The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY March 12, 2026
2026COA15
No. 25CA0859, Barba v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office — Workers’ Compensation — Medical Impairment Benefits — Final Admission of Liability
A division of the court of appeals addresses a novel issue
regarding the impact of section 8-42-107(8)(f), C.R.S. 2025, a
provision of the Workers’ Compensation Act of Colorado, on the
information employers may include in a final admission of liability.
That statute requires employers submitting a final admission of
liability to “admit liability for related reasonable and necessary
medical benefits by an authorized treating physician” in all claims
when “an authorized treating physician recommends medical
benefits after maximum medical improvement,” and the record does
not contain a “contrary medical opinion.”
The division interprets the statutory provision stating that the
“related reasonable and necessary medical benefits” admitted in a final admission of liability “are not limited to any specific medical
treatment” to mean that an employer cannot limit maintenance
medical benefits to any specific medical treatment and that any
attempt to do so is a nullity. In addition, the division concludes
that section 8-42-107(8)(f) neither prohibits an employer from
referring to a physician’s report in a final admission of liability
when admitting liability for maintenance medical benefits nor
implies that such a reference constitutes an impermissible
limitation on benefits. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2026COA15
Court of Appeals No. 25CA0859 Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado WC No. 4-972-041
Fredy Barba,
Petitioner,
v.
Industrial Claim Appeals Office of the State of Colorado and Cardinal Health 200, Inc.,
Respondents,
and
Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. TPA,
Insurer-Respondent.
ORDER AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY Welling and Tow, JJ., concur
Announced March 12, 2026
Elliott & Montgomery, Mark D. Elliott, Erin Montgomery, Arvada, Colorado for Petitioner
No Appearance for Respondent Industrial Claim Appeals Office
Hall & Evans, L.L.C., Douglas J. Kotarek, Matthew J. Hegarty, M. Taylor Feero, Denver, Colorado for Respondent Cardinal Health 200, Inc. and Insurer- Respondent Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. TPA ¶1 This case presents a novel issue regarding the impact of
section 8-42-107(8)(f), C.R.S. 2025, of the Workers’ Compensation
Act of Colorado (the Act) on the information employers may include
in a final admission of liability (FAL). That statute requires
employers submitting a FAL to “admit liability for related reasonable
and necessary medical benefits by an authorized treating physician”
in all claims when “an authorized treating physician recommends
medical benefits after maximum medical improvement” and the
record does not contain a “contrary medical opinion.” Id.
¶2 The parties dispute the meaning of the statutory language
providing that the “related reasonable and necessary medical
benefits” admitted in a FAL “are not limited to any specific medical
treatment.” Id.
¶3 Claimant, Fredy Barba, sustained a back injury in the course
and scope of his employment with Cardinal Health 200, Inc., in
2013. In this appeal, Barba contends that Cardinal’s insurance
carrier — XL Specialty Insurance Company — and XL’s third-party
administrator — Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc.
TPA — violated section 8-42-107(8)(f) by adding, next to the FAL’s
“Yes” box for maintenance care after maximum medical
1 improvement, a reference to a physician’s report recommending a
specific maintenance program. (We refer to XL and Sedgwick jointly
as “insurer.”) He asserts that the administrative law judge (ALJ)
who presided over the hearing on his penalty claim (the penalty
hearing) erred by not imposing statutory penalties for this alleged
statutory violation. Barba’s counsel clarified at oral argument that
Barba sought penalties from Cardinal and insurer. Section
8-43-304(1), C.R.S. 2025, permits the assessment of penalties
against “[a]ny employer or insurer, or any officer or agent of either,
or any employee, or any other person who violates” the Act.
¶4 Barba also contends that the ALJ erred at the penalty hearing
by permitting a claims adjuster to explain why she added the
reference to the physician’s report to the FAL and that the facts did
not support the ALJ’s rejection of his penalty claim. For these
reasons, Barba asks us to reverse the order of the Industrial Claim
Appeals Office (the Panel) affirming the ALJ’s decision.
¶5 We disagree with Barba’s interpretation of section
8-42-107(8)(f) and his other arguments. Therefore, we affirm the
Panel’s order.
2 I. Background
¶6 Following his back injury, Barba underwent surgery and
engaged in physical therapy. Barba’s authorized treating physician
placed him at maximum medical improvement (MMI) — the “point
in time when any medically determinable physical or mental
impairment as a result of injury has become stable and when no
further treatment is reasonably expected to improve the condition,”
§ 8-40-201(11.5), C.R.S. 2025 — on December 1, 2015. The
authorized treating physician assigned a 25% whole person
impairment rating and recommended a specific course of post-MMI
maintenance treatment.
¶7 On behalf of Cardinal, insurer filed a FAL form that was
consistent with the authorized treating physician’s report. Barba
objected to the FAL and requested a Division Independent Medical
Examination (DIME). A DIME physician confirmed the MMI date of
December 1, 2015, and assigned a 24% whole person impairment
rating. In January 2017, insurer filed an amended FAL consistent
with the DIME. Barba’s case was then closed.
¶8 Barba continued to receive post-MMI maintenance care from
his authorized treating physician. But in October 2018, Barba
3 reported that his condition had worsened after he bent down to pick
up a piece of paper. He sought to reopen his workers’
compensation award. An ALJ determined that reopening was
warranted based on proof that Barba had experienced a change in
condition causally connected to his original work injury.
¶9 Barba received further monitoring and treatment for his back
injury. In 2024, he underwent another DIME, which Dr. Bryan
Alvarez performed. In his DIME report dated March 28, 2024 (the
Alvarez report), Dr. Alvarez concluded that Barba had reached MMI
on December 1, 2015, and assigned a 17% whole person
impairment rating. Dr. Alvarez recommended that Barba undergo
physical therapy for three months.
¶ 10 In April 2024, the Division of Workers’ Compensation
(Division) issued a notice of “DIME Process Concluded” that
required “the insurance carrier” either to (1) “admit liability
consistent with the DIME report” or (2) “file an application for
hearing.” Blayre Spring, a claims adjuster for Sedgwick, filed a FAL
on behalf of Cardinal and insurer. The FAL said that Cardinal and
insurer admitted liability consistent with the report, including
liability for permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits totaling
4 $62,451.20 and maintenance medical benefits. As relevant to this
appeal, on the FAL form, Spring checked the “Yes” box for
“[a]dmit[ting] to [m]aintenance [c]are after MMI.” On the same line
as the “Yes” box, Spring wrote, “Pursuant to Dr. Bryan Alvarez’s
medical report dated 03/28/2024.” On the next line, next to
“[r]emarks and basis for permanent disability award,” Springer
summarized Cardinal and insurer’s position regarding the PPD
benefits to which Barba was entitled “[p]ursuant to” the Alvarez
report.
¶ 11 Barba asserted that he was entitled to penalties under section
8-43-304(1) because the reference to the Alvarez report in the FAL
violated section 8-42-107(8)(f). That statute says:
In all claims in which an authorized treating physician recommends medical benefits after maximum medical improvement, and there is no contrary medical opinion in the record, the employer shall, in a [FAL], admit liability for related reasonable and necessary medical benefits by an authorized treating physician, which benefits are not limited to any specific medical treatment.
(Emphasis added.) Barba specifically argued that he was entitled to
recover penalties because insurer had limited his maintenance
5 medical benefits by “t[ying]” them to the treatment recommended in
the Alvarez report.
¶ 12 At the penalty hearing, the ALJ permitted Spring to explain
why she had inserted the reference to the Alvarez report in the FAL.
She testified that “there was no intention to tie maintenance to a
specific physician” or “limit the maintenance [liability] that
[Cardinal and insurer] were admitting to,” but, rather, she only
sought to show the source of her “information regarding
maintenance.” She said that because, in some instances, “the same
doctor” does not issue findings regarding both “PPD or
maintenance,” she indicates on the appropriate lines of the FAL
form which physician’s report supports the PPD award and which
report addresses maintenance treatment. Spring said that she
added the reference to the Alvarez report near the “Yes” box solely
to note that Dr. Alvarez was the physician who had recommended
maintenance treatment for Barba.
¶ 13 When counsel for Sedgwick asked Spring whether she
“intend[ed] to limit [Barba]’s maintenance treatment to any specific
treatment recommended by Dr. Alvarez,” Barba’s counsel objected
that Spring’s “intention [was] irrelevant.” The ALJ overruled the
6 objection, explaining that “there exists a question of fact here as to
whether or not” the reference to the Alvarez report was “a limitation
on maintenance medical benefits” and that Spring’s intent was
relevant to such question.
¶ 14 Spring then testified that she had not limited Barba’s
maintenance medical benefits to “Dr. Alvarez’s recommendations.”
In addition, she testified that, at Barba’s request, she had removed
the reference to the Alvarez report from an amended FAL she issued
on June 28, 2024.
¶ 15 After the penalty hearing, the parties submitted proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law. In his proposed findings
and conclusions, Barba asserted that he was entitled to penalties
because, even though Spring “claimed no intention to limit
maintenance medical treatment,” that was “exactly what [she] did.”
According to Barba, the reference to the Alvarez report in the
context of the admission regarding maintenance medical benefits
“specifically contradicted” section 8-42-107(8)(f)’s “clear statutory”
mandate that such benefits “cannot be limited to any specific
medical treatment.” He asserted that the reference also violated
Rule 5-5(A)(1) of the Workers’ Compensation Rules of Procedure.
7 See Div. of Workers’ Comp. Rule 5-5(A)(1), 7 Code Colo. Regs.
1101-3 (WCRP 5-5(A)(1)).
¶ 16 The ALJ denied Barba’s request for penalties and determined
that whether the reference to the Alvarez report in the FAL
constituted an improper limitation on maintenance benefits was a
question of fact. The ALJ found that Spring’s reference to the
Alvarez report was neither intended to limit nor, in fact, limited
Barba’s maintenance medical benefits. Rather, crediting Spring’s
testimony, the ALJ found that the language “merely indicated the
rationale” for Cardinal and insurer’s general admission to such
benefits.
¶ 17 Barba sought review from the Panel, which affirmed the ALJ’s
order. The Panel rejected Barba’s assertion that Spring’s
identification of the Alvarez report on “the maintenance section of
the [FAL was] necessarily a denial of or limitation on maintenance
medical benefits.” In addition, the Panel concluded that section
8-42-107(8)(f) “does not provide an express prohibition against
mentioning a ‘doctor’s report’ in connection with an admission of
liability for maintenance medical benefits” because the statute only
8 requires that “the admission not limit benefits to any specific
medical treatment.”
II. The Panel Did Not Misinterpret Section 8-42-107(8)(f)
¶ 18 Barba contends that the Panel erred by affirming the ALJ’s
order declining to impose penalties for the alleged violation of
section 8-42-107(8)(f), which he asserts that the Panel
misinterpreted. Although he presents several arguments in support
of this contention, he acknowledges that his appeal focuses on “the
proper interpretation” of section 8-42-107(8)(f). As we understand
Barba’s argument, he asserts that he is entitled to recover penalties
because the language of section 8-42-107(8)(f) providing that related
reasonable and necessary maintenance medical benefits “are not
limited to any specific medical treatment” prohibits an employer,
when admitting liability for maintenance medical benefits in a FAL,
from referring to a physician’s report recommending specific
medical treatment. We disagree.
A. Statutory Interpretation
¶ 19 We review the Panel’s interpretation of section 8-42-107(8)(f)
de novo. See Destination Maternity v. Burren, 2020 CO 41, ¶ 22,
463 P.3d 266, 273 (“We review the proper construction of statutes
9 de novo.” (quoting Williams v. Kunau, 147 P.3d 33, 36 (Colo.
2006))). When interpreting a statute, we must determine and give
effect to the General Assembly’s intent. Davison v. Indus. Claim
Appeals Off., 84 P.3d 1023, 1029 (Colo. 2004). We begin with the
plain language of the statute, giving words and phrases their plain
and ordinary meanings, and construing them according to the rules
of grammar and common usage. McCoy v. People, 2019 CO 44,
¶ 37, 442 P.3d 379, 389. We respect the General Assembly’s choice
of language, and we may not add words to or subtract words from
the statute. UMB Bank, N.A. v. Landmark Towers Ass’n, 2017 CO
107, ¶ 22, 408 P.3d 836, 840. If the statutory language is
unambiguous, we look no further. McCoy, ¶ 38, 442 P.3d at 389.
B. Analysis
¶ 20 As noted above, section 8-42-107(8)(f) says that when an
authorized treating physician recommends maintenance medical
benefits, and there is no contrary medical opinion, the employer
shall admit in its FAL “liability for related reasonable and necessary
medical benefits . . . , which benefits are not limited to any specific
medical treatment.” (Emphasis added.) This language is clear: In a
10 FAL, an employer cannot limit maintenance medical benefits to any
specific medical treatment, and any attempt to do so is a nullity.
¶ 21 Contrary to Barba’s argument, however, section 8-42-107(8)(f)
does not prohibit an employer from referring to a physician’s report
in a FAL when admitting liability for maintenance medical benefits,
nor does it imply that such a reference would constitute an
impermissible limitation on benefits. See UMB Bank, ¶ 22, 408
P.3d at 840. If the General Assembly had intended that section
8-42-107(8)(f) direct what employers must — and must not —
include in an admission for maintenance medical benefits, it knew
how to do so. See, e.g., § 8-43-203(2)(b)(II)(A), C.R.S. 2025
(requiring that a FAL “must include” certain statements and saying
that, when “predicated upon medical reports, the reports must
accompany the final admission”); see also Students for Concealed
Carry on Campus, LLC v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 280 P.3d 18, 23
(Colo. App. 2010) (“Had the legislature intended to exempt
universities, it knew how to do so.”), aff’d, 2012 CO 17, 271 P.3d
496. If the General Assembly believes that employers should be
subject to penalties if they refer to a physician’s report in a FAL, it
can amend section 8-42-107(8)(f) to say so. It is not our role to
11 rewrite the statute to achieve this result. See People v. Rau, 2022
CO 3, ¶ 34, 501 P.3d 803, 813 (“It is for the legislature, not our
court, to rewrite a statute.”).
¶ 22 Thus, because section 8-42-107(8)(f) lacks an express
prohibition against referring to a physician’s report when an
employer admits liability for maintenance medical benefits, we may
not read such a prohibition into the statute. See Kraus v. Artcraft
Sign Co., 710 P.2d 480, 482 (Colo. 1985).
¶ 23 Nor are we persuaded that the principle of liberal construction
of the Act to effectuate its beneficent purposes, see § 8-40-102(1),
C.R.S. 2025, mandates a different outcome. “[L]iberal construction
does not grant us authority to disregard the Act’s plain language or
read nonexistent provisions into the Act.” Salazar v. Indus. Claim
Appeals Off., 2022 COA 13, ¶ 31, 508 P.3d 805, 813.
¶ 24 Accordingly, we perceive no error in the Panel’s interpretation
of section 8-42-107(8)(f). And because we conclude that the statute
is clear, we need not reach Barba’s legislative history arguments.
See McCoy, ¶ 38, 442 P.3d at 389 (holding that courts may only
resort to “other aids to statutory construction, including . . . the
statute’s legislative history,” when statutory language is
12 ambiguous). (To the extent Barba relies in his opening brief on the
history of amendments to WCRP 5-5(A)(1), we do not consider such
argument because he did not raise it before the Panel. See
McClaflin v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 126 P.3d 288, 289 (Colo.
App. 2005) (declining to consider argument not raised to the
Panel).)
III. The Panel Did Not Otherwise Err by Affirming the ALJ’s Order
¶ 25 We next turn to Barba’s contention that the Panel erred by
accepting the ALJ’s resolution of two factual issues. He argues that
the ALJ admitted irrelevant evidence at the penalty hearing and
that the undisputed facts do not support the ALJ’s finding that
Cardinal and insurer did not violate section 8-42-107(8)(f).
¶ 26 We reject this contention in light of our reading of the plain
language of section 8-42-107(8)(f) and, therefore, need not reach
Barba’s arguments regarding the admission of allegedly irrelevant
evidence and the purported lack of factual support for the ALJ’s
determination.
¶ 27 Barba asserts that Cardinal and insurer are liable for a
penalty because they “failed to take an action that a reasonable
insurer would have taken to comply with a statute or rule” and,
13 under the applicable standard, “violated an order, statute, or rule
and failed to take an action that a reasonable insurer would have
taken.” See § 8-43-304(1); Pioneers Hosp. v. Indus. Claim Appeals
Off., 114 P.3d 97, 99 (Colo. App. 2005) (“An ALJ may impose a
penalty under [section] 8-43-304(1) if it is shown that the employer
failed to take an action that a reasonable employer would have
taken to comply with a rule.”).
¶ 28 Significantly, Barba’s penalty argument rests on his
contention that Cardinal and insurer violated section
8-42-107(8)(f) — not that they attempted to violate the statute.
Thus, we need not address whether Cardinal and insurer’s alleged
attempt to violate section 8-42-107(8)(f) subjects them to a penalty.
Cf. Delta Cnty. Mem’l Hosp. v. Indus. Claim Appeals Off., 2021 COA
84, ¶¶ 45-46, 495 P.3d 984, 995 (affirming a penalty award entered
against a medical provider that violated section 8-42-101(4), C.R.S.
2025, which bars employers and insurers from seeking to recover
medical costs or fees from an employee following an admission of
liability or the entry of a final order regarding liability for those
costs or fees).
14 ¶ 29 Because, as a matter of law, Cardinal and insurer could not
limit Barba’s maintenance benefits by referring to the Alvarez report
in the FAL, even if Cardinal and insurer intended to limit Barba’s
benefits, Cardinal and insurer did not violate section 8-42-107(8)(f).
Thus, it is of no consequence that the ALJ may have erroneously
considered irrelevant evidence or that the undisputed facts may not
have supported the ALJ’s decision. No matter what evidence the
parties presented or what facts they established at the penalty
hearing, Cardinal and insurer did not violate section 8-42-107(8)(f).
Thus, they cannot be held liable for a penalty under section
8-43-304(1).
¶ 30 Moreover, in light of our interpretation of section
8-42-107(8)(f), we disagree with Barba’s policy argument that,
because “injured workers” cannot “divine the subjective intent of an
adjuster from an incorrectly filled out” FAL, the ALJ’s “subjective
intent approach,” as reflected in the ALJ’s consideration of Spring’s
testimony regarding her reasons for inserting the reference to the
Alvarez report in the FAL, will “result in multiple, unnecessary
applications for hearing.” This opinion makes clear that injured
workers have no reason to fear that a reference to a physician’s
15 report in a FAL will limit the future medical treatments they will
receive under the Act.
IV. Disposition
¶ 31 The Panel’s order is affirmed.
JUDGE WELLING and JUDGE TOW concur.