The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY April 9, 2026
2026COA26
No. 25CA0071, OnePutt Liquors, LLC v. Colorado Department of Revenue — Colorado Liquor Code — Retail Liquor Store License — Additional Licenses Generally, the owner of a retail liquor store license may not
own an interest in any other retail liquor store license. In 2016, the
General Assembly adopted an exception that allows “[a]n owner,
part owner, shareholder, or person interested directly or indirectly
in . . . a retail liquor store licensed on or before January 1, 2016,
and whose license holder is a Colorado resident” to purchase a
limited number of additional retail liquor store licenses. § 44-3-
409(4)(b)(III), C.R.S. 2025.
For the first time in a published opinion, a division of the
court of appeals addresses this exception. The division concludes
that the exception does not apply to a person who purchases a
retail liquor store that was licensed by another on or before January 1, 2016, even though the purchaser continued to operate a liquor
store at the same location pursuant to a temporary permit and
thereafter under the purchaser’s own license. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026COA26
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0071 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV32169 Honorable Adam J. Espinosa, Judge
OnePutt Liquors, LLC,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Colorado Department of Revenue, Heidi Humphries, in her official capacity as Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Revenue and State Licensing Authority, and Liquor Enforcement Division,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Freyre and Brown, JJ., concur
Announced April 9, 2026
Clark Hill PLC, Michael J. Laszlo, Boulder, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellant
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Alan Call, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Reed Morgan, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Hiwot Covell, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees ¶1 Generally, the owner of a retail liquor store (RLS) license may
not own an interest in any other RLS licenses. This appeal arises
from an agency order confirming that plaintiff, OnePutt Liquors,
LLC (OnePutt), is not eligible to obtain a second RLS license under
the exception contained in section 44-3-409(4)(b)(III), C.R.S. 2025.
This is the first reported Colorado appellate case to interpret this
exception.
¶2 After purchasing an existing RLS, OnePutt submitted its
request for a position statement from the Liquor Enforcement
Division (LED) addressing OnePutt’s eligibility to purchase
additional RLS licenses. The LED concluded that OnePutt is not
eligible. OnePutt then filed a petition for a declaratory order with
the State Licensing Authority (SLA) addressing the same issue.1
Consistent with the LED’s decision, the SLA concluded that
OnePutt is not eligible to purchase additional RLS licenses under
the statute. OnePutt brought an action in the district court against
defendants, the Colorado Department of Revenue (Department), the
1 Section 24-4-105(11), C.R.S. 2025, allows a party to petition an
agency for a declaratory order to remove uncertainties as to any rule or statute as it relates to the petitioning party.
1 Department’s Executive Director and SLA, and the LED, appealing
the SLA’s decision. The district court affirmed the SLA’s order.
¶3 OnePutt now appeals. We affirm the district court’s judgment.
I. Background
¶4 In or about 2000, Gloria Deschamp began operating an RLS
(the Carbondale Store) located on El Jebel Road in Carbondale.2
Deschamp held RLS license No. 04-46530-000 (the Deschamp
license). The Deschamp license permitted Deschamp to sell liquor
at the premises for consumption off the premises. Deschamp
continued to operate the Carbondale Store for approximately two
decades. In late 2020, OnePutt, a newly formed limited liability
company, purchased the Carbondale Store. Contemporaneous with
the purchase, OnePutt obtained a temporary permit from the LED
to continue operating under the Deschamp license while it awaited
a decision on its separate license application. On January 11,
2021, the LED issued OnePutt a new RLS license, under assigned
2 The parties and the district court refer to OnePutt by its trade
name of El Jebel and sometimes refer to the Carbondale Store by the same name. To maintain clarity regarding the names of the licensees and establishments involved in this case, we refer to OnePutt by its legal entity name and the liquor store by the generic descriptor Carbondale Store.
2 license No. 03-14216, to operate an RLS at the same premises as
the Carbondale Store.
¶5 The dispute comes down to the issuance date of OnePutt’s
RLS license. To understand why the date is important, we briefly
discuss the legislative history of section 44-3-409(4)(b)(III).
¶6 In 2016, the General Assembly enacted S.B. 16-197, part of
which was ultimately codified in section 44-3-409. See Ch. 365,
sec. 13, § 12-47-407, 2016 Colo. Sess. Laws 1534-36; Ch. 152, sec.
2, § 44-3-409, 2018 Colo. Sess. Laws 1005-07 (relocating law
related to the regulation of alcohol from title 12 to new title 44).
The legislation was passed, in part, because of potential ballot
measures that — if adopted — would allow the sale of full strength
alcoholic beverages in larger chain stores, like grocery stores and
convenience stores. The General Assembly recognized that the
ballot measures would significantly impact the operations of
currently licensed RLSs, most of which were small, local
businesses. Under the regulatory scheme that existed prior to the
new legislation, owners of an RLS — including shareholders,
partners, or other persons interested directly or indirectly in an RLS
license — could not own, in whole or in part, or be directly
3 interested in, another business that owned an RLS license. S.B.
16-197 was intended to ameliorate the perceived unfair impact that
the existing restrictions would have on entities that had obtained
their RLS license before the anticipated passage of the ballot
measures.
¶7 Under section 44-3-409(4)(a), if a person has an ownership
interest in, or is “interested directly or indirectly” in, an RLS that
was licensed after January 1, 2016, they are not eligible to obtain
additional RLS licenses. On the other hand, if the person obtained
their RLS license on or before January 1, 2016, they are eligible to
obtain a limited number of additional RLS licenses. § 44-3-
409(4)(b)(III).
¶8 OnePutt maintains that when it purchased the Carbondale
Store, it also purchased the Deschamp license. Because the
Deschamp license was issued in about 2000, whoever held the
Deschamp license — if it was still effective — would be eligible
under section 44-3-409(4)(b)(III) to acquire additional RLS licenses.
¶9 In its request for a position statement from the LED, OnePutt
indicated that it or one or more of its principals desired to have a
financial interest in an additional RLS license. OnePutt’s request
4 implicitly recognized that under the historical and existing RLS
licensing schemes, the owner or principal of an RLS license
generally cannot own or have an interest in a different RLS.
¶ 10 Applying the amended versions of the relevant statutes, the
LED and eventually the SLA and district court all concluded that
OnePutt was not the owner of an RLS license that was issued on or
before January 1, 2016, and therefore OnePutt was not eligible to
purchase additional RLS licenses under section 44-3-409(4)(b)(III).
It is this conclusion that OnePutt challenges on appeal.
II. Discussion
¶ 11 To address OnePutt’s arguments, we must first determine
whether section 44-3-409(4)(b)(III) is ambiguous. Each party
argues that the statute is unambiguous and that its construction
dictates a conclusion in its favor. If the statute is unambiguous, as
the parties contend, we must determine if the SLA and district court
applied it correctly. If the statute is ambiguous, we must interpret
the ambiguous language and then determine whether it permits
OnePutt or its principals to purchase additional RLS licenses.
5 A. Standard of Review
¶ 12 In an appeal under C.R.C.P. 106(a)(4), courts consider whether
the agency, based on the evidence before it, abused its discretion or
exceeded its jurisdiction. “Because an appellate court sits in the
same position as the district court when reviewing an agency’s
decision under [Rule] 106(a)(4), appellate review of the district
court’s decision is de novo.” Alward v. Golder, 148 P.3d 424, 428
(Colo. App. 2006). We also review matters of statutory
interpretation de novo. Nieto v. Clark’s Mkt., Inc., 2021 CO 48,
¶ 12.
¶ 13 When interpreting a statute, “we seek to ascertain and give
effect to the General Assembly’s intent.” Elder v. Williams, 2020 CO
88, ¶ 18. We use the plain and ordinary meanings of words and
phrases, looking “to the entire statutory scheme in order to give
consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all of its parts, and
we avoid constructions that would render any words or phrases
superfluous or that would lead to illogical or absurd results.” Id.
¶ 14 A statute is ambiguous when it is reasonably susceptible of
multiple interpretations. Colo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n v.
Martinez, 2019 CO 3, ¶ 19. A statute is not ambiguous simply
6 because the parties offer differing interpretations of its terms.
Morley v. United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 2019 COA 169, ¶ 16. Rather,
an ambiguity exists only if both parties’ interpretations are
reasonable. Martinez, ¶ 19. An alternative interpretation is
unreasonable if it would lead to an illogical or absurd result.
Tucker v. Volunteers of Am. Colo. Branch, 211 P.3d 708, 711 (Colo.
App. 2008) (“We avoid statutory interpretations leading to absurd or
illogical results.”).
¶ 15 If the statute is ambiguous, we may look to, among other
things, the legislature’s intent, the circumstances surrounding the
statute’s adoption, the administrative construction of the statute,
and the possible consequences of different interpretations. Id.; see
also § 2-4-203, C.R.S. 2025.
B. Applicable Law
¶ 16 Article 3 of title 44 is the Colorado Liquor Code. § 44-3-101,
C.R.S. 2025. Section 44-3-301, C.R.S. 2025, addresses the
issuance of licenses under article 3. Section 44-3-303, C.R.S.
7 2025,3 addresses temporary permits and the transfer of ownership
of a license.
¶ 17 Section 44-3-409(4), which controls the resolution of this
appeal, addresses rules and definitions applicable to the issuance of
RLS licenses:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (4)(b) of this section, it is unlawful for any owner, part owner, shareholder, or person interested directly or indirectly in a retail liquor store to conduct, own either in whole or in part, or be directly or indirectly interested in any other business licensed pursuant to this article 3.
(b) An owner, part owner, shareholder, or person interested directly or indirectly in a retail liquor store may have an interest in:
(I) An arts license granted under this article 3;
(II) An airline public transportation system license granted under this article 3;
(III) For a retail liquor store licensed on or before January 1, 2016, and whose license holder is a Colorado resident, additional retail liquor store licenses as follows, but only if the premises for which a license is sought satisfies the distance requirements specified in subsection (1)(a)(II) of this section:
3 Section 44-3-303 was amended subsequent to the agency and
district court decisions, but the amendments did not affect the portions of the statute relevant to this dispute. Therefore, we refer to the 2025 version of section 44-3-303.
8 (A) On or after January 1, 2017, and before January 1, 2022, one additional retail liquor store license, for a maximum of up to two total retail liquor store licenses;
(B) On or after January 1, 2022, and before January 1, 2027, up to two additional retail liquor store licenses, for a maximum of three total retail liquor store licenses; and
(C) On or after January 1, 2027, up to three additional retail liquor store licenses, for a maximum of four total retail liquor store licenses.
C. Analysis
1. RLS Licenses Issued on or Before January 1, 2016
¶ 18 Section 44-3-409(4)(b)(III) contains three requirements for an
owner seeking to acquire additional RLS licenses: The owner must
(1) already own or have an interest in an RLS license; (2) be a
Colorado resident; and (3) own an RLS licensed on or before
January 1, 2016. It is undisputed that OnePutt meets the first two
requirements; OnePutt is licensed to operate an RLS at the
Carbondale Store location, and OnePutt is a Colorado resident for
the purposes of the statute. The crux of the dispute, therefore, is
whether OnePutt owns an RLS “licensed on or before January 1,
2016.” § 44-3-409(4)(b)(III).
9 ¶ 19 The language of section 44-3-409(4) itself is seemingly clear
and unambiguous: If the owner does not own an RLS license issued
on or before January 1, 2016, they are not eligible to obtain a
second RLS license. And it is undisputed that OnePutt’s license to
operate the Carbondale Store was not issued until 2021, after it
purchased the Carbondale Store from Deschamp.
¶ 20 Based on a plain reading of the statute’s language, it appears
that the LED, SLA, and district court were correct: OnePutt is not
permitted to own additional RLS licenses. But, as it did below,
OnePutt argues on appeal that the plain language of the statute
should be interpreted differently. OnePutt makes a variety of
arguments to support its interpretation.
2. OnePutt’s Reading of Section 44-3-409(4)(b)(III)
¶ 21 Before turning to OnePutt’s specific contentions, it is useful to
review the general principles applicable to the issuance of an RLS
license in Colorado. There are three essential factors that must be
evaluated when reviewing an application for an RLS license: who
will be licensed to sell liquor, where will they be allowed to sell it,
and how long can they do so. Reflecting these requirements,
section 44-3-301(4)(a) states that an issued license “shall specify
10 the date of issuance, the period which is covered, the name of the
licensee, [and] the premises . . . licensed.”
¶ 22 Section 44-3-409(1)(a) begins with the principle that an RLS
license “shall be issued to persons.” A person is defined as “a
natural person, partnership, association, company, corporation, or
organization or a manager, agent, servant, officer, or employee
thereof.” § 44-3-103(35), C.R.S. 2025. And the Colorado Liquor
Code defines premises as “a distinct and definite location, which
may include a building, a part of a building, a room, or any other
definite contiguous area.” § 44-3-103(38)(a).
¶ 23 These details of duration, who, and where matter because
[e]ach license issued under this article 3 . . . of this title 44 is separate and distinct. It is unlawful for any person to exercise any of the privileges granted under any license other than the license the person holds or for any licensee to allow any other person to exercise the privileges granted under the licensee’s license, except as provided in [sections not relevant to this case]. A separate license must be issued for each specific business or business entity and each geographic location . . . .
§ 44-3-301(3)(a)(I).
¶ 24 Section 44-3-409(4)(a) articulates the general rule that
governed Colorado’s liquor licensing process until the passage of
11 S.B. 16-197: “Except as provided in [section 44-3-409(4)(b)], it is
unlawful for any owner, part owner, shareholder, or person
interested directly or indirectly in a retail liquor store” to own or be
interested in “any other business licensed pursuant to this article
3.” Thus, the statute begins by restating the traditional prohibition
against owning more than one RLS.
¶ 25 Subsection (4)(b), however, grants an exception to the general
prohibition. It begins by identifying two broad classes of licenses
issued under article 3 that are not subject to the prohibition of
subsection (4)(a): an arts license and an airline public
transportation system license. § 44-3-409(4)(b)(I)-(II). So all owners
of an RLS, regardless of when the corresponding license to operate
the RLS was issued, may also own or have an interest in an arts
license and airline public transportation system license.
¶ 26 The next subsection — (4)(b)(III) — articulates the narrow
exception authorized by S.B. 16-197. It carves out a group of RLS
licensees — Colorado residents who own “a retail liquor store
licensed on or before January 1, 2016.” OnePutt contends that this
language means that anyone who now owns — or who may own in
the future — an RLS that was first licensed at the same location on
12 or before January 1, 2016, is entitled to apply for additional
licenses under section 44-3-409(4)(b)(III). Acknowledging an
inherent assumption in this argument, OnePutt asserts that it
qualifies for the exception based on the Carbondale Store because
the RLS “establishment was first licensed” before 2016.
¶ 27 As OnePutt correctly notes, subsection (4)(b)(III) uses the
phrase “retail liquor store,” which the Colorado Liquor Code defines
as
an establishment engaged only in the sale of malt, vinous, and spirituous liquors in sealed containers for consumption off the premises . . . , but only if the annual gross revenues from the sale of nonalcohol products do not exceed twenty percent of the retail liquor store establishment’s total annual gross sales revenues.
§ 44-3-103(48). From there, OnePutt argues that because it now
owns the RLS located on the same premises as the store that was
owned by Deschamp, it owns the establishment first licensed before
January 1, 2016. But an establishment — that is, an RLS operated
on the physical premises — is not issued a license. Rather, licenses
are issued to persons who are then permitted to operate an RLS on
a designated premises. § 44-3-409(1)(a)(I). Thus, it’s the owner of
13 the license who is “licensed,” as that phrase is used under section
44-3-409(4)(b)(III), not the establishment. See Merriam-Webster
Dictionary, https://perma.cc/PP69-NRXR (defining licensed as
“having a valid license required to engage in a particular business,
occupation, or activity”).
¶ 28 The owner of the establishment that operated the RLS at the
Carbondale Store before January 1, 2016, was Deschamp. It is
undisputed that, aside from OnePutt’s purchase of the Carbondale
Store in 2020, OnePutt and Deschamp have never been in a
business relationship with each other. Deschamp owned and
operated that establishment until the sale. In 2021, OnePutt
obtained a temporary license and then a permanent license to run
its establishment on the same premises. The separate
establishments on the same premises were owned and operated by
different licensees who were issued different licenses. Thus,
OnePutt’s current ownership of the premises does not permit it to
exercise the rights granted to those who owned a license issued in
connection with that premises on or before January 1, 2016.
¶ 29 Relatedly, we reject OnePutt’s argument that an establishment
is simply a physical location. Merriam-Webster Dictionary defines
14 an establishment as “a place of business or residence with its
furnishings and staff” or “a public or private institution.” Merriam-
Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/4X4S-KNK8; see also Collins
Dictionary, https://perma.cc/864F-G8X3 (“An establishment is a
shop, business, or organization occupying a particular building or
place.”). OnePutt’s argument focuses solely on the “premises” or
“location” of where the RLS establishment is operated, to the
exclusion of the business that runs the establishment.
¶ 30 The irrational nature of this argument is illustrated by
substituting the term “premises” (or “location”) for “establishment”
as used in the statute. Under OnePutt’s interpretation, the
definition of an RLS would read as follows: a “[premises/location]
engaged only in the sale of malt, vinous, and spirituous liquors in
sealed containers for consumption off the premises . . . but only if
the annual gross revenues from the sale of nonalcohol products do
not exceed twenty percent of the retail [premises’/location’s] total
annual gross sales revenues.” See § 44-3-103(48). This results in
an absurdity because a premises (or location) does not engage in
the sale of liquor or collect gross revenues. Moreover, this
interpretation would use the term “premises” in two incompatible
15 ways. See Carlson v. Ferris, 85 P.3d 504, 509 (Colo. 2003) (“[T]he
use of different terms signals an intent on the part of the General
Assembly to afford those terms different meanings.”).
¶ 31 Substituting the word “business” in the statutory definition of
RLS brings the point home: a “[business] engaged only in the sale of
malt, vinous, and spirituous liquors in sealed containers for
consumption off the premises . . . but only if the annual gross
revenues from the sale of nonalcohol products do not exceed twenty
percent of the [business’s] total annual gross sales revenues.” See
§ 44-3-103(48).
¶ 32 This harmonious reading demonstrates that the term
“establishment,” as used in the Colorado Liquor Code’s definition of
an RLS, refers to the business that operates the liquor store. See
§ 44-3-103(48). It also gives different and logical meaning to the
General Assembly’s use of the terms “establishment” and
“premises” in the definition of an RLS. See Ferris, 85 P.3d at 509.
¶ 33 In sum, Deschamp was issued a license to operate an RLS
establishment at the premises prior to 2016, and she continued to
operate that establishment until her license and related
establishment terminated in late 2020. Since 2021, OnePutt has
16 owned an RLS license to operate its establishment at the same
premises. But OnePutt does not own a license to a retail liquor
store that was licensed prior to January 1, 2016.4
¶ 34 In our judgment, this conclusion is mandated by the plain and
ordinary meaning of the language used in section 44-3-409(4)(b)(III),
including the related Colorado Liquor Code provisions. See Elder,
¶ 18. Thus, the interpretation gives harmonious effect to the
various provisions of the entire statutory scheme. See id. And this
construction avoids absurd and illogical results. See id.
¶ 35 Moreover, the interpretation urged by OnePutt would allow the
exception in section 44-3-409(4)(b)(III) to continue in perpetuity.
Under OnePutt’s interpretation, every subsequent owner who holds
an RLS license to operate an RLS on the premises where the
Carbondale Store is located could gain additional RLS licenses
under section 44-3-409(4)(b)(III). But, as previously explained,
these additional licenses were intended to benefit only those
persons who were issued their RLS license under the licensing
4 OnePutt’s argument is not advanced by its reliance on City &
County of Denver v. Gushurst, 210 P.2d 616 (Colo. 1949). Gushurst does not discuss whether an establishment should be interpreted as a location, much less suggest such an interpretation.
17 statutes that existed prior to 2016. Because the statutory
argument advanced by OnePutt would create an absurd result, we
conclude that it is not a reasonable alternative and therefore does
not create an ambiguity. See Elder, ¶ 18 (“A statute is ambiguous
when it is reasonably susceptible of multiple interpretations.”).
¶ 36 But even assuming, for the sake of argument, that OnePutt’s
interpretation of section 44-3-409(4)(b)(III) creates an ambiguity, the
legislative history confirms our interpretation. See Nicola v. City of
Grand Junction, 2023 COA 111, ¶ 54 (“Because our interpretation is
based on the plain, unambiguous language of the statute, we need
go no further, see Elder, ¶ 18, but our interpretation also furthers
the end to be achieved by the statute and avoids absurd results,
demonstrating that it is the only reasonable interpretation.”).
¶ 37 Senator Pat Steadman, one of the sponsors of S.B. 16-197,
through which section 44-3-409(4)(b)(III) was created, explained
that the legislation was intended to protect the small businesses
that were operating under the pre-2016 Colorado Liquor Code,
“particularly those that are licensed to sell retail liquor today.”
Hearings on S.B. 16-197 before the S. Bus., Lab. & Tech. Comm.,
70th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (May 6, 2016). Senator
18 Steadman also stated that the bill contained “protections built in for
the small businesses that are currently retail liquor licensees, retail
liquor stores.” Id.
¶ 38 As evidenced by Senator Steadman’s statements, the purpose
of section 44-3-409(4)(b)(III) was to level the playing field for the
small business that bought an RLS license prior to January 1,
2016, by allowing them to compete under the new regulatory
system. The intent of this legislation was not, as OnePutt argues,
to create a means by which subsequent RLS license holders, who
have purchased with full knowledge of the existing rules, can
exploit the benefit intended for those who obtained their RLS license
prior to 2016.
¶ 39 Finally, our reading of section 44-3-409(4)(b)(III) is consistent
with the Department’s reading. “Although we aren’t required to do
so, we may defer to an agency’s interpretation of the statute it’s
charged with administering if its interpretation is reasonable.” Colo.
Educ. Ass’n v. Colo. State Bd. of Educ., 2025 COA 56, ¶ 13. As
demonstrated by the foregoing analysis, we reached our conclusion
independently; nonetheless, the agency interpretation of section 44-
3-409(4)(b)(III) is consistent with ours.
19 3. OnePutt’s Reading of Section 44-3-303
¶ 40 For similar reasons, we reject OnePutt’s argument that the
“pre-2016 RLS license never ceased to exist and is now owned by
[OnePutt].” In support of this contention, OnePutt argues that
section 44-3-303 allows a licensee to transfer their existing RLS
license in its entirety to a new license owner if that owner operates
an RLS at the same physical location as the previous license owner.
Under this reading, OnePutt contends that it is a “retail liquor store
licensed on or before January 1, 2016.” We are not persuaded.
¶ 41 Section 44-3-303 addresses two related, but different, issues.
First, section 44-3-303 permits an applicant to pursue a liquor
license through a transfer of ownership of an existing RLS. This
allows the applicant to obtain a license to operate an RLS on the
same premises that was previously approved when the prior owner
applied for their RLS license. § 44-3-303(1)(c)(I).
¶ 42 When applying for a license to operate an RLS where there is
not already a liquor store, the local licensing authority may require
a public hearing to allow community members to weigh in on the
appropriateness of operating an RLS at the specific premises
identified in the application. § 44-3-311(1), C.R.S. 2025. In this
20 manner, the local community has a chance to be heard concerning
the need for an RLS at this particular location, and whether an RLS
is appropriate for the neighborhood. § 44-3-311(5)(a)-(d). In
addition to this site-specific evaluation, the licensing authority also
evaluates the character and qualifications of the license applicant.
§ 44-3-307, C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 43 Through the transfer of ownership process, the license
applicant still needs to satisfy the character evaluation, but the
applicant does not need to readdress the appropriateness of the
premises for an RLS because that was evaluated when the RLS
license was issued to the prior applicant. § 44-3-303(1)(c)(I).
¶ 44 Second, and relatedly, section 44-3-303 addresses the
issuance of a temporary permit, which allows a new applicant who
is purchasing an existing RLS to continue to sell liquor at the same
location as the prior licensee until the new RLS license is issued.
See § 44-3-303(3)(c) (“The application for a temporary permit shall
be filed no later than thirty days after the filing of the application
for transfer of ownership and shall be accompanied by a temporary
permit fee not to exceed one hundred dollars.”); § 44-3-303(3)(d).
The purpose of the temporary permit is to allow the prospective
21 purchaser of an RLS to continue the business operations conducted
under the old license pending completion of the purchase and sale
process, not to transfer an existing license to a different person.
¶ 45 Thus, the statute begins with a reminder that “[n]o license
granted under the provisions of this article 3 . . . shall be
transferable except as provided in this subsection (1).” § 44-3-
303(1)(a). The only exception to this broad rule that does not
require the issuance of a new license is that
[w]hen a license has been issued to spouses, partners in a civil union, or general or limited partners, the death of a spouse or partner does not require the surviving spouse or partner to obtain a new license. All rights and privileges granted under the original license continue in full force and effect as to the survivors for the balance of the license period.
§ 44-3-303(1)(b). In all other situations, the new owner must apply
for the issuance of a new license. And like a typical application, the
end result of a successful transfer of ownership is the issuance of a
new license, to a new licensee, under a new license number, and for
a new term. The only thing that remains constant is that the new
license authorizes the operation of an RLS at the same location as
the old license did.
22 ¶ 46 Contrary to OnePutt’s argument, which is grounded in section
44-3-303(1)(c)’s admittedly confusing use of the phrase “transfer of
ownership” and section 44-3-303(2)’s use of the phrase “transfer
the ownership of the license,” the transfer process does not result in
a transfer of the original RLS license to the new licensee. As
previously discussed, this reality is evidenced by the fact that an
application for a transfer of ownership results in a new license,
license number, licensee, and term.5
¶ 47 Even if we assume, without deciding, that the provisions of
section 44-3-303 — either standing alone or when read in
connection with section 44-3-409(4)(b)(III) — create any ambiguity
with respect to the proper interpretation of section 44-3-
409(4)(b)(III), we resolve the assumed ambiguity in favor of the
Department’s interpretation.
¶ 48 Particularly in areas as complex and nuanced as the issuance
of RLS licenses under the Colorado Liquor Code, the Department’s
expertise and perspective when interpreting the Code and its related
5 We do not address OnePutt’s argument, raised for the first time in
its reply brief, concerning the specialized retail inventory and license transfers addressed in section 44-3-409(6)-(7), C.R.S. 2025. See Peña v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 2018 COA 56, ¶ 21 n.4.
23 regulations are instructive. See El Paso Cnty. Bd. of Equalization v.
Craddock, 850 P.2d 702, 705 (Colo. 1993) (“Administrative
interpretations are most useful to the court when the subject
involved calls for the exercise of technical expertise which the
agency possesses and when the statutory language is susceptible to
more than one reasonable interpretation.”). The Department’s
construction gives effect to the legislative intent behind section 44-
3-409(4)(b)(III) and does so in a manner that is consistent and
harmonious with the basic tenets of the Colorado Liquor Code. See
Elder, ¶ 18.
¶ 49 The General Assembly’s clear intent is that each license
remain “separate and distinct.” § 44-3-301(3)(a)(I) (“Each license
issued under this article 3 . . . is separate and distinct,” and it is
unlawful for any person to “exercise any of the privileges granted
under any license other than the license the person holds or for any
licensee to allow any other person to exercise the privileges granted
under the licensee’s license.”); see § 44-3-303(1)(a) (“No license
granted under the provisions of this article 3 . . . shall be
transferable except as provided in this subsection (1) . . . .”).
24 Neither section 44-3-303 nor section 44-3-409(4)(b)(III) purports to
violate that principle.
¶ 50 Applying these principles, we conclude that simply because
OnePutt currently operates an RLS at the Carbondale Store, where
Deschamp previously operated her RLS, does not mean that
OnePutt obtained Deschamp’s RLS license when it purchased the
Carbondale Store. That OnePutt, prior to the issuance of its
permanent license, initially operated an RLS at the Carbondale
Store with a temporary permit issued under the Deschamp license
does not alter our conclusion. And that conclusion does not change
simply because OnePutt chose to continue operating the
Carbondale Store under the same trade name — El Jebel — that
Deschamp used for her RLS.
¶ 51 As the district court correctly wrote in its order, “[a] key
principle of the liquor statutes is individuality.” OnePutt was able
to obtain a temporary permit to sell the inventory remaining from
Deschamp’s RLS establishment. OnePutt thereafter obtained its
own license, well after the 2016 cutoff provided in the statute.
25 ¶ 52 For these reasons, the district court did not err by affirming
the SLA’s conclusion that OnePutt does not qualify for additional
RLS licenses under section 44-3-409.
III. Disposition
¶ 53 The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE BROWN concur.