1
Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Case No. 18CA2025
2
Attorneys for Petitioner: Michael J. Allen, District
Attorney, Fourth Judicial District Doyle Baker, Senior Deputy
District Attorney
Attorneys for Respondent: The Bussey Law Firm, P.C. Timothy
R. Bussey
CHIEF
JUSTICE BOATRIGHT, JUSTICE MÁRQUEZ, JUSTICE HOOD,
JUSTICE GABRIEL, JUSTICE HART, and JUSTICE BERKENKOTTER
joined.
3
OPINION
JUSTICE SAMOUR
¶1
Colorado's so-called Make My Day law, section 18-1-704.5,
C.R.S. (2021), addresses the justified use of force against
intruders in the home. The statute's nickname stems from
a line in the film Sudden Impact. See People v.
Alaniz, 2016 COA 101, ¶ 1 n.1, 409 P.3d 508, 510
n.1 (noting the nickname's origin). In one notable scene,
a fictional police inspector known as "Dirty Harry"
points his gun at a robber in a coffee shop and says,
"Go ahead, make my day," seemingly "daring the
suspect to give him an excuse to shoot." Dirk Johnson,
Colorado Journal; 'Make My Day': More
Than a Threat, N.Y. Times, June 1, 1990, at A14.
Although section 18-1-704.5 was originally called "The
Home Protection Bill," its nickname was coined as the
bill made its way through the legislature. See
William Wilbanks, The Make My Day Law: Colorado's
Experiment in Home Protection 1 (1990). The media then
popularized the nickname as a way to describe, and perhaps
criticize, the new legislation's broad
protection.[1] Id.
4
¶2
But the nickname is a misnomer. Though wide-ranging, the
statute's safe harbor in no way permits an occupant of a
dwelling to, à la Dirty Harry, egg on intruders to do
something so as to have an excuse to shoot them. Thus, while
the catchy nickname has stuck around, our preference is to
refer to the statute by its citation or as the
"force-against-intruders" statute.
¶3
Section 18-1-704.5 recognizes that "the citizens of
Colorado have a right to expect absolute safety within their
own homes." § 18-1-704.5(1). As pertinent here, it
provides immunity from criminal prosecution for the use of
physical force (including deadly physical force) against an
intruder when certain specified conditions are met.
See § 18-1-704.5(2)-(3); People v.
McNeese, 892 P.2d 304, 309 (Colo. 1995). One of those
conditions is implicated in this appeal: We must decide
whether the defendant, Patrick Rau, was in a
dwelling when he shot and killed an intruder in the
basement of the house where he and his girlfriend rented an
apartment. A division of the court of appeals concluded that
the basement, which was accessible to all of the
building's tenants and contained the building's heat
and water controls, was part of Rau's dwelling.
People v. Rau, 2020 COA 92, ¶¶ 1, 17, 490
P.3d 804, 806, 808. Therefore, it affirmed the district
court's ruling that Rau was immune from prosecution for
using deadly physical force against the intruder.
Id. at ¶ 26, 490 P.3d at 809.
5
¶4
Relying on the definition of "dwelling" in section
18-1-901(3)(g), C.R.S. (2021), we now hold that the basement
was part of Rau's dwelling because it was part of the
building that he used for habitation. We view the basement in
this case in much the same way we viewed the attached garage
in People v. Jiminez, 651 P.2d 395, 396 (Colo.
1982). Just as the garage in Jiminez was part of the
building that was used for habitation, the basement here was
part of the building that Rau used for habitation. And just
as some of the usual uses of the garage in Jiminez
were incidental to and part of the use of the residence
itself, some of the usual uses of the basement in this case
were likewise incidental to and part of the use of Rau's
residence. Accordingly, we affirm the division.
I.
Facts and Procedural History
¶5
Rau and his girlfriend rented a second-floor apartment in an
old 19th century Victorian home that had been
converted into seven apartments.[2] The door to the basement,
which was just a few feet inside the home's rear
entrance, was padlocked. However, the residents of all seven
apartments had keys to the padlock and shared access to the
basement. Although unfinished, the basement contained a
central furnace, two hot water heaters, the home's only
thermostat,
6
and the plumbing infrastructure. In other words, the controls
for the water and heat supply for all the apartments were
located in the basement.[3] As well, some of the residents stored
household items in the basement.
¶6
Early one January morning, Rau's girlfriend noticed that
the door to the basement was open. She told Rau that she
suspected that an unhoused man had broken into the basement.
Unhoused individuals apparently frequented the area and had
previously broken into the building (including the basement),
sometimes leaving drug paraphernalia and feces behind.
Because police officers had failed (or had been slow) to
respond to calls related to such unhoused individuals in the
past, Rau grabbed a headlamp, armed himself with a loaded
revolver, and made his way to the basement.
¶7
Upon arriving at the door to the basement, Rau noticed that
it was indeed open and that there were pry marks around the
padlock. As he descended the stairs, Rau turned his headlamp
on because the basement was dark. He found D.R., a large man
(six feet, five inches tall), asleep under a sleeping bag in
a small storage closet. Additionally, Rau observed drug
paraphernalia in D.R.'s general
7
vicinity. Because, as the old adage goes, a picture is worth
a thousand words, below are a few pictures depicting the
front of the house, the door to the basement, and the storage
closet where Rau found D.R. Asleep.
Image
Omitted
8
¶8
Rau nudged D.R. with his foot in an attempt to wake him up.
As Rau did so, he told D.R. that D.R. wasn't supposed to
be there and needed to leave immediately. D.R., who at that
point was only about five feet away from Rau, rose to his
knees, became aggressive, began yelling unintelligibly, and
proceeded to throw things around. Rau believed that D.R. had
used drugs while in the basement and was under their
influence. As D.R.'s behavior escalated, Rau became
scared and warned D.R. multiple times that he had a gun. None
of the warnings altered D.R.'s behavior, however, so Rau
said he would "count to five" and if D.R.
hadn't left when he finished counting, he would shoot.
Rau loudly counted to five. Not only did D.R. refuse to
leave, his menacing and intimidating behavior continued.
Fearing that D.R. was going to charge at him, Rau fired his
gun. D.R. died from the gunshot wound.
9
¶9
A grand jury indicted Rau for second degree murder (heat of
passion).
Before
trial, Rau moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that he was
immune from prosecution under the force-against-intruders
statute. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district court
agreed with Rau, granted his motion, and dismissed the charge
against him.
¶10
The People appealed on two grounds. First, they asserted that
the district court had erred in concluding that the basement
was part of Rau's "dwelling," one of the
conditions for immunity under section 18-1-704.5. Second,
they maintained that Rau had presented insufficient evidence
to establish two of the other conditions required for
immunity under section 18-1-704.5: (1) that he reasonably
believed that D.R. might use physical force against him and
(2) that he reasonably believed that D.R. had committed or
intended to commit a crime in the dwelling (in addition to
the uninvited entry).
¶11
A division of the court of appeals rejected both of the
People's claims. Rau, ¶¶ 14, 20, 490
P.3d at 808. On the dwelling front, the division was unmoved
by the People's reliance on People v.
Cushinberry, 855 P.2d 18 (Colo.App. 1992), where a
different division of the court of appeals determined that
the common area of an apartment building was not part of a
dwelling under the force-against-intruders statute.
Rau, ¶ 18, 490 P.3d at 808. Instead, applying
the statutory definition of dwelling and our holding in
Jiminez, the division below concluded that the
10
basement was part of Rau's dwelling. Id. at
¶¶ 18-19, 490 P.3d at 808. And, regarding the two
other conditions mentioned above, the division held that the
record supported the district court's rulings by a
preponderance of the evidence. Id. at ¶ 25, 490
P.3d at 809. More specifically, the division explained that
the evidence was sufficient to support the court's
findings that Rau reasonably believed that "D.R. was
going to use physical force against him" and that Rau
reasonably believed that "D.R. had committed a crime or
intended to commit a crime against a person or property in
the building." Id. at ¶ 26, 490 P.3d at
809. ¶12 The People then sought certiorari, and we
granted in part and denied in part their petition. We
declined to take up the People's sufficiency challenge,
but we agreed to consider whether the division mistakenly
held that the basement was part of Rau's dwelling under
section 18-1-704.5.[4]
¶13
After setting forth the standard that controls our review and
the relevant principles of statutory construction that guide
our decision, we proceed to analyze the question before us.
Because we agree with the division, we affirm.
11
II.
Standard of Review and Relevant Principles of Statutory
Construction
¶14
Whether the basement was part of Rau's dwelling hinges on
the meaning of the word "dwelling" in section
18-1-704.5. Questions of statutory interpretation are
questions of law that we review de novo. People v.
Sprinkle, 2021 CO 60, ¶ 12, 489 P.3d 1242, 1245.
¶15
When we are called upon to interpret a statute, "our
primary aim is to effectuate the legislature's
intent." Nieto v. Clark's Market, Inc.,
2021 CO 48, ¶ 12, 488 P.3d 1140, 1143. To carry out that
goal, we must first and foremost apply the statute's
words and phrases "in accordance with their plain and
ordinary meanings." Bill Barrett Corp. v.
Lembke, 2020 CO 73, ¶ 14, 474 P.3d 46, 49. If the
statute's language is unambiguous, we are required to
apply it as written. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v.
Scholle, 2021 CO 20, ¶ 13, 484 P.3d 695, 699. We
may not add words to the statute. Nieto, ¶ 12,
488 P.3d at 1143. Nor may we subtract words from it.
Id.
¶16
We must read statutory words and phrases in context and in
accordance with the rules of grammar and common usage.
McCulley v. People, 2020 CO 40, ¶ 10, 463 P.3d
254, 257. Further, we have to "look to the entire
statutory scheme in order to give consistent, harmonious, and
sensible effect to all of its parts." Nieto,
¶ 12, 488 P.3d at 1143 (quoting Lembke, ¶
14, 474 P.3d at 49). And we must avoid interpretations that
would render any statutory words or phrases
12
"superfluous or lead to illogical or absurd
results." McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44, ¶
38, 442 P.3d 379, 389.
¶17
If the legislature defines a particular term in a statute,
"that definition governs." Farmers Ins. Exch.
v. Bill Boom Inc., 961 P.2d 465, 470 (Colo. 1998). The
legislature "'has the power to define terms used by
it,' and it is beyond question that those 'statutory
definitions control judicial interpretation.'"
People v. Rigsby, 2020 CO 74, ¶ 24, 471 P.3d
1068, 1076 (quoting Indus. Comm'n v. Nw. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 88 P.2d 560, 563 (Colo. 1939)). Thus, when the
legislature decides to define a term it uses in a statute,
that definition, "not an average person's
understanding" of it, reigns supreme. Id.
III.
Analysis
A.
The Force-Against-Intruders Statute
¶18
Section 18-1-704.5 acknowledges in subsection (1) that the
people of this state have the right to expect "absolute
safety" in their homes. Subsections (2) and (3) then
follow:
(2) [A]ny occupant of a dwelling is justified in using any
degree of physical force, including deadly physical force,
against another person when that other person has made an
unlawful entry into the dwelling, and when the occupant has a
reasonable belief that such other person has committed a
crime in the dwelling in addition to the uninvited entry, or
is committing or intends to commit a crime against a person
or property in addition to the uninvited entry, and when the
occupant reasonably believes that such other person might use
any physical force, no matter how slight, against any
occupant.
13
(3) Any occupant of a dwelling using physical force,
including deadly physical force, in accordance with the
provisions of subsection (2) of this section shall be immune
from criminal prosecution for the use of such force.
¶19
The force-against-intruders statute resides in part 7 of
article 1 of the criminal code (Title 18). Part 7 is labelled
"Justification and Exemptions from Criminal
Responsibility" and includes, alongside section
18-1-704.5, multiple affirmative defense statutes justifying
the use of physical force: the use of physical force-special
relationships, see § 18-1-703, C.R.S. (2021);
the use of physical force in defense of a person,
see § 18-1-704, C.R.S. (2021); the use of
physical force in defense of premises, see §
18-1-705, C.R.S. (2021); and the use of physical force in
defense of property, see § 18-1-706, C.R.S.
(2021).
¶20
Section 18-1-704.5 is similar to section 18-1-704, which is
known in legal parlance as the self-defense statute. Indeed,
the two statutes are next-door neighbors. Unlike section
18-1-704, however, section 18-1-704.5 provides immunity from
criminal prosecution-it bars criminal proceedings against a
person who uses force (including deadly physical force) under
the conditions listed in subsection (2).[5] People v.
Guenther, 740 P.2d 971, 975 (Colo. 1987). The
14
immunity feature is unique to section 18-1-704.5.
Id. at 976. Nowhere else in the affirmative defenses
did the legislature provide immunity from prosecution.
Id. And, if a pretrial motion to dismiss on grounds
of immunity under section 18-1-704.5 fails, the defendant
gets a second bite at the apple: he may raise at trial, as an
affirmative defense, the conditions set forth in subsection
(2). Id. at 981. ¶21 A defendant seeking the
benefit of immunity under the force-against- intruders
statute bears the burden of establishing, by a preponderance
of the evidence, the conditions in subsection (2): (1) the
defendant was an occupant of a dwelling; (2) another person
made a knowingly unlawful entry into that dwelling; (3) the
defendant had a reasonable belief that, in addition to the
uninvited entry, the other person had committed, was
committing, or intended to commit a crime against a person or
property in the dwelling; and (4) the defendant reasonably
believed that the other person might use any physical force
(no matter how slight) against any occupant of the
dwelling.[6] Id. at 980-81; COLJI-Crim. H:15
(2021). Only the first of these conditions is before us
today. The question we confront is whether Rau was in a
dwelling when he shot D.R.
15
¶22
Section 18-1-901 defines certain terms used in Title 18. One
of those terms is "dwelling," which is a
"building . . . used, intended to be used, or usually
used by a person for habitation."[7] §
18-1-901(3)(g). Importantly, the General Assembly has
instructed us to apply this definition "wherever the
same term is used in the same sense" in Title 18
"unless the definition is specifically limited or the
context indicates that it is inapplicable." §
18-1-901(1). Although we have not had occasion to determine
what constitutes a "dwelling" in the
force-against-intruders statute, we are not in uncharted
waters.[8] Before proceeding, we retrace our
jurisprudence on the meaning of "dwelling."
B.
Dwelling
¶23
We applied the statutory definition of "dwelling"
in Jiminez, albeit before the promulgation of the
force-against-intruders statute. There, the People charged
16
Jiminez, a juvenile, in district court with burglary of a
dwelling, a class 3 felony, after he allegedly unlawfully
entered a house's open garage, took a bicycle, and rode
off. Jiminez, 651 P.2d at 396. At the end of the
preliminary hearing, the district court determined that the
People had failed to establish that the garage was part of a
dwelling within the meaning of the burglary statute, which
meant that the charged burglary was a class 4 felony (not a
class 3 felony) and, correspondingly, that the juvenile court
had sole jurisdiction over the case. Id. The
district court thus dismissed the charge with leave to refile
in juvenile court. Id.
¶24
The People appealed, and we reversed. Id. at 395.
Focusing on the definition of dwelling in section
18-1-901(3)(g), we reasoned:
The statutory definition of dwelling comprehends an entire
building. There is no room in the language of that clearly
worded statute to exclude from the meaning of dwelling those
parts of a residence that are not "usually used by a
person for habitation." Moreover, at least some of the
usual uses of a residential garage, including storage of
household items, are incidental to and part of the habitation
uses of the residence itself.
Id. at 396.
Hence,
under section 18-1-901(3)(g), "dwelling"
encompasses even "those parts of a residence that are
not usually used by a person directly for habitation,
including an open garage" People v Young, 825 P.2d 1004,
1010 (Colo App 1991) (Jones, J, concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (discussing Jiminez's
application of the statutory definition of
"dwelling").
17
C.
Application
¶25
In applying the statutory definition of "dwelling,"
we see no meaningful difference between the garage in
Jiminez and the basement in this case. Each was part
of a building that was "used, intended to be used, or
usually used by a person for habitation." §
18-1-901(3)(g); Jiminez, 651 P.2d at 396. Just as
the garage in Jiminez was part of the building that
was used for habitation, the basement here was part of the
building that Rau used for habitation. Additionally, just as
some of the usual uses of the garage in Jiminez
(including the storage of household items) were incidental to
and part of the habitation uses of the residence itself, some
of the usual uses of the basement in this case (including the
control of the water and heat supply and the storage of
household items) were likewise incidental to and part of the
use of Rau's residence. As such, much like the garage in
Jiminez was part of a dwelling, Rau's basement
was part of a dwelling.
¶26
The People argue that the definition of "dwelling"
in section 18-1-901(3)(g) is inapposite. The context in which
the term appears in section 18-1-704.5(2), contend the
People, indicates that the definition is inapplicable to any
common areas of apartment buildings. But we see nothing in
the context in which "dwelling" is used in section
18-1-704.5(2) to convince us that the definition has no
application here.
18
¶27
We are not persuaded otherwise by the decision in
Cushinberry. In that case, the defendant shot and
killed the victim in a stairwell landing of an apartment
building. Cushinberry, 855 P.2d at 19. In a brief
opinion lacking detailed analysis, a division of the court of
appeals concluded that the defendant was not entitled to an
affirmative defense instruction pursuant to section
18-1-704.5 because the stairwell "was not part of the
defendant's apartment" and was instead "a
common area used by other tenants and their guests."
Id. But the division didn't explain why the
common areas of the apartment building did not come within
the definition of "dwelling" in section
18-1-901(3)(g). Id. Rather, the division summarily
determined that the statutory definition didn't include
common areas of apartment buildings. Id. Notably,
the division didn't cite, let alone discuss, our decision
in Jiminez. Regardless, we're not bound by
Cushinberry and, to the extent it is inconsistent
with this opinion, it is now overruled.
¶28
The People latch onto the fact that the legislature
hasn't amended the definition of "dwelling" in
section 18-1-901(3)(g) since Cushinberry was
announced. According to the People, this must mean that the
legislature agrees with the analysis in Cushinberry.
The People read too much into legislative silence. As
we've observed before, "of the many sources we may
consult to discern legislative intent, reliance on
legislative inaction is particularly risky" because the
reasons for not enacting legislation "are too numerous
to tally." Welby Gardens v. Adams Cnty. Bd. of
Equalization,
19
71 P.3d 992, 998 n.8 (Colo. 2003) (quoted with approval in
People v. Jones, 2020 CO 45, ¶ 63, 464 P.3d
735, 747, where we declined the People's invitation to
infer legislative intent from the fact that the legislature
had not amended the definition of "child" or
"person" in the child abuse statute following a
particular court of appeals decision, despite having amended
the statute several times during that timeframe). Inasmuch as
our court has never interpreted the term "dwelling"
in the force-against-intruders statute, we do not find such
legislative inaction instructive. See Jones, ¶
65, 464 P.3d at 747. Drawing inferences from legislative
silence in the circumstances before us is fraught with peril
because it invites us to speculate.
¶29
The People nevertheless insist that two of the trespass
statutes reflect the legislature's intent to exclude the
common areas of apartment buildings from the definition of
"dwelling." In our view, however, these statutes
offer no lifeline to the People.
¶30
Under section 18-4-502, C.R.S. (2021), a person commits first
degree criminal trespass, a class 5 felony, "if such
person knowingly and unlawfully enters or remains in a
dwelling of another." (Emphasis added.) But under
section 18-4-503(1)(b), C.R.S. (2021), a person commits
second degree criminal trespass, a class 3 misdemeanor, if
such person "[k]nowingly and unlawfully enters or
remains in or upon the common areas of a hotel, motel,
condominium, or apartment building."
20
(Emphasis added.) The People posit that the legislature's
distinction in these two statutes between a dwelling and the
common areas of apartment buildings demonstrates its intent
to exclude the common areas of apartment buildings from the
definition of "dwelling."
¶31
The People are right-but only in the context of the quoted
criminal trespass statutes. "Dwelling" in the
first degree criminal trespass statute doesn't
include the common areas of hotels, motels, condominiums, or
apartment buildings. If someone trespasses any such common
area, then the second degree criminal trespass
statute, not the first degree criminal trespass
statute, applies. Still, the criminal trespass statutes under
inspection in no way support the People's position here.
To the contrary, they directly undercut it. The criminal
trespass statutes the People dangle as grounds for reversal
showcase precisely the type of "context" that
renders the definition of dwelling in section 18-1-901(3)(g)
inapplicable. See § 18-1-901(1) (stating that
each definition set forth there, including for
"dwelling," applies throughout Title 18
"unless . . . the context indicates that it is
inapplicable"). Such context is nowhere to be found in
section 18-1-704.5. Had the legislature intended to exclude
the common areas of apartment buildings from the term
"dwelling" in section 18-1-704.5, it presumably
would have followed the blueprint of the two criminal
trespass statutes discussed.
21
¶32
Finally, the People maintain that affirming the
division's judgment will lead to absurd results because
the immunity afforded by section 18-1-704.5 "would
extend to every nook and cranny" in apartment buildings,
including all the common areas over which tenants and their
guests have shared control, such as elevators, parking
garages, clubhouses, and laundry and mail rooms. And, add the
People, such immunity could presumably also extend to spaces
over which tenants are meant to have no control, including
those limited to landlords and their staff (e.g., storage
rooms and business offices), unoccupied apartments, and even
apartments occupied by other tenants.
¶33
We recognize that shared living arrangements introduce an
interesting dynamic into the dwelling inquiry. Indeed, if the
home in question had not been divided into separate units and
Rau and his girlfriend had been its sole occupants, we doubt
that anyone would have disputed that the basement was part of
his dwelling.[9]
¶34
In 1985, when section 18-1-704.5 came into being, the
legislature may not have foreseen the types of shared living
arrangements that have become
22
conventional in 2022. To be sure, times have changed. But we
have no authority to redraft section 18-1-704.5 in an attempt
to contemporize it. It is for the legislature, not our court,
to rewrite a statute. See Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S.
410, 419 (1971). Even if we were authorized to revise
statutory provisions, our court is ill-equipped to make the
types of policy decisions implicated in redefining
"dwelling" for purposes of section 18-1-704.5. For
example, we discussed with counsel during oral argument the
possible wisdom of considering any common area of an
apartment building (and of any shared living arrangement) to
be part of a dwelling only when the general public is
excluded from it and the occupant in question uses it
(directly or indirectly) for habitation. But would that avert
all possible absurd results? Would it properly cover all
shared living arrangements? And would it have any unintended
consequences for people in certain types of shared living
arrangements?
¶35
Rather than play legislators, we exercise restraint and limit
our decision to the narrow situation in this case. To the
extent that the definition of "dwelling" in section
18-1-901(3)(g) is outdated or otherwise problematic when
applied in the context of section 18-1-704.5, legislative
repair-not judicial gloss-is required.
23
¶36
Thus, today we simply conclude that, under section
18-1-704.5, the basement in the house where Rau and his
girlfriend rented an apartment was part of his dwelling when
he shot D.R. We decide nothing more and nothing
less.[10]
IV.
Conclusion
¶37
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the division's
judgment. Rau was in his dwelling when he shot D.R.
24
---------
Notes:
[1] The statute is not unique to Colorado.
See Wilbanks, supra, at 26-27. Many
jurisdictions have similar statutes. Jay M. Zitter,
Annotation, Construction and Application of "Make My
Day" and "Stand Your Ground" Statutes, 76
A.L.R. 6th 1 (2012). And Colorado wasn't the first state
to adopt such a statute-in fact, California had enacted a
more permissive version of it ("Home Protection Bill of
Rights") the previous year (in 1984). See
Wilbanks, supra, at 30.
[2] While the home had been chopped into
multiple residential units, it retained some of the vestiges
of a single-family home.
[3] The landlord often relied on Rau and
another tenant to check on problems related to the water and
heat supply. In exchange, Rau and the other tenant received
discounted rent.
[4] The specific question on which we
granted certiorari is:
Whether the court of appeals erred by declining to
follow the decision in People v. Cushinberry, 855
P.2d 18 (Colo.App. 1992), and holding that the basement in
question was a "dwelling" for purposes of the
"make-my-day" statute, section 18-1-704.5, C.R.S.
(2020).
[5] Section 18-1-704.5(4) also provides
immunity from "civil liability for injuries or
death" for the use of force (including deadly physical
force) under the conditions listed in subsection (2).
[6] Although the force-against-intruders
statute doesn't contain a mens rea, "the
'knowingly' mens rea is required to carry out the
principles of self-defense." McNeese, 892 P.2d
at 309. After all, the statute "is not a license to
commit homicide." Id.
[7] "Building," as used in the
statutory definition of "dwelling," refers to
"a structure which has the capacity to contain, and is
designed for the shelter of, man, animals, or property, and
includes a . . . place adapted for overnight accommodations
of persons or animals, or for carrying on of business
therein, whether or not a person or animal is actually
present." § 18-4-101(1), C.R.S. (2021);
Armintrout v. People, 864 P.2d 576, 581 n.7 (Colo.
1993).
[8] Consistent with the mandate in section
18-1-901(1), the court of appeals has always turned to the
definition in section 18-1-901(3)(g) when construing
"dwelling" in section 18-1-704.5. See Rau,
¶ 15, 490 P.3d at 808; Alaniz, ¶ 24, 409
P.3d at 513.
[9] This opinion should not be understood
as establishing that all common areas in shared living
arrangements come within the scope of the term
"dwelling" in the force-against-intruders statute.
The question before us is much narrower and, accordingly, so
is our holding.
[10] We pass no judgment on the district
court's determination that Rau demonstrated by a
preponderance of the evidence that he reasonably believed
both that D.R. might use physical force against him and that
D.R. had committed or intended to commit a crime in the
dwelling (in addition to the uninvited entry).