The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY April 9, 2026
2026COA27
No. 25CA0175, Douglas County v. Colorado — Government — State and Local Involvement in Immigration Detention; Constitutional Law — Colorado Constitution — Article XIV — Intergovernmental Relationships — Article V — Revival, Amendment, or Extension
A division of the court of appeals addresses, for the first time
in a reported case, whether H.B. 23-1100 — which prohibits
counties and political subdivisions from entering into immigration
detention agreements with the federal government or private
entities — violates a county’s right to contract with the federal
government, as protected by article XIV, section 18 of the Colorado
Constitution. Similarly, this is the first reported case addressing
whether H.B. 23-1100 violates article V, section 24 of the Colorado
Constitution, which prohibits the amendment of statutes by
reference to their title only. The division concludes that H.B. 23-
1100 and the resulting statutes do not violate article XIV, section 18 or article V, section 24 of the Colorado Constitution, and the
district court did not err by dismissing Douglas County’s claims for
lack of standing. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026COA27
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0175 City and County of Denver District Court No. 24CV31125 Honorable David H. Goldberg, Judge
Douglas County, Colorado acting through the Board of County Commissioners of Douglas County Colorado, in their elected and official capacity, and Douglas County Sheriff,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
State of Colorado, by and through Jared S. Polis, in his official capacity as Governor of Colorado,
Defendant-Appellee.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division IV Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Freyre and Brown, JJ., concur
Announced April 9, 2026
Jeffrey A. Garcia, County Attorney, Andrew C. Steers, Deputy County Attorney, Castle Rock, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellants
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Kyle M. Holter, Assistant Attorney General, Joseph G. Michaels, Assistant Solicitor General, Talia Kraemer, Assistant Solicitor General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee ¶1 Plaintiffs, Douglas County, acting through its Board of County
Commissioners, and the Douglas County Sheriff (collectively,
County), appeal the district court’s order granting the motion of
defendant, the State of Colorado, acting through Governor Jared S.
Polis, to dismiss on the grounds that the County suffered no injury
to a legally protected interest and therefore lacked standing to bring
its claims. We affirm the district court’s judgment.
I. Background and Procedural History
A. Legislative Overview
¶2 In 2019, the General Assembly enacted House Bill 19-1124
(H.B. 19-1124), which created article 76.6 of title 24 of the Colorado
Revised Statutes. See Ch. 299, sec. 2, 2019 Colo. Sess. Laws 2760-
62. The law declares that “[r]equests for civil immigration detainers
. . . are not warrants under Colorado law” and are not “reviewed,
approved, or signed by a judge as required by Colorado law,” so the
continued detention of an inmate under such requests beyond
when they would otherwise be released constitutes an
unconstitutional “warrantless arrest.” § 24-76.6-102(1)(b), C.R.S.
2025. Accordingly, the law mandates that state law enforcement
officers “shall not arrest or detain an individual on the basis of a
1 civil immigration detainer.” § 24-76.6-102(2)(a). The law also
prohibits probation officers and employees from providing personal
information about individuals to federal immigration authorities.
§ 24-76.6-103(1)(a), C.R.S. 2025.
¶3 In 2024, while this matter was being litigated in the district
court, a division of this court concluded that H.B. 19-1124’s
prohibitions on Colorado law enforcement arresting and detaining
individuals based solely on civil immigration detainers prevailed
over a county sheriff’s general grant of authority under Colorado
law. Nash v. Mikesell, 2024 COA 68, ¶¶ 44-45 (citing § 30-10-516,
C.R.S. 2025); see § 30-10-516 (“It is the duty of the sheriffs,
undersheriffs, and deputies to keep and preserve the peace in their
respective counties, and to quiet and suppress all affrays, riots, and
unlawful assemblies and insurrections.”). The division in Mikesell
also concluded that federal law does not require a state to comply
with immigration detainer requests and, therefore, federal law did
not preempt H.B. 19-1124. Id. at ¶ 34 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1));
see 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g)(1) (The United States “Attorney General may
enter into a written agreement with . . . any political subdivision of
a State . . . to perform a function of an immigration officer in
2 relation to the investigation, apprehension, or detention of aliens in
the United States . . . to the extent consistent with State and local
law.”).
¶4 Following up on H.B. 19-1124, in 2023, the General Assembly
enacted House Bill 23-1100 (H.B. 23-1100), which created article
76.7 of title 24 of the Colorado Revised Statutes. See Ch. 413, sec.
2, 2023 Colo. Sess. Laws 2449. As relevant to this case,
section 24-76.7-102(1), C.R.S. 2025, provides that state
governmental entities may not
(a) Enter into an agreement of any kind for the detention of individuals in an immigration detention[1] facility that is owned, managed, or
1 In its briefing on appeal, the County often transposes the terms
“detainer” and “detention.” H.B. 19-1124, as codified in title 24, article 76.6, addresses civil immigration detainer requests. See § 24-76.6-101(1), C.R.S. 2025 (‘“Civil immigration detainer’ means a request for federal immigration enforcement to law enforcement officers to arrest or detain an individual or to maintain custody of an individual beyond the time when the individual is eligible for release from custody, including a request for law enforcement agency action, warrant for arrest of alien, order to detain or release alien, or warrant of removal or deportation on a form promulgated by federal immigration enforcement.”). H.B. 23- 1100, as codified in title 24, article 76.7, addresses civil immigration detention agreements. See § 24-76.7-101(2), C.R.S. 2025 (‘“Immigration detention agreement’ means any contract, including but not limited to an intergovernmental service agreement, or portion thereof for payment to a governmental entity to detain individuals for federal civil immigration purposes.”).
3 operated, in whole or in part, by a private entity;
(b) Sell any public or government-owned property or building for the purpose of establishing an immigration detention facility that is or will be owned, managed, or operated, in whole or in part, by a private entity; [or]
(c) Pay, reimburse, subsidize, or defray in any way any costs related to the sale, purchase, construction, development, ownership, management, or operation of an immigration detention facility that is or will be owned, managed, or operated, in whole or in part, by a private entity[.]
§ 24-76.7-102(1).
¶5 The law also requires governmental entities to terminate any
existing immigration detention contracts by January 1, 2024, and
mandates that, as of the same date, “a governmental entity shall
not enter into or renew an immigration detention agreement.” § 24-
76.7-103(1), C.R.S. 2025.
B. The County’s Lawsuit
¶6 In 2024 the County2 filed a complaint in district court
asserting claims that H.B. 19-1124 and H.B. 23-1100 violate (1) the
2 El Paso, Mesa, Rio Blanco, Elbert, and Garfield Counties and their
respective sheriffs were named as plaintiffs in the district court; however, only Douglas County and its sheriff are pursuing this appeal.
4 Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution; (2) the lawful
authority of the executive branch to perform law enforcement
functions; (3) the County’s right under the Colorado Constitution to
contract with the federal government; and (4) the Colorado
Constitution by amending existing laws without specifically
delineating the changes made to those laws. Based on these
claims, the County requested that the court enter a declaratory
judgment stating that articles 76.6 and 76.7 of title 24 violate the
United States Constitution and the Colorado Constitution.
¶7 The State moved to dismiss the County’s claims under
C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1), on the basis that the County lacked standing to
bring its claims and therefore the court lacked jurisdiction to hear
the County’s complaint, and under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), on the basis
that the County failed to state viable claims for relief. The State
initially argued that, because the County is a political subdivision of
the State, it lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of a
state statute. See Martin v. Dist. Ct., 550 P.2d 864, 865 (Colo.
1976), abrogated by, Colo. State Bd. of Educ. v. Adams Cnty. Sch.
Dist. 14, 2023 CO 52.
5 ¶8 In response, the County argued that Martin’s standing
analysis no longer controlled in view of Colorado State Board of
Education v. Adams County School District 14, 2023 CO 52. Rather,
under Adams County, a county’s standing to sue is evaluated in the
same manner as any other person or entity. Therefore, the County
must only satisfy the standing factors enumerated in Wimberly v.
Ettenberg, 570 P.2d 535, 539 (Colo. 1977).
¶9 In a detailed written order, the district court concluded that
“[p]olitical subdivisions do not have any rights under the federal
constitution,” Adams Cnty., ¶ 57, and therefore have no standing to
assert federal preemption under the Supremacy Clause. The court
also concluded that H.B. 19-1124 and H.B. 23-1100 did not injure
the County by improperly infringing on the County’s authority,
improperly restricting the County’s right to contract with the federal
government, or amending other statutes by reference to their titles
only. Thus, the district court granted the motion to dismiss for lack
of standing.
II. Issues on Appeal
¶ 10 The County does not challenge the district court’s ruling with
respect to the federal Supremacy Clause, so we do not address that
6 issue further. Nor does the County pursue any argument on appeal
challenging the district court’s ruling with respect to H.B. 19-1124.
Instead, the County challenges the court’s conclusion that the
County lacked standing to challenge H.B. 23-1100. Specifically, the
County asserts that it has suffered an injury because H.B. 23-1100
violates article XIV, section 18 and article V, section 24 of the
Colorado Constitution. We address these contentions in turn.
A. The County’s Standing Under Article XIV, Section 18
¶ 11 The County first claims that the district court erred by
rejecting the County’s contention that H.B. 23-1100’s prohibition
against entering into detention agreements violates article XIV,
section 18. We are unpersuaded.
1. Standard of Review
¶ 12 We review de novo issues of standing and statutory
interpretation, including whether a statute or constitutional
provision creates a legally protected right. Weld Cnty. Colo. Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs v. Ryan, 2023 CO 54, ¶¶ 8, 13.
2. Applicable Law
¶ 13 The County’s appellate analysis sometimes blurs the legal
standards applicable to a motion to dismiss for lack of standing and
7 a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. That is
understandable to a degree because the State’s motion was based
on both C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) and (5). But the district court’s order was
based on lack of standing alone. Nonetheless, we address the
standards that control the resolution of both types of motions to
contextualize the County’s procedural arguments on appeal.
a. Standards Governing Motions to Dismiss
¶ 14 Under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5), a claim may be dismissed if it fails to
allege plausible facts upon which relief may be granted. Warne v.
Hall, 2016 CO 50, ¶ 24. In ruling on a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion, the
court must accept all supporting factual allegations as true and
view them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Norton v. Rocky Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc., 2018 CO 3, ¶ 7.
But the court does not accept as true a plaintiff’s allegations on
issues of law. Warne, ¶ 9.
¶ 15 Despite this established legal principle, the County notes that
Warne addressed a motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) for
failure to state a claim, rather than a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). The County
argues that the district court erred by not deferring to the County’s
8 factual and legal allegations for purposes of determining jurisdiction
under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1). We disagree.
¶ 16 We are unpersuaded by the County’s reliance on Young v.
Green Mountain Water Sanitation District, (Colo. App. No. 21CA0960,
Aug. 11, 2022) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). First,
Young is an unpublished opinion from this court and therefore has
no precedential value.3 Welby Gardens v. Adams Cnty. Bd. of
Equalization, 71 P.3d 992, 999 (Colo. 2003). Moreover, Young does
not state that courts apply a different rule when interpreting legal
conclusions in the context of a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion than they
do in the context of a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion.
¶ 17 The County’s reliance on Tidwell v. City & County of Denver,
83 P.3d 75, 85 (Colo. 2003), is similarly misplaced. Tidwell simply
distinguishes “between a 12(b)(1) motion, where the court is free to
3 Not only does Young have no precedential value, but the County’s
citation to it violates this court’s established policy. Colo. Jud. Branch, Court of Appeals Policies, Policy Concerning Citation of Opinions Not Selected for Official Publication (2026), https://perma.cc/9T2D-RGBE (“Opinions not selected for official publication may be cited to the Colorado Court of Appeals only to explain the case history, identify the law of the case, or assert the doctrines of issue preclusion or claim preclusion.”). We trust the County and its counsel will, in the future, abide their obligation to comply with this court’s policy.
9 weigh the evidence and determine only its ‘power to hear the case,’”
and a 12(b)(5) motion, “which ‘results in a determination on the
merits at an early stage of plaintiff’s case.’” Id. at 86 (quoting
Trinity Broad. of Denv., Inc. v. City of Westminster, 848 P.2d 916,
925 (Colo. 1993)). Nothing in Tidwell supports a conclusion that a
court treats legal allegations differently in the Rule 12(b)(1) context
than in the Rule 12(b)(5) context. To the contrary, Tidwell echoes
the established legal principles we apply here:
Where “the jurisdictional issue involves a factual dispute, a reviewing court employs the clearly erroneous standard of review to the trial court’s findings.” Where, however, the facts are undisputed and the issue is one of law, the appellate court reviews the trial court’s jurisdictional ruling de novo.
Tidwell, 83 P.3d at 81 (quoting Springer v. City & County of Denver,
13 P.3d 794, 798 (Colo. 2000)).
b. Standing
¶ 18 “In order for a court to have jurisdiction over a dispute, the
plaintiff must have standing to bring the case.” Ainscough v.
Owens, 90 P.3d 851, 855 (Colo. 2004). Because standing is a
necessary prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction, a court must
10 dismiss a case if standing does not exist. Hotaling v. Hickenlooper,
275 P.3d 723, 725 (Colo. App. 2011).
¶ 19 To establish standing to pursue its claims challenging H.B.
23-1100, the County must show (1) that it “suffered injury in fact”
and (2) that the injury was to a “legally protected interest as
contemplated by statutory or constitutional provisions.” Barber v.
Ritter, 196 P.3d 238, 245 (Colo. 2008) (quoting Wimberly, 570 P.2d
at 538).4
¶ 20 To establish an injury in fact, the County must show that it
suffered an injury that is “sufficiently direct and palpable to allow a
court to say with fair assurance that there is an actual controversy
proper for judicial resolution.” O’Bryant v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 778
P.2d 648, 653 (Colo. 1989). Tangible and intangible injuries may
satisfy Wimberly’s injury-in-fact requirement. Hickenlooper v.
4 Despite its contrary position in the district court, the State now
concedes that whether the County has standing is controlled by the Wimberly test. See Colo. State Bd. of Educ. v. Adams Cnty. Sch. Dist. 14, 2023 CO 52, ¶ 46 (“We hold that subordinate state agencies, political subdivisions, and officials raising claims challenging a government entity’s decision are not subject to any specialized standing test in addition to the Wimberly test; instead, the court should conduct a Wimberly analysis, and that should be the end of its standing inquiry.”).
11 Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 2014 CO 77, ¶ 9. “[T]he injury-
in-fact requirement ensures that an actual controversy exists so
that the matter is a proper one for judicial resolution.” Id. (citing
Conrad v. City & County of Denver, 656 P.2d 662, 668 (Colo. 1982)).
“The requirement ensures a ‘concrete adverseness’ that sharpens
the presentation of issues to the court.” Id. (quoting City of
Greenwood Village v. Petitioners for the Proposed City of Centennial,
3 P.3d 427, 437 (Colo. 2000)).
¶ 21 To establish the second Wimberly prong, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that the injury impacted a legally protected interest.
Barber, 196 P.3d at 245. To determine whether an interest is
legally protected, the court must consider “whether the plaintiff has
a claim for relief under the constitution, the common law, a statute,
or a rule or regulation.” Id. at 246 (quoting Ainscough, 90 P.3d at
856).
3. Analysis
¶ 22 Article XIV, section 18 of the Colorado Constitution — referred
to as the Intergovernmental Relationships provision — reads, in
relevant part, as follows:
12 (2)(a) Nothing in this constitution shall be construed to prohibit the state or any of its political subdivisions from cooperating or contracting with one another or with the government of the United States to provide any function, service, or facility lawfully authorized to each of the cooperating or contracting units, including the sharing of costs, the imposition of taxes, or the incurring of debt.
(b) Nothing in this constitution shall be construed to prohibit the authorization by statute of a separate governmental entity as an instrument to be used through voluntary participation by cooperating or contracting political subdivisions.
(c) Nothing in this constitution shall be construed to prohibit any political subdivision of the state from contracting with private persons, associations, or corporations for the provision of any legally authorized functions, services, or facilities within or without its boundaries.
Colo. Const. art. XIV, § 18(2)(a)-(c); see also §§ 29-1-201 to -206.5,
C.R.S. 2025 (implementing article XIV, section 18(2)(a)-(b)).
¶ 23 The parties agree that H.B. 23-1100 prohibits governmental
entities from entering into or renewing immigration detention
agreements. See §§ 24-76.7-101(2), -103(1)-(2), C.R.S. 2025.
Nevertheless, the County contends that the district court
erroneously found that it lacked standing because H.B. 23-1100
13 deprives the County of rights afforded to it under article XIV,
section 18 and its implementing statutes. See §§ 29-1-201 to -203,
C.R.S. 2025.
¶ 24 Both the constitutional and statutory provisions cited by the
County allow political subdivisions, such as the County, to enter
into contracts with the federal government. But that right is not
unfettered. That fact is apparent from the express language of
article XIV, section 18(2)(a), which states that the County has the
authority to contract with the federal government “to provide any
function, service, or facility lawfully authorized to each of the
cooperating or contracting units.” (Emphasis added.) Similarly,
article XIV, section 18(2)(c) states that a political subdivision is not
constitutionally prohibited from contracting with private persons or
entities “for the provision of any legally authorized functions,
services, or facilities.” (Emphasis added.) Thus, the operative
question is, Who gets to decide what types of functions, services,
and facilities the County is legally authorized to provide?
¶ 25 The County essentially argues that it is an autonomous legal
entity that is allowed to determine — free from the General
Assembly’s oversight — what types of services it may provide,
14 including whether it may provide immigration detention services to
the federal government. The County is mistaken.
¶ 26 “A county is not an ‘independent governmental entity existing
by reason of any inherent sovereign authority of its residents;
rather, it is a political subdivision of the state, existing only for the
convenient administration of the state government, created to carry
out the will of the state.’” Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Bainbridge, Inc.,
929 P.2d 691, 699 (Colo. 1996) (quoting Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v.
Love, 470 P.2d 861, 862 (Colo. 1970)). And while counties have
been empowered to enter into agreements with other governmental
entities, that power is not unlimited; rather, it is subject to the
limitations imposed by the state government. Id. Thus, “counties
have only those powers that are expressly granted to them by the
Colorado Constitution or by the General Assembly.” Id.
¶ 27 In contrast, the state constitution vests the General Assembly
with plenary power to adopt general laws, subject only to the
restraints and limitations of the United States Constitution and
Colorado Constitution. People v. Y.D.M., 593 P.2d 1356, 1359
(Colo. 1979). Therefore, the General Assembly may enact any law
15 that is not expressly or inferentially prohibited by either
constitution. Id.
¶ 28 A division of this court has applied these established
principles in the context of article XIV, section 18(2). See Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs v. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth., 881 P.2d 412, 421
(Colo. App. 1994), aff’d in part and rev’d in part on other grounds
sub nom., Nicholl v. E-470 Pub. Highway Auth., 896 P.2d 859 (Colo.
1995). After quoting article XIV, section 18(2)(a) and (b), the
division stated,
This provision preserves the authority of the General Assembly over political subdivisions created pursuant to it. The General Assembly defines the powers of each contracting entity and, as such, it may alter those rights. And, except to the extent that the Colorado Constitution authorizes a county to act upon a subject, a county has only those powers that are expressly, or by necessary implication, delegated to it by the General Assembly.
Id.
¶ 29 Article XIV, section 18(2)(a) allows a political subdivision to
enter into any agreement with a governmental entity to provide
functions, services, and facilities that the political subdivision is
“lawfully authorized” to perform. By adopting H.B. 23-1100, the
16 General Assembly simply removed the County’s legal authorization
to enter into immigration detention agreements with the federal
government. Thus, once H.B. 23-1100 became law, the County lost
any legal authority it once had to enter into federal immigration
detention agreements. This result is consistent with the General
Assembly’s plenary authority to enable or limit the County’s power
as it deems appropriate to conform with “the will of the state.”
Bainbridge, 929 P.2d at 699 (quoting Love, 470 P.2d at 862). As a
consequence, the district court did not err by concluding that the
County suffered no injury to its rights under article XIV, section 18.
¶ 30 The County’s reliance on sections 29-1-201 to -203 fares no
better. As the County correctly notes, these statutes are intended
to facilitate the provisions of article XIV, section 18 by allowing
counties to contract with other governmental entities. The language
of section 29-1-203(1) is illustrative:
Governments may cooperate or contract with one another to provide any function, service, or facility lawfully authorized to each of the cooperating or contracting units, including the sharing of costs, the imposition of taxes, or the incurring of debt, only if such cooperation or contracts are authorized by each party thereto with the approval of its legislative body or
17 other authority having the power to so approve.
(Emphasis added.) The italicized language dovetails with article
XIV, section 18, permitting the governmental entities to enter into
intergovernmental agreements to provide services and facilities so
long as the two entities are both “lawfully authorized” to enter into
such agreements. But as it pertains to immigration detention
agreements, the County is no longer authorized to enter into such
agreements by the terms of sections 24-76.7-102 and -103.
Accordingly, section 29-1-203 cannot be read to permit the County
to do that which the state has expressly forbidden.
¶ 31 Skipping over the italicized language of section 29-1-203(1),
the County focuses on the last clause of that statute’s first
sentence, which requires that “such cooperation or contracts are
authorized by each party thereto with the approval of its legislative
body or other authority having the power to so approve.” Because
the Douglas County Board of County Commissioners apparently
approved the County’s entry into an immigration detention
agreement, the County argues that it has the authority to do so.
But that argument ignores and would render superfluous the
18 italicized portion of section 29-1-203(1). This we may not do. See
Ceja v. Lemire, 154 P.3d 1064, 1066 (Colo. 2007) (“If courts can give
effect to the ordinary meaning of words used by the legislature, the
statute should be construed as written, giving full effect to the
words chosen, as it is presumed that the General Assembly meant
what it clearly said.” (quoting State, Dep’t of Corr. v. Nieto, 993 P.2d
493, 500 (Colo. 2000))).
¶ 32 Equally important, the County’s argument fails to recognize
the state’s broad power to determine what services a county may
perform and what services it may not. Bainbridge, 929 P.2d at 699.
As previously explained, H.B. 23-1100 did just that by prohibiting
political subdivisions from entering into immigration detention
agreements. Thus, the County’s reliance on section 29-1-203 is
misplaced.
¶ 33 Nor is the County’s argument advanced by its reliance on
Durango Transportation, Inc. v. City of Durango, 824 P.2d 48 (Colo.
App. 1991). True, as the County asserts, the division in Durango
indicated that sections 29-1-201 to -203 should be interpreted to
ensure that contracting entities possess the powers necessary to
effectuate intergovernmental agreements. Id. at 50. But the
19 division in Durango made this observation while acknowledging that
“the phrase ‘lawfully authorized to each’ [means] only that each
entity must have the authority to perform the subject activity within
its jurisdictional boundaries.” Id. at 51. Thus, Durango reinforces
our conclusion that for an intergovernmental agreement to be
authorized, both governmental entities must have the authority to
provide the function, service, or facility contemplated by the
agreement.
¶ 34 For these reasons, the district court did not err by concluding
that the County suffered no injury in fact to a legally protected
interest under article XIV, section 18 of the Colorado Constitution.
Accordingly, the court did not err by concluding that the County
lacked standing to challenge H.B. 23-1100 under article XIV,
section 18.
B. The County’s Standing Under Article V, Section 24
¶ 35 The County also contends that the district court erred by
concluding that the County lacked standing to bring its claims
under article V, section 24 of the Colorado Constitution. We
disagree.
20 1. Standard of Review and Applicable Law
¶ 36 As previously explained, we review a district court’s legal
conclusions regarding standing and statutory interpretation de
novo. Ryan, ¶ 13.
¶ 37 Article V, section 24 of the Colorado Constitution provides that
“[n]o law shall be revived, or amended, or the provisions thereof
extended or conferred by reference to its title only, but so much
thereof as is revived, amended, extended or conferred, shall be
re-enacted and published at length.” The constitutional provision is
designed to “prevent the confusion and uncertainty which prevailed
as a result of the amendment of statutes and ordinances by
reference to [their] title only, or by interpolating words without
re-stating the part amended, often resulting in the legislative body
itself being in ignorance of its own enactment.” Thiele v. City &
County of Denver, 312 P.2d 786, 793 (Colo. 1957). The supreme
court has explained that article V, section 24 “was framed for the
purpose of avoiding confusion, ambiguity and uncertainty in the
statutory law through the existence of separate and disconnected
legislative provisions, original and amendatory, scattered through
different volumes or different portions of the same volumes.” City &
21 County of Denver v. People, 88 P.2d 89, 91 (Colo. 1939) (quoting
Callahan v. Jennings, 27 P. 1055, 1057 (Colo. 1891)).
2. Analysis
¶ 38 The County argues that H.B. 23-1100 violates its
constitutional rights under article V, section 24 by implicitly
amending existing Colorado statutes — namely, sections 29-1-201
to -203 — and thereby diminishing its rights under those statutes.
We disagree for two reasons.
¶ 39 First, H.B. 23-1100 simply precludes the County from entering
into immigration detention agreements. Nothing in sections 29-1-
201 to -203, or any other authority cited by the County,
affirmatively grants it the right to enter into immigration detention
agreements. Rather, as previously explained, those statutes simply
permit the County to enter into intergovernmental agreements to
provide those functions, services, and facilities that the state deems
appropriate. Because H.B. 23-1100 does not amend sections 29-1-
201 to -203 or any other statute identified by the County, article V,
section 24 is not implicated.
¶ 40 Second — and relatedly — as the district court correctly noted,
article V, section 24 prohibits the revival, amendment, or extension
22 of a law “by reference to its title only.” H.B. 23-1100 does not refer
to sections 29-1-201 to -203 or any other statutory provision.
Rather, as previously explained, H.B. 23-1100 is a new legislative
directive that simply prohibits political subdivisions from entering
into immigration detention agreements.
¶ 41 Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that the
County suffered no injury in fact under article V, section 24
because H.B. 23-1100 does not amend any law by reference to its
title only. It necessarily follows that the district court correctly
concluded the County lacked standing to challenge H.B. 23-1100
under article V, section 24.
III. Disposition
¶ 42 The district court’s judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE BROWN concur.