UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OMAR J. CALZADA,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 25-cv-03281 (TSC) HON. LOREN ALIKHAN, et al.,
Defendants,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Omar Jose Calzada, proceeding pro se, sues a number of judicial officers and other
government officials in their official capacities, alleging that his 2012 arrest in Texas was improper
because it was not performed by a federal officer and that the Fifth Circuit judgments rejecting his
appeals were invalid because they were issued by the clerk. See Compl. ¶¶ 2–7, ECF No. 1.
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No 7. For the reasons
below, the court will GRANT Defendants’ motion.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2012, Plaintiff was arrested, charged, and pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Texas to conspiracy to manufacture more than 100 marijuana plants in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 846. See Order at 2, 4, United States v.
Page 1 of 7 Calzada, No. 5:12-cr-642 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2022), ECF No. 189. 1 He was sentenced to time
served and a term of supervised release, which he completed in January 2019. See id. at 4–5.
Thereafter, Plaintiff initiated several challenges to his conviction, see id. at 5–6, each of which
were denied and later affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, see United States v. Calzada, No. 22-50090,
2023 WL 2010750, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb 15, 2023) (rejecting, inter alia, Plaintiff’s contention that
“the trial court did not have jurisdiction in his case because the state did not transfer custody of
Calzada to the federal government” for failure to raise the claim below); United States v. Calzada,
No. 23-50367, 2023 WL 6162797, at *1 (5th Cir. Sept. 21, 2023) (affirming the district court’s
jurisdiction and rejecting Plaintiff’s contention on appeal that his due process rights were violated
when he was “seized” without a federal arrest warrant); United States v. Calzada, No. 23-50838,
2024 WL 3103326, at *1 (5th Cir. June 24, 2024) (concluding that law of the case and Plaintiff’s
failure to previously raise his argument—that the district court lacked jurisdiction “because a
federal law enforcement officer did not file his criminal complaint”—prevented further appellate
review).
Plaintiff then filed a civil action in this court, see Calzada v. Roberts, No. 24-cv-2477, 2025
WL 1328764 (D.D.C. May 7, 2025), asserting that Chief Justice John Roberts and Judge Robert
Conrad, the Director of the Administrative Office of United States Courts, “failed to properly
supervise various judicial officers who were involved in his criminal prosecution and unsuccessful
appeals.” Id. at *2. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that his criminal conviction was
invalid because no “[f]ederal law enforcement officer” was involved in his arrest or the issuance
1 Although a court must presume all factual allegations contained in a complaint are true for the purpose of resolving a motion to dismiss, see Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F. 3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), “[t]he court may take judicial notice of public records from other court proceedings,” Lewis v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 777 F. Supp. 2d 151, 159 (D.D.C. 2011). Page 2 of 7 of his criminal complaint and that the Fifth Circuit’s decisions affirming the denials of his post-
conviction motions were improperly issued by the Fifth Circuit clerk instead of a judge. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 4, 14, 31–38, Calzada, No. 24-cv-2477 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2024), ECF No. 3; see also id.
¶¶ 64–67. Judge AliKhan dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
to review decisions by other federal courts. Calzada, 2025 WL 1328764, at *5–6.
After numerous unsuccessful attempts to reassert his claims before Judge AliKhan, see
Min. Ord., Calzada, No. 24-cv-2477 (D.D.C. Aug. 4, 2025), Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on
September 18, 2025. See Compl. His Complaint names as Defendants Judge AliKhan, Assistant
United States Attorney Oblea, several officials associated with his criminal proceedings in Texas,
including the clerk of the Fifth Circuit, the United States Attorney for the Western District of Texas,
and Judge Xavier Rodriguez, as well as Judge Conrad. See id. ¶¶ 32–37. The Complaint alleges
that the Fifth Circuit’s judgments were constitutionally defective because they are “issued by [the]
Clerk Lyle Cayce” and not an Article III judge, id. ¶¶ 127–29, and that his criminal proceedings
were void ab initio because he was arrested by a state police officer, id. ¶¶ 130–31. Plaintiff seeks
declaratory and mandamus relief, as well as requests that the court order “sealed in-camera review
of the Fifth Circuit’s” records regarding its judgments. Id. ¶¶ 141.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, see Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d
442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004), and the law presumes that “a cause lies outside [the court’s] limited
jurisdiction” unless the plaintiff establishes otherwise, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citation omitted). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court
must “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and ‘construe the
complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences.’” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC,
Page 3 of 7 642 F. 3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, “the court need not accept
factual inferences drawn by plaintiffs if those inferences are not supported by facts alleged in the
complaint, nor must the Court accept plaintiff’s legal conclusions.” Disner v. United States, 888
F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Speelman v. United States, 461 F. Supp. 2d 71, 73
(D.D.C. 2006)).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “The pleadings of pro se parties are to be ‘liberally
construed,’ and a pro se complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” James v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 3d 58,
63 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). “This benefit is not,
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
OMAR J. CALZADA,
Plaintiff,
v. Civil Action No. 25-cv-03281 (TSC) HON. LOREN ALIKHAN, et al.,
Defendants,
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Omar Jose Calzada, proceeding pro se, sues a number of judicial officers and other
government officials in their official capacities, alleging that his 2012 arrest in Texas was improper
because it was not performed by a federal officer and that the Fifth Circuit judgments rejecting his
appeals were invalid because they were issued by the clerk. See Compl. ¶¶ 2–7, ECF No. 1.
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). See Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (“Defs.’ Mot.”), ECF No 7. For the reasons
below, the court will GRANT Defendants’ motion.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2012, Plaintiff was arrested, charged, and pleaded guilty in the U.S. District Court for
the Western District of Texas to conspiracy to manufacture more than 100 marijuana plants in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B), and 846. See Order at 2, 4, United States v.
Page 1 of 7 Calzada, No. 5:12-cr-642 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2022), ECF No. 189. 1 He was sentenced to time
served and a term of supervised release, which he completed in January 2019. See id. at 4–5.
Thereafter, Plaintiff initiated several challenges to his conviction, see id. at 5–6, each of which
were denied and later affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, see United States v. Calzada, No. 22-50090,
2023 WL 2010750, at *1 (5th Cir. Feb 15, 2023) (rejecting, inter alia, Plaintiff’s contention that
“the trial court did not have jurisdiction in his case because the state did not transfer custody of
Calzada to the federal government” for failure to raise the claim below); United States v. Calzada,
No. 23-50367, 2023 WL 6162797, at *1 (5th Cir. Sept. 21, 2023) (affirming the district court’s
jurisdiction and rejecting Plaintiff’s contention on appeal that his due process rights were violated
when he was “seized” without a federal arrest warrant); United States v. Calzada, No. 23-50838,
2024 WL 3103326, at *1 (5th Cir. June 24, 2024) (concluding that law of the case and Plaintiff’s
failure to previously raise his argument—that the district court lacked jurisdiction “because a
federal law enforcement officer did not file his criminal complaint”—prevented further appellate
review).
Plaintiff then filed a civil action in this court, see Calzada v. Roberts, No. 24-cv-2477, 2025
WL 1328764 (D.D.C. May 7, 2025), asserting that Chief Justice John Roberts and Judge Robert
Conrad, the Director of the Administrative Office of United States Courts, “failed to properly
supervise various judicial officers who were involved in his criminal prosecution and unsuccessful
appeals.” Id. at *2. Specifically, Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that his criminal conviction was
invalid because no “[f]ederal law enforcement officer” was involved in his arrest or the issuance
1 Although a court must presume all factual allegations contained in a complaint are true for the purpose of resolving a motion to dismiss, see Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F. 3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), “[t]he court may take judicial notice of public records from other court proceedings,” Lewis v. Drug Enf’t Admin., 777 F. Supp. 2d 151, 159 (D.D.C. 2011). Page 2 of 7 of his criminal complaint and that the Fifth Circuit’s decisions affirming the denials of his post-
conviction motions were improperly issued by the Fifth Circuit clerk instead of a judge. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 4, 14, 31–38, Calzada, No. 24-cv-2477 (D.D.C. Sept. 9, 2024), ECF No. 3; see also id.
¶¶ 64–67. Judge AliKhan dismissed Plaintiff’s Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
to review decisions by other federal courts. Calzada, 2025 WL 1328764, at *5–6.
After numerous unsuccessful attempts to reassert his claims before Judge AliKhan, see
Min. Ord., Calzada, No. 24-cv-2477 (D.D.C. Aug. 4, 2025), Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on
September 18, 2025. See Compl. His Complaint names as Defendants Judge AliKhan, Assistant
United States Attorney Oblea, several officials associated with his criminal proceedings in Texas,
including the clerk of the Fifth Circuit, the United States Attorney for the Western District of Texas,
and Judge Xavier Rodriguez, as well as Judge Conrad. See id. ¶¶ 32–37. The Complaint alleges
that the Fifth Circuit’s judgments were constitutionally defective because they are “issued by [the]
Clerk Lyle Cayce” and not an Article III judge, id. ¶¶ 127–29, and that his criminal proceedings
were void ab initio because he was arrested by a state police officer, id. ¶¶ 130–31. Plaintiff seeks
declaratory and mandamus relief, as well as requests that the court order “sealed in-camera review
of the Fifth Circuit’s” records regarding its judgments. Id. ¶¶ 141.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, see Gen. Motors Corp. v. EPA, 363 F.3d
442, 448 (D.C. Cir. 2004), and the law presumes that “a cause lies outside [the court’s] limited
jurisdiction” unless the plaintiff establishes otherwise, Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am.,
511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (citation omitted). When deciding a Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the court
must “assume the truth of all material factual allegations in the complaint and ‘construe the
complaint liberally, granting plaintiff the benefit of all inferences.’” Am. Nat’l Ins. Co. v. FDIC,
Page 3 of 7 642 F. 3d 1137, 1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Nevertheless, “the court need not accept
factual inferences drawn by plaintiffs if those inferences are not supported by facts alleged in the
complaint, nor must the Court accept plaintiff’s legal conclusions.” Disner v. United States, 888
F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Speelman v. United States, 461 F. Supp. 2d 71, 73
(D.D.C. 2006)).
Under Rule 12(b)(6), a “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true,
to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atl.
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “The pleadings of pro se parties are to be ‘liberally
construed,’ and a pro se complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’” James v. United States, 48 F. Supp. 3d 58,
63 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007)). “This benefit is not,
however, a license to ignore the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.” Sturdza v. United Arab
Emirates, 658 F. Supp. 2d 135, 137 (D.D.C. 2009) (quoting Jarrell v. Tisch, 656 F. Supp. 237, 239
(D.D.C. 1987)). “[E]ven a pro se plaintiff must meet his burdens of proving subject matter
jurisdiction and stating a claim for relief.” James, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 63.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Dismiss
Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint on numerous grounds, including lack of
subject matter jurisdiction and issue preclusion. Defs.’ Mot. at 4–5, 6–7.
It is well established that this court “lacks jurisdiction to review decisions of other federal
courts.” Klayman v. Rao, 49 F.4th 550, 552 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (per curiam) (quoting Smalls v. United
States, 471 F.3d 186, 192 (D.C. Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Choi, 818 F. Supp. 2d 79, 85
(D.D.C. 2011) (stating that federal district courts “generally lack[ ] appellate jurisdiction over other
Page 4 of 7 judicial bodies, and cannot exercise appellate mandamus over other courts”). The gravamen of
Plaintiff’s Complaint is that the Texas district court lacked jurisdiction over his criminal case
because he was not arrested by a federal officer and that the Fifth Circuit’s decisions affirming the
district court’s denials of his post-conviction motions are invalid because they were issued by a
clerk rather than a judge. See Compl. ¶¶ 2–8. But because the bases for Plaintiff’s claims “are
decisions made in separate legal proceedings by other district [and appellate] court judges,”
Klayman, 49 F.4th at 553, this court lacks the authority to review them, which is precisely why
Judge AliKhan dismissed Plaintiff’s nearly identical arguments when he raised them before her,
see Calzada, 2025 WL 1328764, at *5.
Apparently aware of this defect, Plaintiff explains in his Complaint that he “does not
challenge the merits of any substantive criminal charges,” but rather attacks “antecedent
jurisdictional prerequisites for any valid federal proceeding,” Compl. ¶¶ 20, 23. Such a distinction,
however, is immaterial; “a federal district court is not a reviewing court and, thus, lacks subject
matter jurisdiction to review the final determinations of other courts,” Kissi v. United States, No.
12-cv-1765, 2012 WL 5382898, at *1 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2012). That is so regardless of whether the
challenge is “to the substance of the opinions” or “the validity of the judgments.” See
Calzada v. Roberts, No. 24-cv-2477, 2025 WL 1895610, at *5 (D.D.C. July 9, 2025) (denying
Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration).
Moreover, Judge AliKhan’s determination that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
to review the validity of the Texas district court and Fifth Circuit’s decisions carries preclusive
effect. 2 See Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. EPA, 786 F.3d 34, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (“Issue
2 In anticipation of Defendants’ arguments, Plaintiff contends in his Complaint that issue preclusion does not apply because the Fifth Circuit’s judgments are not “valid.” See Compl. ¶ 115. But it is Judge AliKhan’s decision that provides the requisite preclusive effect, and Plaintiff has Page 5 of 7 preclusion applies to threshold jurisdictional issues . . . as well as issues going to a case’s merits.”).
For instance, in his prior case, Plaintiff raised “allegations that his original arrest and prosecution
in the Western District of Texas were undertaken without a proper criminal complaint,” which
Judge AliKhan concluded were issues “extensively litigated in the Western District of Texas and
the Fifth Circuit.” Calzada, 2025 WL 1328764, at *5. The court therefore “‘lack[ed] jurisdiction
to review decision of other federal courts.’” Id. (quoting Klayman, 49 F.4th at 552). Similarly,
Judge AliKhan rejected Plaintiff’s contention that “[the] Fifth Circuit Clerk of
Court . . . improperly electronically filed that court’s panel opinion in his three appeals” again on
the ground that the court had “no jurisdiction to police the actions of the Fifth Circuit” and,
alternatively, because “the recording of official court orders and opinions is a routine task by the
Clerk of Court.” Id. at *5 & n.5 (citing Fed. R. App. P. 45(b)(1)). “[O]nce an issue is raised and
determined, it is the entire issue that is precluded, not just the particular arguments raised in support
of it in the first case.” Yamaha Corp. v. United States, 961 F.2d 245, 254 (D.C. Cir. 1992). This
court will not revisit Judge AliKhan’s determinations. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss
will be granted.
B. Leave to Amend
Plaintiff has also filed an opposed motion for leave to amend his Complaint to include
details about “jurisdictional alignment, custody sequencing, authority, and proper-party
identification.” Mot. to Amend. at 2, ECF No. 31; see also id. at 7–8. While courts “should freely
give leave when justice so requires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), particularly where a plaintiff proceeds
pro se, see Moore v. Agency for Int’l Dev., 994 F.2d 874, 877 (D.C. Cir. 1993), they should not do
not made any meaningful challenge to that decision’s validity, see Pl.’s Opp’n to Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss at 4–17, ECF No. 20. Page 6 of 7 so where amendment would be futile, would result in undue delay or prejudice, is motivated by
bad faith or a dilatory motive, or follows a “repeated failure to cure deficiencies by previous
amendments.” Onyewuchi v. Gonzalez, 267 F.R.D. 417, 420 (D.D.C. 2010). Plaintiff’s motion
indicates that he merely seeks to elaborate on his challenge to his underlying criminal proceedings
in Texas. See Mot. to Amend at 2, 7–8. As set forth above, however, this court lacks jurisdiction
over any such challenges, which are also precluded by Judge AliKhan’s prior opinion.
Accordingly, any amendment would be futile. See McGee v. District of Columbia, 646 F. Supp.
2d 115, 119 (D.D.C. 2009) (“An amended complaint is futile if it merely restates the same facts as
the original complaint in different terms, reasserts a claim on which the court previously ruled,
fails to state a legal theory or could not withstand a motion to dismiss.”). 3
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court will grant Defendants’ motion to dismiss, deny Plaintiff
leave to amend his Complaint, and deny the remaining motions, ECF Nos. 8, 11, 17, 18, 21, 23,
25, 27, 28, 29, 32, 35, 38, 39, as moot. A separate Order will follow.
Date: May 28, 2026
Tanya S. Chutkan TANYA S. CHUTKAN United States District Judge
3 In addition, Plaintiff has not attached an Amended Complaint to his motion for leave to file, as required under the court’s Local Rules. See LCvR 7(i); see also LCvR 15.1. Page 7 of 7