Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States

79 Fed. Cl. 22, 2007 U.S. Claims LEXIS 353, 2007 WL 3277260
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedNovember 1, 2007
DocketNo. 07-700C
StatusPublished
Cited by27 cases

This text of 79 Fed. Cl. 22 (Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Weeks Marine, Inc. v. United States, 79 Fed. Cl. 22, 2007 U.S. Claims LEXIS 353, 2007 WL 3277260 (uscfc 2007).

Opinion

OPINION AND ORDER

WHEELER, Judge.

I. Introduction

In this pre-award bid protest, Plaintiff Weeks Marine, Inc. (‘Weeks”) challenges the decision of the United States Army Corps of Engineers, South Atlantic Division (“SAD”), to solicit proposals for maintenance dredging and shore protection projects using negotiated indefinite delivery indefinite quantity (“IDIQ”) multiple-award task order contracts. Historically, the Corps of Engineers has employed competitive sealed bidding procedures for dredging work, where contract awards are based upon price. The contemplated change to negotiated IDIQ task order contracting represents a significant departure from SAD’s prior practice, and has caused widespread industry criticism.

Weeks filed its Complaint in this Court on September 28, 2007 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent SAD from employing its new solicitation. SAD issued the solicitation on June 4, 2007, and later amended it on ten occasions. After Weeks filed its Complaint, Defendant agreed to extend the proposal due date until November 1, 2007 to permit the Court’s expedited consideration of Weeks’s protest. Defendant filed a four-volume Administrative Record on October 5, 2007 consisting of nearly 2,000 pages. The Court also has before it the parties’ October 17, 2007 cross-motions under Rule 52.1 for judgment on the Administrative Record, and the parties’ October 22, 2007 reply briefs. The Court heard oral argument on October 24,2007.

As grounds for its protest, Weeks asserts that SAD’s proposed change to IDIQ task order contracting is contrary to law, and is without any rational basis. Weeks relies upon 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) and Federal Acquisition Regulation (“FAR”) H 6.401(a), mandating that an agency shall use sealed bidding procedures when (1) time permits, (2) awards will be made solely based on price, (3) discussions are not necessary, and (4) the agency reasonably expects to receive more than one bid. Weeks contends that each of these four [24]*24conditions is met for SAD’s dredging contracts, and that no legal basis exists to use negotiation procedures. See also FAR 1T 14.103-l(a) (“Sealed bidding shall be used whenever the conditions in 6.401(a) are met.”); FAR 1136.103(a) (“The contracting officer shall use sealed bid procedures for a construction contract if the conditions in 6.401(a) apply.”). Weeks further states that the agency has violated Corps of Engineers FAR Supplement (“EFARS”) 1116.501, S-103 (a) because none of the five identified conditions for using indefinite delivery contracts has been satisfied. Weeks also argues that SAD’s attempt to justify a move to negotiated IDIQ task order contracting lacks any rational basis.

Defendant argues in opposition that SAD’s proposed IDIQ task order contracting is lawful, that the agency has wide discretion in selecting an appropriate procurement method, and that SAD’s justification for the change is reasonable under current circumstances. Defendant alleges that SAD expects to save time through task order contracting, and that SAD’s future awards will not be made on the basis of price alone, but will consider other factors such as “past performance.” Defendant also contends that Weeks has not shown any prejudice if the solicitation is allowed to go forward because Weeks is a prominent contractor in the dredging industry, and will likely receive ample work under the new procedures.

A disturbing feature of SAD’s new procurement method is that approximately $2 billion in task order awards during the next five years would become virtually immune from any judicial or administrative bid protest review. The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (“FASA”) provides that “[a] protest is not authorized in connection with the issuance of a task order or delivery order except for a protest on the ground that the order increases the scope, period, or maximum value of the contract under which the order is issued.” 10 U.S.C. § 2304c(d); see also FAR 1116.505(a)(9) (same provision). While SAD’s current sealed bid awards routinely are subject to bid protest review by the Government Accountability Office (“GAO”) or this Court, SAD’s task order awards would be insulated from review except in very limited circumstances. Thus, while purporting to use highly discretionary “best value” evaluation procedures in awarding task orders, SAD effectively would remove itself from any bid protest oversight. Defendant argues that the Court must apply the FASA provision that Congress created. However, this provision did not authorize SAD to convert all of its procurements into task orders. The agency’s Administrative Record contains no mention or discussion of this important concern.2

Despite SAD’s attempt to insulate itself from any bid protest review, the Court would be constrained to uphold SAD’s new procurement method if it complied with law, and if the reasoning behind the new method was rationally based. However, this is not the case. The new method violates 10 U.S.C. § 2304(a) and related procurement regulations. SAD has raised a number of reasons for its purported move to IDIQ task order contracting, such as: (1) shortening the procurement cycle; (2) reducing administrative costs; (3) reducing the need for emergency contracting with less than full and open competition; 3 and (4) eliminating competition among SAD districts for contractor equipment and resources. As will be explained, SAD’s Acquisition Plan conspicuously is lacking in empirical data supporting its rationale, and not one of the reasons advanced, except for the ability to respond to emergencies, justifies SAD’s new procedures. See AR 1-71. Moreover, the need to respond to emer[25]*25gencies does not justify a sweeping five-year change for approximately $2 billion in expected procurements. The agency states that its sealed bid approach “has excelled in program execution” during the last two years. AR 10, 50-51. The agency has provided no evidence that the current system is failing or in need of revision. In fact, the Court would be hard-pressed to identify any contracts better suited to sealed bid procurement than dredging. If not appropriate for dredging work, it is difficult to imagine when sealed bidding ought to be used.

After carefully considering the Administrative Record and the parties’ arguments, the Court finds that the solicitation violates applicable statutes and regulations, and that SAD’s attempted justification for the new procurement approach is without a rational basis. The agency’s Acquisition Plan (AR 1-71) is the principal document on which SAD relies, but it fails even to address the legality of the proposed action, and does not satisfy the rational basis test. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 468 U.S. 29, 43, 103 S.Ct. 2856, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983) (“[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’ ”) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168, 83 S.Ct. 239, 9 L.Ed.2d 207 (1962)).

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Bluebook (online)
79 Fed. Cl. 22, 2007 U.S. Claims LEXIS 353, 2007 WL 3277260, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/weeks-marine-inc-v-united-states-uscfc-2007.