Justice BENDER
delivered the Opinion of the Court.
I. Introduction
We granted certiorari in this eminent domain proceeding, to review the court of appeals' opinion in School District No. 12 v. Security Life of Denver Insurance Co., 179 [783]*783P.3d 1 (Colo.App.2007) (selected for official publication), in which the court of appeals held that the trial court's confirmation of the jury verdict was an improper change of substance and, thus, remanded the case to the trial court for a partial retrial.1 In this case, Petitioner/Cross-Respondent School District No. 12, a quasimunicipal corporation in Adams County, Colorado, now known as Adams 12 Five Star Schools, seeks to condemn, through its power of eminent domain, 138 acres of land owned by Respondent/Cross-Petitioner Security Life of Denver Insurance Co. This appeal involves three issues: (1) whether the trial court's confirmation of the jury verdict was an improper change of substance; (2) whether the court of appeals incorrectly awarded "interim damages" to Security Life as compensation for the condemnation of its entire property; and (3) whether Security Life is entitled to attorney fees.
Due to the way that the School District structured its petition for condemnation and its amendment to that petition, this case involves two distinct and separable condemnations that were tried in a single condemnation proceeding: one in which the School District would condemn 60 of the 188 acres ("Parcel A") on February 19, 2004, the date the School District took possession of the 60 acres, thus resulting in damages to the rest of the property; and another in which the School District would first condemn Parcel A on February 19, 2004, and would then condemn the remaining 78 acres ("Parcel B") on February 7, 2005, the date of trial.
We conclude that the jury followed the requirements set forth in the jury instructions and answered the interrogatories contained in the verdict form accordingly, and that the trial court's ruling reflected the jury's intent. Hence, we hold that the trial court's ruling was a permissible change of form because it did nothing more than confirm what the jury had already determined: that if the School District wanted to condemn all 138 acres, then it must compensate Seeu-rity Life first for taking Parcel A on February 19, 2004, which resulted in damages to Parcel B, and then for taking Parcel B on February 7, 2005.
Because the School District will condemn all 138 acres, Security Life is not entitled to damages. As part of its holding, the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court to determine the value of damages to Parcel B for the period between the date the School District took possession of Parcel A and the date the School District took possession of Parcel B. We vacate this holding to the extent that it can be construed to create a category of so-called interim damages.
Under section 88-1-122(1.5), C.R.S. (2007), a landowner is entitled to attorney fees if the condemnation award equals or exceeds 130 percent of the last written offer given to the landowner prior to the filing of the condemnation proceeding. This case involves two distinct and separable condemnations that were tried in a single condemnation proceeding. The School District made a written offer to purchase Parcel A before filing its petition in condemnation to acquire Parcel A. Before amending its petition in condemnation to acquire Parcel B as well, the School District made a written offer to purchase both Parcel A and Parcel B. Because the condemnation award in either scenario exceeds 130 percent of the School District's corresponding final written offer, Security Life is entitled to attorney fees under the statute. Security Life requests attorney fees incurred on appeal and states section 88-1-122(1.5) as its legal basis for such fees. We direct the [784]*784trial court to determine whether Security Life is entitled to attorney fees incurred on appeal and, if so, to determine the reasonable amount of those fees.
For these reasons, we reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand this case to that court to be returned to the trial court with directions to enter judgment pursuant to the trial court's order which requires the School District to pay Security Life $9,274,520 for the condemnation of all 188 acres.
II. Facts and Proceedings Below
Security Life owns approximately 138 acres of contiguous and similarly zoned land located immediately south of 128th Avenue, between Huron Street and Interstate 25 in Westminster, Colorado. On January 12, 2004, the School District made a final offer to purchase 60 of the 188 acres, Parcel A, for $3,250,000, which Security Life rejected. On January 16, 2004, the School District filed a petition in condemnation to acquire, through its power of eminent domain, Parcel A for the construction of a high school. On February 19, 2004, the trial court granted the School District possession of Parcel A.
On May 18, 2004, the School District made a final offer to purchase both Parcel A and the remaining 78 acres, Parcel B, for $6,564,492, which Security Life rejected. On June 15, 2004, the School District amended its petition in condemnation to acquire both Parcel A and Parcel B for construction of a high school, middle school, and sports stadium. However, because the School District had not yet determined if it would condemn the entire property, it did not seek immediate possession of Parcel B. Rather, the School District intended to wait until the value of Parcel B was determined at trial before deciding whether to condemn Parcel B.
At trial, the jury was instructed that the condemnation proceeding involved two parcels of land, Parcel A and Parcel B. Instruction No. 2 stated:
The property that the petitioner seeks to acquire is approximately 188 acres.... The petitioner seeks to acquire the property in two parcels. One is a roughly rectangular 6O-acre parcel located on the southeast corner of Huron Street and 128th Avenue ("Parcel A"). The other is an L-shaped 78-acre parcel surrounding two sides of Parcel A and directly abutting 128th Avenue, Interstate 25, and Huron Street ("Parcel B").
(Emphasis added).
The jury was further instructed that the condemnation proceeding involved two see-narios, one which was certain and in which possession had already occurred, and another which was hypothetical. The jury was required to value each of these scenarios. In the first scenario, in which possession occurred before the date of trial, the School District would condemn Parcel A on February 19, 2004, the date the School District took possession of Parcel A, thus resulting in damages to Parcel B. Instruction No. 2 stated:
The petitioner has had possession of Parcel A since February 19, 2004, and will acquire Parcel A.
Parcel B is the residue after Parcel A is taken. You must determine the reasonable market value of Pareel A as of February 19, 2004, and the damages, if any, to Parcel B.
In the second and hypothetical scenario, the School District would first condemn Parcel A on February 19, 2004, thus resulting in damages to Parcel B, and would then condemn Parcel B on February 7, 2005, the date of trial. Instruction No. 2 stated:
The petitioner does not have possession of Parcel B, but may acquire Parcel B at the conclusion of the trial. In the event the petitioner decides to actually take Parcel B, you must also determine the reasonable market value of Parcel B as of the date of this trial, February 7, 2005.
Having explained these two scenarios, Instruction No. 2 summarized the jury's task as two-fold: first, to determine the value of Parcel A and the resulting damages to Parcel B on February 19, 2004, the date the School District took possession of Parcel A; and second, to determine the value of Parcel B on February 7, 2005, the date of trial:
[785]*785[Y¥Jou shall without fear, favor or partiality ascertain the reasonable market value of Parcel A and the amount of compensable damages, if any, to the residue, which is Parcel B, as of February 19, 2004, and the reasonable market value of Parcel B as of the date of this trial, February 7, 2005.
Based on the jury's determination of the value of Parcel B, the School District would then determine if it wanted to condemn Parcel B.
To determine the value of the damages to Parcel B, if any, the jury was instructed to subtract the value of Parcel B after the School District's possession of Parcel A from the value of Parcel B before the School Dis-triet's possession of Parcel A. Instruction No. 11 stated:
Any damages are to be measured by the decrease, if any, in the reasonable market value of the residue, that is, the difference between the reasonable market value of the residue before the property actually taken is acquired and the reasonable market value of the residue after the property actualty taken has been acquired.
In explaining the meaning of the term "residue," Instruction No. 11 also emphasized that the condemnation proceeding involved two scenarios. Instruction No. 11 stated:
"Residue" means that portion of any property which is not taken but which belongs to the respondent, Security Life of Denver Insurance Company ... The petitioner, Adams County School District No. 12, has had possession of Parcel A since February 19, 2004. The residue is Parcel B. The petitioner may decide to acquire Parcel B, in which case, there will be mo residue. For purposes of this trial, however, you are to determine the amount of compensa-ble damages, if any, to Parcel B, in the event Parcel B is not acquired by the petitioner.
The verdict form asked the jury to determine the value of Parcel A on the date the School District took possession of Parcel A; the value of the damages to Parcel B; and the value of Parcel B on the date of trial:
(2) The value of Parcel A, which is actually taken, on February 19, 2004, was $
(3) The damages to the residue of such property, or Parcel B, if not actually taken, are $
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(5) The value of Parcel B on February 7, 2005, if actually taken is $
In answering the interrogatories contained in the verdict form, the jury determined that the value of Parcel A on the date the School District took possession of Parcel A was $5,619,240; the value of the damages to Parcel B was $2,000,000;2 and the value of Parcel B on the date of trial was $1,655,280.
Following the jury verdict, Security Life filed a C.R.C.P. 593 post-trial motion to "confirm" the jury verdict to show that if the School District intended to condemn all 188 acres, then it must compensate Security Life first for the value of Parcel A on the date the School District took possession of Parcel A, together with the damages to Parcel B, and then for the value of Parcel B on the date of trial. In other words, to acquire the entire property, the School District would have to pay Security Life the sum of the three values provided by the jury in the verdict form, which equals $9,274,520.
The School District disagreed with Seeurity Life's interpretation of the verdiet form, arguing that Colorado condemnation law permits compensation for damages only when part of a property is acquired, and not when the entire property is acquired. Thus, the [786]*786School District argued that the amount of compensation owed to Security Life for the condemnation of both Parcel A and Parcel B, is the sum of the value of Parcel A on the date the School District took possession of Parcel A, and the value of Parcel B on the date of trial, which equals $7,274,520.
The trial court ruled that the amount of compensation owed to Security Life for the condemnation of the entire property is the sum of the three values provided by the jury in the verdiet form, or $9,274,520. The trial court reasoned that to disregard the value of the damages to Parcel B that was provided by the jury in the verdict form, would lead to an absurd result in which the damages to Parcel B would exeeed the fee value of Parcel B.
In another order, issued on March 7, 2005, the trial court granted the School District possession of Parcel B. Later, the trial court awarded attorney fees to Security Life under section 38-1-122(1.5).
On appeal, the court of appeals held that the trial court's ruling confirming the jury verdict was an improper change of substance and, thus, remanded the case to the trial court for a partial retrial. Sch. Dist. No. 12, 179 P.3d at 4-6. The court of appeals reasoned that the jury instructions and verdict form failed to provide adequate instruction to the jury as to the damages to Parcel B caused by the School District's possession of Parcel A, as reflected in the jury's "damage award [which] exceeded the value of Parcel B." Id. at 4-5. The court of appeals concluded that the instructions and verdict form were confusing because they failed to instruct the jury "that it could award damages to Security [Life] for the time period between February 19, 2004 [the date the School District took possession of Parcel A] and February 7, 2005 [the date of trial]." Id. at 6.
Accordingly, the court of appeals affirmed the value of Parcel A as provided by the jury in the verdict form and reversed both the value of the damages to Parcel B and the value of Parcel B. Id. at 7. Taking into account the fact that the School District took possession of Parcel B on March 7, 2005, the court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court to determine the damages to Parcel B between the date the School District took possession of Parcel A and the date the School District took possession of Parcel B, and to determine the value of Parcel B on the date the School District took possession of Parcel B. Id.
Presumably, then, under the court of appeals' interpretation of the condemnation proceeding, the amount of compensation owed to Security Life for the taking of all 138 acres would be the sum of the value of Parcel A on the date the School District took possession of Parcel A; the value of the resulting damages to Parcel B between the date the School District took possession of Parcel A and the date the School District took possession of Parcel B; and the value of Parcel B on the date the School District took possession of Parcel B.
As to whether Security Life is entitled to attorney fees under section 38-1-122(1.5), the court of appeals concluded that both of the School District's written offers "constitute last written final offers under § 38-1-122(1.5) as to those respective parcels." Id. at 22. As such, the court of appeals affirmed the portion of the trial court's ruling that awarded Security Life attorney fees incurred in connection with the determination of the value of Parcel A, together with the determination of the value of the damages to Parcel B. Id. at 28. The court of appeals remanded the case to the trial court to determine the amount of attorney fees incurred in connection with the determination of the value of the damages to Parcel B as determined on retrial, and to determine whether the portion of the School District's final offer to purchase Parcel A and Parcel B for $6,564,492 that is attributable to Parcel B is equal to or exceeds 130 percent of the value of Parcel B as determined on retrial. Id.
Having granted the School District's petition for certiorari and Security Life's cross-petition for certiorari, we now review these issues.
III. Analysis
We review the trial court's ruling on Security Life's C.R.C.P. 59 post-trial motion for an abuse of discretion. Buckley Powder Co. v. State, 70 P.3d 547, 564 (Colo.[787]*787App.2002); see Blue Cross of W. N.Y. v. Bukulmez, 736 P.2d 834, 840 (Colo.1987). Likewise, we review the trial court's ruling on Security Life's motion for attorney fees for an abuse of discretion. Haystack Ranch, LLC v. Fazzio, 997 P.2d 548, 556 (Colo.2000). A trial court abuses its discretion if its actions are manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair. Colo. Nat'l Bank of Denver v. Friedman, 846 P.2d 159, 166-67 (Colo.1993).
A. The Trial Court's Ruling Was a Permissible Change of Form
A trial court may amend a jury verdict regarding matters of form but not regarding matters of substance. Harrison Constr. Co. v. Nissen, 119 Colo. 42, 47, 199 P.2d 886, 888-89 (1948). The rationale of this rule is obvious. If a trial court is permitted to amend a jury verdict regarding matters of substance, then "the court could arbitrarily set aside a verdict of a jury in its entirety, and make a contrary finding in a law action for itself, and render judgment upon it." Bartlett v. Hammond, 76 Colo. 171, 175, 230 P. 109, 110 (1924). A change of substance is a change that affects the underlying determination made by the jury, while a change of form is one that corrects a technical error made by the jury without affecting the underlying determination made by the jury. Weeks v. Churchill, 44 Colo.App. 520, 615 P.2d 74, 75 (1980). Therefore, if an inconsistency in a jury verdict demonstrates that the jury "did not understand the directions, was misled, or ignored certain instructions," then any change in the verdict made by the court is a change of substance and not a change of form. Id. at 76. However, if an inconsistency in a jury verdict can be resolved based upon the instructions given to the jury and without violating the intent of the jury, then such a change is a change of form. Id. (citing Morgan v. Gore, 96 Colo. 508, 510-12, 44 P.2d 918, 919-20 (1935)).
Because an appellate court is bound by the jury's findings, a jury verdict will not be reversed for inconsistency where the jury has been properly instructed by the trial court and where the record contains sufficient competent evidence to support the finding. Hock v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 876 P.2d 1242, 1259 (Colo.1994). To determine whether the jury could have logically reached its verdict, the appellate court must review the jury instructions, the jury verdiet forms, and the evidence. Id. Furthermore, the appellate court must attempt to reconcile the jury's answers to a special verdict,4 if it is at all possible, based upon the evidence and the instructions given. Id. If there is a view of the case that makes the jury's answers consistent, then the appellate court must reconcile the special verdict in that way. Id.
Here, the jury instructions and interrogatories contained in the verdict form asked the jury to determine the value of Parcel B on the date of trial, at a time when the School District had possessed Parcel A for nearly a year. Instruction No. 2 explained to the jury that the condemnation proceeding involved two seenarios, one which was certain and in which possession had already occurred, and another which was hypothetical. In the first scenario, in which possession occurred before the date of trial, the School District would condemn Parcel A on February 19, 2004, the date the School District took possession of Parcel A. In the second and hypothetical seenario, the School District would condemn Parcel A on February 19, 2004, thus resulting in damages to Parcel B, and would then condemn Parcel B on February 7, 2005, the date of trial. Having explained these two scenarios, Instruction No. 2 summarized the jury's task as twofold: first, to determine the value of Parcel A and the resulting damages to Parcel B on the date the School District took possession of Parcel A; and second, to determine the value of Parcel B on the date of trial. Consistent with the explanations and requirements set forth in Instruction No. 2, the interrogatories contained in the verdict form asked the jury for the value of Parcel A on the date the School District took possession of Parcel A; the value of the damages to Parcel B; and the value of Parcel B on the date of trial
[788]*788As to the value of damages to Parcel B, Instruction No. 11 told the jury that "[aluy finding of damages to the residue shall not affect your determination of the value of the property actually taken." Thus, Instruction No. 11 prohibited the jury from adding the value of the damages to Parcel B to the value of Parcel B on the date of trial. Moreover, the interrogatory regarding the value of Parcel B specifically asked for the value of Parcel B on the date of trial. For these reasons, the jury determined that the value of Parcel B on the date of trial was the value of Parcel B as damaged by the School District's possession of Parcel A.
In other words, the interrogatories contained in the verdict form told the jury that the School District already possessed Parcel A, which resulted in damages to Parcel B, and asked the jury to value the damages to Parcel B. Moreover, Instruction No. 11 prohibited the jury from adding the value of the damages to Parcel B to the value of Parcel B on the date of trial. As such, the jury accurately and appropriately determined that the value of Parcel B as it existed on the date of trial was the value of Parcel B as damaged by the School District's possession of Parcel A.
Following the requirements set forth in the jury instructions and answering the interrogatories contained in the verdict form, the jury determined that the value of Parcel A on the date the School District took possession of Parcel A was $5,619,240; the value of the resulting damages to Parcel B was $2,000,000; and the value of Parcel B on the date of trial was $1,655,280.
The trial court ruled that the value of Parcel B for the purpose of condemning Parcel B is the sum of the value of Parcel B as damaged by the School District's possession of Parcel A and the value of the damages to Parcel B. This equation makes the value of Parcel B whole, as if it had not been damaged by the School District's possession and taking of Parcel A on February 19, 2004, and is easily determined by adding the value of Parcel B as damaged, $1,655,280, to the value of the damages to Parcel B, $2,000,000, which equals $3,655,280.
The logic of this calculation is bolstered by Instruction No. 11, which required the jury to determine the value of the damages to Parcel B by subtracting the value of Parcel B after the School District's possession of Parcel A from the value of Parcel B before the School District's possession of Parcel A.
Thus, to determine that the value of the damages to Parcel B due to the School Dis-triect's possession of Parcel A was $2,000,000, the jury first had to determine that the value of Parcel B before the School District's possession of Parcel A was $3,655,280 and that the value of Parcel B after the School Dis-triet's possession of Pareel A was $1,655,280.
Viewing the trial court's ruling mathematically illustrates this point. For the condemnation of Parcel A, the trial court ordered the School District to pay $5,619,240 for Parcel A, plus $2,000,000 for the resulting damages to Parcel B. Because the verdiet form states that Parcel A "is actually taken," the School District was required to pay Security Life $7,619,240 for the condemnation of Parcel A, which the School District has possessed since February 19, 2004. For the condemnation of Parcel B, the trial court ordered the School District to pay Security Life an additional $1,655,280 because the jury determined that the value of Parcel B, as it existed on the date of trial and as damaged by the School District's possession of Parcel A, was $1,655,280. Hence, to acquire both Parcel A and Parcel B through its power of eminent domain, the School District must pay Seecurity Life $9,274,520, which is the sum of the value of the two distinct and separable condemnations as determined by the jury.
Under either condemnation scenario, the jury, in its answers to the interrogatories contained in the verdict form, logically accounted for the damages to Parcel B due to the School District's possession of Parcel A on February 19, 2004. In the first scenario, in which possession had already occurred, the School District would take Parcel A, thus resulting in damages to Parcel B, and would pay Security Life $7,619,240, which is the sum of the value of Parcel A on the date the School District took possession of Parcel A and the value of the resulting damages to Parcel B. In the second and hypothetical scenario, the School District would take Parcel A on February 19, 2004, and would then [789]*789take Parcel B on the date of trial,. In the second scenario, the School District would pay Security Life an additional $1,655,280, which is the value of Parcel B as it existed on the date of trial-that is, the value of Parcel B less the damages that had already occurred due to the School District's possession and taking of Parcel A.
At first blush, the facts of this case appear to be analogous with the facts in Boulder Valley School District R-2 v. Price, 805 P.2d 1085, 1092-94 (Colo.1991), rev'd on other grounds by Community Hospital v. Fail, 969 P.2d 667, 670 (Colo.1998), in which we held that the court of appeals' attempt to correct an inconsistent jury verdict was a change of substance and not one of form because the jury instructions and verdict forms were misleading. There, we explained that the jury was presented with two verdict forms, one for each defendant. Id. at 1098. Because the jury in Boulder Valley had no jury instruction stating that it was necessary to mark only one verdict form for the teacher, or that, in the alternative, only one defendant was liable, we concluded that the jury had been misled by the jury instructions and verdict forms. Id. On these grounds, we remanded the case for a new trial Id. at 1094.
Closer review reveals that the facts of Boulder Valley are distinguishable from the facts of this case. In Bowilder Valley, the court of appeals changed the jury verdict in a way that imposed damages on a defendant even though the jury had indicated that the defendant was liable for "$0" in damages. Id. at 1098-94. Here, the trial court imposed judgment based on the sum of two values that were determined by the jury. In this case, the trial court changed neither the values provided by the jury in the verdiet form nor the substance of any interrogatory contained in the verdiet form. Rather, the trial court used the jury's values to determine the answer to a question that was not presented to the jury regarding the second and hypothetical seenario: What is the total amount of compensation owed by the School District to Security Life for the taking of both Parcel A and Parcel B? On that question, the trial court determined that the answer was the sum of the three values provided by the jury in the verdiet form, or $9,274,520.
The principles set forth in Hock require us to review the jury instructions, the jury verdict forms, and the evidence in an attempt to reconcile the jury's answers to a special verdict based upon the evidence and the instructions given. 876 P.2d at 1259. Following these principles and for the reasons stated above, we conclude that the jury followed the requirements set forth in the jury instructions and answered the interrogatories contained in the verdict form accordingly, and that the trial court's ruling reflected the jury's intent. Hence, we hold that the trial court's ruling was a permissible change of form because it did nothing more than confirm what the jury had already determined: that if the School District wanted to condemn all 188 acres, then it must compensate Security Life first for taking Parcel A on February 19, 2004, which resulted in damages to Parcel B, and then for taking Parcel B on February 7, 2005.
B. Because the School District Will Condemn All 138 Acres, Security Life Is Not Entitled to Damages
The School District argues that the court of appeals incorrectly awarded "interim damages" to Security Life as compensation for the condemnation of its entire property. Both parties agree that because the School District will condemn all 188 acres, Security Life is not entitled to damages. See § 88-L-115(2), C.R.S. (2007) ("No findings as to damages ... shall be required in cases involving the total taking of property.").
Although the court of appeals does not use the term "interim damages," it remanded the case to the trial court to determine the value of damages to Parcel B for the period between the date the School District took possession of Parcel A and the date the School District took possession of Parcel B. We vacate this part of the court of appeals' judgment to the extent that it can be construed to create a category of so-called interim damages.
C. Security Life Is Entitled to Attorney Fees Under Section 38-1-122(1.5)
Under section 88-1-122(1.5), a landowner is entitled to attorney fees if the condemna[790]*790tion award equals or exceeds 180 percent of the last written offer given to the landowner prior to the filing of the condemnation proceeding:
[In addition to any compensation awarded to the owner in an eminent domain proceeding, the condemning authority shall reimburse the owner whose property is being acquired or condemned for all of the owner's reasonable attorney fees incurred by the owner where the award by the court in the proceedings equals or exceeds one hundred thirty percent of the last written offer given to the property owner prior to the filing of the condemmation action.
The School District contends that the plain language of section 38-1-122(1.5) requires a court to disregard any written offer other than the one made prior to the filing of the petition in condemnation. Thus, the School District maintains that the final written offer in this case is its final offer to purchase Parcel A for $3,250,000, which was made four days before the School District filed its petition in condemnation. The School District further argues that the offer to purchase Parcel A should be modified to reflect its amendment to the petition in condemnation by prorating the offer, either by the square foot or by the square acre, to a proportional value of either $7,477,761.81 or $7,474,999 depending on which unit value is used in the calculation. In either case, the amount of compensation owed by the School District to Security Life for the condemnation of all 188 acres-$9,274,520, as confirmed by the trial court-would not equal or exceed 180 percent of the prorated last written offer, and Security Life would not be entitled to any attorney fees.
In support of its position, the School District cites two court of appeals cases: E-470 Public Highway Authority v. Wagner, 77 P.3d 902, 903-05 (Colo.App.2003), and E-470 Public Highway Authority v. Kortum Investment Co., 121 P.3d 331, 332-34 (Colo.App.2005). There are no Colorado cases that interpret section 38-1-122(L.5) in situations such as the one in this case, where a condemning authority makes a final written offer before filing its petition in condemnation and then decides to amend the petition in condemnation in a way that changes the amount of property condemned. However, Wagner and Kortum Investment required the court of appeals to interpret identical language from section 48-4-506(1)(h)(II)(B),5 which pertains to highway condemnation proceedings, and to apply that interpretation to situations in which the condemning authority amended its petition in condemnation.
In Wagner, the E-470 Highway Authority made a written offer to purchase thirty-nine acres, which the landowner rejected, before filing a petition in condemnation to acquire the property. 77 P.3d at 903. The highway authority later amended its petition in condemnation to acquire only twenty-seven acres and an easement. Id. Because the highway authority did not make a "new last written offer" before it amended its petition, the trial court determined the value per acre represented by the written offer to purchase the thirty-nine acres and then reduced that offer by deducting the value of the acreage that the highway authority decided not to condemn. Id. at 904. On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed, finding that the trial court properly prorated the last written offer because the highway authority "did not make a new last written offer based upon the changes in the amount of land." Id. at 905.
In Kortum Investment, the E-470 Highway Authority made a written offer to purchase fourteen acres in fee, as well as an easement to use five and a half acres, which the landowners rejected. 121 P.3d at 332. The highway authority then filed a petition in condemnation to acquire the fourteen acres in fee as well as an easement to use the five [791]*791and a half acres. Id. Subsequently, the highway authority amended its petition in condemnation to acquire the entire nineteen and a half acres in fee, and made a written offer to purchase the nineteen and a half acres in fee three days after filing the amendment, which the landowners rejected. Id.
Based on the second written offer, the trial court awarded the landowner attorney fees. Id. The court of appeals held that the second written offer could not be considered a final written offer because the highway authority offered it three days after filing its amended petition, in contradiction to the plain language of the statute which requires final written offers to be made "prior to the filing of the condemnation action." Id. Citing Wagner, the court of appeals held that the trial court should have prorated the highway authority's first written offer to a proportional value for the purchase of the entire property in fee. Id. at 884. In dicta, the court of appeals commented that it is unclear whether section 43-4-506(1)(h)(II)(B) either requires or permits a "new last written offer when the condemning authority amends its petition in such a substantial manner as to warrant a conclusion that a taking of an essentially new or different character is at issue." Id.
However, Wagner and Kortum Investment are distinguishable from this case because, unlike the condemnation proceedings in either Wagner or Kortum Investment, this case involves two distinct and separable condemnations that were tried in a single proceeding, and the School District made a final written offer both before filing its petition in condemnation to acquire Parcel A and before amending its petition in condemnation to acquire both Parcel A and Parcel B. Four days before it filed its petition in condemnation to acquire Parcel A, the School District made a final offer to purchase Parcel A for $3,250,000. Almost one month before it amended its petition in condemnation to acquire both Parcel A and Parcel B, the School District made a final offer to purchase both Parcel A and Parcel B for $6,564,492. Unlike the second written offer in Kortum Investment, which was made three days after the highway authority amended its petition in condemnation, the second written offer in this case was made almost one month before the School District amended its petition in condemnation.
Section 88-1-122(1.5) defines the "last written offer" as the "offer given to the property owner prior to the filing of the condemnation action." Given that this case involves two distinct and separable condemnations that were tried in a single proceeding, we conclude that section 88-1-122(1.5) contemplates the trial court's application of each written offer to the corresponding condemnation scenario. In the first scenario, the condemnation action occurred when the original petition was filed on January 16, 2004, four days after the School District's last written offer of $3,250,000 on January 12, 2004. The value of Parcel A and the value of the damages to Parcel B as determined by the jury, $7,619,240, exceeds 180 percent of the School District's last written offer of $8,250,000. In the second scenario, the condemnation action occurred when the petition was amended to include both parcels on June 15, 2004, following the last written offer of $6,564,492 for both parcels on May 18, 2004. The amount of compensation owed by the School District to Security Life for the condemnation of all 188 acres, as confirmed by the trial court to be $9,274,520, exceeds 130 percent of the School District's last written offer of $6,564,492.
Hence, we hold that Security Life is entitled to attorney fees under section 838-1-122(1.5). Security Life requests attorney fees incurred on appeal and states section 38-1-122(1.5) as its legal basis for such fees. We direct the trial court to determine whether Security Life is entitled to attorney fees incurred on appeal and, if so, to determine the reasonable amount of those fees.
IV. Conclusion
We reverse the court of appeals' judgment and remand this case to that court to be returned to the trial court with directions to enter judgment pursuant to the trial court's order which requires the School District to pay Security Life $9,274,520 for the condemnation of all 188 acres.
Justice HOBBS dissents, Justice RICE and Justice COATS join in the dissent.