The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY June 12, 2025
2025COA56
No. 24CA1085, Colorado Education Association v. Colorado State Board of Education — Education — Licensed Personnel Performance Evaluation Act — Performance Evaluation Ratings for Teachers — Process for Nonprobationary Teacher to Appeal Second Consecutive Performance Evaluation Rating of Ineffective or Partially Ineffective
A teachers’ association appeals the district court’s judgment
denying its petition for review of two rules governing the evaluation
of teacher performance adopted by the Colorado State Board of
Education (Board). The challenged rules (1) established a “partially
effective” performance rating, defined as one of two ratings
demonstrating ineffectiveness; and (2) established the appeal
process for teachers who receive a second consecutive performance
rating demonstrating ineffectiveness, limiting the grounds upon
which a teacher can base such an appeal. A division of the court of
appeals addresses the teachers’ association’s contention that the Board’s promulgation of the challenged rules exceeded its statutory
authority. The division concludes that the Board didn’t exceed its
authority with respect to either rule. Accordingly, the division
affirms the judgment of the district court. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2025COA56
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1085 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV32208 Honorable David H. Goldberg, Judge
Colorado Education Association,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Colorado State Board of Education,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Grove and Johnson, JJ., concur
Announced June 12, 2025
Colorado Education Association, Rory M. Herington, Ethan Ice, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Phillip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Michelle Berge, First Assistant Attorney General, Joseph Peters, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee ¶1 The Colorado Education Association (CEA) appeals the district
court’s judgment denying its petition for review of two rules
governing the evaluation of teacher performance adopted by the
Colorado State Board of Education (Board). Department of
Education Rule 3.3, 1 Code Colo. Regs. 301-87 (Rule 3.3),
establishes a performance standard of “partially effective” and
defines it as one of two ratings that demonstrates ineffectiveness.
Department of Education Rule 5.4, 1 Code Colo. Regs. 301-87 (Rule
5.4), establishes the appeal process for teachers who have received
two consecutive ratings demonstrating ineffectiveness but limits the
grounds upon which a teacher can base their appeal. The CEA
argues, as it did to the district court, that the Board exceeded its
statutory authority by defining the “partially effective” performance
standard as a second rating demonstrating ineffectiveness and by
impermissibly restricting the grounds on which teachers may
appeal a second consecutive rating demonstrating ineffectiveness.
We, like the district court, disagree that the Board exceeded its
authority. We, therefore, affirm the judgment of the district court.
1 I. Background
¶2 In 2010, the General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 10-191,
which significantly changed the way teachers are evaluated under
the Licensed Personnel Performance Evaluation Act (the Act), §§ 22-
9-101 to -109, C.R.S. 2024. See Ch. 241, 2010 Colo. Sess. Laws
1053-75; see also Johnson v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 2018 CO 17, ¶¶ 3-7
(discussing sweeping changes ushered in by Senate Bill 10-191).
As part of the Act, the General Assembly established a performance
evaluation system that would sort teacher performance into one of
two categories — demonstrating effectiveness or demonstrating
ineffectiveness. § 22-63-103(7), C.R.S. 2024. A teacher who
demonstrates effectiveness for three consecutive years achieves
nonprobationary status. Id. But if a teacher who has obtained
nonprobationary status is given a rating that demonstrates
ineffectiveness for two consecutive years, they lose their
nonprobationary status and are returned to probationary status.
Id.
¶3 This distinction between probationary and nonprobationary
status is vitally important because, while a probationary teacher’s
contract can’t be longer than one school year and can be denied
2 renewal for any reason, § 22-63-203(2)(a), (4)(a), C.R.S. 2024, a
nonprobationary teacher may only be dismissed for “just cause,”
§ 22-63-301, C.R.S. 2024. Simply put, nonprobationary teachers
have far more robust job protections than probationary teachers.
See § 22-63-202, C.R.S. 2024.
¶4 The legislative scheme adopted in 2010 expressly created two
performance standards demonstrating effectiveness — “highly
effective” and “effective” — and one performance standard
demonstrating ineffectiveness — “ineffective.” § 22-9-105.5(3)(a),
C.R.S. 2024. The statute, however, provides that the three
prescribed performance standards don’t constitute an exhaustive
list and explicitly authorizes the Board — in consultation with a
council of educators appointed by the governor — to create
additional performance standards. Id.; see also § 22-9-105.5(1)-(2)
(discussing the appointment and composition of the council of
educators).
¶5 The Act also instructed the Board to design and implement an
appeal process for nonprobationary teachers who have received two
consecutive ratings demonstrating ineffectiveness. §§ 22-9-
105.5(3)(e)(VII), -106(4.5)(b), C.R.S. 2024.
3 ¶6 The statutory scheme charged the Board with promulgating
administrative rules through rulemaking. §§ 22-9-103(2.5),
-104(2)(f), -105.5(10)(a), C.R.S. 2024. Following notice and
comment, the Board adopted a comprehensive set of rules in
February 2012. With respect to performance standards, the Board
adopted Rule 3.3, which defines the Act’s three prescribed
performance standards — “highly effective,” “effective,” and
“ineffective” — as well as a fourth performance standard: “partially
effective.” Dep’t of Educ. Rule 3.3(B), 1 Code Colo. Regs. 301-87.
Rule 3.3(B) defined “partially effective” as a second performance
rating — along with “ineffective” — demonstrating ineffectiveness.
¶7 Regarding the appeals process for nonprobationary teachers
who receive two consecutive performance ratings of “ineffective” or
“partially ineffective,” the Board adopted Rule 5.4. Dep’t of Educ.
Rule 5.4, 1 Code Colo. Regs. 301-87. In Rule 5.4, the Board limited
the grounds upon which a teacher could appeal a rating
demonstrating ineffectiveness to (1) the evaluator’s failure to follow
the proper evaluation procedures; and (2) the evaluator’s reliance
on data inaccurately attributed to the appealing teacher (“e.g., data
4 included in the evaluation was from students for whom the teacher
was not responsible”). Id. at Rule 5.4(A)(7).
¶8 Before these two rules could go into effect, they had to survive
a special legislative rule-review process separate from the annual
rule review bill.1 See § 22-9-105.5(10)(b). As part of this special
rule-review process, the General Assembly expressly “reserve[d] the
right to repeal individual rules contained in the rules promulgated
by the [Board].” Id. Rules 3.3 and 5.4 survived this review process
and became effective February 15, 2012. See Ch. 2, sec. 1, 2012
Colo. Sess. Laws 2-3.
¶9 In 2023, the Board proposed nonsubstantive changes to Rules
3.3 and 5.4, such as renumbering them for the sake of “clarity and
consistency.” Sec’y of State, Code of Colorado Regulations eDocket:
Details of Tracking No. 2023-00091, https://perma.cc/MEA3-M88L.
1 Section 24-4-103(8)(c), C.R.S. 2024, sets forth the annual rule
review process to which all new and amended rules are subject. Section 24-4-103(8)(c)(I)(A) provides that “all rules adopted or amended during any one-year period that begins each November 1 and continues through the following October 31 expire at 11:59 p.m. on the May 15 that follows such one-year period unless the general assembly by bill acts to postpone the expiration of a specific rule.” Surviving this process, however, “does not constitute legislative approval of the rule and is not admissible in any court as evidence of legislative intent.” § 24-4-103(8)(c)(I)(C).
5 During the Board’s 2023 rulemaking process, the CEA objected to
Rules 3.3 and 5.4 and proposed substantive amendments to those
rules. The Board didn’t adopt any of the CEA’s requested changes
to Rules 3.3 or 5.4, and the updated rules went into effect on June
20, 2023, notwithstanding the CEA’s objections. The CEA filed a
suit in the district court challenging Rules 3.3 and 5.4 as being
beyond the Board’s statutory authority. See §§ 22-63-103, 22-9-
106. In a thorough written order, after full briefing by the parties,
the district court denied the CEA’s petition for review, finding that
the CEA hadn’t met its burden to prove the two rules were invalid.
This appeal follows.
II. Issues on Appeal
¶ 10 The CEA argues that by adopting Rule 3.3, which established
the “partially effective” performance standard and defined it as a
rating demonstrating ineffectiveness, the Board exceeded its
statutory authority because Rule 3.3 is contrary to the
unambiguous language of section 22-63-103(7). The CEA also
argues that by adopting Rule 5.4, which limits the grounds on
which a teacher can appeal a second consecutive rating
demonstrating ineffectiveness, the Board exceeded its statutory
6 authority because, by limiting the grounds for appeal, the rule
violates the statutory requirement that the appeals process must
provide a teacher with the opportunity to demonstrate that they
deserved an effective rating. After discussing our standard of
review, we address, and reject, each contention in turn below.
A. Standard of Review and Legal Principles
¶ 11 This case presents issues of statutory interpretation.
“Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de
novo.” Larimer Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v. 1303 Frontage Holdings
LLC, 2023 CO 28, ¶ 29 (citing McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶ 37).
When construing a statute, “our primary task is to effectuate the
legislative intent.” Id. (citing Colo. Prop. Tax Adm’r v. CO2 Comm.
Inc., 2023 CO 8, ¶ 22). In doing so, “we look to the entire statutory
scheme in order to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect
to all of its parts” and give “words and phrases . . . their plain and
ordinary meanings.” Id. (quoting UMB Bank, N.A. v. Landmark
Towers Ass’n, 2017 CO 107, ¶ 22). “If the statutory language is
clear and unambiguous — in other words, not susceptible to
multiple interpretations — we look no further.” Id. (quoting CO2
7 Comm., ¶ 22). These principles of statutory interpretation also
apply to administrative rules and regulations. Id. at ¶ 30.
¶ 12 Any rule that conflicts with a statute is void. § 24-4-103(8)(a),
C.R.S. 2024. The plaintiff — here, the CEA — has the burden of
establishing that the agency has exceeded its statutory authority.
Colo. Workers for Innovative & New Sols. v. Gherardini, 2023 COA
80, ¶ 18.
¶ 13 Although we aren’t required to do so, we may defer to an
agency’s interpretation of the statute it’s charged with
administering if its interpretation is reasonable. Larimer, ¶ 30; see
also Table Servs., LTD v. Hickenlooper, 257 P.3d 1210, 1217 (Colo.
App. 2011) (“[W]e generally accept an agency’s statutory
interpretation if it has . . . a reasonable basis in the law, and is
warranted by the record.”). But we won’t defer if the agency’s
interpretation is contrary to the plain language of the statute. BP
Am. Prod. Co. v. Colo. Dept. of Revenue, 2016 CO 23, ¶ 16.
¶ 14 The CEA argues that the degree of deference we should accord
the Board in interpreting its organic statute has been dramatically
lowered — if not eliminated — by Loper Bright Enterprises v.
Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), which jettisoned what had been
8 known as the Chevron doctrine. Under that doctrine, courts
applying the federal Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551
to 559, generally deferred to a federal agency’s interpretation of its
organic statute and rules. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), overruled in part by Loper, 603
U.S. 369. But we aren’t persuaded that Loper has any bearing on
the level of deference we should or may give to state agencies under
Colorado law. We reach this conclusion for two reasons.
¶ 15 First, the Colorado Supreme Court has stated that our
framework for according deference when reviewing state-agency
rulemaking is different than Chevron’s. See Nieto v. Clark’s Mkt.,
Inc., 2021 CO 48, ¶ 38 (“True, we have, at times, appeared to
embrace Chevron-style deference for the purposes of the Colorado
Administrative Procedure Act. But in other cases, we have made
clear that, while agency interpretations should be given due
consideration, they are ‘not binding on the court.’”) (citations
omitted).
¶ 16 Second, nothing in Loper calls into question the propriety or
constitutionality of the longstanding framework of deference
described in Nieto and its progeny, see, e.g., Larimer, ¶ 29, so we
9 must continue to adhere to that framework, see, e.g., People v. Cox,
2021 COA 68, ¶ 8 (noting that both this court and trial courts are
bound by decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court). Simply put, if
Loper is going to have any bearing on the deference Colorado courts
may accord Colorado agencies, that change will need to come from
the Colorado Supreme Court. See People v. Novotny, 2014 CO 18,
¶ 26 (The Colorado Supreme Court “alone can overrule [its] prior
precedents concerning matters of state law.”). Accordingly, we
reject the notion that Loper impacts the level of deference we accord
the Board’s interpretation of its own statute.
¶ 17 With these principles in mind, we turn to the merits of the
CEA’s challenges to Rules 3.3 and 5.4.
B. Rule 3.3
¶ 18 The CEA argues that the Board exceeded its statutory
authority by defining the “partially effective” rating as a rating
demonstrating ineffectiveness. While the CEA concedes that the
language in section 22-9-105.5(3)(a) — which permits the Board to
“consider whether additional performance standards should be
established” — authorizes the Board to promulgate additional
performance standards, including a “partially effective” standard,
10 the CEA nevertheless contends that the Board exceeded its
authority by designating its new “partially effective” standard as a
standard of ineffectiveness that results, if received for two
consecutive years, in the loss of nonprobationary status. The CEA
contends this is so because the Act authorizes the Board to create
only additional categories of effectiveness, not new categories of
ineffectiveness that could lead to a loss of nonprobationary status.
We disagree that the Act is so constrained.
¶ 19 When the General Assembly amended the statute to change
how teachers are evaluated in 2010, it instructed the Board — in
consultation with a special council of educators — to promulgate
rules that would outline and govern this evaluation system. See
§ 22-9-105.5(10)(a). In doing so, it specifically defined
“[p]robationary teacher” as “a teacher who has not completed three
consecutive years of demonstrated effectiveness or a
nonprobationary teacher who has had two consecutive years of
demonstrated ineffectiveness, as defined by rule adopted by the
general assembly pursuant to section 22-9-105.5.” § 22-63-103(7)
(emphasis added). In turn, section 22-9-105.5(3)(a) provides:
11 The quality standards for teachers shall be clear and relevant to the teacher’s roles and responsibilities and shall have the goal of improving student academic growth. The council shall include in its recommendations a definition of effectiveness and its relation to quality standards. The definition of effectiveness shall include, but need not be limited to, criteria that will be used to differentiate between performance standards.
(Emphasis added.)
¶ 20 Nothing in section 22-9-105.5(3)(a) — or any other provision of
the Act — requires that all new performance standards created by
the Board be standards for rating a teacher’s performance effective
or provides that the statutorily prescribed “ineffective” performance
standard must be the only standard for rating a teacher’s
performance ineffective. Nor does the Act prohibit the Board from
creating a new performance standard that defines an alternative
rating of ineffectiveness. Instead, the Act authorizes the Board to
both establish new performance standards and define any new
performance standard’s rating as either demonstrating effectiveness
or demonstrating ineffectiveness.
¶ 21 By adopting Rule 3.3, the Board established the “partially
effective” performance standard and defined it as a rating that
12 demonstrates ineffectiveness, meaning two consecutive “partially
effective” ratings would result in a loss of nonprobationary status:
Implications for earning or losing nonprobationary status: A nonprobationary teacher who is rated partially effective or ineffective for two consecutive years loses nonprobationary status.
Dep’t of Educ. Rule 3.3(B)(1), 1 Code Colo. Regs. 301-87.
¶ 22 The CEA argues that section 22-9-105.5(3)(a) “granted the
Board [authority] to create other categories of effectiveness, but
explicitly articulated, and thus limited, which categories would
contribute to loss of nonprobationary status.” That’s simply not an
accurate reading of section 22-9-105.5(3)(a). That subsection
authorizes the Board — based on recommendations made by a
council of educators — to create additional performance standards
beyond the three designated without saying anything about whether
any new performance standard could demonstrate ineffectiveness
and, therefore, contribute to the loss of nonprobationary status.
See § 22-9-105.5(3)(a) (“The defined performance standards shall
include, but need not be limited to, ‘highly effective’, ‘effective’, and
‘ineffective’. The council shall consider whether additional
performance standards should be established.”); see also § 22-63-
13 103(7) (defining “[p]robationary teacher” to include “a
demonstrated ineffectiveness, as defined by rule adopted by the
general assembly pursuant to section 22-9-105.5”) (emphasis added).
¶ 23 Could the Board have defined the performance standard of
“partially effective” as a rating that demonstrates effectiveness?
Certainly. But nothing in the statute requires such a definition or
prohibits the Board from defining an alternative performance
standard that demonstrates ineffectiveness. Instead, whether to do
so is a policy decision that the General Assembly explicitly
delegated to the Board. And the Board’s adoption of Rule 3.3 fell
within the scope of that delegated authority.
¶ 24 In the event that there is any doubt whether the adoption of
Rule 3.3 was a valid exercise of the Board’s statutory authority, it’s
instructive that Rule 3.3, including the provisions related to the
“partially effective” performance standard, survived the special rule-
review process in 2012. See § 22-9-105.5(10)(b); Ch. 2, sec 1, 2012
Colo. Sess. Laws 2. Neither the Act nor Rule 3.3 has materially
changed since this rule-review process was completed.
14 ¶ 25 Notwithstanding the legislative history confirming the validity
of Rule 3.3, the CEA wants us to interpret the legislature’s inaction
since 2012 as a tacit disapproval of Rule 3.3. But, as the district
court aptly pointed out, parsing the meaning of legislative inaction
is a “risky” endeavor since the reasons for enacting, or not enacting,
legislation are “too numerous to tally.” Welby Gardens v. Adams
Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 71 P.3d 992, 998 n.8 (Colo. 2003).
Regardless, there’s no legislative inaction in this case. The 2012
versions of the challenged rules were reviewed by the General
Assembly and weren’t repealed. See § 22-9-105.5(10)(b). Because
the 2023 versions — the rules at issue in this appeal — haven’t
substantively changed, we don’t view the General Assembly’s
subsequent silence as disapproval, tacit or otherwise.
¶ 26 Moreover, we agree with the district court that, if the General
Assembly’s silence on the “partially effective” rating raises any
inference at all, that inference would be that Rule 3.3, including its
definition of “partially effective,” is a valid exercise of the Board’s
statutory authority. After all, the Board promulgated Rule 3.3 over
a decade ago, so the General Assembly has had ample time and
opportunity to correct any perceived overreach by the Board. See
15 § 24-4-103(8)(d) (authorizing the office of legislative legal services to
recommend rules or portions of rules that should be repealed by the
General Assembly because they are beyond the agency’s rulemaking
authority).
¶ 27 Simply put, we conclude that the Board’s promulgation of Rule
3.3 was a valid exercise of its statutory authority and that the rule’s
definition of “partially effective” as a rating demonstrating
ineffectiveness isn’t contrary to the plain and unambiguous
language of the statute. Accordingly, the district court correctly
denied the CEA’s challenge to Rule 3.3.
C. Rule 5.4
¶ 28 The CEA next argues that the Board exceeded its statutory
authority when it improperly limited the grounds for a teacher to
appeal a second consecutive rating demonstrating ineffectiveness
because the statute granting the Board the authority to design and
implement the appeals process didn’t include any such limitations.
Again, we disagree.
¶ 29 The Act instructs the Board to develop a “process by which a
nonprobationary teacher may appeal his or her second consecutive
16 performance rating of ineffective.” § 22-9-105.5(3)(e)(VII). The Act
goes on to require the following with respect to an appeals process:
Each school district shall ensure that a nonprobationary teacher who objects to a rating of ineffectiveness has an opportunity to appeal that rating, in accordance with a fair and transparent process developed, where applicable, through collective bargaining. At a minimum, the appeal process provided shall allow a nonprobationary teacher to appeal the rating of ineffectiveness to the superintendent of the school district and shall place the burden upon the nonprobationary teacher to demonstrate that a rating of effectiveness was appropriate.
§ 22-9-106(4.5)(b).
¶ 30 Rule 5.4 is the Board’s answer to the General Assembly’s
charge to develop an appeals process for teachers who have
received two consecutive ratings demonstrating ineffectiveness.
Rule 5.4 allows local school districts to develop their own appeals
process or follow the state’s model process. Regardless of which
path a district follows, Rule 5.4 allows only two grounds for a
teacher to appeal a rating that demonstrates ineffectiveness: (1) the
evaluator failed to follow proper evaluation procedures, and (2) the
data the evaluator relied upon was for a different teacher. Dep’t of
Educ. Rule 5.4(A)(7), 1 Code Colo. Regs. 301-87.
17 ¶ 31 The CEA argues that by limiting the grounds to appeal a rating
demonstrating ineffectiveness to the two grounds enumerated in
Rule 5.4, the Board violated the legislature’s requirement that the
appeals process provide the teacher with an opportunity “to
demonstrate that a rating of effectiveness was appropriate.” § 22-9-
106(4.5)(b). We disagree for three reasons.2
¶ 32 First, the language the CEA relies on isn’t directed at
establishing minimum requirements for the appeals process.
Instead, the statute is focused on ensuring that the teacher bears
the burden of proving that a rating of effectiveness was appropriate:
“At a minimum, the appeal process provided shall allow a
nonprobationary teacher to appeal the rating of ineffectiveness to
the superintendent of the school district and shall place the burden
upon the nonprobationary teacher to demonstrate that a rating of
effectiveness was appropriate.” § 22-9-106(4.5)(b). Thus, this isn’t
2 The CEA also argues that Rule 5.4 is ultra vires because (1) Rule
5.4 allows a teacher to lose their nonprobationary status as a result of receiving a “partially effective” rating, and (2) the General Assembly didn’t explicitly approve of the appeals process in Rule 5.4 when it amended the governing statutes in 2023. Because we have already rejected these arguments, supra Part II.B, we don’t readdress them here.
18 an affirmative grant of a broad right for a teacher to be afforded an
opportunity to demonstrate effectiveness on appeal. Instead, it
describes the burden of proof the teacher must carry in any appeals
process established by the Board.
¶ 33 Second, the requirements of the appeal process as set forth in
section 22-9-106(4.5)(b) aren’t numerous: (1) the process must be
fair and transparent; (2) the teacher must be allowed to appeal to
the superintendent; and (3) the burden must be placed on the
teacher to prove that an effectiveness rating was appropriate. And
the statute doesn’t provide any specific means that a teacher must
be afforded to demonstrate that a rating of effectiveness was
appropriate.
¶ 34 In any event, the appeals process is more robust than what is
set forth in Rule 5.4(A)(7). Rule 5.4 provides a number of
procedural protections that discharge the statute’s requirement that
the Board establish a “fair and transparent” appeal process. § 22-
9-106(4.5)(b). For example,
• Rule 5.4(A)(1) guarantees an opportunity to appeal a
second consecutive rating demonstrating ineffectiveness;
19 • Rule 5.4(A)(2) requires that an appeals process be
appropriate to the circumstances, fair and clearly
communicated, and timely;
• Rule 5.4(A)(3) requires that the appeals process must be
developed through collective bargaining, where
appropriate;
• Rule 5.4(A)(8) requires that the appeal proceedings be
confidential; and
• Rule 5.4(A)(11) allows for a “no score” option when a
“superintendent determines that a rating of ineffective or
partially effective was not accurate but there is not
sufficient information to assign a rating of effective.”
¶ 35 Section 22-9-106(4.5)(b) granted the Board broad discretion to
craft an appeals process that was “fair and transparent.” This list
of protections, together with the limitations set forth in Rule
5.4(A)(7), demonstrates that the Board has acted within the scope of
its delegated authority under statute.
¶ 36 Third, the Act clearly delegated the task of crafting an appeals
process, and thus the grounds upon which an appeal could be
made, to the Board. Because the legislature, in section 22-9-
20 106(4.5)(b), gave the Board a wide berth to develop an appeals
process, the task of creating an appeals process amounted to a
policy decision entrusted to Board. See Barela v. Beye, 916 P.2d
668, 677 (Colo. App. 1996). And, as the Board notes, “[w]hen an
administrative agency adopts a rule based on a policy judgment,
particularly within the expertise of the agency[,] . . . it can choose to
‘reject any adverse submissions and adopt the proposed rule.’” City
of Aurora v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 785 P.2d 1280, 1287 (Colo. 1990)
(citations omitted).
¶ 37 Last, the CEA argues that Rule 5.4 exceeds the Board’s
statutory mandate because it empowers local school districts to
develop their own appeals processes. But the CEA doesn’t point to
any language in a governing statute that prohibits the Board from
allowing local school districts to do so. Indeed, the statute seems to
explicitly authorize this delegation by providing that “[e]ach school
district shall ensure that a nonprobationary teacher who objects to
a rating of ineffectiveness has an opportunity to appeal that rating,
in accordance with a fair and transparent process developed, where
applicable, through collective bargaining.” § 22-9-106(4.5)(b)
(emphasis added).
21 ¶ 38 Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the CEA hasn’t
carried its burden of demonstrating that the Board exceeded its
statutory authority in adopting Rule 5.4. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s denial of the CEA’s petition challenging Rule 5.4.
III. Disposition
¶ 39 We affirm the district court’s judgment.
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.