Calzada v. Roberts

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: May 7, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-2477
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

OMAR JOSE CALZADA,

Plaintiff,

v. Civil Action No. 24 - 2477 (LLA)

JOHN G. ROBERTS, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Omar Jose Calzada, proceeding pro se, sues the Honorable John G. Roberts, Chief

Justice of the United States, and the Honorable Robert J. Conrad, Director of the Administrative

Office of the U.S. Courts, for alleged constitutional and other violations related to Mr. Calzada’s

2012 arrest, conviction, and subsequent litigation. ECF No. 3, at 2-3. After numerous procedural

developments, Defendants have moved to dismiss. ECF No. 21. For the reasons explained below,

the court will grant Defendants’ motion.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The following factual allegations drawn from Mr. Calzada’s amended complaint, ECF

No. 3, are accepted as true for the purpose of evaluating the motion before the court, Jerome

Stevens Pharms., Inc. v. Food & Drug Admin., 402 F.3d 1249, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 2005).

Mr. Calzada resides in San Antonio, Texas. ECF No. 3 ¶ 26. In June 2012, he was arrested

and charged with various marijuana-related offenses in the U.S. District Court for the Western

District of Texas. ECF No. 3-1, at 79-80. Mr. Calzada eventually pleaded guilty to one count of

conspiring to manufacture a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 846. See Order at 4, United States v. Calzada, No. 5:12-CR-642 (W.D. Tex.

Jan. 18, 2022), ECF No. 189; Redacted Indictment at 1, Calzada, No. 5:12-CR-642 (W.D. Tex.

July 11, 2012), ECF No. 23.1 Mr. Calzada was sentenced to time served and a term of supervised

release, which he completed in January 2019. See Order at 4-5, Calzada, No. 5:12-CR-642 (W.D.

Tex. Jan. 18, 2022), ECF No. 189.

In June 2021, Mr. Calzada filed a pro se petition for a writ of error coram nobis alleging

that fundamental errors had occurred in his criminal prosecution. See Mot. for Writ of Error Coram

Nobis, Calzada, No. 5:12-CR-642 (W.D. Tex. June 16, 2021), ECF No. 174. Specifically, he

claimed that a critical search warrant and affidavit had been improperly admitted into evidence,

among other transgressions. See id. at 8-10. The district court denied the petition, finding that the

petition was untimely, that “the search warrant and affidavit were properly authenticated,” and that

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had previously affirmed the propriety of the search

warrant and affidavit on appeal. Order at 11, Calzada, No. 5:12-CR-642 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 18,

2022), ECF No. 189. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition in February 2023 and

subsequently denied rehearing en banc. Op., United States v. Calzada, No. 22-50090 (5th Cir.

Feb. 15, 2023); Order, Calzada, No. 22-50090 (5th Cir. Mar. 9, 2023).

In the ensuing months, Mr. Calzada filed six motions to vacate or amend the district court’s

denial of his petition. See Docket, Calzada, No. 5:12-CR-642, ECF Nos. 196, 199, 200, 201, 202,

208. The court denied each motion. See Docket, Calzada, No. 5:12-CR-642. Mr. Calzada

appealed two of them, see Docket, Calzada, No. 5:12-CR-642, ECF Nos. 203, 209, and the Fifth

1 “The court may take judicial notice of public records from other court proceedings.” Lewis v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 777 F. Supp. 2d 151, 159 (D.D.C. 2011).

2 Circuit affirmed both, Op., United States v. Calzada, No. 23-50367 (5th Cir. Sept. 21, 2023); Op.,

United States v. Calzada, No. 23-50838 (5th Cir. June 24, 2024).

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

After his final, unsuccessful appeal in the Fifth Circuit, Mr. Calzada filed a pro se

complaint in this court in August 2024, ECF No. 1, which he subsequently amended, ECF No. 3.

Mr. Calzada alleged that Chief Justice Roberts and Judge Conrad had failed to properly supervise

various judicial officers who were involved in his criminal prosecution and unsuccessful appeals.

See generally ECF No. 3.

In the ensuing months, the parties filed a series of overlapping and crisscrossing motions,

oppositions, and replies. In December 2024, Defendants filed a Westfall Act certification attesting

that they “were acting within the scope of their employment as employees of the United States of

America at the time of the alleged incidents.” ECF No. 13-1. Pursuant to the Westfall Act, 28

U.S.C. § 2679, the United States was substituted as the defendant for all claims against Chief

Justice Roberts and Judge Conrad in their official capacities. ECF No. 13. Mr. Calzada

subsequently moved to disqualify the U.S. Attorney’s Office for the District of Columbia from the

case and to stay the proceedings pending appointment of a “Special U.S. Counsel.” ECF Nos. 15,

16. The court denied both motions in January 2025. ECF No. 20.

Defendants then moved to dismiss on January 17, 2025. ECF No. 21. Mr. Calzada filed a

combined opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss and motion for partial summary judgment

on January 31, ECF No. 22, and he subsequently moved to challenge Defendants’ Westfall Act

certification and strike Defendants’ motion to dismiss on February 6, ECF No. 28. On February 7,

Defendants filed a reply in support of their motion to dismiss and simultaneously moved to the

3 stay proceedings on Mr. Calzada’s motion for partial summary judgment pending the court’s

resolution of the outstanding motion to dismiss. ECF Nos. 25, 26.

On February 11, the court issued a Fox/Neal Order giving Mr. Calzada an opportunity to

supplement his previously filed opposition. ECF No. 29, at 2-3. In the same order, the court held

Mr. Calzada’s partial motion for summary judgment in abeyance so that it could resolve

Defendants’ outstanding motion to dismiss. Id. at 3. On February 18, Mr. Calzada submitted a

supplemental memorandum in opposition to Defendants’ motion to dismiss. ECF Nos. 30, 31. In

the same filing, Mr. Calzada also requested that the case be stayed and then referred to the Judicial

Conference of the United States for resolution and that the court direct Chief Justice Roberts to

appear at future hearings. ECF No. 31, at 47. On March 3, Defendants filed a supplemental reply

and simultaneously opposed Mr. Calzada’s motion to stay, motion for referral, and motion to order

the appearance of Chief Justice Roberts. ECF No. 35. The next day, Mr. Calzada filed a reply in

support of his three new motions. ECF No. 37.

On March 13, Mr. Calzada filed a motion for a hearing on his challenge to Defendants’

Westfall Act certification. ECF No. 39. The court denied the motion and explained that it would

rule on each of the parties’ pending motions in due course. Mar. 20, 2025 Minute Order.

On April 22, Mr. Calzada filed a motion for sanctions, an injunction, and an order to show

cause. ECF No. 40. He argued that sanctions were warranted because Defendants’ counsel had

omitted or ignored material facts when filing the motion to dismiss. Id. at 6-7. He requested an

injunction requiring the preservation of evidence related to the purported fraud and barring

Defendants from making certain arguments. Id. at 7. Finally, he requested an order to show cause

as to why Defendants’ counsel had failed to report various instances of alleged prosecutorial

4 misconduct. Id. at 13-14. Defendants moved for an extension of time to respond, ECF No. 41,

which the court granted, Apr. 28, 2025 Minute Order.

On May 1, Mr. Calzada filed a motion for leave to supplement the record “with newly

compiled evidence of systemic violations of the U.S. Constitution, federal criminal procedure, and

federal appellate practice.” ECF No. 42, at 1. The supplement contains details of other cases that

Mr. Calzada maintains are similar to his. Id. at 4-8.

In total, seven motions (containing twelve discrete requests) are currently before the court:

▪ (1) Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 21;

▪ (2) Mr. Calzada’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, ECF No. 22;

▪ (3) Defendants’ Motion to Stay Briefing on Mr. Calzada’s Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 26;

▪ Mr. Calzada’s Motion (4) to Challenge Defendants’ Westfall Act Certification and (5) to Strike Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 28;

▪ Mr. Calzada’s Motion (6) to Stay the Case, (7) to Refer the Case to the Judicial Conference of the United States, and (8) to Order the Appearance of Chief Justice Roberts, ECF No. 31;

▪ Mr. Calzada’s Motion (9) for Sanctions, (10) for an Injunction, and (11) for an Order to Show Cause, ECF No. 40; and

▪ (12) Mr. Calzada’s Motion for Leave to Supplement, ECF No. 42.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” and it is generally “presumed that a cause

lies outside [of] this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S.

375, 377 (1994). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), the court must dismiss an action

unless the plaintiff can establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the court possesses

subject matter jurisdiction. Green v. Stuyvesant, 505 F. Supp. 2d 176, 178 (D.D.C. 2007). In

reviewing such a motion, the court “is not limited to the allegations set forth in the complaint” and

5 “may consider materials outside the pleadings.” Morrow v. United States, 723 F. Supp. 2d 71, 76

(D.D.C. 2010) (quoting Jerome Stevens Pharms., 402 F.3d at 1253).

Pleadings by pro se litigants are generally held “to less stringent standards than formal

pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). This

liberal construction “is not, however, a license to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”

Sturdza v. United Arab Emirates, 658 F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (D.D.C. 2009). Thus, “even a pro se

plaintiff[] must meet his burden of proving that the [c]ourt has subject matter jurisdiction over

[his] claims.” Woodyard v. Harper, 162 F. Supp. 3d 3, 6 (D.D.C. 2016).

IV. DISCUSSION

As a threshold matter, Mr. Calzada challenges Defendants’ Westfall Act certification,

which the court addresses first. See Jackson v. United States, 857 F. Supp. 2d 158, 160 (D.D.C.

2012) (“Before turning to the merits of the motion to dismiss [for lack of subject matter

jurisdiction], the [c]ourt will address plaintiff’s apparent challenge to the Westfall Act

certification.”); see Harris v. Wilson, 282 F. Supp. 3d 80, 84-86 (D.D.C. 2017) (addressing the

plaintiff’s challenge to the defendants’ Westfall Act Certification before addressing the

defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction); Steele v. Meyer, 964 F. Supp.

2d 9, 15-21 (D.D.C. 2013) (same). The court then turns to Defendants’ arguments for dismissal

and concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Mr. Calzada’s complaint.

A. Westfall Act Certification

Mr. Calzada challenges Defendants’ Westfall Act certification with respect to any official-

capacity claims. See ECF No. 28. Under the Westfall Act, “an Attorney General or designee who

believes that a federal employee was acting within the scope of employment at the time of the

alleged incident may issue a certification to that effect,” after which point the United States is

6 substituted as the defendant in the case. Harbury v. Hayden, 444 F. Supp. 2d 19, 28 (D.D.C. 2006);

see 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2).

“[T]he burden of challenging the correctness of a Westfall Act certification rests with the

plaintiff.” Steele v. Meyer, 964 F. Supp. 2d 9, 17 (D.D.C. 2013). The plaintiff must present more

than “‘[m]ere conclusory statements’ . . . to rebut a certification.” Id. (quoting Jacobs v. Vrobel,

724 F. 3d 217, 221 (D.C. Cir. 2013)). The plaintiff is only entitled to “discovery and an evidentiary

hearing” if there is a “genuine question of fact material to the scope-of-employment issue.” Id.

(quoting Estate of Callaham ex rel. Foster v. United States, No. 12-CV-579, 2012 WL 1835366

(D.S.C. May 21, 2012)). When evaluating such a challenge, the court appl[ies] the respondeat

superior law of the state where the alleged tort occurred.” Id. In this case, the relevant law is that

of the District of Columbia because both Defendants work in the District. ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 27-28

(listing workplace addresses within the District for both Defendants); see ECF No. 33.

Mr. Calzada flatly asserts that Defendants were not acting within the scope of their

employment and relies entirely on conclusory assertions to do so. See ECF No. 28, at 15-19. He

argues that both Defendants exceeded their authority under Article III of the U.S. Constitution by

not acting on his allegations of fraud on the court. See ECF No. 28, at 15-19. But any actions that

Defendants took or did not take in their supervisory roles over the federal judiciary would be within

their official duties as the Chief Justice of the United States and Director of the Administrative

Office of the U.S. Courts. See ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 27-28. At most, Mr. Calzada complains about how

Defendants carried out their duties, not whether those duties fell within the scope of their

employment. Indeed, Mr. Calzada’s central claim that Defendants were derelict in their official

responsibilities necessarily implies that their alleged misconduct was related to their official duties.

See id. ¶ 31 (stating that “[t]he [d]irect violation of Article III . . . requir[es] an immediate answer

7 from Defendant Chief Justice John G. Roberts in how his position plans to correct the violations

created by the U.S. Courts” (emphasis added)). Mr. Calzada therefore cannot satisfy his burden

of rebutting the Westfall Act certification. See Steele, 964 F. Supp. 2d at 17.2

B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction

Mr. Calzada’s complaint could be read to allege a variety of claims. At some points, he

appears to bring negligence claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1402,

2401, 2671, et seq. (“FTCA”), accusing Defendants of improperly supervising judicial officers in

the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas and U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth

Circuit. See ECF No. 3 ¶ 35, 67. At other points, Mr. Calzada seems to allege a Bivens claim

against Defendants for invading his Fourth Amendment rights. See id. ¶ 65; see Bivens v. Six

Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). And at others still, he

appears to challenge the process by which his appeals were handled in the Fifth Circuit. See id.

¶ 66.

Despite these multiple possible readings, Mr. Calzada insists in his supplemental opposition

that he is not bringing FTCA or Bivens claims. ECF No. 30, at 47 (“Mr. Calzada argues that the

lawsuit is not a Federal Tort Claims [sic] or Bivens claim[.]”); see id. at 40 (accusing Defendants

of “attempt[ing] to reformat the lawsuit to another category of law such as ‘FTCA’ or

‘BIVENS’”).3 Instead, he states that his “lawsuit is focused on systemic fraud upon the

judiciary”—specifically, that the Western District of Texas and the Fifth Circuit lacked Article III

2 Because Mr. Calzada’s request to strike Defendants’ motion to dismiss is premised on the invalidity of the Westfall Act certification, see ECF No. 28, at 10, the court will deny the request as moot. 3 Without the FTCA or Bivens, there is no clear basis for Mr. Calzada’s individual-capacity claims against Defendants.

8 jurisdiction to adjudicate his 2012 criminal case. Id.; see ECF No. 3 ¶¶ 5, 7 (alleging that the

district court that presided over his criminal case “lack[ed] subject matter jurisdiction [in the

absence of any] criminal complaint . . . , federal warrants[,] or federal summon[s] issuance/

executions”); see ECF No. 22, at 33-35 (alleging that there was “a complete absence of jurisdiction

and judicial power for the supreme court [sic] and the lower courts to hear [his criminal] case”).

But Mr. Calzada does not identify any basis for this court (which derives its own authority from

Article III) to invalidate the Article III jurisdiction of other federal courts. He attempts to bring

his claim under “Rule 60(d)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,” ECF No. 30, at 16, which

enables a court to “set aside a judgment for fraud on the court,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(d)(3). But this

court does not have the jurisdiction or ability to vacate a criminal judgment pursuant to a Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure. Hinojosa v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 759 F. Supp. 2d 53, 54-55 (D.D.C. 2011);

United States v. Mims, No. 04-3050, 2004 WL 2191629, at *1 (D.C. Cir. Sept. 24, 2004) (per

curiam) (“[A litigant] may not challenge his criminal conviction through a motion filed under Fed.

R. Civ. P. 60.”).4

Mr. Calzada also makes a series of allegations that his original arrest and prosecution in

the Western District of Texas were undertaken without a proper criminal complaint. See ECF

No. 3 ¶ 65; ECF No. 22, at 8. But this precise claim, and various other legal challenges to the

merits of his criminal prosecution, were extensively litigated in the Western District of Texas and

4 In his supplemental reply, Mr. Calzada appears to disclaim reliance on Rule 60 and instead argues that this court has “inherent powers to intervene in an independent action involving [s]ystemic fraud upon the Judiciary.” ECF No. 37, at 3-4. But because “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,” it is generally “presumed that a cause lies outside [of] this limited jurisdiction.” Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377. Mr. Calzada asserts that “there is no contest or no opposition being provided by the Defendants in regards to . . . this [c]ourt’s inherent powers,” ECF No. 37, at 4 (emphasis omitted), but it is the plaintiff’s burden to establish jurisdiction, Kokkonen, 511 U.S. at 377.

9 the Fifth Circuit. To the extent that Mr. Calzada seeks to relitigate these issues, it is well

established that this court “lacks jurisdiction to review decisions of other federal courts.” Klayman

v. Rao, 49 F.4th 550, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (quoting Smalls v. United States, 471 F.3d

186, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2006)); Calderon v. Brown, No. 15-CV-75, 2015 WL 222164, at *1 (D.D.C.

Jan. 13, 2015) (“As a general rule applicable here, this [c]ourt lacks subject matter jurisdiction to

review the decisions of another court[.]”); Fleming v. United States, 847 F. Supp. 170, 172

(D.D.C. 1994) (similar).

Mr. Calzada further argues that he was “denied the opportunity to present his case to a

panel of judges within the [Fifth] Circuit,” ECF No. 30, at 8, because Fifth Circuit Clerk of Court

Lyle Cayce “improperly electronically fil[ed]” that court’s panel opinions in his three appeals, id.

at 9; see Op., United States v. Calzada, No. 22-50090 (5th Cir. Feb. 15, 2023) (Higginbotham,

Graves, Ho); Op., United States v. Calzada, No. 23-50367 (5th Cir. Sept. 21, 2023) (Smith,

Higginson, Engelhardt); Op., United States v. Calzada, No. 23-50838 (5th Cir. June 24, 2024)

(Higginbotham, Stewart, Southwick). But this court has no jurisdiction to police the actions of the

Fifth Circuit; instead, Mr. Calzada should have raised any grievances with the panel opinions

through a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court. See R.A. v. McClenahan, 122 F.4th 143,

149 (4th Cir. 2024) (“[W]hen a litigant is dissatisfied with the decision of a [federal] circuit court,

[he] should file a petition for rehearing or seek certiorari at the Supreme Court. What [he] should

not do is return to the trial court and ask it to undo the appellate court’s decision.”).5

5 Even if the court had subject matter jurisdiction over this claim (and it does not), the claim would fail because the recording of official court orders and opinions is a routine task by the Clerk of Court. See Fed. R. App. Proc. 45(b)(1) (explaining that “[t]he clerk must record all papers filed with the clerk and all process, orders, and judgments”).

10 V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant Defendant’s motion to dismiss, ECF No. 21,

and deny the remaining motions, ECF Nos. 22, 26, 28, 31, 40, 42, as moot. A contemporaneous

order will issue.

LOREN L. ALIKHAN United States District Judge

Date: May 7, 2025