Spencer v. United States Department of Justice

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: January 30, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-3641
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

ANTWOYN TERRELL SPENCER,

Plaintiff,

Civil Action No. 24-cv-3641 (RDM) v.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, et al,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, brings this action against the United States Department of

Justice, Merrick Garland, and various other government officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for

“deprivation of his civil right to due process” by his “being held to answer for infamous crimes

not on an indictment of grand jury” and “being restrained of his liberty against law.” Dkt. 1 at 2

(Compl). Plaintiff was found guilty of several drug offenses in 2007. See id. at 1. According to

Plaintiff, the charges for which he was “tried, convicted, and sentenced [] are not crimes returned

by a grand jury.” Id. at 2. He seeks monetary damages for the alleged injuries.

Where, as here, the plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court will hold his pleadings “to

less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S.

89, 94 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Although none of the Defendants

have been properly served, nor have they appeared in this suit, the Court may sua sponte dismiss

a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) where “it is patently obvious” that

the plaintiff cannot “prevail[] on the facts alleged in his complaint.” Baker v. Director, U.S. Parole Comm'n, 916 F.2d 725, 727 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also Strunk v. Obama, 880 F. Supp. 2d

1, 3 (D.D.C. 2011).

Plaintiff’s claims are not cognizable in this Court. He seeks monetary damages for his

conviction for crimes that he alleges were not presented to a grand jury and for his “currently

being restrained of his liberty.” See Dkt. 1 at 2 (Compl.). Those claims are not cognizable

“unless [Spencer’s] conviction or sentence [itself] has been invalidated or called into question by

issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,” In re Jones, 652 F.3d 36, 37–38 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing

Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994)). Absent any indication that Plaintiff’s

convictions have been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid

by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal

court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,” Humphrey, 512 U.S. at 487, the Court must dismiss

these claims for failure to state a claim, see In re Jones, 652 F.3d at 38.

For the reasons stated, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s complaint is DISMISSED. A

separate order shall issue.

SO ORDERED.

/s/ Randolph D. Moss RANDOLPH D. MOSS United States District Judge

Date: January 30, 2025