Hutzler Bros. Co. v. Commissioner

8 T.C. 14, 1947 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 318
CourtUnited States Tax Court
DecidedJanuary 14, 1947
DocketDocket No. 4683
StatusPublished
Cited by45 cases

This text of 8 T.C. 14 (Hutzler Bros. Co. v. Commissioner) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Tax Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Hutzler Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 14, 1947 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 318 (tax 1947).

Opinions

OPINION.

Offer, Judge:

Although the subject matter of the present proceeding is complex and technical, its general purpose is one which can be simply stated in terms of everyday general experience. The central problem is one dealing with inventories which, in the case of department stores, are kept by the use of a unit which is the dollar. When prices or costs are constant, any increase or decrease in the dollar amount will furnish a reasonably reliable measure of the increase or decrease in the physical inventory. But it is common and sometimes bitter experience that in a period of rising prices the same amount of dollars will represent a smaller physical volume of goods, and the same physical volume will be represented by a higher number of dollars. The fundamental proposition about which the present proceeding revolves is the possibility and desirability of eliminating from an inventory kept in dollars that part which represents not an increase in physical inventory, but merely an expanded dollar figure at which that inventory is being carried.

A review of the characteristics of the retail method of inventories is necessary to appreciate the genesis of the present problem. Because of the number and diversity of individual articles constituting the stock of the typical department store, a system has been devised, approved,1 and generally practiced of reducing such articles to their lowest common denominator — a dollar figure. The inventories are taken and carried over from year to year in that form, rather than by specific items or quantities. And the annual stock-taking process constituting the ascertainment of the physical inventory is likewise, because of the complications of recording and maintaining actual costs for a constantly fluctuating stock, permitted to be based on computation and averaging.

That process is, roughly, to take from the price tags of the merchandise in stock on the day of the closing inventory a total for each department which, of course, represents the retail price on that day of all the goods then on hand. From this there is deducted the department’s average mark-on for the year, and the resulting figure, representing a theoretical conversion back to the cost of the goods on the shelves, is the closing inventory of the department in question.2

The mark-on or difference between the cost to the store and its selling price is obtained by recourse to the original invoices. During the year, as goods are received the invoices are extended by a notation of the retail price at which such goods are to be sold. These invoices form the records from which the mark-on for the year is computed by comparing the total of the costs they show with the total retail prices extended on them.

The dollar amount of the inventory so determined is then used like any other in computing the cost of goods sold, gross merchandising profit, and. ultimate net income of the store. The immediately apparent consequences of the retail method are that the goods in a single department are treated for inventory purposes as being entirely fungible, even though in fact they may, and generally do, differ considerably as to type, quality, and price. This follows from the fact that inventories are taken, entered, and maintained not in terms of individual items of merchandise, but only in the form of dollars, which are necessarily completely interchangeable. And also for the same reason, and what is perhaps a different method of saying the same thing, the problem of pricing the inventory, or more accurately, of “costing” it, has been eliminated, since the dollar figure arrived at as the make-up of the inventory is also taken as its cost without further conversion. A taxpayer who keeps his inventories in terms of specific items or quantities must convert them into dollars before they can be entered on the books and used in arriving at income. The retail method of inventories eliminates that intermediate step.

Petitioner’s position is founded on the proposition that, in a period of consistently advancing price levels, the result is to show as a profit what is merely an increase in the retail price and hence in the apparent cost of its inventories. In order to eliminate the consequent unrealized income, it claims to be entitled to the benefits of section 22 (d), added by the Revenue Act of 1939, which provides as follows:

(d) (1) A taxpayer may use the following method (whether or not such method has been prescribed under subsection (c)) in inventorying goods specified in the application required under paragraph (2):

(A) Inventory them at cost;
(B) Treat those remaining on hand at the close of the taxable year as being: First, those included in the opening Inventory of the taxable year (in the order of acquisition) to the extent thereof, and second, those acquired in the taxable year; and
(C) Treat those included in the opening inventory of the taxable year in which such method is first used as having been acquired at the same time and determine their cost by the average cost method.
(2) The method described in paragraph (1) may be used—
(A) Only in inventorying goods (required under subsection (c) to be inventoried) specified in an application to use such method filed at such time and in such manner as the Commissioner may prescribe; and
(B) Only if the taxpayer establishes to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that the taxpayer has used no procedure other than that specified in subparagraphs (B) and (C) of paragraph (1) in inventorying (to ascertain income, profit, or loss, for credit purposes, or for the purpose of reports to shareholders, partners, or other proprietors, or to beneficiaries) such goods for any period beginning with or during the first taxable year for which the method described in paragraph (1) is to be used.
(3) The change to, and the use of, such method shall be in accordance with such regulations as the Commissioner, with the approval of the Secretary, may prescribe as necessary in order that the use of such method may clearly reflect income.
(4) In determining income for the taxable year preceding the taxable year for which such method is first used, the closing inventory of such preceding year of the goods specified in such application shall be at cost
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Slight and presently immaterial amendments were made retroactively by section 118 of the Revenue Act of 1942.

The effect of this provision is to permit the use of a concept described as last in, first out in the determination of the contents of an inventory — familiarly known and sometimes here referred to as Lifo— in place of a first in, first out, or Fifo, theory, without regard to whether the actual physical content of the inventory conforms to the assumptions so made.3

A comparable provision appeared for the first time in the Revenue Act of 1938, but was there limited to special classes of taxpayers.4

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Bluebook (online)
8 T.C. 14, 1947 U.S. Tax Ct. LEXIS 318, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/hutzler-bros-co-v-commissioner-tax-1947.