Bohanan v. Esurance Property & Casualty Insurance Co.

• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals
• Decided: February 5, 2026
• Docket: 24CA1649
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.

SUMMARY February 5, 2026

2026COA6

No. 24CA1649, Bohanan v. Esurance Property & Casualty Insurance Co. — Insurance — Regulation of Insurance Companies — Unfair Competition and Deceptive Practices — Required Disclosures

This case requires a division of the court of appeals to

interpret the phrase “is or may be relevant” as used in section 10-3-

1117(2)(a), C.R.S. 2025, for the first time in a published Colorado

appellate opinion.

The plaintiff was injured in a motor vehicle accident caused by

a driver who obtained liability coverage through an insurance policy

apparently issued after the incident occurred. The majority

concludes that the insurer was obligated under section 10-3-

1117(2)(a) to provide a copy of the policy to the plaintiff because it

was relevant or potentially relevant to her contemplated claim

against the driver. Because the insurer failed to provide a copy of the policy for over a year, the majority concludes that it is liable to

the plaintiff in the amount of $100 per day, calculated from the date

the insurer was statutorily obligated to provide a copy of the policy

until the day it provided the policy to the plaintiff.

The dissent argues that the insurer’s determination that the

policy was purchased after the accident relieved it of any obligation

to provide the plaintiff with a copy of the policy. Accordingly, the

dissent argues there was no violation of the statute. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026COA6

Court of Appeals No. 24CA1649 City and County of Denver District Court No. 23CV32933 Honorable Kandace C. Gerdes, Judge

Reesa Bohanan,

Plaintiff-Appellant and Cross-Appellee,

v.

Esurance Property & Casualty Insurance Company, a foreign corporation,

Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant.

JUDGMENT AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS

Division I Opinion by JUDGE SCHUTZ Grove, J., concurs J. Jones, J., dissents

Announced February 5, 2026

The Wilhite Law Firm, Sarah A. Schreiber, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff- Appellant and Cross-Appellee

Hall & Evans, LLC, Daniel J. Bristol, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee and Cross-Appellant

Ramos Law, Jessica L. McBryant, Northglenn, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Colorado Trial Lawyers Association ¶1 This appeal arises from Reesa Bohanan’s request for copies of

any insurance policies issued by defendant, Esurance Property &

Casualty Insurance Company (Esurance), that may provide liability

coverage for Yeraldy Ugalde Arteaga, the driver who caused an

automobile accident with Bohanan. Although Esurance had issued

a policy naming Arteaga as an insured, it refused to produce the

policy on the grounds that it had determined the policy was not in

effect at the time of the collision. Bohanan thereafter filed suit

against Esurance under section 10-3-1117(3), C.R.S. 2025, seeking

an award of statutory damages in the amount of $100 for each day

following the thirtieth day after Bohanan’s request through the date

Esurance ultimately delivered the policy to her.

¶2 The district court found Esurance liable for its failure to

respond to Bohanan’s request. But the court limited Bohanan’s

damages award to $600, representing the six days that elapsed

between the statutory deadline and the date Esurance disclosed to

Bohanan that the policy was not in effect at the time of the

accident. ¶3 Bohanan appeals the district court’s damages award.

Esurance cross-appeals the court’s liability finding. We affirm the

liability finding, reverse the damages award, and remand for an

award of the full amount of damages mandated by the statute.

I. Background

¶4 On August 31, 2022, at approximately 7:20 a.m. Mountain

Daylight Time (MDT)1, Arteaga drove through a red light and

collided with Bohanan’s car. The same day, at approximately

9:03 a.m. MDT, a third party obtained an auto insurance policy

from Esurance that named Arteaga as an additional insured.

¶5 Bohanan retained a lawyer to bring a personal injury claim

against Arteaga. On September 7, 2022, her attorney faxed a

written notification to the Colorado Division of Insurance, as the

registered agent for Esurance, stating that Bohanan was making a

claim for personal injuries against Arteaga. As part of this notice,

Bohanan requested any Esurance automobile policy information in

1 While not entirely clear from the record, it appears that the policy

was issued at approximately 8:03 a.m. Pacific Standard Time. To alleviate any confusion, we have adjusted and noted that the times referenced in this opinion are in MDT because the accident occurred in that time zone.

2 connection with Bohanan’s claim against Arteaga. The Division of

Insurance forwarded the request to Esurance the same day. After

receiving the notice, Esurance set up a claim file.

¶6 On September 22, 2022, Esurance established a bodily injury

reserve on Bohanan’s claim for $17,100. On September 30,

Esurance noted in Bohanan’s claim file that “coverage is in order for

[date of loss].” It wasn’t until October 11 that Esurance determined

that the car accident apparently occurred more than ninety minutes

before the insurance policy was purchased. On October 13, thirty-

six days after receiving Bohanan’s formal request for relevant policy

information, Esurance determined that Arteaga wasn’t covered by

the policy at the time of the crash, noted that a “coverage denial”

was appropriate, and closed its reserve. Esurance sent a letter to

Bohanan’s counsel on October 13 denying coverage for the loss on

the grounds that the accident occurred before the policy was

issued. The letter did not include a copy of the policy.

¶7 The following year, on August 11, 2023, Bohanan sent a letter

to Esurance asserting that it had failed to respond to her request

for policy information as required by section 10-3-1117(2)(a).

Bohanan sent another letter several weeks later. On September 29,

3 2023, Esurance responded to Bohanan’s two letters and, for the

first time, provided a copy of the policy. In that letter, Esurance

represented that Bohanan’s counsel had failed to send the demand

letter to its registered agent, a contention that neither party

advances on appeal. Nonetheless, Esurance relied on that

representation as justification for not paying the $100 per diem

statutory penalty for the delayed production.

¶8 Bohanan filed suit against Esurance on October 6, 2023. She

alleged that Esurance had improperly withheld a copy of the

insurance policy and sought monetary damages in the statutory

amount of $100 per day for the 356 days between the expiration of

the statutory thirty-day deadline and the day Esurance produced a

copy of the policy.

¶9 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and

the district court ruled in Bohanan’s favor on the liability aspect of

her claim. The court concluded that Esurance had not complied

with the statute requiring it to provide a copy of the policy to

Bohanan within thirty days:

Even if the policy ultimately is irrelevant, that is a secondary consideration to the issue of disclosing such a policy. As the General

4 Assembly stated, citizens should be protected, and unnecessary litigation should be prevented . . . . This cannot be achieved without transparency and full disclosure by insurance companies.

The undisputed facts in this case establish that [Bohanan] properly requested policy information from [Esurance], who did not disclose information as required by [section] 10-3-1117.

¶ 10 The district court subsequently held a hearing to determine

the proper amount of Bohanan’s statutory damages award. The

court determined that Bohanan was only entitled to damages for

the period between the expiration of thirty days from the initial

request (October 7, 2022) and the date that Esurance issued its

denial letter (October 13, 2022). Thus, the court entered judgment

against Esurance in the amount of $600.

II. Analysis

¶ 11 We turn now to the controlling legal principles before

addressing the merits of the parties’ appellate contentions.

A. Liability Determination

¶ 12 We first address Esurance’s cross-appeal, in which it contends

that the district court improperly determined that Esurance violated

section 10-3-1117(2)(a).

5 1. Standard of Review

¶ 13 We review the grant of summary judgment de novo. Univ. of

Denv. v. Doe, 2024 CO 27, ¶ 7. “A reviewing court applies the same

standards as the [district] court in determining whether summary

judgment is warranted.” Timm v. Reitz, 39 P.3d 1252, 1255 (Colo.

App. 2001). Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no

disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law. Id. The moving party bears the

burden of establishing that no genuine issues of fact exist, and any

doubts in that regard must be resolved against the moving party.

Doe, ¶ 8.

¶ 14 We also review a district court’s statutory interpretation de

novo. Est. of Ross v. Pub. Serv. Co. of Colo., 2025 COA 31, ¶ 14

(cert. granted Nov. 17, 2025). “[W]e strive to give effect to the

legislative purposes by adopting an interpretation that best

effectuates those purposes. . . . [W]e look first to the plain language

of the statute, giving the language its commonly accepted and

understood meaning.” Id. (quoting Smith v. Exec. Custom Homes,

Inc., 230 P.3d 1186, 1189 (Colo. 2010)).

6 ¶ 15 If the language is clear and unambiguous, we typically do not

examine legislative history or use other rules of statutory

interpretation. Id. However, we may consider the General

Assembly’s declaration of purpose when interpreting arguably

ambiguous statutory language. § 2-4-203(1)(g), C.R.S. 2025; see

also Welby Gardens v. Adams Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 71 P.3d

992, 995 (Colo. 2003) (discussing legislative history despite

concluding that “the plain language of the statute is clear”);

Kisselman v. Am. Fam. Mut. Ins. Co., 292 P.3d 964, 969 (Colo. App.

2011) (“[W]e may consider legislative history when there is

substantial legislative discussion surrounding the passage of a

statute, and the plain language interpretation of a statute is

consistent with legislative intent.”).

2. Analysis

¶ 16 The district court concluded that Esurance violated section

10-3-1117(2)(a) when it failed to provide a copy of the insurance

policy to Bohanan within thirty days. The relevant portion of the

statute reads as follows:

Each insurer that provides or may provide commercial automobile or personal automobile liability insurance coverage to pay all or a

7 portion of a pending or prospective claim shall provide to the claimant or the claimant’s attorney via mail, facsimile, or electronic delivery, within thirty calendar days after receiving a written request from the claimant or the claimant’s attorney, which request is sent to the insurer’s registered agent, a statement setting forth the following information with regard to each known policy of insurance of the named insured, including excess or umbrella insurance, that is or may be relevant to the claim:

....

(IV) A copy of the policy.

§ 10-3-1117(2)(a)(IV) (emphasis added). The district court

recognized, as we do, that there is no binding appellate court

decision interpreting the scope of an insurer’s obligation under the

statute.

¶ 17 While acknowledging that the decision was not controlling, the

district court found persuasive a recent United States District Court

for the District of Colorado decision. See Fogel v. Shelter Mut. Ins.

Co., 728 F. Supp. 3d 1171, 1177 (D. Colo. 2024).

¶ 18 In Fogel, a motorist struck a cyclist; the motorist carried

several auto insurance policies. Id. at 1173-74. The cyclist

requested copies of “each known policy” the motorist carried, and

8 the insurer disclosed some, but not all, of the policies. Id. at 1174.

The cyclist claimed, among other things, that the insurance

company violated the statute when it did not provide copies of all

the motorist’s insurance policies. Id. The insurance company

responded that it was not obligated to produce the disputed policies

because they did not provide coverage for the subject accident. Id.

at 1176.

¶ 19 The federal district court reasoned that the statute in question

does not define the term “relevant” and that, without explicit

guidance from the General Assembly, the common use of that term

controls. As the court noted, “relevant” is defined as “having

significant and demonstrable bearing on or relation to the matter at

hand.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://perma.cc/4AYC-

3DZG; see Fogel, 728 F. Supp. 3d at 1177.2

¶ 20 The federal district court concluded that the scope of the

statute’s disclosure requirement was ambiguous, and, in view of

2 Fogel v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Company, 728 F. Supp. 3d 1171,

1177 (D. Colo. 2024), references a prior version of the Merriam- Webster Dictionary definition of “relevant”; we reference the current definition. We perceive no material differences between the two definitions.

9 that ambiguity, the court referred to the General Assembly’s

statement of purpose in enacting the statute. Fogel, 728 F. Supp.

3d at 1177; see § 2-4-203(1)(g), C.R.S. 2025; see also Peabody Sage

Creek Mining, LLC v. Colo. Dep’t of Pub. Health & Env’t, 2020 COA

127, ¶ 11 (“[I]f the statute is ambiguous, we turn to other tools of

statutory construction to discern the General Assembly’s intent,

including . . . statements of legislative purpose . . . .”).

¶ 21 The court turned to section 10-3-1101(2), C.R.S. 2025, which

provides as follows:

It is in the best interests of the citizens of this state to have transparency in the insurance claims process to further the public policy of encouraging settlement and preventing unnecessary litigation. Claimants and injured parties should fully understand the total amount of insurance coverage available to them. In addition, because payment of uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits covers the difference between the amount of the limits of any legal liability coverage and the amount of the damages sustained, it is important that the citizens of this state have accurate and reliable information about the amount of legal liability coverage available for a claim. Providing information to Colorado residents concerning the amount of liability coverage will:

10 (a) Help Colorado residents evaluate whether their uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage will be triggered; and

(b) Allow an insurer who provides uninsured or underinsured motorist coverage or policies more time to evaluate and place reserves on claims.

¶ 22 The court concluded that the insurer’s proposed interpretation

of section 10-3-1117 would diminish transparency and encourage

litigation, while the cyclist’s interpretation would facilitate

transparency and discourage litigation. Fogel, 728 F. Supp. 3d at

1178-79. Thus, the court concluded that the insurer violated the

statute by failing to timely produce the policies. Id. at 1179.

¶ 23 As in Fogel, the question of coverage under the Esurance

policy was not immediately clear. Esurance’s internal assessment

of the claim initially indicated that “coverage [was] in order” for the

date of loss associated with Bohanan’s claim, and Esurance

established a reserve for her bodily injury claim. It was not until

after the thirty-day statutory deadline had expired that Esurance

determined the policy was not purchased until after the collision. It

apparently took Esurance five weeks to make this determination

11 because it did not notify Bohanan’s counsel of the coverage decision

until thirty-six days after it received Bohanan’s request.

¶ 24 Despite the factual uncertainties regarding whether the policy

was in effect at the time of the automobile accident, we conclude

that the statute unambiguously required Esurance to provide

Bohanan’s counsel with a copy of the policy within thirty days of

the date its registered agent received the request.

¶ 25 As an initial matter, we reject any implied suggestion that

Bohanan’s counsel failed to deliver the letter to Esurance’s

registered agent. Indeed, despite its initial denial letter, on appeal,

Esurance seems to concede that the Division of Insurance was

acting as its registered agent and that it received the request for the

policy on September 7, 2022.

¶ 26 Second, we reject Esurance’s argument that the policy did not

fall within the statutory mandate that it produce “each known

policy of insurance of the named insured . . . that is or may be

relevant to the claim.” § 10-3-1117(2)(a). Upon receipt of the

request for policy information, Esurance promptly determined that

it issued a policy on the date of the car accident and that the policy

may provide coverage for Bohanan’s potential claim. Esurance

12 investigated the facts of the accident and the circumstances

surrounding the issuance of the policy over the course of the next

five weeks before ultimately concluding that the policy did not

provide coverage.

¶ 27 As evidenced by Esurance’s investigation of this incident,

when there is a fundamental question of whether a policy provides

coverage for a loss, the facts surrounding the claimed loss and the

policy’s language have significant bearing on the coverage

determination. While Esurance ultimately denied coverage, both

the amount of time it took to assess the coverage issue and the

initial confusion on both sides as to whether the loss could or

would be covered make clear that during the statutory response

period the policy “[wa]s or may [have been] relevant to the claim.”

Id.

¶ 28 Finally, we reject Esurance’s argument that its unilateral

decision that the policy did not provide coverage for the incident

excused it from producing the policy. This rationale would permit

an insurer to reject a claimant’s request for policy information any

time the insurer concludes that no coverage exists, and to do so

without ever producing a copy of the policy to the claimant.

13 ¶ 29 This argument is directly contrary to the language used by the

General Assembly in section 10-3-1117. For example, the initial

sentence of section 10-3-1117(2)(a) applies the disclosure obligation

to each insurer that “provides or may provide . . . automobile

liability insurance coverage” to pay all or a portion of the injured

party’s claim. The word “provides” encompasses policies that

clearly supply coverage, while the phrase “may provide” captures

policies that might extend coverage to the claim. This same

nomenclature is carried forward to require the insurer to produce

each known policy that “is or may be relevant to the claim.” Id.

And in between, the General Assembly used the phrase “shall

provide” to indicate the insurer’s obligation is mandatory. Id.; see

Kidder v. Chaffee Cnty. Bd. of Equalization, 312 P.3d 1181, 1183

(Colo. App. 2011) (“When the word ‘shall’ is used in a statute, it

ordinarily creates a mandatory obligation.”).

¶ 30 If the General Assembly had intended the statutory obligation

to extend only to policies that the insurer unilaterally concludes do

provide coverage, it would have said that expressly. See People v.

Market, 2020 COA 90, ¶ 40 (“If the legislature intends a certain

interpretation, ‘it certainly [knows] how to say so.’” (quoting People

14 v. Griffin, 397 P.3d 1086, 1089 (Colo. App. 2011))). But it didn’t say

that. See People ex rel. Rein v. Meagher, 2020 CO 56, ¶ 22 (“[W]e do

not add words to or subtract words from a statute.”). Instead, the

General Assembly required the insurer to provide each “known

policy . . . that is or may be relevant to the claim.” § 10-3-

1117(2)(a). This express mandate captures the requested Esurance

policy.

¶ 31 Moreover, we reject Esurance’s argument that it had no

disclosure obligation when the request was received because, in its

view, it is now clear that the policy did not provide coverage for the

claimed loss.3 See id.; cf. Reynolds v. Great N. Ins. Co., 2023 COA

77, ¶ 13 (“[T]he penalty applies even if the claimant is subsequently

found to be entitled to no damages in the underlying automobile

accident.” (citing § 10-3-1117(5))); Fogel, 728 F. Supp. 3d at 1178

n.6 (noting that, at the time of the decision, it was undisputed that

the subject policies did not provide coverage, but, at the time of the

production request, coverage had not been determined).

3 While Bohanan does not expressly state a position on whether the

policy does or does not provide coverage for the claimed loss, we need not decide that issue and therefore do not address it further.

15 ¶ 32 Nor are we persuaded by Esurance’s argument that Bohanan’s

interpretation of section 10-3-1117(2)(a) creates enormous

uncertainties and burdens for insurance companies by requiring

them to find and produce long-expired policies that have no

arguable relevance to the presented claim. We decline Esurance’s

invitation to imagine the outer parameters of the statute based on

facts that are not before us. It is sufficient to resolve this appeal to

simply observe that the Esurance policy met the definition of one

that “provide[d] or may [have] provide[d]” coverage and “[wa]s or

may [have been] relevant to the claim.” § 10-3-1117(2)(a).

¶ 33 Finally, even if we were to accept Esurance’s argument that

the scope of the statute is ambiguous, we conclude that any

ambiguity must be interpreted in accordance with the General

Assembly’s statement of purpose when enacting the statute. See

Peabody, ¶ 9. Esurance’s proposed interpretation would allow

insurers to deny — or, at best, delay — the production of potentially

relevant policy information and sow doubt rather than promote

clarity. It would also perpetuate uncertainty and

misunderstanding, which are the fertile breeding grounds of

litigation. Such outcomes are directly at odds with the General

16 Assembly’s stated purposes when enacting section 10-3-1117. See

§ 10-3-1101(2)(a), (b); see also Reynolds, ¶ 12 (section 10-3-1117

was passed to promote transparency in the insurance claims

process and accessibility to accurate and reliable information).

Thus, the General Assembly’s declaration of purpose supports the

district court’s analysis and our independent analysis of the

unambiguous mandate of section 10-3-1117(2)(a).

¶ 34 For these reasons, we affirm that portion of the district court’s

judgment finding Esurance liable for violating section 10-3-

1117(2)(a).

B. Damages Award

¶ 35 We now turn to Bohanan’s claim that the district court

improperly calculated the statutory penalty that was the foundation

of the damages award.

1. Applicable Law

¶ 36 The penalty provision that underlies a damages award for

failing to timely produce an insurance policy is set forth in section

10-3-1117(3), which provides, in relevant part, as follows:

An insurer that violates this section is liable to the requesting claimant for damages in an amount of one hundred dollars per day,

17 beginning on and including the thirty-first day following the receipt of the claimant’s written request. The penalty accrues until the insurer provides the information required by this section.[4]

¶ 37 As stated previously, we review a district court’s statutory

interpretation de novo and first look to the plain meaning of a

statute’s language. Est. of Ross, ¶ 14.

¶ 38 The district court determined that Bohanan was entitled to

damages only for the dates between the expiration of thirty days

from the initial request (October 7, 2022) and the date Esurance

issued its denial letter (October 13, 2022). It reasoned that

“[Bohanan] was put on notice six days after the 30-day deadline”

4 As illustrated, the first sentence of section 10-3-1117(3), C.R.S.

2025, refers to the monetary award as “damages,” and the second sentence refers to it as a “penalty.” At least one division of this court has concluded that the statute should be viewed as imposing a penalty for purposes of determining the applicable statute of limitations. See Reynolds v. Great N. Ins. Co., 2023 COA 77, ¶ 15 (“[S]ection 10-3-1117 is an action for penalties. Therefore, the one- year statute of limitations for penalties applies.”). We need not weigh in on this question, however, because the applicable limitations period is not at issue in this case. Our use of the terms “damages” and “penalty” is driven by the language of section 10-3- 1117(3) and is not intended to reflect any position on the statute of limitations issue.

18 that the insurance policy had not been issued until after the

collision occurred and therefore did not cover the accident. The

court further reasoned that the intent of the statute was to provide

transparency for consumers and that, by providing the letter

denying coverage, Esurance had provided that transparency.

¶ 39 Bohanan contends that section 10-3-1117(3) required the

court to award her damages for the entire 356-day period that

Esurance failed to produce the policy. Esurance counters that the

district court’s $600 award expanded the language of section 10-3-

1117, specifically contending that the district court read into the

statute an “additional requirement of ‘transparency.’” Alternatively,

Esurance argues that the district court appropriately terminated

the per diem penalty once Esurance told Bohanan’s counsel that

the policy was not in effect at the time of the collision. We are

unpersuaded by Esurance’s arguments.

¶ 40 As previously discussed, it took Esurance thirty-six days to

investigate and determine that the policy was purchased ninety

minutes after the collision. Therefore, Esurance’s argument — that

it should not be obligated to produce a policy that was not in effect

at the time of the loss — hinges on a fact that was unknown when

19 Bohanan made her request and ultimately supports Bohanan’s

argument. As previously explained, the policy was relevant, or at

least potentially relevant, to Bohanan’s claim. Bohanan’s counsel

had learned that Esurance issued a policy that named Arteaga as

an additional insured. Bohanan’s counsel contacted Esurance and

its registered agent to obtain the policy so that counsel could

evaluate potential coverage for the contemplated claim against

Arteaga.

¶ 41 As for Esurance’s contention that the district court improperly

imposed a “transparency” requirement that does not appear in the

statute, the question of whether the policy provided coverage was

essential to counsel’s assessment of the economics of a potential

claim against Arteaga. Thus, production of the policy was central to

complying with the letter and intent of section 10-3-1117, as

reflected in section 10-3-1101(2)(a). Specifically, unless and until

the policy was produced, Bohanan’s counsel was unable to make an

informed assessment of the coverage issue. This type of

uncertainty is what the General Assembly intended section 10-3-

1117 to eliminate.

20 ¶ 42 Moreover, Esurance’s claim that the district court added a

“transparency” requirement to the statute — which is the only

argument Esurance presents in its section 10-3-1117(3) analysis —

focuses not on the damages award mandated by the statute but,

rather, on its liability argument under section 10-3-1117(2)(a).

Subsection (3) says nothing about transparency issues. Thus,

Esurance’s lone damages argument is untethered to the controlling

statutory language.

¶ 43 In any event, Esurance fails to address the General Assembly’s

stated objective of incentivizing the timely production of polices that

are or may be relevant to a claim through the imposition of the daily

penalty. We are not allowed to disregard that manifest purpose.

See Reid v. Berkowitz, 2013 COA 110M, ¶ 38 (“[W]e are not at

liberty to ignore the General Assembly’s directive . . . .”).

¶ 44 Under section 10-3-1117(3), an insurer that violates the

requirement to provide a copy of the policy within thirty days “is

liable to the requesting claimant for damages in an amount of one

hundred dollars per day, beginning on and including the thirty-first

day following the receipt of the claimant’s written request.” From

there, it is a matter of simple mathematics. Bohanan filed her

21 request for a copy of the insurance policy on September 7, 2022.

Thirty days elapsed on October 7, 2022. On September 29, 2023 —

356 days later — Esurance finally provided a copy of the policy to

Bohanan. At $100 per day, the statutorily mandated damages

award equals $35,600.

III. Disposition

¶ 45 We affirm the district court’s finding that Esurance violated

section 10-3-1117(2)(a), reverse the damages award, and remand

with instructions that the district court enter a judgment awarding

Bohanan damages in the amount $35,600.5

JUDGE GROVE concurs.

JUDGE J. JONES dissents.

5 Neither party raises the issue of attorney fees on appeal.We therefore do not address that issue. We do note, however, that Bohanan filed a motion for an award of attorney fees in the district court, which the court declined to rule on until the completion of this appeal. On remand, the district court may address Bohanan’s request for attorney fees. See § 10-3-1117(3) (“An insurer that fails to make a disclosure required by this section is also responsible for attorney fees and costs incurred by a claimant in enforcing the penalty.”).

22 JUDGE J. JONES, dissenting.

¶ 46 The majority holds that, under section 10-3-1117(2)(a), C.R.S.

2025, defendant, Esurance Property & Casualty Insurance

Company, had a duty to provide to plaintiff, Reesa Bohanan, an

insurance policy that wasn’t in effect at the time of the automobile

accident giving rise to Bohanan’s potential claim against the other

driver. Because I don’t agree with the majority that the language of

the statute supports that conclusion, I respectfully dissent.

¶ 47 As the majority notes, the relevant part of the statute reads as

follows:

Each insurer that provides or may provide commercial automobile or personal automobile liability insurance coverage to pay all or a portion of a pending or prospective claim shall provide to the claimant or the claimant’s attorney via mail, facsimile, or electronic delivery, within thirty calendar days after receiving a written request from the claimant or the claimant’s attorney, which request is sent to the insurer’s registered agent, a statement setting forth the following information with regard to each known policy of insurance of the named insured, including excess or umbrella insurance, that is or may be relevant to the claim:

23 § 10-3-1117(2)(a)(IV) (emphasis added). Bohanan argues that the

policy “is or may be relevant” to her claim against the other driver.

The majority agrees with Bohanan, holding that the policy was one

that, when requested by her attorney, may have been relevant to

her claim.

¶ 48 In so holding, the majority fails to afford the word “may,” as

twice used in the statute (“may provide” and “may be relevant”), its

plain and ordinary meaning. See Rios de Martinez v. Landaverde,

2024 COA 115, ¶ 11 (in interpreting a statute, we begin by giving

terms their plain and ordinary meanings). As used in this

grammatical and substantive context, the word “may” means “in

some degree likely,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary

1396 (2002), or “[t]o be a possibility,” Black’s Law Dictionary 1169

(12th ed. 2024).

¶ 49 As I see it, there is no degree of likelihood or possibility that an

insurance policy that wasn’t in effect at the time of the incident

giving rise to a claim could provide coverage. Bohanan doesn’t

seem to argue otherwise, and the majority doesn’t seem to dispute

24 this proposition.1 Likewise, such a policy isn’t “relevant” to such a

claim, nor is it possibly relevant.

[A] liability insurance policy exists for the single purpose of satisfying the liability that it covers. It has no other function and no other value. Litigation is a practical business. The litigant sues to recover money and is not interested in a paper judgment that cannot be collected. The presence or absence of liability insurance is frequently the controlling factor in determining the manner in which a case is prepared for trial.

Lucas v. Dist. Ct., 345 P.2d 1064, 1068 (Colo. 1959) (quoting People

ex rel. Terry v. Fisher, 145 N.E.2d 588, 593 (Ill. 1957); emphasis

added). Section 10-3-1117 appears to acknowledge this reality, as

reflected in the declaration of purpose contained in section 10-3-

1101, C.R.S. 2025. But a policy that wasn’t in effect at the time of

1 Bohanan has never argued that the policy in question was in

effect at the time of the accident. Nor could she. The policy says that it applies only to accidents and losses that occur after the latter of “[t]he effective date and time shown on the” declarations page or “[t]he time the policy was bought.” The declarations page says, “This policy is effective at 12:01 AM on the date shown or the time the policy was purchased, whichever is later.” The policy was purchased at 9:03 a.m. (Mountain Daylight Time) on August 31, 2022. The accident occurred at 7:20 a.m. (Mountain Daylight Time) that day.

25 the incident giving rise to the claim has no relevance to the case

and, just as importantly, no potential relevance to the case.

¶ 50 Nor would imposing a duty on an insurer to provide such a

policy serve the purposes motivating the disclosure requirement.

Knowledge of such a policy will not “encourag[e] settlement” or

“prevent[] unnecessary litigation.” § 10-3-1101(2). It will not help

claimants and injured parties “fully understand the total amount of

insurance coverage available to them.” Id. (emphasis added). It will

not “[h]elp Colorado residents evaluate whether their uninsured or

underinsured motorist coverage will be triggered.” Id. And it will

not “[a]llow an insurer who provides uninsured or underinsured

motorist coverage or policies more time to evaluate and place

reserves on claims.” Id. Rather, such a policy is, in effect, no policy

at all — at least when it comes to the purposes served by the

¶ 51 Fogel v. Shelter Mutual Insurance Co., 728 F. Supp. 3d 1171

(D. Colo. 2024), on which both Bohanan and the majority rely,

actually supports a conclusion contrary to that reached by the

majority in this case. In Fogel, there were four insurance policies at

issue, all of which were in effect at the time of the accident and all

26 of which identified the at-fault driver as a named insured or

additional insured. Id. at 1173. The court held that the insurance

company was required by section 10-3-1117 to disclose all the

policies, not just the one the insurer conceded applied. It so held

“because it was at least plausible that one or more of the policies

could have a significant and demonstrable bearing on the claim at

hand.” Fogel, 728 F. Supp. 3d at 1178 (emphasis added). In this

case, however, the policy in question couldn’t plausibly have had

any such bearing.

¶ 52 True, as the majority points out, Esurance initially didn’t

know that the policy didn’t apply. But that wasn’t a function of any

uncertainty about the type or amount of coverage provided by the

policy, or any ambiguity in the policy’s language, but of a lack of

knowledge of the time the accident occurred. I don’t see how the

lack of such knowledge on the insurer’s part makes a policy any

more relevant or possibly relevant to the claim. To hold otherwise

penalizes — literally — an insurer for failing to know from the

outset a fact negating the possible existence of any potentially

applicable policy — a fact in this case of which the insurer had no

reason to know until it conducted an investigation. I don’t think

27 imposing liability in such circumstances comports with the General

Assembly’s intent.

¶ 53 In sum, I would hold that a policy “may be relevant” only when

there is a plausible argument that the policy provides coverage. To

hold otherwise, as the majority does, imposes virtually boundless

obligations on insurance companies to disclose policies that have

no conceivable possibility of providing coverage: All that’s necessary

to impose liability under the statute, in the majority’s view, is a

request to which the insurer doesn’t respond and the existence of a

policy that at any point in time may have covered the insured.

Again, I don’t think that’s what the General Assembly had in mind.

¶ 54 As I believe this case demonstrates, section 10-3-1117 could

stand some clarification by the General Assembly. But barring

that, I don’t think the statute and its motivating purposes should be

read so broadly as to create satellite litigation divorced from any

real world harm to any of the parties in the underlying dispute.

¶ 55 Because I would conclude that Esurance isn’t liable under

section 10-3-1117(2)(a), I don’t address whether the district court

erred in calculating damages under the statute.