Rough Diamond Co. v. United States

351 F.2d 636, 173 Ct. Cl. 15
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedOctober 15, 1965
DocketNo. 69-61
StatusPublished
Cited by31 cases

This text of 351 F.2d 636 (Rough Diamond Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Rough Diamond Co. v. United States, 351 F.2d 636, 173 Ct. Cl. 15 (cc 1965).

Opinion

Davis, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

In the spring of 1959, plaintiffs , agreed with the Department of Agriculture to barter more than $6,600,000 worth of industrial diamonds for surplus cotton owned by the Commodity Credit Corporation (OCC). In this suit, they demand damages of $1,736,514.45, claimed to stem from the Department’s refusal to exchange its cotton on the basis of the average world market value of cotton, rather than a higher price desired by CCC. Charging that the agency’s actions contravened its statutory authority, plaintiffs sue for the money value of the additional cotton they say they should have received.

Congress, in 1954, authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to “barter or exchange agricultural commodities owned by the Commodity Credit Corporation for * * * such strategic or other materials of which the United States does not domestically produce its requirements * * * as the President may designate * * 68 Stat. 459, as amended, 7 U.S.C. § 1692. The statute also provided that the Secretary could “take reasonable precautions * * * to assure that barters or exchanges * * * will not unduly disrupt world prices of agricultural commodities or replace cash sales for [18]*18dollars.” Two years later, in an effort to stimulate lagging cotton exports, Congress directed tlie CCC “to encourage the export of cotton by offering to make cotton available at prices not in excess of the level of prices at which cottons of comparable qualities are being offered * * * by other exporting countries * * * [i.e., the world market price].”1 Agricultural Act of 1956, § 203, 70 Stat. 188, 199, 7 U.S.C. § 1853. Until the latter half of 1958, CCC sold and exchanged cotton at minimum prices substantially equal to world market rates. The agency’s practice was to determine its prices in advance of each marketing year for cotton (which begins on August 1st and ends on July 31st), and to adhere to that pattern for the entire marketing year. In the fall of 1958, the rates established by CCC began to exceed those at which comparable grades of cotton were being offered by other countries. In keeping with its previous policy, however, the 'Department did not revise its prices until August 1, 1959.

On December 24,1958, 'CCC sent an announcement to the major dealers in industrial diamonds, inviting offers to exchange such materials for CCC agricultural commodities. Among the conditions stated were the requirements that the bartered commodities be exported, and that their sale be in addition to, rather than in replacement of, normal cash sales of CCC agricultural surplus. During the next month, plaintiffs Rough Diamond Company, Inci and A. G. Parser, Inc., New York-based industrial diamond concerns, offered to exchange surplus diamonds valued at approximately $6,700,000, in accordance with the specified conditions.2 To be in a position to take advantage of the barter agreements which would follow acceptance of their offers, the plaintiffs made contingent arrangements with exporters for resale of the cotton.3 These export agents agreed to purchase stipu[19]*19lated dollar amounts of government cotton at the CCC’s going rate, in the event that the plaintiffs’ bids were approved. After the execution of formal contracts by plaintiffs and CCC, the latter would refund the exporters’ cash payments to plaintiffs. Under their agreements with the exporters, plaintiffs would in turn remit to them discounts based on the cost of exporting and reselling the cotton, as well as the disparity between the anticipated world market price and CCC’s selling price during the 1958-1959 marketing year.

CCC conditionally accepted plaintiffs’ principal offers on March 16, 1959, agreeing to the terms specified in the bids other than the proffered export deadline (December 31, 1959), which was set by the Department at an earlier date (July 31, 1959). On March 20th, Eough Diamond and Parser wrote similar letters to the Barter and Stockpiling Division of the Commodity Stabilization Service (CSS),4 requesting in effect that the cotton be exchanged at the world market rate, rather than at the higher price the Department was then receiving. After their counteroffers had been repeatedly rejected, plaintiffs accepted the Government’s terms and entered into agreements on that basis in late March and early April 1959. But when the contracts formalizing the agreement were to be signed in the fall of 1959, plaintiffs once again balked at Agriculture’s cotton exchange rate, insisting on the world market prices. After fruitless attempts to negotiate an adjustment with the Department, plaintiffs executed the contracts under protest, and thereafter brought suit in this court.

a. The principal claim is that Section 203 of the Agricultural Act of 1956, supra, commanded the Government to barter the cotton for plaintiffs’ diamonds at the world market price of cotton — and forbade any higher rate. As already noted, this section directed the CCC “to make [its] cotton available at prices not in excess of the level of prices at which cottons of comparable qualities are being offered * * * by other exporting countries * * *” The pri[20]*20mary purpose of this part of the statute is stated in the legislation itself, which declares that, “Such quantities of cotton shall be sold as will reestablish and maintain the fair historical share of the world market for United States cotton, said volume to be determined by the Secretary of Agriculture.” In attaining that goal, however, CCC was given some leeway, since it was also authorized to “accept bids in excess of the maximum prices specified herein [i.e., competitive world market prices],” although not permitted to “reject bids at such maximum prices unless a higher bid is received for the same cotton.” 70 Stat. 199, 7 U.S.C. § 1853.5

Passing over the Government’s substantive defenses that Section 203 did not apply at all to barters and did not, in any case, preclude an averaging of the world market price over a three-year period, we concentrate on the plaintiffs’ assumption that, once the court finds a violation of the statute, there is no escape from a judgment of recovery for them. This threshold postulate calls for inquiry. We can presuppose (without deciding) that the Department of Agriculture deviated from Section 203 when it pegged its cotton price above the current world level, but the probing question is whether that infringement should lead to an award of the additional monies paid by these purchasers for the CCC’s cotton.

[21]*21In a series of decisions growing out of the sale of government-owned vessels after World War II, this court held that buyers who had been charged more than the prices set by Congress could recover the excess, even though-they had entered into contracts to pay those higher, sums. A. H. Bull S.S. Co. v. United States, 123 Ct. Cl. 520, 108 F. Supp. 95 (1952); Southeastern Oil Florida, Inc. v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 409, 411-12, 414, 119 F. Supp. 731, 732-34 (1953), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 834 (1954); Clapp v. United States, 127 Ct. Cl. 505, 508-09, 513-15, 117 F. Supp. 576, 577-78, 581-82, cert.

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351 F.2d 636, 173 Ct. Cl. 15, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/rough-diamond-co-v-united-states-cc-1965.