The Smoot Sand & Gravel Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

274 F.2d 495, 5 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 626, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 5653
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 11, 1960
Docket7886
StatusPublished
Cited by101 cases

This text of 274 F.2d 495 (The Smoot Sand & Gravel Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
The Smoot Sand & Gravel Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 274 F.2d 495, 5 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 626, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 5653 (4th Cir. 1960).

Opinion

SOBELOFF, Chief Judge.

This case, here for the second time, concerns the taxpayer’s liability for the years 1945-1950 for surtaxes under § 102 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939, 26 U.S.C.A. § 102 1 by reason of the alleged accumulation of profits “for the purpose of preventing the imposition of the surtax” upon its sole shareholder, Columbia Sand & Gravel Company, Inc., and upon L. E. Smoot, owner of all the common stock of Columbia. The Tax Court having sustained the Commissioner’s position in the first trial of the case, this court, on review, concluded its opinion as follows:

“Accordingly, we affirm the Tax Court on all issues except as to the working capital (exclusive of self-insurance reserves) necessary in petitioner’s business and as to the ready-mix business, and remand the case to the Tax Court for findings in those respects in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion.” Smoot Sand & Gravel Corp. v Commissioner, 4 Cir., 1957, 241 F.2d 197, 208, certiorari denied 354 U.S. 922, 77 S.Ct. 1383, 1 L.Ed.2d 1437, rehearing denied 354 U.S. 943, 77 S.Ct. 1401, 1 L.Ed.2d 1541.

After remand, the Tax Court took further evidence and again upheld the Commissioner’s imposition of surtaxes under § 102.

*497 The background of this controversy is fully set forth in the two memoranda of the Tax Court, T.C. Memo 1956-82 and T.C. Memo 1958-221, respectively, and in our earlier opinion at 241 F.2d 197. It would serve no useful purpose to repeat all the facts that have been developed in the course of the litigation, but as we proceed we shall outline the evidence relevant to the disposition of the present issues.

Three main questions are involved on this review:

I. Did taxpayer’s officers reasonably believe that it was necessary to accumulate earnings and profits, since the taxpayer might have to enter the ready-mix concrete business?

II. How much working capital was needed by the taxpayer?

III. Upon whom is the burden of proof as to the asserted unreasonable accumulation of earnings and profits?

I

Did the taxpayer reasonably believe in the years 1945-1950 that it would likely be forced into the ready-mix concrete business, thus justifying an accumulation of earnings and profits for that purpose? The Tax Court has now found that the taxpayer never intended to enter the business; never formulated any definite plans for doing so; was not at any time during the years in question under any real threat from its customers or its competitors which might reasonably have been regarded by petitioner’s officers as likely to force taxpayer into the ready-mix business; that “if any such threat ever existed it did not extend beyond 1940 at the latest.” In sum, the finding is that “petitioner’s officers had no reasonable cause to consider petitioner’s entry into the ready-mix business as more than a remote possibility, or to accumulate petitioner’s earnings and profits for that purpose.”

It is the taxpayer’s initial contention that the Tax Court found in its favor on this issue at the first trial and changed this finding in the second although no further unfavorable evidence wTas adduced. Great emphasis is placed by the taxpayer on the following passage of the Tax Court’s first memorandum opinion:

“In the meantime, the ready-mix concerns began demanding certain price concessions and other concessions which petitioner was unable or unwilling to grant, and transferring as much of their business as possible to petitioner’s competitors. By 1945 this situation had reached the point where, in the opinion of petitioner’s officers, it constituted a severe threat to petitioner’s business. Petitioner was confronted with the alternative of going into the ready-mix business itself or losing the major portion of its sand and gravel market.” (Emphasis supplied.)

We believe, however, that the Tax Court explains this statement adequately in its second opinion, when it declares,

“In our original findings of fact we found that in the opinion of petitioner’s officers, the actions of the ready-mix concerns in the vicinity of petitioner’s business posed a serious threat to the continuation of the business as operated by petitioner, and that petitioner might eventually be forced into the ready-mix business itself. This finding was based on the testimony of petitioner’s officers as to their state of mind during the critical period, some 6 to 10 years previously. We did not find that any such threat to petitioner’s business constituted a reasonable need for a cash reserve sufficient to equip the petitioner for entry into the ready-mix business on a competitive basis, or what would have been a reasonable amount for such a reserve.”

Taxpayer’s main contention on this issue appears to be that its officers sincerely believed that it would be forced into the ready-mix industry because “[f]rom 1940 on petitioner was under heavy attack from powerful financial forces seek *498 ing to destroy and take its business.” Taxpayer’s brief continues as follows:

“Also, on the basis of its long and repeated experiences, petitioner knows that those seeking to take or detroy its business will stop at nothing and will resort to such tactics as attempts to have Mr. Smoot indicted under the anti-trust laws, attempts to have petitioner’s business destroyed under the anti-trust laws, attempts to have petitioner’s business destroyed under the penalty surtax provisions of the Internal Revenue Code, attempts to have its customers’ bank credit cut off if they continue to be petitioner’s customers, and so on.”

Eloquent but unsupported assertions in the brief do not take the place of testimony or proof. The “powerful financial forces” (also referred to, in taxpayer’s brief, as “powerful invading financial interests from outside of Washington”) are not identified by petitioner, nor is there evidence in the record of any threats made or pressures brought to bear against petitioner in the 1945-1950 period. The taxpayer’s unsubstantiated allegations do not require or even permit a finding that it entertained at the time a reasonable belief that it would have to enter the ready-mix business.

In further support of its asserted “reasonable belief,” taxpayer presses several other considerations. It declares that at the end of World War II it was in a seriously weakened condition since its inventory and productive facilities were exhausted to such a point that it could not satisfy all the orders of its customers. Taxpayer maintains that “[d]ue to its weakened condition petitioner’s management felt strongly that it was in greater peril than ever before from the ready-mix concrete industry during the 1945-1950 period.” The proposed inference of weakness does not necessarily follow, and there is nothing more than bare assertion to support it.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Advanced Delivery & Chem. Sys. Nev., Inc. v. Comm'r
2003 T.C. Memo. 250 (U.S. Tax Court, 2003)
Northwestern Ind. Tel. Co. v. Commissioner
1996 T.C. Memo. 168 (U.S. Tax Court, 1996)
Snow Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner
86 T.C. No. 18 (U.S. Tax Court, 1986)
Grob, Inc. v. United States
565 F. Supp. 391 (E.D. Wisconsin, 1983)
Chaney & Hope, Inc. v. Commissioner
80 T.C. No. 6 (U.S. Tax Court, 1983)
C. E. Estes, Inc. v. Commissioner
1980 T.C. Memo. 504 (U.S. Tax Court, 1980)
Doug-Long, Inc. v. Commissioner
72 T.C. 158 (U.S. Tax Court, 1979)
D. G. Matthews & Son, Inc. v. United States
448 F. Supp. 948 (E.D. North Carolina, 1977)
Marie's Shoppe, Inc. v. Commissioner
1977 T.C. Memo. 381 (U.S. Tax Court, 1977)
Firstco, Inc. v. United States
430 F. Supp. 1193 (S.D. Mississippi, 1977)
Vulcan Steam Forging Co. v. Commissioner
1976 T.C. Memo. 29 (U.S. Tax Court, 1976)
W. L. Mead, Inc. v. Commissioner
1975 T.C. Memo. 215 (U.S. Tax Court, 1975)
Ivan Allen Co. v. United States
422 U.S. 617 (Supreme Court, 1975)
Atlantic Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner
62 T.C. No. 73 (U.S. Tax Court, 1974)
Ready Paving & Constr. Co. v. Commissioner
61 T.C. No. 86 (U.S. Tax Court, 1974)
GPD, Inc. v. Commissioner
60 T.C. No. 53 (U.S. Tax Court, 1973)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
274 F.2d 495, 5 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 626, 1960 U.S. App. LEXIS 5653, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/the-smoot-sand-gravel-corporation-v-commissioner-of-internal-revenue-ca4-1960.