefits claim, without any

lodestar enhancement. GTL attached an affidavit from an expert,

who recommended that the court award no more than $75,000 in

fees.

¶ 62 GTL made the same apportionment argument with respect to

the supplemental fee request and attached an exhibit that set forth

its objections to specific time entries. It identified numerous entries

that it claimed were attributable to work on a related probate

matter, but it only identified two entries as being otherwise

unrelated to the statutory claim, and those entries amounted to

approximately $800 in fees. It did not provide an expert affidavit

related to apportionment or reasonableness of the supplemental fee

request.

¶ 63 The hearing on attorney fees was conducted by telephone and

neither party called any witnesses or introduced any evidence

beyond the expert affidavits that had previously been submitted by

both parties. Casper’s lawyers reiterated their request for fees plus

33 a fifty percent lodestar enhancement, and GTL reiterated its request

that the court award only those fees attributable to the statutory

claim, though it did not suggest any particular percentage or

amount. At the hearing, GTL did not reassert its specific objections

to the time entries or protest that the vagueness of the entries

prevented additional specific objections.

¶ 64 The court determined that, as a rough estimate, only one-third

of the fees in the initial request were attributable to the statutory

bad faith claim. It denied Casper’s lawyers a fifty percent lodestar

enhancement and instead applied a twenty percent enhancement to

the reduced fee amount. As for the supplemental fees, the court

examined the time entries, concluded that — with the exception of

work on the probate case — the entries related to the statutory bad

faith claim, and approved the remaining fees. After those

reductions, the attorney fee award totaled $281,197, a sixty percent

overall decrease from the request of approximately $718,000

($594,270 in the initial motion for fees plus the $123,925 requested

in the supplemental motion).

¶ 65 On appeal, GTL contends that the district court erred in

awarding all of the fees requested in the supplemental fee request,

34 insisting that the court should have reduced the overall request of

$123,925 by two-thirds. It specifically objects to the award of fees

related to the motion to amend the judgment and research on

abatement, which GTL says were matters unrelated to the statutory

claim.

B. Standard of Review

¶ 66 The determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees

is a question of fact for the trial court and will not be disturbed on

review unless it is patently erroneous and unsupported by the

evidence. Melssen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012 COA 102, ¶ 67;

see also Planning Partners Int’l, LLC v. QED, Inc., 2013 CO 43, ¶ 12.

We therefore review the reasonableness of the amount of attorney

fees awarded for an abuse of discretion. Melssen, ¶ 67.

C. Discussion

¶ 67 The parties disagree as to whether apportionment of fees is

necessary in this case. GTL maintains that the court could award

fees only for work directly related to the statutory unreasonable

denial of benefits claim. The Estate, however, argues that

apportionment is not required under section 10-3-1116 and that, in

any event, Casper’s statutory claim was intertwined with the

35 common law claim, rendering apportionment unnecessary. We

need not resolve this dispute because we determine that, even if

apportionment was required, the district court did not clearly err in

its award of supplemental fees.

¶ 68 GTL did not request a two-thirds reduction in the

supplemental fees until after the court had reduced the initial

request for fees by two-thirds. Indeed, it never suggested any

percentage reduction based on an apportionment theory. Its

argument, then, is simply that the court was required to apportion

the supplemental fees in precisely the same manner as the initial

fees. We discern no such requirement.

¶ 69 Rather than applying a rough, across-the-board reduction in

fees, as it had with the primary motion for attorney fees, the district

court examined the entries included in the supplemental fee

petition and the parties’ related exhibits to determine whether those

entries were sufficiently related to the statutory claim. We perceive

no abuse of discretion in the use of this more precise methodology

for apportionment. See Planning Partners, ¶ 23 (“‘[T]here is no

precise rule or formula’ for determining attorney’s fees.” (quoting

Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 736 (1986))); cf. Haystack Ranch,

36 LLC v. Fazzio, 997 P.2d 548, 557 (Colo. 2000) (observing that

because the trial court made no attempt to parse the billing

statements and timesheets, the allocation was unsupported by the

evidence).

¶ 70 That leaves GTL’s specific objections to two time entries: work

related to (a portion of) the motion to amend the judgment and

research concerning abatement. GTL did not object to Casper’s

lawyers’ recovery of their fees for research on abatement until after

the court had issued its order on attorney fees. But even if it had

made an earlier objection, the district court did not clearly err in

determining that research on abatement of claims was related to

Casper’s statutory bad faith claim. GTL’s motion to set aside the

verdict argued that Casper’s statutory claim had abated upon his

death. Research conducted in response to that argument would

relate to the statutory claim. As for the motion to amend the

judgment, GTL concedes that at least some portion of the motion

was attributable to that claim. Even where apportionment is

warranted, we do not require the kind of surgical precision

demanded by GTL. The trial court’s goal when awarding attorney

fees and costs “is to do rough justice, not to achieve auditing

37 perfection.” Payan v. Nash Finch Co., 2012 COA 135M, ¶ 35

(quoting Fox v. Vice, 563 U.S. 826, 838 (2011)).

¶ 71 Furthermore, the district court’s apportionment of fees

resulted in an overall reduction of more than sixty percent from the

amount requested. Given that GTL did not suggest any particular

apportionment method or percentage reduction, we discern no

abuse of discretion in the district court’s apportionment of the

supplemental fees. See Am. Water Dev., Inc. v. City of Alamosa, 874

P.2d 352, 384 (Colo. 1994) (reviewing court will uphold allocations

of fees if the record affords sufficient support).

V. Jury Instruction 27

¶ 72 Finally, GTL asserts that the trial court erred by instructing

the jury on Regulation 4-2-3, which regulates advertising by the

insurance industry. Div. of Ins. Reg. 4-2-3, 3 Code Colo. Regs. 702-

4. We are not persuaded.

¶ 73 A trial court has substantial discretion in formulating and

tendering jury instructions, so long as they include correct

statements of the law and fairly and adequately cover the issues

presented. Tricon Kent Co. v. Lafarge N. Am., Inc., 186 P.3d 155,

38 162 (Colo. App. 2008); Taylor v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 179 P.3d

246, 248 (Colo. App. 2007). Therefore, we review de novo the jury

instruction at issue to assess whether the instruction correctly

states the law, Bedor v. Johnson, 2013 CO 4, ¶ 8, and review for an

abuse of discretion the trial court’s decision to give a particular jury

instruction. Id.

¶ 74 The duty of good faith and fair dealing implied in every

insurance contract in Colorado extends to the advertisement and

purchase of the policy. Ballow v. PHICO Ins. Co., 875 P.2d 1354,

1362-63 (Colo. 1993). To determine whether an insurer has

breached this duty, its conduct is measured objectively and is

tested based on industry standards. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.

Allen, 102 P.3d 333, 343 (Colo. 2004). Administrative rules and

agency regulations may help establish the applicable standard of

care. Id.; see also Giampapa v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 919 P.2d

838, 842 (Colo. App. 1995). However, even if they do not, they “may

nonetheless ‘be relevant evidence bearing on the issue of negligent

conduct.’” Gerrity Oil & Gas Corp. v. Magness, 946 P.2d 913, 931

(Colo. 1997) (quoting Restatement (Second) of Torts § 288B (Am.

39 Law Inst. 1965)). Thus, regulations may be “valid, but not

conclusive, evidence” of an insurer’s breach of the duty of good faith

and fair dealing. Id.

¶ 75 Regulation 4-2-3 was set forth in Instruction 27. The

instruction first explained that “[a]t the time of the sale of the policy

at issue in this case, the following regulations of the Division of

Insurance . . . were in effect, and applied to the advertisement of

policies like the one purchased by Mr. Casper.” The instruction

then presented excerpts of Regulation 4-2-3, including

requirements that all policy limitations and restrictions be “set out

conspicuously,” and that advertisements not contain misleading

representations.

¶ 76 The instruction concluded by stating that “[t]hese regulations

are valid, but not conclusive evidence of insurance industry

standards, and you may consider such regulations in determining

whether the defendant acted unreasonably toward the Plaintiff.”

¶ 77 GTL objected to the instruction at trial, contending that it was

irrelevant to Casper’s remaining claims, given the settlement with

Platinum and Gaylord. The district court disagreed, concluding

that the instruction related to Casper’s theory that GTL’s marketing

40 and sale of the insurance policy, through Platinum, was evidence of

its bad faith. We perceive no abuse of the district court’s discretion.

¶ 78 One of Casper’s theories at trial was that GTL, through

Platinum, intentionally misrepresented the nature of the insurance

coverage by misleadingly calling the policy a “First Diagnosis” policy

when, in fact, hidden and ambiguous language enabled the

insurance company to deny benefits if the diagnosis was traceable

in any way to advice given prior to the effective date of the policy.

¶ 79 Casper’s lawyers discussed advertising and marketing tactics

in their opening statement. Many of Casper’s witnesses addressed

GTL’s allegedly deceptive sales practices; one of his expert witnesses

testified extensively about Regulation 4-2-3 and the connection

between GTL’s sales practices and the denial of Casper’s claim.

Additionally, two of GTL’s own witnesses discussed Regulation 4-2-

3. They acknowledged that GTL’s duty to act in good faith extended

to the advertising, marketing, and sale of the insurance policy, but

they opined that GTL’s conduct had not violated the regulation.

¶ 80 We agree with the district court that the standard of care

related to the sale and marketing of the policy was relevant to

Casper’s claims, and it is undisputed that the instruction was a

41 correct statement of the law. Accordingly, we conclude that the

district court did not abuse its discretion in giving the instruction.

VI. Appellate Attorney Fees

¶ 81 Finally, the Estate asserts that it should be awarded its

attorney fees and costs on appeal. We agree that under section

10-3-1116, Casper’s estate is entitled to an award of its reasonable

appellate attorney fees and costs. Stresscon, ¶ 136 (“When a party

is awarded attorney fees for a prior stage of the proceedings, it may

recover reasonable attorney fees and costs for successfully

defending the appeal.” (quoting Melssen, ¶ 75)).

¶ 82 We exercise our discretion under C.A.R. 39.1 to remand this

issue to the district court to determine the total amount of the

Estate’s reasonable fees and costs incurred on appeal, and to award

those fees. Payan, ¶ 63 (citing Martin v. Essrig, 277 P.3d 857, 862-

63 (Colo. App. 2011)).

VII. Conclusion

¶ 83 The judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the

district court to determine and award the total amount of the

Estate’s reasonable appellate fees and costs allocable to the

statutory claim.

42 JUDGE WEBB and JUDGE ASHBY concur.