OPINION
Before RABINOWITZ, C. J., and CON-NOR, ERWIN, BOOCHEVER, and FITZGERALD, JJ.
ERWIN, Justice.
This appeal presents the question whether the superior court properly confirmed an arbitration award.
Appellee Modern Construction, Inc., was prime contractor for construction of a “Campus Activity Center” building on the appellant University of Alaska’s College campus. The $3,480,000 contract between Modern and the University empowered the University to alter the scope of the work during the period of construction. These changes, as well as necessary adjustments to the contract price, were to be authorized by a “change order” issued by the University or its architect.
The contract also provided that disputes between the parties would be referred initially to the University’s architect, and, if necessary, ultimately resolved by arbitration.
During construction the University expanded the project to include construction of an underground “utilidor” (utility corridor). After Modern completed this work the architect issued a change order allowing Modern an additional $110,000. Modern signed the order and returned it with a separate letter explaining that it was impossible to then determine the extent of delay caused by the extra work and that Modern reserved the right to subsequently claim extra “impact” costs.
Later, defects were discovered in certain concrete beams used in construction of the building itself. These defects stemmed from architectural design errors, as was admitted by the architect. Modern corrected the beam problem, and two additional change orders allowing $65,000 were issued to compensate Modern for this extra work. One order granted a 35-day extension on the main contract which Modern had requested. The other order allowed no extra time, because Modern had asked for none. In contemporaneous letters to the architect, Modern again reserved the right to later claim additional sums for delay caused by the beam work.
After all contract work was completed, accepted and paid for, Modern presented the University with additional claims for impact costs incurred due to delays attributable to the University and its architect during the course of construction. The University rejected these claims, evidently because it felt that impact costs due to delay were consequential damages not com-pensable under the contract.
Modern then demanded arbitration of its claims. The University went to arbitration under objection, restating its position that Modern’s claims were not covered by the contract and were therefore not arbitrable. Hearings were held in Fairbanks before a panel of three arbitrators chosen under the auspices of the American Arbitration Association. Both parties were ably represented by counsel.
Modern submitted six claims to the panel, representing approximately $950,000. The claims were generally as follows:
1. $480,000 for impact expenses due to delay caused by the utilidor work.
2. $61,000 for impact expenses due to delay caused by the beam repair.
3. $9,000 for other repair work made necessary by the delays.
4. $49,000 for general manpower and utility costs due to the delays.
5. $46,000 for additional costs incurred by Modern’s subcontractors due to the delays, and for payment of which Modern claimed to be ultimately responsible.
6. $304,000 for interest, taxes, bond, insurance, overhead and profit costs.
After the hearings, the arbitrators awarded Modern a lump sum of nearly $384,000 “in full settlement of all claims submitted to this arbitration.” No alloca
tion of the award among the various claims was made, and there was no mention of findings of fact or conclusions of law made by the arbitrators in reaching their decision.
The University’s attorney wasted little time in requesting a clarification of the award. He wrote to the regional director of the American Arbitration Association requesting that the arbitrators be directed to allocate their award among the various claims made by Modern. Apparently the University’s request for clarification of the award was denied.
Next the Univeristy filed a motion to vacate the arbitrators’ award in the superi- or court. Thereafter it also moved to compel clarification of the arbitrators’ award. Modern filed opposition to both motions, and itself moved the court to confirm the award. After hearing arguments, the superior court ruled that it had no authority to order segregation of the award. After further hearings, the superior court issued an order denying the University’s motion and confirming the award. The University then brought this appeal.
Appellant first argues that the superior court erred in failing to compel clarification of the award. In denying the University’s motion, the superior court ruled that AS 09.43.090 did not give it authority to compel arbitrators to clarify the award.
Apparently the court reasoned that, under the statute, discretion to decide whether or not to clarify the award was properly vested in the arbitrators rather than in the court.
The court’s ruling on this point was error. Section 9 of the Uniform Arbitration Act, from which AS 09.43.090 is taken, was intended to empower the court to order clarification.
In our view, AS 09.-43.090 clearly authorizes the superior court to return an award to the arbitrators for clarification. We hold the error here to be harmless, however, because of our further conclusion that the court properly confirmed the award as made.
The University also contends that the decision below to confirm the award was erroneous because the arbitrators exceeded their powers when they considered Modern’s claims. The University insists, as it has throughout this dispute, that the terms of the contract afforded Modern no right to claim “impact” damages due to delays. Consequently, it contends that none of Modern’s claims were subject to arbitration and that the panel had no power to consider them. If the arbitrators exceeded their powers in this regard, the award should have been vacated under AS 09.43.120(a) (3) or (5).
The powers of arbitrators are confined to those conferred upon them by the arbitration agreement, subject, of course, to further limitations imposed by the law of the jurisdiction.
Here, the contractual arbitration clause empowered the arbitrators to decide “[a] 11 claims, disputes and other matters in question arising out of, or relating to this Contract or the breach thereof . . . .”
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OPINION
Before RABINOWITZ, C. J., and CON-NOR, ERWIN, BOOCHEVER, and FITZGERALD, JJ.
ERWIN, Justice.
This appeal presents the question whether the superior court properly confirmed an arbitration award.
Appellee Modern Construction, Inc., was prime contractor for construction of a “Campus Activity Center” building on the appellant University of Alaska’s College campus. The $3,480,000 contract between Modern and the University empowered the University to alter the scope of the work during the period of construction. These changes, as well as necessary adjustments to the contract price, were to be authorized by a “change order” issued by the University or its architect.
The contract also provided that disputes between the parties would be referred initially to the University’s architect, and, if necessary, ultimately resolved by arbitration.
During construction the University expanded the project to include construction of an underground “utilidor” (utility corridor). After Modern completed this work the architect issued a change order allowing Modern an additional $110,000. Modern signed the order and returned it with a separate letter explaining that it was impossible to then determine the extent of delay caused by the extra work and that Modern reserved the right to subsequently claim extra “impact” costs.
Later, defects were discovered in certain concrete beams used in construction of the building itself. These defects stemmed from architectural design errors, as was admitted by the architect. Modern corrected the beam problem, and two additional change orders allowing $65,000 were issued to compensate Modern for this extra work. One order granted a 35-day extension on the main contract which Modern had requested. The other order allowed no extra time, because Modern had asked for none. In contemporaneous letters to the architect, Modern again reserved the right to later claim additional sums for delay caused by the beam work.
After all contract work was completed, accepted and paid for, Modern presented the University with additional claims for impact costs incurred due to delays attributable to the University and its architect during the course of construction. The University rejected these claims, evidently because it felt that impact costs due to delay were consequential damages not com-pensable under the contract.
Modern then demanded arbitration of its claims. The University went to arbitration under objection, restating its position that Modern’s claims were not covered by the contract and were therefore not arbitrable. Hearings were held in Fairbanks before a panel of three arbitrators chosen under the auspices of the American Arbitration Association. Both parties were ably represented by counsel.
Modern submitted six claims to the panel, representing approximately $950,000. The claims were generally as follows:
1. $480,000 for impact expenses due to delay caused by the utilidor work.
2. $61,000 for impact expenses due to delay caused by the beam repair.
3. $9,000 for other repair work made necessary by the delays.
4. $49,000 for general manpower and utility costs due to the delays.
5. $46,000 for additional costs incurred by Modern’s subcontractors due to the delays, and for payment of which Modern claimed to be ultimately responsible.
6. $304,000 for interest, taxes, bond, insurance, overhead and profit costs.
After the hearings, the arbitrators awarded Modern a lump sum of nearly $384,000 “in full settlement of all claims submitted to this arbitration.” No alloca
tion of the award among the various claims was made, and there was no mention of findings of fact or conclusions of law made by the arbitrators in reaching their decision.
The University’s attorney wasted little time in requesting a clarification of the award. He wrote to the regional director of the American Arbitration Association requesting that the arbitrators be directed to allocate their award among the various claims made by Modern. Apparently the University’s request for clarification of the award was denied.
Next the Univeristy filed a motion to vacate the arbitrators’ award in the superi- or court. Thereafter it also moved to compel clarification of the arbitrators’ award. Modern filed opposition to both motions, and itself moved the court to confirm the award. After hearing arguments, the superior court ruled that it had no authority to order segregation of the award. After further hearings, the superior court issued an order denying the University’s motion and confirming the award. The University then brought this appeal.
Appellant first argues that the superior court erred in failing to compel clarification of the award. In denying the University’s motion, the superior court ruled that AS 09.43.090 did not give it authority to compel arbitrators to clarify the award.
Apparently the court reasoned that, under the statute, discretion to decide whether or not to clarify the award was properly vested in the arbitrators rather than in the court.
The court’s ruling on this point was error. Section 9 of the Uniform Arbitration Act, from which AS 09.43.090 is taken, was intended to empower the court to order clarification.
In our view, AS 09.-43.090 clearly authorizes the superior court to return an award to the arbitrators for clarification. We hold the error here to be harmless, however, because of our further conclusion that the court properly confirmed the award as made.
The University also contends that the decision below to confirm the award was erroneous because the arbitrators exceeded their powers when they considered Modern’s claims. The University insists, as it has throughout this dispute, that the terms of the contract afforded Modern no right to claim “impact” damages due to delays. Consequently, it contends that none of Modern’s claims were subject to arbitration and that the panel had no power to consider them. If the arbitrators exceeded their powers in this regard, the award should have been vacated under AS 09.43.120(a) (3) or (5).
The powers of arbitrators are confined to those conferred upon them by the arbitration agreement, subject, of course, to further limitations imposed by the law of the jurisdiction.
Here, the contractual arbitration clause empowered the arbitrators to decide “[a] 11 claims, disputes and other matters in question arising out of, or relating to this Contract or the breach thereof . . . .”
This agreement necessarily gave the arbitrators power to interpret the contract; otherwise it would have been impossible for them to determine which claims or disputes they could properly arbitrate.
The arbitrators concluded that the intent of the parties, as evidenced by their written contract, was to arbitrate any claims Modern might have for damages caused by delays attributable to the University.
When an award is attacked under the Uniform Arbitration Act on the grounds that the arbitrators exceeded their powers through erroneous interpretation of the contract, the reviewing court should determine
. . . whether the construction of the contract made by the arbitrator^] is a reasonably possible one that can seriously be made in the context in which the contract was made. Stated affirmatively, if all fair and reasonable minds would agree that the construction of the contract made by the arbitrator[s] was not possible under a fair interpretation of the contract, then the court would be bound to vacate or refuse to confirm the award.
In Harrison F. Blades, Inc. v. Jarman Memorial Hospital Building Fund, Inc.,
the Appellate Court of Illinois was faced with the question whether a contractor’s claim for damages due to the owner’s delays was arbitrable. The arbitration clause in the contract there involved stated in part:
It is mutually agreed that all disputes arising in connection with this contract shall be submitted to arbitration in accordance with the provisions of the current Standard Form of Arbitration Procedure of the American Institute of Architects.
The only mention of delay damages in the contract was a clause protecting the contractor from being compelled to pay liquidated damages for delays caused by the owner.
In affirming a lower court decision to stay arbitration, the court first noted that “in Illinois for an issue to be the subject of arbitration, it must be included in the contract in clear and unequivocal language.”
Examining the contract language, the court found no provision dealing with the contractor’s right to claim damages due to owner delays.
Conse
quently, the court held that the contractor’s claims were not “ ‘disputes arising in connection with this contract’ ” within the meaning of the arbitration clause, and were therefore not arbitrable.
We agree with the Illinois court that where the parties have clearly agreed to arbitrate only those “disputes arising in connection with this contract” a particular claim is not arbitrable if it is nowhere mentioned in the contract. However, we do not agree that in all cases a particular claim is not arbitrable unless it is so designated by “clear and unequivocal” contract language. Alaska’s arbitration act evinces a strong public policy in favor of arbitration.
We would therefore allow ambiguous contract terms to be construed in favor of arbitrability where such construction is not obviously contrary to the parties’ intent, especially where, as here, the party contesting arbitrability drafted the contract.
We are convinced, however, that the critical contract language in the present case would reasonably support the interpretation given it by the arbitrators even under the more restrictive Illinois standard.
The arbitration clause here mandated arbitration of “[a] 11 claims, disputes and other matters in question arising out of this Contract or the breach thereof . ”
Section 2.10 of article 2 of the contract expressed the parties’ further intent that “[a]ny claim, dispute or other matter that has been referred to the Architect . . . shall be subject to arbitration upon the written demand of either party.”
Finally, section 3 of article 8, which specifically addressed delays attributable to the owner, provided in section 3.4:
This Paragraph 8.3 does not exclude the recovery of damages for delay by either party under other provisions of the Contract Documents.
In view of this specific language we agree with the superior court that the arbitrators’ decision on the arbitrability of Modern’s claims for “impact” damages due to delays was not based upon an unreasonable interpretation of the contract.
Next the University contends that the arbitrators exceeded their powers by awarding compensation based upon the claims of Modern’s subcontractors, who were not parties to the contract. Had it been alleged that the panel attempted to adjudicate the rights and liabilities of the subcontractors, who were neither parties to the contract nor represented at the hearings, close inspection would, indeed, be warranted. The University, however, has not made such allegations. Instead, it argues that the panel exceeded its powers by awarding Modern an unknown amount in reliance upon the unverified claims of subcontractors. The thrust of the University’s argument is that, since the record is silent as to how the panel arrived at the lump sum award, it is possible that the award was based in part upon unverified subcontractor claims. Consequently, the University contends that the award must be presumed invalid.
We disagree with appellant’s argument and decline to adopt this presumption as the law in Alaska. Instead, we conclude that whenever possible an arbitration award rendered in the form required by our statute
is presumptively valid and shall be upheld without inquiry into the merits of the dispute. It is our belief that “[t]he law now favors arbitration with a minimum of court interference.”
We find nothing in the record to rebut the presumption of validity due the award.
Finally, the University claims that the arbitrators exceeded their powers by ignoring legal precedent on the issues of (1) recoverability of “consequential” damages; (2) accord and satisfaction; (3) proof of liability for delays; and (4) propriety of the “total cost — total time” method for computing the amount of Modern’s damages. The general rule in both statutory and common law arbitration is that arbitrators need not follow otherwise applicable law when deciding issues properly before them, unless they are commanded to do so by the terms of the arbitration agreement.
Since the relevant clause here contains no such command, the arbitrators were free to determine the merits of Modern’s claims under their own notions of fairness.
The judgment of the superior court is affirmed.
