Mobil Oil Corp. v. Greenwich Township

20 N.J. Tax 66
CourtNew Jersey Tax Court
DecidedApril 15, 2002
StatusPublished
Cited by10 cases

This text of 20 N.J. Tax 66 (Mobil Oil Corp. v. Greenwich Township) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Greenwich Township, 20 N.J. Tax 66 (N.J. Super. Ct. 2002).

Opinion

SMALL, P.J.T.C.

The issue before me is whether the assessor of Greenwich Township may invoke the attorney-client privilege (N.J.R.E. 504, N.J.S.A. 2A:84A-20) in refusing to answer a question posed during his deposition conducted as part of a local property tax appeal.

I.

The facts and procedural history of this ease are not complex. On February 1, 2001, as part of the litigation in which plaintiffs are challenging their tax assessments for the tax years 1998,1999 and 2000, Mi'. Frank Leone, the Assessor of Greenwich Township, was asked about discussions he had with the Township’s attorney concerning the assessments that are the subject of these appeals. He refused to answer on the grounds that his conversations were protected by the attorney-client privilege. I was called on the telephone and ruled (based in part on (a) the opinions in Rosenberg v. South Orange Tp., 8 N.J. Tax 1(Tax), aff'd 8 N.J. Tax 7 (App.Div.1983) and Clinton Tp. Citizen’s Comm. v. Clinton Tp., 185 N.J.Super. 343, 448 A.2d 526 (Law Div.1982) and (b) the fact that the municipal attorney and Mr. Leone had previously asserted that, for purposes of determining whether he should appear at a deposition, the municipal attorney was not his attorney) that the privilege did not apply.

An interlocutory appeal was taken from my ruling. The Appellate Division remanded the matter with instructions to make a full record.

[69]*69A trial was held at which I heard the testimony of six witnesses: the assessor of Greenwich Township, the solicitor of Greenwich Township, two other assessors, and two other municipal attorneys. I have concluded, after analysis of the evidence on remand, that my initial determination was incorrect.

Although the statutory obligations of an assessor and his or her statutory relationship to the municipal attorney support my initial conclusion that the assessor should be independent from the municipality and not represented by the municipal attorney, the actual, long-standing, and widely-accepted relationships between Mr. Leone and Greenwich Township and other assessors and municipal governments goes well beyond the simple statutory duty of making independent assessments of property. Whether these extended duties are appropriate and consistent with the assessors’ primary duties is not the issue before me. But the actual relationship of the assessor to the municipality cannot be ignored.

I am forced to choose between the conflicting objectives of the world as prescribed by the statute (independent assessors) and the world as it exists (assessors who are part of the municipal family working for the mayor and council). Given the world as it exists, I find that Mr. Leone, the assessor, had a reasonable expectation that his conversations with Mr. DiMuzio, the municipal attorney, were privileged. I should have permitted Mr. Leone to assert the attorney-client privilege and decline to answer the questions asked.

The description of the independent role of the assessor vis-a-vis the mayor and council found in the statutes and case law stands in contrast to the evidence presented to me on remand.

The thrust of the testimony was that assessors act as agents of the municipality in defending their assessments; they are part of the municipal government, advising the mayor and council on everything from local budget issues to valuations of real estate being sold or taken by eminent domain (“condemned”) by the municipality. They are delegated, often by municipal resolution, the responsibility of working with the local municipal attorney to prosecute, defend, and settle local property tax appeals. They are [70]*70part of the municipal government family and the municipal tax appeal litigation team. The appropriateness of this relationship and whether it is consistent with their obligation to make assessments independently and objectively are not before me. It is clear from the testimony that I heard that the assessors, as part of them actual function of defending against challenges to tax assessments, consult with municipal attorneys and share information with those attorneys as if those attorneys were representing the assessors and their employer, the municipal government. I have no doubt that the assessor, Mr. Leone, expected his conversations with the Township Solicitor, Mr. DiMuzio, to be conversations with his attorney. Whether it was reasonable and appropriate for him to have such expectations is the subject of this remand.

II.

Mr. Frank Leone has been the assessor of Greenwich Township (“Township”) since 1956. He testified that he solicits and receives legal advice on his assessing duties from the Township Solicitor, Mr. DiMuzio, and the Township’s special tax counsel, Messrs. Peter J. Zipp and Saul A. Wolfe. He has never sought legal advice from anyone else. He testified that, if his conversations with these attorneys were not confidential, he could not tell them everything they need to know. He has authority to settle cases at the county board of taxation without consulting with anyone. He is involved in hiring experts for tax court litigation. He discusses settlement of tax appeals with the municipal attorneys.

He further testified that, although he is autonomous when he sets assessments, he is the agent of the local government when defending those assessments. He decides on settlements and appears for Greenwich in defending assessments. He has sought advice from the Division of Taxation and the municipal solicitor.

Michael S. Barker, the full-time assessor in Ridgewood and part-time assessor in North Haledon, testified as to his experience as an assessor. He has been working in the assessment field since 1977 and has held the designation of C.TA. (“Certified Tax Assessor”) for twenty years. He is the immediate past-president [71]*71of the Association of Municipal Assessors of New Jersey and has been active in the assessors’ associations in Bergen and Passaic counties. Mr. Barker was asked to describe his work as an assessor, and he indicated that it principally involved the valuation of properties for tax assessment purposes, the determination as to whether specific properties should be exempt from taxation or benefit from special farmland assessments, and participation in the Director of the Division of Taxation’s annual data collection efforts in connection with the Director’s Sales Ratio Study. See generally Division of Taxation, Handbook for New Jersey Assessors (1989) § X (“Assessors Handbook”). He testified that he gets any legal advice he needs from the municipal attorney, and he does not seek legal advice from the County Board of Taxation or the Director of the Division of Taxation. He considers himself an employee of the municipality. He further testified as to his role in selecting contractors for revaluations and his role in defending municipal appeals. Marked in evidence was a resolution of the Ridgewood council which designated him to prosecute, defend, and settle municipal tax appeals. He considers himself an agent of the municipality in connection with litigation over tax assessments, and he answers the interrogatories propounded on the municipality in consultation with the municipal attorney. He discusses settlement with the municipal attorney, and he prepares a report for the mayor and council recommending acceptance or rejection of settlement proposals.

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Bluebook (online)
20 N.J. Tax 66, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mobil-oil-corp-v-greenwich-township-njtaxct-2002.