Magellan Corp. v. United States

27 Fed. Cl. 446, 1993 U.S. Claims LEXIS 260, 1993 WL 4215
CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedJanuary 12, 1993
DocketNo. 92-862C
StatusPublished
Cited by81 cases

This text of 27 Fed. Cl. 446 (Magellan Corp. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Magellan Corp. v. United States, 27 Fed. Cl. 446, 1993 U.S. Claims LEXIS 260, 1993 WL 4215 (uscfc 1993).

Opinion

ORDER ON MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION

BRUGGINK, Judge.

On December 22, 1992, Magellan Corporation (“Magellan”) filed an application for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) and a motion for a preliminary injunction. At issue is the procurement of Precision Lightweight Global Positioning Receivers (“PLGR”) being conducted by the Joint Program Office of the Department of Defense on the basis that the PLGR is a nondevelopmental item (“NDI”). The procurement is proceeding in two phases. Phase one, now complete, involved testing of the devices submitted by the suppliers, along with an evaluation of their technical proposals. Suppliers that submitted techni[447]*447cally satisfactory PLGR’s and backup data were to be invited to submit bids. Following completion of phase one, Magellan was notified that its submission did not qualify. Magellan sought a TRO to block the bid opening. After consultation with counsel, the court deemed a restraining order to be unnecessary, as the event of greatest immediate concern to Magellan was the bid opening, then assumed to be scheduled for January 7, 1993. The date of bid opening was subsequently moved to January 11, 1993. Accordingly, Magellan’s motion for expedited discovery was granted, as were two motions for protective orders. The court held a closed hearing on the motion for a preliminary injunction on January 6-7, 1993. On January 8, 1993, the court announced its decision to deny the motion and stated its reasons. At defendant’s request, those reasons are now expressed in this opinion.

The court has the authority to enter an injunction blocking the award to any bidder other than Magellan. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(3) (1988). The limited question is whether the status quo ante should be maintained while the plaintiff undertakes discovery and proofs on its request for permanent relief. Prior decisions of this court and of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, however, make it clear that such authority should not be routinely exercised. As the Federal Circuit wrote in United States v. John C. Grimberg Co., 702 F.2d 1362 (Fed.Cir.1983), equitable powers “should be exercised in a way which best limits judicial interference in contract procurement.” Id. at 1372.

That is not to say that relief is unavailable. Clearly it must be. Nor is the plaintiff’s burden of proof only satisfied by “clear and convincing evidence,” as the government suggests. Quality Transp. Servs., Inc. v. United States, 12 Cl.Ct. 276, 281 (1987). The standard is high enough without that additional burden. But the drift of the cases is clear: courts should not enjoin a procurement lightly.

Although Rule 65, Rules of the Court of Federal Claims does not contain a checklist to aid the court in determining whether to issue a preliminary injunction, the cases and commentaries have isolated four relevant factors: degree of immediate irreparable harm to the plaintiff; degree of harm to the party to be enjoined; the impact of the injunction on public policy considerations; and the likelihood of plaintiff’s ultimate success on the merits. See We Care, Inc. v. Ultra-Mark, Int’l Corp., 930 F.2d 1567, 1570 (Fed.Cir.1991); see also Brown v. Chote, 411 U.S. 452, 456, 93 S.Ct. 1732, 1735, 36 L.Ed.2d 420 (1973). These competing elements must be simultaneously weighed. In the court’s view, therefore, it is not fatal to Magellan’s effort to obtain interim relief, for example, that it cannot demonstrate a “significant” or “strong” likelihood of success. See Hamilton Watch Co. v. Benrus Watch Co., 206 F.2d 738, 740 (2d Cir.1953).

1. Irreparable harm to the plaintiff. The relevant inquiry in weighing this factor is whether plaintiff has an adequate remedy in the absence of an injunction. If the plaintiff’s sole interest is in being reintroduced into the competition for the NDI procurement, then in reality, it does not have an adequate equitable or legal remedy in the future. For instance, if the procurement were to proceed, a source was to be selected, and six months later the court were to find that Magellan had been improperly excluded, it is doubtful that the court would cancel the award and require further discussions with Magellan. Nor could Magellan recover as damages its potential lost profits: In such a scenario, Magellan would be entitled to prove and recover its bid preparation costs (which it alleges are not insubstantial), but it would lose out on the opportunity to participate in this large procurement on the particular type of hardware that is its primary livelihood. In that sense, the harm to plaintiff is significant.

Weighing against the irreparable harm factor are two considerations. The first is the fact that an independent ground upon which Magellan intends to seek permanent relief is that the procurement was in violation of applicable law from the outset; that [448]*448this should not have been an NDI procurement. If that is the case, one of the remedies Magellan will seek is cancellation of the entire procurement, even after award to some other supplier. Admittedly, that would not be the inevitable remedy, but it is a possible remedy, and its very potentiality discounts the harm to plaintiff. The second minimizing factor is the large difference between General Garner’s testimony concerning the military’s need and funding authorization for PLGR’s, compared with what would appear to be the maximum number of PLGR’s that can be ordered under this contract. Under the circumstances, there may have to be reprocurements. Thus, plaintiff may have another opportunity to supply its product.

2. Harm to the government. The government argues that time is of the essence in the award. General Garner tells us that PLGR’s may become an essential technology in future combat. We have no reason to doubt that. The urgency is somewhat minimized by the long duration of the solicitation process and the relatively long period of time until production. Nevertheless, a holding for plaintiff would result in a delay in implementation that would be solely attributable to this injunction. If we were dealing with a procurement for toilet seats or belt buckles, then delaying for three weeks a procurement that will evolve over three years would be de minimis. In this case, however, we are dealing with hardware that, according to General Garner, can give our armed forces a critical advantage in combat. In assessing the need for injunctions, the court must give due regard to the interests of national security. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(3).

3. Public policy considerations. The various public policy considerations do not shed a great deal of light on the result. The public has an interest in honest, open and fair competition, and if plaintiff is improperly excluded, that interest is compromised. The more qualified bidders there are, the greater the likelihood that the public will end up paying less for PLGR’s.

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27 Fed. Cl. 446, 1993 U.S. Claims LEXIS 260, 1993 WL 4215, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/magellan-corp-v-united-states-uscfc-1993.