UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
_________________________________________ ) ANTHONY LEWIS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Action No. 09-0264 (RBW) ) DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, ) ) Defendant. ) _________________________________________ )
MEMORANDUM OPINION
The plaintiff brings this action against the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)
seeking judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), see 5 U.S.C. § 702
(2006), regarding the seizure of two vehicles, along with their contents, and the administrative
forfeiture of the vehicles by the DEA.1 This matter is before the Court on the defendant’s motion
to dismiss and the plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief. For the reasons discussed below, the
defendant’s motion will be granted and the plaintiff’s motion will be denied.
I. BACKGROUND
On August 17, 1993, the plaintiff was arrested at his residence in Tampa, Florida, at
which time two vehicles and the contents thereof were seized by DEA Special Agents Tom
Feeney and Dale Van Dorple, two Tampa Police Department officers, and a Hillsborough
1 Under the APA, “[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006).
1 County Deputy Sheriff. Complaint (“Compl.”) ¶¶ 3-4. The vehicles were described as a 1969
Cadillac DeVille convertible (VIN E9259095) (“DeVille”) and a 1987 Chevrolet Blazer S-10
(VIN 1G8CS18R2G8116399) (“Blazer”). See id. ¶¶ 3-5; Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Def.’s Mem.”) at 2, Declaration of
Terrence J. King (“King Decl.”) ¶¶ 4(a), 5(a). The personal property inside the vehicles
allegedly included jewelry, clothing, and tools. See Compl., Ex. A (Itemized List).
According to the plaintiff, he was provided neither a warrant authorizing these seizures,
nor an inventory list of the vehicles’ contents. Compl. ¶¶ 5-6. The plaintiff contends that the
“vehicles were never used to facilitate any illegal narcotics activities, nor . . . [were they] derived
from proceeds of illegal narcotics dealing.” Id., Exhibit (“Ex.”) B (Affidavit of Anthony Lewis)
(“Pl.’s Aff.”) ¶ 5. The plaintiff has “remained incarcerated [by] the federal Government [since]
August 17, 1993,” and allegedly he never “receive[d] notice of the seizure” of his property.
Compl. ¶ 8. “The [p]laintiff was later convicted and sentenced in the [United States] District
Court [for the] Middle District of Florida, Tampa Division,” id. ¶ 17, and is serving a term of life
imprisonment, see United States v. Lewis, No. 8:93-CR-249-RAL-1 (M.D. Fla. filed Sept. 16,
1993).2
2 Remote access to documents filed in criminal cases in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida prior to November 1, 2004, is not available. With one exception [#228], docket entries in the plaintiff’s criminal case prior to July 23, 1997, do not appear on the court’s electronic docket. A docket entry dated August 12, 1993 [#502] notes that the first 278 docket entries, including the criminal complaint against the plaintiff [#1], minutes of the sentencing [#13], and the judgment [#14], appear on the original paper docket sheet, but does not indicate the dates on which these documents were filed.
2 A. Administrative Forfeiture Proceedings
1. The DeVille
DEA employees in its Tampa, Florida office “prepared and submitted a forfeiture report,”
which either “[a]n attorney or paralegal reviewed . . . to determine if the DEA field office
provided adequate information to support administrative forfeiture proceedings against the
property.” Def.’s Mem., King Decl. ¶ 4(a). This process “included a legal review of the
evidence that existed to seize the . . . DeVille.” Id. Based on this review, “the DEA accepted
[the] case for administrative forfeiture.” Id.
Pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (2006), the DEA sent two written notices of the
DeVille’s seizure by certified mail, along with domestic return receipts, to the plaintiff at his
Tampa, Florida residence. Def.’s Mem., King Decl. ¶ 4(b)-4(c); see id., Exs. 1 and 3 (Notices of
Seizure dated October 8, 1993).3 Someone signed each return receipt on October 18, 1993. Id.,
3 The defendant represents that the plaintiff’s property was seized and forfeited in accordance with the administrative forfeiture procedures set forth in 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (2006), rather than the provisions of the Civil Asset Seizure Reform Act of 2000, see 18 U.S.C. § 983 (2006), which applies to forfeiture proceedings initiated after August 23, 2000, Def.’s Mem. at 1 n.1.
Generally, all vehicles “which are used, or are intended for use, to transport, or in any manner to facilitate the transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of” controlled substances or raw materials intended for illegal drug trade are subject to forfeiture. 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (2006). Under the earlier forfeiture statute, which governs the forfeiture in this case, if the value of a seized vehicle does not exceed $500,000, the following provision applies:
[T]he appropriate . . . officer shall cause a notice of the seizure of such [vehicle] and the intention to forfeit and sell or otherwise dispose of the same according to law to be published for at least three successive weeks in such manner as the Secretary of the Treasury may direct. Written notice of seizure together with information on the applicable procedures shall be sent to each party who appears to (continued...)
3 Exs. 2 and 4 (domestic return receipts for certified mail). In addition, the DEA sent a notice of
the seizure to the plaintiff at the Pinellas County Jail in Clearwater, Florida. Id. ¶ 4(d); see id.,
Ex. 5 (Notice of Seizure dated October 8, 1993). This third notice was returned to the DEA by
the United States Post Office, with the envelope “stamped ‘RETURNED TO SENDER’ and
marked ‘MOVED. LEFT NO ADDRESS.’” Id. ¶ 4(d); see id., Ex. 6.
The DEA provided notice of “the seizure of the property . . . in USA TODAY, a
newspaper of general circulation in the Middle District of Florida and the District of Columbia.”
Def.’s Mem., King Decl. ¶ 4(e). The notice was “published once each week for three successive
weeks: October 20 and 27, and November 3, 1993.” Id. ¶ 4(e); see id., Ex. 7 (Legal Notices).
Both “[t]he published and mailed notices explained the option of filing a claim and cost bond, or
an affidavit of indigency in lieu of the cost bond, with the DEA Forfeiture Counsel in order to
contest the forfeiture action in United States District Court.” Id. ¶ 4(e). The DEA received
neither a claim nor a cost bond by the November 9, 1993 deadline, id., and on November 26,
1993, “the DEA forfeited the . . . DeVille . . . to the United States” pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1609
[(2006)]. Id. ¶ 4(f); see id., Ex. 8 (Declaration of Forfeiture dated November 26, 1993).
2. The Blazer
As was the case with the DeVille, DEA employees in its Tampa office “prepared and
submitted a forfeiture report,” and upon its review, which “included a legal review of the
evidence that existed to seize the . . . Blazer,” the case was “accepted . . . for administrative
3 (...continued) have an interest in the seized [vehicle].
19 U.S.C. § 1607(a) (2006). DEA Special Agents “are authorized and designated to seize such property as may be subject to seizure.” 21 C.F.R. § 1316.72.
4 forfeiture.” Def.’s Mem., King Decl. ¶ 5(a). On November 1, 1993, the DEA sent by certified
mail, along with return receipts, three notices of seizure to the plaintiff – one to the plaintiff’s
Tampa, Florida residence, one to the plaintiff at the Pinellas County Jail, and one to the
plaintiff’s attorney. Id. ¶¶ 5(c)-(f); see id., Exs. 19, 21 and 23 (Notices of Seizure dated
November 1, 1993). The DEA also mailed a fourth notice to Henry L. Lewis at the same Tampa,
Florida address as the plaintiff’s residence. Id. ¶ 5(f); see id., Ex. 25 (Notice of Seizure dated
November 1, 1993). With the exception of the notice mailed to the Pinellas County Jail, which
the United States Postal Service returned, id., Ex. 22, an individual signed for each of the other
three notices, id., Exs. 20, 24, and 26 (domestic return receipts for certified mail).
The DEA “published in USA TODAY, a newspaper of general circulation in the Middle
District of Florida and the District of Columbia,” a notice of the seizure “once each week for
three successive weeks: November 10, 17, and 24, 1993.” Def.’s Mem., King Decl. ¶ 5(g) & Ex.
27 (Legal Notices). Once again the DEA did not receive a claim or cost bond by the November
30, 1993 deadline, and “the DEA forfeited the . . . Blazer . . . to the United States” on December
17, 1993. Id. ¶¶ 5(g)-(h) & Ex. 28 (Declaration of Forfeiture dated December 17, 1993).
B. Criminal Action No. 93-249
The plaintiff filed in his criminal case a Petition for Writ of Replevin “in an attempt to
obtain judicial review of the . . . DEA’s seizure and administrative forfeiture of his vehicles and
the contents of his vehicles.” Compl. ¶ 16; Def.’s Mem., King Decl., Ex. 9 (Petition for Writ of
Replevin, Lewis v. United States, No. 93-249-CR-T-21(B) (M.D. Fla. June 9, 1994)).4
4 The DeVille and the Blazer already had been forfeited, and the United States took the position that “the only remaining issue for evidentiary hearing . . . would be limited to the (continued...)
5 According to the plaintiff, his property was seized and forfeited without probable cause, proper
notice and hearing, and otherwise was taken in violation of law. See generally, Def.’s Mem.,
King Decl., Ex. 9. The presiding judge in the plaintiff’s criminal case held a hearing on January
30, 1997, and denied the petition on March 24, 1997.5 Compl. ¶ 20. That proceeding has been
summarized by another Judge of the Middle District of Florida as follows:
Judge Nimmons held that Lewis failed to establish that any of the fourteen items of personal property at issue were ever contained within either [the DeVille or the Blazer] at the time those vehicles were seized on August 17, 1993, or that the items of personal property were ever seized from the vehicles by any Government agent. Judge Nimmons further held that the Government had established by a preponderance of the evidence that Detective Tim Lovett of the Hillsborough County Sheriff’s Office, Detective Rick Olewinski of the Tampa Police Department, and Special Agents Dale Van Dorple and Tom Feeney with the [DEA] did not remove or steal any of the fourteen items of personal property from either of the vehicles on August 17, 1993, or in the days following, in connection with the processing of the vehicles for administrative seizure by the [DEA].
See Def.’s Mem., King Decl., Ex. 17 (Order, Lewis v. United States, No. 95-580-CIV-T-24E
(M.D. Fla. July 15, 1997)) at 2 (internal citations omitted). According to the plaintiff, Judge
Nimmons “did not effect review of the . . . DEA’s seizure and administrative forfeiture” of the
vehicles. Compl. ¶ 20.
4 (...continued) personal property contained within the vehicle[s].” Def.’s Mem., King Decl., Ex. 16 (Response to Lewis’ Petition for Writ of Replevin and United States of America’s Request for an Evidentiary Hearing, United States v. Lewis, No. 93-249-CR-T-21(B) (M.D. Fla. Sept. 13, 1996)) at 2. 5 The plaintiff alleges that he had filed two motions for return of property in his criminal case, one on June 9, 1994 and another on July 7, 1994, Compl. ¶ 19, and that both motions were denied, id. ¶ 20. It is not clear from the record whether the second motion was also addressed at the January 30, 1997 hearing.
6 C. Civil Action No. 95-580
The plaintiff “filed a civil action against the . . . DEA and others . . . in the . . . Middle
District of Florida, Tampa Division, in Case Number 95-[580]-civ-T-24E, for the illegal seizure
and forfeiture” of the DeVille and the Blazer. Compl. ¶ 18; see Lewis v. United States, No. 8:95-
580-SCB (M.D. Fla. filed Apr. 14, 1995); see also Def.’s Mem., King Decl., Ex. 10 (Amended
Complaint, Lewis v. United States, No. 95-580-CIV-T-24E (M.D. Fla. May 30, 1995)). The
United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit summarized these proceedings as
follows:
Lewis . . . filed this civil action seeking declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief against Tom Feeney and Dale Van Dorple, agents of the [DEA], Jack Fernandez, the federal prosecutor in [his] criminal case, and the United States. Lewis’ amended complaint alleged that (1) Feeney and Van Dorple, in connection with their arrest of Lewis, seized and disposed of Lewis’ [DeVille and Blazer], and personal property therein, illegally and without a hearing, and (2) Fernandez failed to prevent Feeney and Van Dorple’s illegal actions by exercising his exclusive authority to begin forfeiture proceedings against Lewis. Lewis sought to hold Feeney, Van Dorple, and Fernandez liable under Bivens [v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971)], alleging that the seizure of his property without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment, and the forfeiture of his property without notice or a hearing violated the Fifth Amendment. Lewis also claimed that Feeney, Van Dorple, and Fernandez were liable under the [Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”)], based upon their violation of Florida law regarding the illegal conversion of property. Lewis sought to hold the United States liable under the FTCA pursuant to the theory of respondeat superior.
* * *
On August 26, 1996, the district court granted the United States’ motion for summary judgment on Lewis’s FTCA claim, finding that the seizure of his property fit within the ambit of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c), and exemption from the FTCA’s general waiver of sovereign immunity in cases where property is seized pursuant to law
7 enforcement purposes. In regard to Lewis’ Bivens claims against Van Dorple, Feeney, and Fernandez, the district court ruled as follows: (1) granted summary judgment for the defendants on Lewis’ Fourth Amendment claim, finding that the confiscation of Lewis’ property was supported by probable cause and occurred pursuant to a valid warrant; (2) granted summary judgment for the defendants on Lewis’ Fifth Amendment claim regarding the forfeiture of two of his automobiles, where proper notice had been issued; and (3) granted summary judgment for Fernandez, but denied summary judgment for Van Dorple and Feeney on Lewis’ Fifth Amendment claim regarding the forfeiture of his personal property within the automobiles, finding that material issues of fact remained disputed regarding [their] actions, but that Lewis had failed to establish a causal connection between the loss of his personal property and any actions of Fernandez.
Lewis v. Feeney, No. 98-2328, Slip Op. at 2-3, 4-5 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 1999) (per curiam)
(emphasis added).
Based on Judge Nimmons’ earlier denial of the plaintiff’s petition for writ of replevin,
Van Dorple and Feeney moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s remaining Fifth Amendment claim on
the ground that the claim was barred under the doctrine of collateral estoppel. See Def.’s Mem.,
King Decl., Ex. 17 (Order, Lewis v. United States, No. 95-580-CIV-T-24(E) (M.D. Fla. July 15,
1997)) at 1. The plaintiff did not file an opposition to their motion, see id., and the court granted
the motion, concluding that “[t]he issues raised by Plaintiff’s instant Fifth Amendment due
process claim relating to the alleged personal property contained in his two seized vehicles were
adjudicated in Case No. 93-249-Cr-T-21B, . . . [and the] Plaintiff is therefore barred from
relitigating those issues here,” id. at 2-3. The plaintiff did not appeal the ruling. Lewis v.
Feeney, No. 98-2328, Slip Op. at 5 (11th Cir. Aug. 31, 1999) (per curiam).
8 D. The Plaintiff’s Complaint In This Case
The plaintiff summarizes the grounds for this action and the relief he demands as follows:
This is a civil action pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) against the [DEA] for illegally, unlawfully, arbitrarily, capriciously, maliciously, and as a result of fraud and fraudulent concealment, seiz[ing] and administratively forfeit[ing his] property . . . . The [p]laintiff seeks judicial review of the DEA’s administrative seizure and forfeiture of his property in equity as an independent action[, and he asks] the court to hold that the DEA’s seizure and forfeiture . . . was erroneous and unlawful, then set aside the agency’s action.
Compl. at 1. As a result of the DEA’s actions, the plaintiff asserts that he “has suffered the loss
of his property [and] loss of his property interest [in] violation of his Fourth Amendment right,”
and in “violation of his protected liberty interest” under the Fifth Amendment. Id. ¶ 29.6
The plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment claim arises from the DEA’s seizure of the DeVille
and the Blazer and their contents, and the administrative forfeiture of the vehicles, on the ground
that the agency “lacked jurisdiction and authority” to conduct the seizure “without first obtaining
a transfer and/or takeover order from the State court which allegedly issued seizure warrants.”
Compl. ¶ 30(A). The plaintiff further asserts that the DEA “lacked probable cause to seize and
attempt forfeiture proceedings” due to the absence of “evidence or facts to support that the
plaintiff’s property was derived from, associated with, or used for any illegal activity, or failing
to show a nexus between the plaintiff’s property and illegal narcotics activity in a drug case.” Id.
¶ 30(B).7 He also contends that the DEA violated his Fifth Amendment right to due process
6 The plaintiff also alleges violations of federal statutory law and Florida law. Compl. ¶ 29. 7 According to the plaintiff, the vehicles were used “for advertisement purposes and (continued...)
9 because it “failed to provide notice to the plaintiff and an opportunity to contest the seizure and
forfeiture of his [vehicles].” Id. ¶ 30(C). Lastly, the plaintiff contends that the DEA “committed
fraud and fraudulent concealment” in effecting this “unlawful seizure and forfeiture.” Id. ¶
30(D).
The plaintiff demands declaratory judgment and injunctive relief. Compl. ¶ 31.8 In
addition, he demands compensatory damages of $50,000.00 for the vehicles and their contents,
id. ¶ 31(C)(1), and punitive damages totalling $3,000,000.00 to redress the alleged violations of
his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights, id. ¶ 31(C)(2), the “loss of the plaintiff’s business
interest” in and the sentimental value of the vehicles, id. ¶ 31(C)(3), and for the “emotional
distress, anxiety, discomfort, and vexation [he] has suffer[e]d in attempting to have his vehicles
and the contents of his vehicles returned to him,” id. ¶ 31(C)(4).
II. DISCUSSION
A. Dismissal Under Rule 12(b)(6)9
A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) tests whether the
plaintiff properly has stated a claim upon which relief may be granted. See, e.g., Woodruff v.
7 (...continued) other matters associated with [his] family’s business,” Compl., Ex. B (Pl.’s Aff.) ¶ 8, an auto body repair shop, id. ¶ 7. 8 The plaintiff numbered two paragraphs of the complaint as paragraph 31, one beginning on page 11 (requesting declaratory judgment), and another beginning on page 14 (requesting injunctive relief). 9 Ordinarily, if “matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court” on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, “the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56.” FED. R. CIV. P. 12(d). The Court need not convert the defendants’ motion to dismiss in this case, however, because the materials on which the Court relies either are referred to in the complaint itself or are matters of which the Court may take judicial notice.
10 DiMario, 197 F.R.D. 191, 193 (D.D.C. 2000). For a complaint to survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion, it need only provide “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief,” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2), in order to “give the defendant fair notice of what the
claim is and the grounds on which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555
(2007) (citation omitted). “Although detailed factual allegations are not necessary to withstand a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, to provide the grounds of entitlement to relief, a plaintiff must
furnish more than labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of
action.” Hinson ex rel. N.H. v. Merritt Educ. Ctr., 521 F. Supp. 2d 22, 27 (D.D.C. 2007)
(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks omitted). Or, as the Supreme
Court more recently stated, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, __ U.S. __, __, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The
complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and “the court must
assume the truth of all well-pleaded allegations.” Warren v. Dist. of Columbia, 353 F.3d 36, 39
(D.C. Cir. 2004). Generally, on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court is limited to considering “only
the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or incorporated in the
complaint and matters of which we may take judicial notice.” EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier
Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a party may assert an affirmative
defense by motion in its initial response to a complaint. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b). Res judicata and
collateral estoppel are affirmative defenses. Blonder Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Illinois
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971); Stanton v. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals, 127 F.3d 72,
11 76 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“Res judicata is an affirmative defense that may be lost if not pleaded in the
answer[.]”); Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Internal Revenue Serv., 765 F.2d 1174, 1176 n.1
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (“Issue preclusion is an affirmative defense [which] may be expressly waived or
forfeited through failure to raise it at a proper time.” (internal citations omitted)). These
defenses may be raised by motion under Rule 12(b)(6) where they “can either be established
from the face of the complaint, matters fairly incorporated within it, and matters susceptible to
judicial notice.” Felter v. Salazar, 679 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4 (D.D.C. 2010) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted); Sheppard v. Dist. of Columbia, __ F. Supp. 2d __, __, 2011 WL 710211, at
*4 n.3 (D.D.C. Feb. 22, 2011) (“Res judicata may be raised in a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim when the defense appears on the face of the complaint and any
materials of which the court may take judicial notice.”). The court may take judicial notice of
public records from other court proceedings. See Covad Commc’ns. Co. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 407
F.3d 1220, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
B. Claim Preclusion and Issue Preclusion
The defendant moves to dismiss the complaint in its entirety on the grounds that the
claims “against the DEA regarding the alleged improper seizure and forfeiture of [the plaintiff’s]
property . . . have already been litigated,” Def.’s Mem. at 11, and that the issues presented “have
already been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction,” id. at 13.
1. Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion)
“Res judicata plays a central role in advancing the ‘purpose for which civil courts have
been established, the conclusive resolution of disputes within their jurisdictions.’” Apotex, Inc.
v. FDA, 393 F.3d 210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147,
12 153 (1979)). Res judicata (claim preclusion) bars a subsequent lawsuit “if there has been prior
litigation (1) involving the same claims or cause of action, (2) between the same parties or their
privies, and (3) there has been a final, valid judgment on the merits, (4) by a court of competent
jurisdiction.” Porter v. Shah, 606 F.3d 809, 813-14 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Essentially, the doctrine “prevents a party from filing a new civil
action which is based on the same operative facts as underlay a previously-litigated civil action.”
Morton v. Locke, 387 F. App’x 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (per curiam) (citations omitted). “Whether
two cases implicate the same cause of action turns on whether they share the same ‘nucleus of
facts.’” Drake v. FAA, 291 F.3d 59, 66 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Page v. United States, 729 F.2d
818, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). In determining whether two cases share a nucleus of facts, courts
consider “whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a
convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties’ expectations
or business understanding or usage.” Apotex, 393 F.3d at 217 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
The defendant contends that the plaintiff’s “claims against the DEA regarding the alleged
improper seizure and forfeiture of his property must be dismissed under the doctrine of res
judicata because such claims have already been litigated against Defendant . . . before the
[United States] District Court for the Middle District of Florida.” Def.’s Mem. at 11. The
plaintiff counters that “the present civil action does not contain claims [or] defendants that were
contained in the previous civil action.” Plaintiff’s Arguments with Points and Authorities in
Support of Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (“Pl.’s Opp’n”) at 13. Rather, he
contends, he brings this action “against the DEA, the agency,” while the “Fourth and Fifth
13 Amendment claims raised in the . . . previous civil action were against the United States, DEA
agents and the prosecuting attorney.” Id. Further, the plaintiff purports to raise for the first time
in this action new claims, specifically, the DEA’s “lack[] [of] jurisdiction and authority to seize
and forfeit his vehicles and property,” its alleged “fraud and fraudulent concealment in
establishing probable cause to seize and forfeit” the vehicles and their contents, and its “fail[ure]
to comply with the requirements of Title 19 U.S.C. §[§] 1602-1604 prior to the seizure and
forfeiture of the plaintiff’s vehicles.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 14.10 For these reasons, the plaintiff argues
that his claims are not barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Id. He is mistaken.
The current civil action and the prior action in the Middle District of Florida involve the
same cause of action – the operative facts are those arising out of the August 17, 1993 seizure of
the DeVille, the Blazer, and the property contained in those vehicles, as well as the subsequent
administrative forfeiture of the vehicles and their contents by the DEA. Moreover, there can be
no doubt that the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, the same district
where the plaintiff was arrested and where the seizure and forfeiture occurred, is a court of
competent jurisdiction which decided the merits of the plaintiff’s prior challenges to the seizure
and forfeiture of his property.
Although the plaintiff names as the defendant in this action a party not named in the prior
action, the DEA is in privity with the defendants sued in the prior action. “[F]or purposes of res
judicata, privity exists between officers of the same government,” Lindsey v. Dist. of Columbia,
609 F. Supp. 2d 71, 77 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing Sunshine Anthracite Coal v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381,
10 The plaintiff numbered two pages as page 14. The Court’s citation is to the first of those two pages.
14 402 (1940)), and the prior rulings in favor of the United States and DEA Special Agents Feeney
and Van Dorple are binding as to the DEA itself. See Sunshine Anthracite Coal, 310 U.S. at
402-03 (“[A] judgment in a suit between a party and a representative of the United States is res
judicata in relitigation of the same issue between that party and another officer of the
government.”); Mervin v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 591 F.2d 821, 830 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (concluding
that the plaintiff was barred from pursuing the same reduction-in-force claim before the Federal
Trade Commission that he had pursued previously against the Civil Service Commission). The
defendants named in the two actions, then, are considered the same parties.
The plaintiff cannot avoid the preclusive effect of the Florida district court’s rulings in
the prior action by presenting in this action new legal theories for relief. “[R]es judicata . . . bars
relitigation not only of matters determined in a previous litigation but also ones that [the
plaintiff] could have raised.” Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Thomas, 838 F.2d 1224, 1252
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Tutt v. Doby, 459 F.2d 1195, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“If the doctrine of res
judicata applies, both parties are concluded, not only as to things which were determined but as
to all matters which might have been determined as well.”); Middlebrooks v. Medstar Health,
Inc., No. 10-1519, 2010 WL 5373939, at *2 (D.D.C. Dec. 22, 2010) (finding no significance in
the fact that the plaintiff’s prior cases in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia asserted
claims under the District of Columbia Human Rights Act and the current case includes a claim
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 because the plaintiff was “barred from litigating not only claims that
were actually litigated but also those that could have been litigated in the first action”). The fact
that the plaintiff did not present his additional legal theories in the prior suit is immaterial.
“Under the doctrine, the parties to a suit and their privies are bound by a final judgment and may
15 not relitigate any ground for relief which they already have had an opportunity to litigate even if
they chose not to exploit that opportunity whether the initial judgment was erroneous or not.”
Hardison v. Alexander, 655 F.2d 1281, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (emphasis added).
For all of the reasons set forth above, the Court concludes that the plaintiff’s claims in
this case are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.11
2. Collateral Estoppel (Issue Preclusion)
“Along with the doctrine of claim preclusion or res judicata, issue preclusion aims to
avert needless relitigation and disturbance of repose, without inadvertently inducing extra
litigation or unfairly sacrificing a person’s day in court.” Otherson v. Dep’t of Justice, 711 F.2d
267, 273 (D.C. Cir. 1983). Under the doctrine of collateral estoppel (issue preclusion), “once a
court has decided an issue of fact or law necessary to its judgment, that decision may preclude
relitigation of the issue in a suit on a different cause of action involving a party to the first case.”
Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). In Yamaha Corp. of Am. v. United States, 961 F.2d
245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1078 (1993), the District of Columbia Circuit
sets forth the following standard for establishing the preclusive effect of a prior holding:
First, the same issue now being raised must have been contested by the parties and submitted for judicial determination in the prior case. Second, the issue must have been actually and necessarily determined by a court of competent jurisdiction in that prior case. Third, preclusion in the second case must not work a basic unfairness to the party bound by the first determination. An example of such unfairness would be when the losing party clearly lacked any incentive to litigate the point in the first trial, but the stakes of the second trial are of a vastly greater magnitude.
11 The plaintiff’s FTCA claim, see Compl. ¶ 27 & Ex. L (Claim for Damage, Injury or Death dated October 4, 2004), also is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
16 Id. (internal citations and footnote omitted).
The defendant argues that “the issues raised in Plaintiff’s Complaint have already been
decided by a court of competent jurisdiction and therefore this Court is barred from deciding
them under the doctrine of collateral estoppel.” Def.’s Mem. at 13. The plaintiff counters that
“the present civil action does not contain claims []or defendants that were contained in the
previous civil action filed in the Middle District of Florida,” Pl.’s Opp’n at 14, pointing to the
new defendant, the DEA, and his new legal theories offered as the basis for the relief he is
seeking, to support his argument that collateral estoppel does not bar this action. See id. at 14-
15. Again, the plaintiff is mistaken.
The Florida district court described the issues presented by the plaintiff in the prior civil
action as follows:
Regarding the seizures, Plaintiff makes three claims. First, he claims that his property was seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment, stating in support that he never saw a warrant for the seizure of the items. Second, Plaintiff claims that his property was seized without adequate due process, in contravention of the Fifth Amendment. Third, Plaintiff asserts a federal tort claim of deprivation of his property based upon a state law claim of conversion.
Def.’s Mem., King Decl., Ex. 15 (Order, Lewis v. United States, No. 95-580-CIV-T-24E (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 22, 1996)) at 6. The court then construed the claims “as under Bivens . . . and as
pursuant to the [FTCA].” Id. at 6-7.
The Florida district court then determined that the United States was not liable under the
FTCA for any injury arising from the seizure of the plaintiff’s vehicles. Id. at 7. Because the
FTCA “exempts any claim based on the detention of goods by any federal law enforcement
officer, [and] extends to officers in other agencies performing their proper duties,” the court
17 deemed the plaintiff’s FTCA claim to be “without merit, and the United States [was] dismissed
as a Defendant in [that] action.” Id.
In resolving the Bivens claims brought against DEA Special Agents Van Dorple and
Feeney, and their qualified immunity defense, the Florida district court found it “clear from the
record that a warrant to search Plaintiff’s premises was validly issued,” id. at 9, thus resolving
his Fourth Amendment claim based on the lack of probable cause or the absence of a warrant, id.
at 10. Further, that Florida district court found not only that the plaintiff “raise[d] no meritorious
due process claims regarding the forfeiture of his vehicles,” id. at 11, but also that his claims
against the agents with respect to the contents of the vehicles were barred under the doctrine of
collateral estoppel based on Judge Nimmons’ earlier determination, following an evidentiary
hearing, that the agents neither removed nor stole any of the items allegedly found in the
vehicles at the time of their seizure, Def.’s Mem., King Decl., Ex. 17 (Order, Lewis v. United
States, No. 95-580-CIV-T-24E (M.D. Fla. July 15, 1997)) at 2. In short, the Florida district court
determined that no violation of the plaintiff’s Fourth or Fifth Amendment rights occurred. The
plaintiff cannot avoid the consequences of the Florida district court’s rulings by raising new
legal theories in a subsequent lawsuit where, as here, he could have raised such theories in the
prior action. See Hall v. Clinton, 285 F.3d 74, 81 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
A plaintiff can avoid the preclusive effect of an earlier judicial decision if he can
demonstrate that preclusion would “work a basic unfairness” on him, or that he “lacked any
incentive to litigate the [issues] in the [prior proceedings],” or that he was otherwise denied a full
and fair opportunity to litigate these issues previously. Yamaha, 961 F.2d at 254. However, the
plaintiff presents no such arguments, and given his persistence in seeking the return of his
18 property, both in the criminal proceedings and subsequent civil proceedings in the Middle
District of Florida, coupled with the rulings rendered in those proceedings, the Court finds that
invoking the preclusive impact of collateral estoppel in this case is not at odds with the
limitations articulated in Yamaha. The Court therefore concludes that the issues presented in this
civil action are barred by the doctrine of collateral estoppel.
III. CONCLUSION
The Court concludes that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel bar
relitigation of the claims and issues presented in this case due to the proceedings that were
conducted in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.12 Accordingly,
the Court grants the defendants’ motion to dismiss and denies the plaintiff’s motion for
injunctive relief.13
REGGIE B. WALTON United States District Judge DATE: April 15, 2011
12 In light of these rulings, the Court will not address the defendants’ alternative arguments for dismissal. 13 This Memorandum Opinion accompanies the Order issued on March 31, 2011, and the Final Order issued contemporaneously, granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss and denying the plaintiff’s motion for injunctive relief.