Pink Cheetah Express, LLC v. Total Quality Logistics, LLC

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: September 12, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2025-0552
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

PINK CHEETAH EXPRESS, LLC,

Plaintiff, Civil Action No. 25 - 552 (SLS) v. Judge Sparkle L. Sooknanan

TOTAL QUALITY LOGISTICS, LLC,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pink Cheetah Express (Pink Cheetah) is a motor-carrier company that contracted with Total

Quality Logistics (Total Quality) to haul a load of ice cream. After transporting the ice cream, Pink

Cheetah sought certain records from Total Quality under 49 C.F.R. § 371.3, a regulation

promulgated by the Department of Transportation (DOT) that requires freight brokers to maintain

and disclose certain records upon request. But Total Quality refused, arguing that Pink Cheetah

waived any right to these disclosures in the broker agreement governing the transaction. Pink

Cheetah submitted a complaint to the Secretary of Transportation, and DOT’s Federal Motor

Carrier Safety Administration (FMSCA) emailed Total Quality with guidance to remove the

contractual waiver and comply with the regulation. After Total Quality ignored FMSCA’s email,

Pink Cheetah brought this action for declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that FMSCA’s email

was an actionable “order” that it may enforce under the Interstate Commerce Commission

Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14704(a)(1). Total Quality Logistics now moves to dismiss under

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(3), and 12(b)(6). For the reasons below, the Court

grants the motion under Rule 12(b)(6) and dismisses the case. BACKGROUND

A. Statutory and Regulatory Background

The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) Termination Act of 1995 provides a cause of

action to “[a] person injured because a carrier or broker providing transportation or service subject

to jurisdiction under chapter 135 does not obey an order of the Secretary or the Board, as

applicable, under this part.” 49 U.S.C. § 14704(a)(1). The Act “abolish[ed] the Interstate

Commerce Commission[,]” a regulatory agency that originally resolved these disputes. ICC

Termination Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–88, 109 Stat 803 (1995). The House Transportation and

Infrastructure Committee explained the provision’s purpose:

The bill transfers responsibility for all the areas in which the ICC resolves disputes to the Secretary (except passenger intercarrier disputes). The Committee does not believe that DOT should allocate scarce resources to resolving these essentially private disputes, and specifically directs that DOT should not continue the dispute resolution functions in these areas. The bill provides that private parties may bring actions in court to enforce the provisions of the Motor Carrier Act. This change will permit these private, commercial disputes to be resolved the way that all other commercial disputes are resolved—by the parties.

H.R. Rep. No. 104–311, at 87–88 (1995), reprinted in 1995–2 U.S.C.C.A.N. 793, 799–800. The

Act thus establishes a hybrid enforcement mechanism, depending on collaboration between DOT

and private actors to enforce motor carrier regulations.

DOT has promulgated regulations to carry out its statutory duties, including 49 C.F.R.

§ 371.3. That regulation governs “[r]ecords to be kept by brokers” and grants “each party to a

brokered transaction . . . the right to review the record of the transaction[,]” which includes

“compensation” and the “freight charges collected.” Id.

B. Factual Background

The Court draws the facts, accepted as true, from the Plaintiff’s Complaint and

attachments. Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Found., 68 F.4th 612, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2023). The

2 Court also takes “judicial notice of public records from other court proceedings.” Lewis v. Drug

Enf’t Admin., 777 F. Supp. 2d 151, 159 (D.D.C. 2011).

Pink Cheetah is a for-hire motor carrier based in the District of Columbia. Compl. ¶ 5, ECF

No. 1. Total Quality is a freight broker that acts as a commodity transport intermediary licensed

by FMSCA. Compl. ¶ 6. In January 2023, Pink Cheetah contracted with Total Quality to haul one

truck load of ice cream. Compl. ¶ 7. In relevant part, their broker agreement contained the

following waiver:

BROKER is not required to disclose its charges to CUSTOMERS, commissions, or brokerage revenue, and CARRIER waives its right to receive, audit, and/or review information and documents to be kept as provided in 49 C.F.R. § 371.3.

Compl., Ex. A, § 4(c).

Following the delivery, Pink Cheetah requested transactional records under § 371.3.

Compl. ¶ 7. Total Quality refused, taking the position that the broker agreement waived any

disclosure requirements it had under § 371.3. Id. Pink Cheetah then filed a complaint against Total

Quality with the Secretary of Transportation for failure to comply with § 371.3. Compl., Ex. B. In

November 2023, FMSCA acted on this complaint by sending an email to Total Quality. Compl.,

Ex. D. In relevant part, the email stated:

Please ensure compliance with the Federal Motor Carrier regulations and follow the below guidance and regulations. . . .

Remove the [§ 371.3 waiver] from any and all Broker/Carrier Agreements which . . . may be a violation of [49 U.S.C.] § 14906 . . . .

Ensure compliance with the [§ 371.3] regulation and provide transaction records to any carrier when requested.

Id. (emphasis in original). But Total Quality continued to deny Pink Cheetah’s requests for

transaction records and blocked Pink Cheetah from further communications. Compl. ¶¶ 16, 19, 21.

3 C. Procedural Background

Pink Cheetah brought this lawsuit under the ICC Termination Act, 49 U.S.C. § 14704, and

the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201. Pink Cheetah asks this Court to: (1) order Total

Quality to turn over the requested records, (2) order Total Quality to remove the waiver from its

contracts, (3) order Total Quality to comply with FMSCA’s email in all future transactions for all

motor carriers, (4) award attorney fees and costs, and (5) grant any other relief the Court deems

proper. Compl. at 10–11. Total Quality has moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure 12(b)(1), 12(b)(3) and 12(b)(6). Mot. Dismiss (Mot.), ECF No. 5. The motion is fully

briefed and ripe for review. Opp’n, ECF No. 6; Reply, ECF No. 7.

LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 12(b)(6), a court must dismiss a complaint that does not “contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).

Courts “must construe the complaint in favor of the plaintiff, who must be granted the benefit of

all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.” Hettinga v. United States, 677 F.3d 471,

476 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (quotation omitted). But courts need not accept as true “a legal conclusion

couched as a factual allegation,” nor an “inference[] . . . unsupported by the facts set out in the

complaint.’” Trudeau v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 456 F.3d 178, 193 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (quoting

Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)).

DISCUSSION

Total Quality urges dismissal on several grounds, including improper venue under

Rule 12(b)(3) and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6).

The Court dismisses under Rule 12(b)(6) because Pink Cheetah lacks a cause of action under the

4 ICC Termination Act. The Court thus need not address Total Quality’s venue arguments under

Rule 12(b)(3). See Mowatt v. U.S. Parole Comm’n, 815 F. Supp. 2d 199, 204 (D.D.C. 2011).1

A. ICC Termination Act

The ICC Termination Act authorizes private civil actions when a covered carrier or broker

“does not obey an order of the Secretary” of Transportation. 49 U.S.C. § 14704(a)(1). Pink Cheetah

argues that FMSCA’s November 2023 email to Total Quality constitutes an actionable “order”

under § 14704(a)(1). Opp’n at 13–17. And it alleges that Total Quality failed to comply with

FMSCA’s email. Compl. ¶ 16. Total Quality points out that the email, by its own terms, is merely

“guidance,” and contends that it is not enforceable under the statute. Mot. at 13–17. The Court

agrees.

The ICC Termination Act does not define the term “order,” but the ordinary meaning is

“[a]n authoritative direction; an injunction, or mandate; an oral or written command; an

instruction.” Order, Oxford English Dictionary, https://doi.org/10.1093/OED/6605008216 (last

visited Aug. 28, 2025). The November 2023 email does not authoritatively identify a regulatory

violation but instead suggests the waiver’s language “may be a violation” of the statute. Compl.,

Ex. D. Then, the email simply reminds Total Quality of its pre-existing obligation to “[e]nsure

compliance with the [] regulation and provide transaction records to any carrier when requested.”

Id. Indeed, the email characterizes at least part of these obligations as “guidance” rather than an

1 Total Quality also seeks dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1). Mot. at 1. Normally, the Court would “consider Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional challenges before” other grounds to dismiss. Raines v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 424 F. Supp. 2d 60, 63 n. 2 (D.D.C. 2006). But that rule is inapplicable here where Total Quality moves to dismiss for lack of statutory standing. See Reply at 6. Statutory standing is non-jurisdictional, and so the Court addresses it under Rule 12(b)(6). See United States v. Emor, 785 F.3d 671, 677–78 (D.C. Cir. 2015); Leyse v. Bank of Am. Nat.’l Ass’n, 804 F.3d 316, 320 (3d Cir. 2015); In re Century Aluminum Co. Sec. Litig., 729 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013).

5 authoritative command. Id. It follows, then, that FMSCA’s email was not an actionable “order”

under § 14704(a)(1).

This is consistent with how the D.C. Circuit has interpreted the term “order” in the

regulatory context. In Rhea Lana, Inc. v. Dep’t of Lab., for example, the plaintiffs received two

letters from the Department of Labor: one warning that their employees “might not have been paid

as required by” the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and another that “direct[ed] [their] attention

to section 16(e) of the FLSA and Regulations” alongside potential penalties. 824 F.3d 1023, 1026

(D.C. Cir. 2016). The plaintiffs there argued that the second letter provided them with a cause of

action under the Administrative Procedure Act because: (1) the letter amounted to an actionable

“order to comply,” and (2) it resulted in legal consequences making it final. Id. at 1027–28. The

court accepted the second argument, but—as relevant here—rejected the first. Id. at 1028.

The Court explained that such a letter does not “resemble[]” a “compliance order, but ‘the

type of workaday advice . . . that agencies prepare countless times per year in dealing with the

regulated community.’” Id. (quoting Indep. Equip. Dealers Ass’n v. EPA, 372 F.3d 420, 427 (D.C.

Cir. 2004)). And it warned that “[t]reating such reminders of regulated parties’ legal obligations”

as actionable “would discourage their use, quickly muzzling informal communications between

agencies and their regulated communities that are vital to the smooth operation of both government

and business.” Id. (cleaned up).

Applying that reasoning here, the November 2023 email is closer to advice or guidance

than an “order compelling [the regulated entity] to do anything.”2 Indep. Equip. Dealers Ass’n,

2 Nothing in the ICC Termination Act suggests that this Court should deviate from the D.C. Circuit’s sound reasoning in this context. Indeed, Pink Cheetah relies on the Administrative Procedure Act’s definition of an “order” in arguing against dismissal. Opp’n at 16 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 551).

6 372 F.3d at 428 (quoting Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. CPSC, 324 F.3d 726, 732 (D.C. Cir.

2003)). This sort of “workaday advice” by an agency official cannot be an actionable “order,”

Rhea Lana, 824 F.3d at 1028 (quotation omitted), that gives rise to a claim under 49 U.S.C.

§ 14704(a)(1). Since Pink Cheetah lacks a cause of action to enforce the November 2023 email,

the Court dismisses its claim under Rule 12(b)(6).3

B. Declaratory Judgment Act

Pink Cheetah alternatively argues that it should survive the motion to dismiss because it

brings an additional claim under the Declaratory Judgment Act. Opp’n at 9. But “the Declaratory

Judgment Act standing alone [cannot] supply a cause of action”; “the availability of declaratory

relief presupposes the existence of a judicially remediable right.” Citizens for Resp. & Ethics in

Washington v. Trump, 302 F. Supp. 3d 127, 135 (D.D.C. 2018) (cleaned up). And “[c]ourts in this

Circuit have understood a ‘judicially remediable right’ to require the plaintiff to assert some

underlying cognizable claim that arises under the Constitution or federal law.” Westinghouse Elec.

Co. LLC v. Korea Elec. Power Corp., 694 F. Supp. 3d 48, 52 (D.D.C. 2023) (cleaned up). Because

Pink Cheetah lacks a cause of action under any other statute, it may not seek declaratory relief.

3 It troubles the Court that regulated entities may attempt to evade regulatory obligations by embedding waivers in contractual agreements. Some courts have suggested that a regulation promulgated through a formal rulemaking process may serve as an “order” that gives rise to a cause of action under § 14704(a)(1). See Owner-Operator Indep. Drivers Ass’n v. Mayflower Transit, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 948, 955 (S.D. Ind. 2001). But Pink Cheetah identifies only the November 2023 email as the applicable “order” it seeks to enforce under § 14704(a)(1). Compl. at 10–11. And its briefing seems to disclaim the theory that “rule making” may constitute an “order.” Opp’n at 16 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 551). So that argument is not before the Court.

7 CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court grants the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 5.

A separate order will issue.

SPARKLE L. SOOKNANAN United States District Judge

Date: September 12, 2025