Attorney Grievance v. Smith-Scott

230 A.3d 30, 469 Md. 281

Opinion

Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Arlene Adasa Smith-Scott, Misc. Docket AG Nos. 8 & 64, September Term, 2018. Opinion by Getty, J.

ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE–SANCTION–DISBARMENT

Respondent, Arlene Adasa Smith-Scott, violated several provisions of the Maryland Lawyer’s Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC”) and the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) through her self-representation before the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland and unrelated representation of Crystal Combs, Angela Plater, Furrah Deeba, Benjamin Thomas, Jr., John Thomas Jones, Jr., and Theresa Saunders.

Ms. Smith-Scott’s conduct violated the following rules of professional conduct: 1.1 (Competence); 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority); 1.3 (Diligence); 1.4 (Communication); 1.5 (Fees); 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information); 1.15 (Safekeeping Property); 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation); 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions); 3.2 (Expediting Litigation); 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal); 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney); 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others); 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters); 8.4 (Misconduct); and 19-404 (Trust Account— Required Deposits). This misconduct warrants disbarment. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. CAE-18-23035 Argued: January 10, 2020 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF MARYLAND

Misc. Docket AG Nos. 8 & 64

September Term, 2018 ______________________________________

ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND

v.

ARLENE ADASA SMITH-SCOTT

______________________________________

Barbera, C.J. McDonald, Watts, Hotten, Getty, Booth, Biran,

JJ. ______________________________________

Opinion by Getty, J. ______________________________________

Filed: June 29, 2020

Pursuant to Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.

Suzanne Johnson 2020-06-29 14:11-04:00

Suzanne C. Johnson, Clerk “A person who represents himself [or herself] has a fool for a client.”1

The instant attorney discipline case fortifies the import of this age-old adage often

attributed to President Lincoln. Regrettably, the underlying conduct involves an attorney’s

overzealous self-representation in a voluntary bankruptcy proceeding in the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland (“Bankruptcy Court”). Over the course of

the nearly three-year bankruptcy proceeding, among other things, the attorney filed

countless frivolous pleadings, motions, and appeals, intentionally hindered the court-

appointed trustee’s ability to administer the case, and knowingly made false statements of

fact in filings and appeals before the Bankruptcy Court and United States District Court for

the District of Maryland (“U.S. District Court”).

Moreover, this attorney represented several clients in Maryland’s circuit courts, the

Court of Special Appeals, and the Bankruptcy Court. In these instances, among other

things, the attorney misappropriated client funds, made knowing misrepresentations to and

intentionally concealed information from clients, and failed to prosecute clients’ motions

and appeals.

This attorney’s conduct violated sixteen separate provisions of the Maryland

Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MARPC”). For the reasons that follow, we

hold that this attorney’s conduct merits disbarment.

1 This Court has had occasion to discuss this adage, often attributed to President Abraham Lincoln, in a previous attorney discipline case. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Trye, 444 Md. 201, 205 (2015); see also Marshall H. Tanick & Phillip J. Trobaugh, Lincoln’s Minnesota Legacy, 66 Bench & B. Minn. 25, 28 (Feb. 2009). BACKGROUND

Procedural Context

On June 27, 2018, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland (the

“Commission”), acting through Bar Counsel, filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial

Action (“Petition I”) with this Court alleging that Arlene Smith-Scott had violated the

Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct (“MLRPC” or “Rules”).2 See Md. Rule

19-721. On February 21, 2019, the Commission, acting through Bar Counsel, filed a

second Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action (“Petition II”) with this Court alleging

that Ms. Smith-Scott violated the MLRPC by conduct unrelated to Petition I.

Petition I, which related to Ms. Smith-Scott’s actions during a nearly three-year long

personal bankruptcy case, and Petition II, which concerned Ms. Smith-Scott’s unrelated

representation of seven clients, together alleged that Ms. Smith-Scott violated the following

Rules: 1.1 (Competence); 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority); 1.3

(Diligence); 1.4 (Communication); 1.5 (Fees); 1.6 (Confidentiality of Information); 1.15

(Safekeeping Property); 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation); 3.1 (Meritorious

Claims and Contentions); 3.2 (Expediting Litigation); 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal);

3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney); 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others);

2 Effective July 1, 2016, the MLRPC were renamed the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct and recodified in Title 19 of the Maryland Rules. Since Ms. Smith- Scott’s misconduct occurred before and after the effective date of the recodification of the rules of professional conduct, she committed violations of the same rules of professional conduct under both the MLRPC and the MARPC. For simplicity, and because there is no substantive difference in the two codifications of the rules, we shall use the shorter designations of the MLRPC, e.g., “Rule 1.1.”

2 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters); 8.4 (Misconduct); 19-403 (Duty to Maintain

Account);3 and 19-404 (Trust Account—Required Deposits).

We designated Judge Peter K. Killough (the “hearing judge”) of the Circuit Court

for Prince George’s County by Order dated June 28, 2018 to conduct a hearing concerning

the alleged violations and to provide findings of fact and recommended conclusions of law.

See Md. Rule 19-722(a). In relation to Petition I, Ms. Smith-Scott was personally served

with process on July 30, 2018 and filed her Answer to Petition I on September 4, 2018.

Bar Counsel filed a Motion to Consolidate Petition I and Petition II on February 21, 2019.

We consolidated the two Petitions on March 6, 2019 and referred Petition II to the hearing

judge. In relation to Petition II, Ms. Smith-Scott was personally served with process on

April 1, 2019 and filed her Answer to Petition II on April 24, 2019.

The evidentiary hearing spanned five days: June 17, 18, 19, 20 and 28, 2019. In this

Court, Bar Counsel filed exceptions to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and

recommended conclusions of law on November 13, 2019. Likewise, Ms. Smith-Scott filed

exceptions to the same on November 15, 2019. This Court heard oral argument in this

matter on January 10, 2020. We disbarred Ms. Smith-Scott and awarded costs against her

by per curiam order dated January 10, 2020. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Smith-

Scott, 466 Md. 543, 543–44 (2020). We explain in this opinion the reasons for the per

curiam order.

3 The hearing judge did not make any determination as to whether Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 19-403. Bar Counsel did not except to the absence of the hearing judge’s determination on this alleged violation, so we shall not consider it in the discussion that follows.

3 Factual Findings

We begin with a summary of the hearing judge’s factual findings. Ms. Smith-Scott

was admitted to the Bar of the State of Maryland on February 2, 2012. Since then, she has

maintained a law office—Strategic Law Group, LLC—in Prince George’s County,

Maryland and has focused on representing individuals in Chapter 7 and Chapter 13

bankruptcy proceedings. The instant matter involves Ms. Smith-Scott’s wrongdoing in her

own personal bankruptcy case and multiple instances of misconduct spanning several

different bankruptcy clients.

Personal Bankruptcy Case

Ms. Smith-Scott filed a voluntary bankruptcy petition under Chapter 11 of

Bankruptcy Code in the Bankruptcy Court on September 28, 2014. See In re: Arlene Smith-

Scott, Case No. 14-25022. The case was assigned to the Honorable James F. Schneider.4

At the time of the bankruptcy petition, Ms. Smith-Scott held title to three investment

properties: (1) 367-371 Main Street, Laurel, Maryland (mortgage held by Patapsco Bank)

(“367 Main Street”);5 (2) 511 Main Street, Laurel, Maryland (mortgage held by Patapsco

4 The Honorable James F. Schneider served as an Associate Judge (1982–2001; 2005– 2017) and Chief Judge (2001–2005) of the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland. 5 In 2015, Howard Bancorp acquired Patapsco Bancorp. Howard Bankcorp, Inc. Completes Acquisition of Patapsco Bancorp, Inc., Howard Bank https://www.howardbank.com/maryland-banking-blog/Howard-Bancorp-Inc-Completes- Acquisition-of-Patapsco-Bancorp-Inc (last visited June 26, 2020), archived at https://perma.cc/K354-9YEC. Therefore, while we begin by discussing mortgages held by Patapsco Bank, we shall reference Howard Bank, as successor-in-interest to Patapsco Bank, beginning with events that occurred in September 2015.

4 Bank) (“511 Main Street,” together with 367 Main Street the “Laurel Properties”) ; and (3)

10 Stanley Drive, Catonsville, Maryland (mortgage held by U.S. Bank) (“10 Stanley

Drive”). All three properties had multiple residential tenants; the Laurel Properties also

had commercial tenants. Ms. Smith-Scott maintained her law office at 367 Main Street.

In March 2014, before Ms. Smith-Scott filed for bankruptcy, U.S. Bank exercised

its contractual rights under an assignment of rents clause contained in its loan documents

with Ms. Smith-Scott to collect rental income directly from the 10 Stanley Drive tenants.

U.S. Bank’s attorney, Bradley Swallow, contacted the tenants and instructed them to pay

rent to U.S. Bank directly. Two days later, Ms. Smith-Scott wrote the tenants and

instructed them to send rent to her directly or face eviction. In the letter, Ms. Smith-Scott

claimed that U.S. Bank did not have a legal basis to collect the rent and instructed the

tenants to file complaints against Mr. Swallow with the Commission.

On April 10, 2014, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a lawsuit against U.S. Bank and Mr.

Swallow in the U.S. District Court (the “U.S. Bank Action”) claiming violations of the Fair

Debt Collection Practices Act. See Smith-Scott v. U.S. Bank, Case No. 1:14-cv-01157-

JFM. In response, U.S. Bank filed a counterclaim to foreclose on the property at 10 Stanley

Drive. The U.S. District Court appointed a receiver to collect the rental income based on

Ms. Smith-Scott’s interference with U.S. Bank’s rent collection efforts (the “August 26

Order I”). In a separate order, the U.S. District Court ruled that “[Mr. Swallow] acted

entirely within his rights and the rights of his client in sending the letter” regarding the

collection of rent to Ms. Smith-Scott’s tenants (the “August 26 Order II,” together with

August 26 Order I the “August 26 Orders”).

5 Along with Ms. Smith-Scott’s personal bankruptcy petition, filed on September 28,

2014, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion to Use Cash Collateral. Ms. Smith-Scott sought

authorization to use the rental income from the three properties for maintenance expenses.

In the motion, Ms. Smith-Scott represented to the Bankruptcy Court that she was receiving

rental income from all three properties. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to mention the U.S. District

Court’s August 26 Orders.

Two days later, on September 30, 2014, Ms. Smith-Scott informed the U.S. District

Court in the U.S. Bank Action of her bankruptcy filing. That same day, U.S. Bank filed an

opposition to Ms. Smith-Scott’s Motion to Use Cash Collateral. Ms. Smith-Scott filed a

reply, in which she argued that U.S. Bank was not the mortgage holder of the 10 Stanley

Drive property because of a defect in the chain of title. This argument was unsupported by

any facts and belied by the August 26 Orders. Nevertheless, Ms. Smith-Scott continued to

assert this claim throughout her bankruptcy proceedings. The U.S. District Court

administratively closed the U.S. Bank Action without prejudice on October 2, 2014.

On October 9, 2014, Patapsco Bank also filed a motion to oppose Ms. Smith Scott’s

Motion to Use Cash Collateral. The Bankruptcy Court denied Ms. Smith-Scott’s motion

by order dated October 29, 2014 (“October 29 Order”) and barred her from using cash

collateral—i.e., rental income—from the Laurel Properties without the consent of Patapsco

Bank or the court.

6 In January 2015, Patapsco Bank filed Motions for Relief from Stay6 asserting that

Ms. Smith-Scott had defaulted on her loans and had failed to file monthly operating reports

demonstrating that she had not used the rental income for any unauthorized purpose.7 Ms.

Smith-Scott filed an opposition to Patapsco Bank’s motions on January 30, 2015. Ms.

Smith-Scott provided operating reports for October, November and December 2014 on

February 18, 2015. Bank statements attached to the report showed that Ms. Smith-Scott

ignored the October 29 Order and routinely used cash collateral for personal expenses

without the permission of the court or Patapsco Bank during the reporting periods.

Patapsco Bank filed a motion on February 24, 2015 to dismiss Ms. Smith-Scott’s

Chapter 11 case or, alternatively, convert the case to Chapter 7 because of Ms. Smith-

Scott’s unauthorized use of cash collateral in violation of the October 29 Order. Ms. Smith-

Scott filed an opposition. On February 25, 2015, Patapsco Bank filed a Motion for Civil

Contempt and Sanctions (the “Contempt Motion”) against Ms. Smith-Scott for violating

6 In Hoang v. Lowery, this Court explained the protections of the automatic stay imposed at the filing of a bankruptcy petition:

The filing of a petition operates as a stay . . . of actions against the debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a). The automatic stay applies to several types of actions, including “the commencement or continuation” of an action “to recover a claim against the debtor”; enforcement against the debtor or property of the bankruptcy estate of a judgment obtained pre-filing; and any act to obtain possession of property of the bankruptcy estate or from the estate or to exercise control over the property of the estate. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)–(3).

___ Md. ___, ___ (2020). 7 See Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure (“Fed. R. Bankr. Proc.”) 2015(a).

7 the October 29 Order. Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition to this motion as well,

contending that she did not use cash collateral for any unauthorized purpose. On March 8,

2015, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion for Contempt and Sanctions for Unreasonable and

Vexatious Multiplication of Proceedings against Patapsco Bank. Ms. Smith-Scott argued

that Patapsco Bank’s motions were in bad faith and that Patapsco Bank improperly

enlarged its proof of claim. Additionally, Ms. Smith-Scott alleged that she suffered

emotional distress from Patapsco Bank’s attempts to collect the mortgage payments and

sought $5,000 in punitive damages. Later rulings of the Bankruptcy Court confirm that

Patapsco Bank’s motions were not made in bad faith. Instead, its claims were based on the

terms of Ms. Smith-Scott’s Deed of Trust.

By order on April 7, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court converted Ms. Smith-Scott’s case

to a Chapter 7 proceeding (“April 7 Conversion Order”) because of Ms. Smith-Scott’s (1)

violation of the October 29 Order prohibiting the unauthorized use of cash collateral; (2)

failure to report on the operations of Strategic Law Group; (3) commingling of personal

funds and rental income; and (4) untimely filing of financial reports. In ordering the

conversion to a Chapter 7 proceeding, the Bankruptcy Court reasoned as follows:

I’m very concerned at the various lapses that counsel has—and I say counsel because the debtor is an attorney, who actually is a bankruptcy lawyer, who evidenced today by her lack of knowledge of the Bankruptcy Code, the inability to properly proceed in this case. All of these things cause me to come to the conclusion that not only the creditors, but the debtor would be better off if this case were in a Chapter 7 because she will not then be in charge of the way this case is handled, which has been completely mismanaged from the beginning, to her own detriment, and to her possible violation of various statutes and criminal laws as well. I don’t want to see her get in trouble in this case. And she’s going to be in big trouble if we don’t stop this now and get somebody in there who knows what he or she is

8 doing . . . . And finally, the violation of a court order and the terms of its use of cash collateral, which she’s been prohibited from doing, is the final straw that leads me to conclude that this case must have a Chapter 7 Trustee appointed. The case cannot continue in a Chapter 11, and the debtor has shown quite clearly her unable [sic] to properly manage this case from the very beginning.

(Emphasis and ellipsis in original). Ms. Smith-Scott appealed the April 7 Conversion

Order to the U.S. District Court on April 8, 2015. See Smith-Scott v. Patapsco Bank, Case

No. 1:15-cv-01013-RDB.

Patapsco Bank filed Amended Motions for Relief from the Automatic Stay relating

to the Laurel Properties on April 8, 2015. Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition. The

Bankruptcy Court heard arguments on June 18, 2015. Four days later, the court granted

Patapsco Bank’s motions (the “June 22 Order”). The June 22 Order granted Patapsco Bank

relief from the automatic stay, allowed it to foreclose on the Laurel Properties, and collect

the rents.

Meanwhile, the Bankruptcy Court appointed George W. Liebmann, Esq.

(“Trustee”) as the United States Chapter 7 Trustee to oversee Ms. Smith-Scott’s bankruptcy

case. The Trustee filed an Application to employ his law partner, Orbie R. Shively, Esq.

(“Mr. Shively”) as his attorney in his capacity as the Trustee. On May 11, 2015, during a

conversation between Ms. Smith-Scott and Mr. Shively, Ms. Smith-Scott indicated her

intent to move forward with the U.S. Bank Action, even though the case had been

administratively closed by the U.S. District Court. Mr. Shively advised Ms. Smith-Scott

that the U.S. Bank Action was property of the bankruptcy estate. As such, the lawsuit was

within the exclusive control of the Trustee. Mr. Shively further explained that only the

9 Trustee could proceed in the U.S. Bank Action—not Ms. Smith-Scott—and he requested

that Ms. Smith-Scott provide him with relevant filings in the case. Ms. Smith-Scott failed

to comply with Mr. Shively’s request.

During the same conversation, Ms. Smith-Scott requested a postponement of her

§ 341 meeting of creditors,8 which was originally scheduled for May 12, 2015. Mr. Shively

consented, and postponed the meeting until May 26, 2015. However, Ms. Smith-Scott

never appeared for the rescheduled meeting. Yet, on May 26, 2015, Ms. Smith-Scott

emailed Mr. Shively and again informed him of her intent to proceed in the U.S. Bank

Action. On May 27, 2015, Mr. Shively responded by email and reminded Ms. Smith-Scott

that the Trustee exclusively controlled the U.S. Bank Action and she had no right to

proceed in the case.

Notwithstanding Mr. Shively’s warnings, Ms. Smith-Scott filed three motions in the

U.S. Bank Action on June 15, 2015: (1) Motion to Reopen Case; (2) Motion to Vacate

Order Granting Receivership; and (3) Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint to

Add Party and Due to New Evidence. However, because of the Trustee’s appointment,

Ms. Smith-Scott lacked standing to file these motions. Additionally, Ms. Smith-Scott

failed to serve the Trustee or Mr. Shively with copies or notice of the filings. On June 17,

2015, the Trustee filed a Motion and Notice of Substitution of Trustee arguing that the

Trustee was the real party in interest and that Ms. Smith-Scott lacked standing to proceed

8 11 U.S.C. § 341 requires that the Trustee “convene and preside at a meeting of creditors” in the debtor’s case. The debtor’s attendance is required. See 11 U.S.C. § 343(a) (“The debtor shall appear and submit to examination under oath at the meeting of creditors under section 341(a) of this title.”).

10 in the case. Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition on July 1, 2015, arguing, without support,

that the Trustee’s motion was not ripe because the April 7 Conversion Order was pending

on appeal. The Trustee filed a reply.

The U.S. District Court denied Ms. Smith-Scott’s motions on June 17, 2015. Ms.

Smith-Scott noted an appeal of the U.S. District Court’s order to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. In response, the Trustee filed a Line Withdrawing with

Prejudice Notice of Appeal. Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition to the Trustee’s line

withdrawing the appeal on July 20, 2015. The U.S. District Court granted the Trustee’s

Motion and Notice of Substitution on August 5, 2015. Ms. Smith-Scott filed a second

appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The appellate court consolidated

the two appeals and, on November 5, 2015, dismissed the case on joint stipulation between

the Trustee and U.S. Bank.

Meanwhile, pursuant to the June 22 Order, Patapsco Bank sent letters to Ms. Smith-

Scott’s tenants directing them to send rent payments directly to Patapsco Bank. Patapsco

Bank copied Ms. Smith-Scott on each letter. On July 13, 2015, Ms. Smith-Scott sent letters

to her tenants acknowledging that Patapsco Bank had the right to collect the rents; however,

she informed the tenants that she would be unable to maintain the properties without rental

income. Ms. Smith-Scott instructed the tenants to remit their rent payments directly to her.

On July 18, 2015, Patapsco Bank filed a Motion for Civil Contempt and Sanctions noting

Ms. Smith-Scott’s efforts to obstruct Patapsco Bank’s rent collection. Patapsco Bank

asserted that Ms. Smith-Scott continued to use rent payments in violation of the October

29 Order. Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition on July 20, 2015.

11 Patapsco Bank sent a second letter to Ms. Smith-Scott’s tenants on July 31, 2015,

directing them to remit their rental payments to a property management company,

Summerfield Investment Group, LLC. On August 3, 2015, Ms. Smith-Scott sent another

letter to the tenants falsely stating that Patapsco Bank did not have a court order to collect

the rent; again, she directed the tenants to remit the rent payments directly to her. Ms.

Smith-Scott directed the tenants to call 9-1-1 if any person came to the properties to collect

the rents. Patapsco Bank filed a supplement to its earlier Motion for Civil Contempt and

Sanctions on August 6, 2015.

Ms. Smith-Scott, without authorization from the Bankruptcy Court or the Trustee,

filed a lawsuit against Patapsco Bank (“Patapsco Bank Action”) in the Circuit Court for

Prince George’s County on August 14, 2015. See Smith-Scott v. Patapsco Bank, Case No.

CAL15-20704. Because Ms. Smith-Scott’s complaint related to allegations and events

occurring prior to the filing of her bankruptcy petition, the Patapsco Bank Action became

a part of the bankruptcy estate; therefore, it fell under the exclusive control of the Trustee.

The Trustee filed a Motion to Intervene as the real party in interest on November 25, 2015.

The circuit court granted the Trustee’s motion, and the Trustee and Patapsco Bank settled

the matter by stipulation.

12 On August 31, 2015, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the April 7

Conversion Order and the June 22 Order permitting Patapsco Bank to foreclose.9 Howard

Bank, successor-in-interest to Patapsco Bank, filed an opposition on September 14, 2015.

In response to Ms. Smith-Scott’s failure to attend the rescheduled § 341 meeting of

creditors, the Trustee filed, on September 2, 2015, a Motion for Order Compelling Debtor

to Attend Rescheduled Meeting of Creditors. The Trustee requested that the court compel

Ms. Smith-Scott’s attendance at another rescheduled meeting set for October 22, 2015.

Ms. Smith-Scott filed a response on September 21, 2015, in which she alleged her case

should not have been converted to Chapter 7 and that U.S. Bank did not hold the mortgage

for 10 Stanley Drive based on a defect in the chain of title.10 Her response did not address

the Trustee’s request to compel her presence at the October 22 meeting of creditors. The

Bankruptcy Court granted the Trustee’s motion on September 24, 2015 (“September 24

Order”) and ordered Ms. Smith-Scott’s attendance at the October 22 meeting.

Nevertheless, Ms. Smith-Scott failed to appear. Indeed, after the April 7 Conversion Order,

Ms. Smith-Scott refused to attend any of the required meetings of creditors.

On September 29, 2015, on the Trustee’s motion, the Bankruptcy Court entered an

order (“September 29 Order”) compelling Ms. Smith-Scott to turn over the following to

the Trustee within ten days: (1) copies of all leases identified on Schedules E and G of the

9 The hearing judge’s findings of fact indicate a “June 23” order, but the circuit court entered its order permitting Patapsco Bank to foreclose on June 22, 2015—i.e., the June 22 Order. 10 Ms. Smith-Scott continued to assert this second argument despite the U.S. District Court’s ruling to the contrary. See supra at 6.

13 bankruptcy petition;11 (2) bank records showing the accounts where each of the tenants’

security deposits were deposited and subsequent bank statements to the present; (3) the

tenants’ security deposits plus 3% interest; (4) the records showing each client of Strategic

Law Group, amount and dates of legal services rendered constituting the pre-petition

accounts receivable; (5) accounting, plus bank records, showing all of Ms. Smith-Scott’s

collection or other receipts of pre-petition accounts receivable from September 28, 2014 to

April 7, 2015; (6) accounting, plus bank records, showing all of Ms. Smith-Scott’s

collection or other receipts of pre-petition accounts receivable from April 7, 2015 to the

present; (7) copies of Ms. Smith-Scott’s 2013 federal and Maryland income tax returns; (8)

copies of the 2014 federal and Maryland income tax returns; and (9) the pro rata portion

(74%) of the total amount in 2014 tax refunds. Ms. Smith-Scott provided her residential

11 “Schedules” in a bankruptcy petition indicate all assets, liabilities, and other information about a debtor for an accounting of what will become the bankruptcy estate. In 2015, at the time Ms. Smith-Scott filed her petition, Schedule E required debtors to list “Creditors Holding Unsecured Priority Claims,” and Schedule G required debtors to list “Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases.” See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Schedule E - Creditors Holding Unsecured Priority Claims (Superseded), https://www.uscourts.gov/forms/bankruptcy-forms/schedule-e-creditors-holding- unsecured-priority-claims (last visited June 26, 2020) archived at https://perma.cc/4QSF- VPSX; Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Schedule G - Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases (Superseded), https://www.uscourts.gov/forms/bankruptcy- forms/schedule-g-executory-contracts-and-unexpired-leases (last visited June 26, 2020) archived at https://perma.cc/Y8EY-X29M. Schedule E/F (“Creditors Who Have Unsecured Claims”) replaced the superseded Schedules E and G on December 1, 2015. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Schedule E/F: Creditors Who Have Unsecured Claims (Individuals), https://www.uscourts.gov/forms/individual- debtors/schedule-ef-creditors-who-have-unsecured-claims-individuals (last visited June 26, 2020) archived at https://perma.cc/LFN8-ZWPU.

14 leases and 2013 tax returns, but failed to turn over the remaining documentation ordered

by the Bankruptcy Court.

On October 1, 2015, the Trustee filed a Motion for Sale of 10 Stanley Drive Free

and Clear of Liens and Encumbrances. Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition and, again,

asserted that U.S. Bank did not hold the mortgage for 10 Stanley Drive. The Trustee’s

reply contended that Ms. Smith-Scott lacked standing to oppose the sale because the

property had no equity and Ms. Smith-Scott was insolvent. The Bankruptcy Court heard

arguments on November 5, 2015. Before the hearing, the Trustee explained to Ms. Smith-

Scott that she did not have standing to oppose the sale and that Ms. Smith-Scott’s

accusations of fraud on the part of U.S. Bank were irrelevant to the validity of the mortgage.

During the hearing, the Bankruptcy Court advised Ms. Smith-Scott that she lacked standing

to challenge the sale of 10 Stanley Drive. The Bankruptcy Court granted the Trustee’s

motion on November 6, 2015 (“November 6 Order”).

Meanwhile, the U.S. District Court affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s April 7

Conversion Order on October 8, 2015. See Smith-Scott v. Patapsco Bank, Case No. 1:15-

cv-01013-RDB. The U.S. District Court’s written opinion noted that, “the record in this

case is replete with cause for conversion” and the Bankruptcy Court’s “findings of fact

were not clearly erroneous.” The U.S. District Court continued, “the evidence in this case

clearly supports [the bankruptcy court’s] findings that [Ms.] Smith-Scott is not competent

to administer her case.” (First alteration in original). That same day, Ms. Smith-Scott filed

an Amended Motion to Alter or Amend the Bankruptcy Court’s April 7 Conversion

Order—the very order the U.S. District Court affirmed on appeal. Again, Ms. Smith-Scott

15 reiterated the same argument that U.S. Bank did not hold the mortgage for 10 Stanley

Drive. The Bankruptcy Court denied the motion on November 6, 2015 (“November 6

Denial”).

On November 6, 2015, Ms. Smith-Scott appealed the Bankruptcy Court’s

November 6 Order and November 6 Denial to the U.S. District Court. See Smith-Scott v.

Howard Bank, et al., Case No. 1:15-cv-03423-RDB. During the pendency of the appeal,

on November 17, 2015, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion to Reconsider November 6 Order.

On November 23, 2015, on the Trustee’s motion, the Bankruptcy Court struck Ms. Smith-

Scott’s motion (“November 23 Order”) because it concerned “the same Order that [Ms.

Smith-Scott] previously appealed to the United States District Court.”

On November 17, 2015, the Trustee filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal in the U.S.

District Court. See Case No. 1:15-cv-03423-RDB. Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition.

The U.S. District Court granted the Trustee’s motion on March 18, 2016, affirmed the April

7 Conversion Order, and affirmed the November 6 Denial. In its memorandum opinion,

the U.S. District Court found that Ms. Smith-Scott lacked standing to challenge the sale of

10 Stanley Drive, and that “there [] remains substantial evidence supporting the issuance

of the [April 7] Conversion Order and [the Bankruptcy Court’s] decision to uphold it.”

(Alteration in original). On March 22, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott filed an appeal to the U.S.

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The appellate court affirmed the U.S. District

Court’s ruling in part and dismissed the appeal in part on August 8, 2016.

On November 22, 2015, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion to Remove Chapter 7

Trustee for Cause. Ms. Smith-Scott alleged that the Trustee neglected his duties by

16 declining to investigate Ms. Smith-Scott’s claims against U.S. Bank and that the Trustee

“purposely and knowingly conceal[ed] fraud” on the part of U.S. Bank. On November 25,

2015, before the Trustee could respond, the Bankruptcy Court denied the motion

(“November 25 Order”) stating, “the motion has no merit whatsoever. No hearing is

required.” That same day, Ms. Smith-Scott filed an appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s

November 23 Order and November 25 Order. See Smith-Scott v. Liebmann, Case No. 1:15-

cv-03637-RDB. The Trustee filed a Motion to Dismiss on February 3, 2016. Ms. Smith-

Scott did not file an opposition.

The U.S. District Court entered an order on March 18, 2016 dismissing the appeal

and affirming the November 25 Order. In its memorandum opinion, the U.S. District Court

determined that the November 25 Order was not a final appealable order; therefore, it was

not properly before the U.S. District Court and required dismissal. The U.S. District Court

further concluded that Ms. Smith-Scott’s appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s November 6

Order divested the Bankruptcy Court of jurisdiction to adjudicate her November 17 Motion

to Reconsider. Ultimately, the U.S. District Court held that, “[w]ithout jurisdiction over

the issue, [the Bankruptcy Court] properly struck [Ms. Smith-Scott’s] Motion to

Reconsider.” (First and second alterations in original).

The Trustee filed a Motion for Approval of Settlement and Compromise with

Howard Bank on November 25, 2015. Ms. Smith-Scott did not file an opposition. The

Bankruptcy Court granted the Trustee’s motion on January 4, 2016 (“January 4 Order”).

Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion to Alter or Amend the January 4 Order on April 25, 2016.

The Trustee filed an opposition. On September 26, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court denied

17 Ms. Smith-Scott’s motion, explaining that Ms. Smith-Scott failed to meet “the initial

threshold for consideration [of the motion] pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure]

Rule 60(b).” (Alteration in original).

On December 21, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court found Ms. Smith-Scott in civil

contempt for violating its October 29 Order, which prohibited Ms. Smith-Scott from using

cash collateral. In response, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion to Recuse Judge Schneider on

January 5, 2016, contending that Judge Schneider was partial and biased against her. The

Trustee and United States Trustee—who had not participated in the case until this point—

filed oppositions. Ms. Smith-Scott filed on May 16, 2016 a supplement to her Motion to

Recuse.

The Bankruptcy Court issued an order on March 22, 2016 requiring Ms. Smith-Scott

and Strategic Law Group to vacate the Laurel Properties on or before April 1, 2016 (“March

22 Order”). Ms. Smith Scott defied the March 22 Order and refused to vacate 367 Main

Street. On April 12, 2016, Mr. Shively went to the Laurel Properties with a locksmith to

change the locks. There, Mr. Shively encountered two Strategic Law Group employees;

he informed them that they needed to vacate the property immediately. One employee

called Ms. Smith-Scott, who instructed the employees to stay in the office despite Mr.

Shively’s instructions. Mr. Shively then told the employees that they had three days to

vacate the property. Later that month, without notice or authorization from the Trustee,

Ms. Smith-Scott changed the locks to her law office.

On April 13, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott, on behalf of Strategic Law Group, filed an

“Emergency Injunctive Relief as to and [sic] Motion to Alter and/or Amend Order dated

18 March 24, 2016.” Ms. Smith-Scott argued that the court did not have jurisdiction over

Strategic Law Group and could not force it to vacate 367 Main Street. The Trustee

countered that the ownership of Strategic Law Group is an asset of the bankruptcy estate

and the law firm had not paid rent in over a year to the detriment of the estate and the

secured party.

On April 19, 2016, as a result of Ms. Smith-Scott’s failure to vacate 367 Main Street

in violation of the March 22 Order, the Trustee filed a Motion for Civil Contempt and

Sanctions. Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition on May 5, 2016. Ms. Smith-Scott accused

Mr. Shively of engaging in criminal conduct in an effort to secure possession of 367 Main

Street. On April 25, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a second Motion to Remove Chapter 7

Trustee. Both the Trustee and the U.S. Trustee filed oppositions.

The Bankruptcy Court held a hearing on May 16, 2016 where it found Ms. Smith-

Scott in civil contempt of its March 22 Order and warned Ms. Smith-Scott that continued

contempt may result in her incarceration (the “May 16 Contempt Order”). The Bankruptcy

Court ordered that Ms. Smith-Scott pay the Trustee, within ten days, the following: $612

in locksmith costs and $100 per day from April 1, 2016 until she vacated 367 Main Street.

Ms. Smith-Scott did not pay the sanctions. Further, despite the contempt finding, Ms.

Smith-Scott refused to vacate 367 Main Street. On May 19, 2016, the Trustee filed a Notice

of Non-Compliance alerting the Bankruptcy Court of Ms. Smith-Scott’s continued refusal

to comply with the March 22 Order.

Ms. Smith-Scott noted an appeal of the May 16 Contempt Order to the U.S. District

Court on May 20, 2016. See Smith-Scott v. Howard Bank, et al., 1:16-cv-01572-RDB. In

19 her brief, Ms. Smith-Scott accused Mr. Shively of committing perjury during the May 16

hearing, alleged the Bankruptcy Court was violating her Eighth Amendment right against

cruel and unusual punishment by threatening incarceration, alleged a number of

constitutional violations, and argued that “the Trial Court abused its discretion by failing

to rule on [Ms. Smith-Scott’s] Motion to Recuse while allowing perjury and mortgage

fraud to take place which would lead an objective observer to question the judge’s

impartiality.”

On September 20, 2016, the U.S. District Court affirmed the May 16 Contempt

Order and dismissed Ms. Smith-Scott’s appeal. The U.S. District Court’s opinion rejected

all of Ms. Smith-Scott’s arguments and held that Ms. Smith-Scott, “cites no facts which

would support her [perjury] contentions but appears to rely upon the sheer audacity of her

allegations” and that her allegations are “contradicted by signed submissions to the Court

by counsel for [the Trustee.]” Concerning the Eighth Amendment challenge, the U.S.

District Court held “[t]o be clear: [Ms. Smith-Scott] has not been incarcerated in

conjunction with this case, and her Brief does not allege that she was . . . . [Ms. Smith-

Scott’s] claim that her Eighth Amendment rights have been violated is premature.”

(Ellipsis in original). On the judicial recusal challenge, the U.S. District Court held that

Ms. Smith-Scott “cites no action or conflict which would warrant judicial

disqualification—indeed, she alleges no facts involving Judge Schneider at all—but, again,

relies only upon the audacity of her allegations.”

As of June 8, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott still refused to vacate 367 Main Street, causing

the Trustee to file a Second Notice of Non-Compliance with Contempt Order. On June 20,

20 2016, the U.S. Trustee filed an Adversary Complaint against Ms. Smith-Scott. The U.S.

Trustee requested an order denying discharge of Ms. Smith-Scott’s debts on the grounds

that she (1) refused to comply with the court’s September 24 Order; (2) transferred and

concealed estate property, i.e., the Patapsco Bank rents; (3) refused to comply with the

court’s September 29 Order; (4) refused to comply with the court’s March 22 Order, and

(5) intended to delay the Trustee’s administration of the estate by filing the Patapsco Bank

Action.

The Trustee filed a Motion to Sell 511 Main Street free and clear of liens and

encumbrances on June 17, 2016. Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition. On July 22, 2016,

the Bankruptcy Court granted the Trustee’s motion. By June 27, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott

still refused to vacate 367 Main Street, causing the Trustee to file a Third Notice of Non-

Compliance with Turnover Order and with Contempt Order.

On July 8, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a complaint in the U.S. District Court against

the Trustee, Mr. Shively, and their law firm, Liebmann and Shively, P.A. (collectively,

“Defendants”). The case was ultimately transferred to the Bankruptcy Court. In her

complaint, Ms. Smith-Scott alleged that during the May 16 contempt hearing, Mr. Shively

made four “negligent and willful misrepresentations” to the Bankruptcy Court intending to

obtain a favorable ruling. She sought relief in the form of punitive damages in the amount

of “$10,000 for each statement and from each Defendant.” Additionally, Ms. Smith-Scott

falsely alleged that the Trustee engaged in unlawful entry and trespass when he changed

the locks to her law office on April 12, 2016. Ms. Smith-Scott sought further damages in

the amount of $215 to “re-key the lock” to her law office and punitive damages in the

21 amount of “$10,000 from each Defendant.” Ms. Smith-Scott’s complaint included several

other unsubstantiated charges against the Trustee, Mr. Shively, and their law firm. The

Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss on July 27, 2016. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to respond;

therefore, the U.S. District Court dismissed the complaint with prejudice on September 15,

2016.

Also on July 8, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion to Withdraw Bankruptcy Case

to the U.S. District Court requesting the U.S. District Court to take complete jurisdiction

over her bankruptcy case. Ms. Smith-Scott claimed that she had “proven that the Chapter

7 Trustee has perjured himself in the United States Bankruptcy Court” and has “breached

[his] fiduciary duty to the unsecured creditors.” (Alteration in original). Ms. Smith-Scott

made several arguments that her constitutional rights had been violated. On July 22, 2016,

the Trustee filed an opposition. On September 29, 2017, the U.S. District Court denied the

motion, noting that Ms. Smith-Scott moved to withdraw her case “a full twenty-one months

after she voluntarily commenced the case in the bankruptcy court . . . where there were

over 400 docket entries in the case, including three unsuccessful appeals to the District

Court.” (Ellipsis in original). The U.S. District Court held that Ms. Smith-Scott’s motion

“could be denied on timeliness grounds alone,” that her complaint was “devoid of claims

premised on other federal laws,” and that the motion “appears to be an attempt by [Ms.

Smith-Scott] to find a more favorable forum for her claims.”

As of July 19, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott still refused to vacate 367 Main Street, causing

the Trustee to file a Fourth Notice of Non-Compliance with Turnover Order and with

Contempt Order. On July 22, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order on its own

22 accord (“July 22 Order”) directing the U.S. Marshal to assist the Trustee in securing the

property. The Bankruptcy Court’s order found:

[Ms.] Smith-Scott, the debtor and a member of the bar of this Court, has failed and refused to comply with the lawful orders of this Court. It is apparent from the Trustee’s motion, notices of non-compliance and the record that the debtor is willfully disregarding court orders and refusing to allow the Trustee to undertake his statutory function to administer the assets of the estate.

Ms. Smith-Scott, that same day, noted an appeal of the July 22 Order to the U.S.

District Court directing the U.S. Marshal to assist the Trustee and the order approving the

sale of 511 Main Street. See Smith-Scott v. Liebmann, Case No. 1:16-cv-02658-GLR. Ms.

Smith-Scott failed to file an appellate brief; therefore, the U.S. District Court dismissed the

appeal on December 27, 2016.

On August 11, 2016, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order denying Ms. Smith-

Scott’s Motion to Recuse Judge (“August 11 Order”) and held, “the debtor’s allegations of

bias are nothing more than ‘unsupported, irrational, or highly tenuous speculation’” and

that “her dissatisfaction with the results obtained in the instant case does not entitle her to

a change of judge.” The Bankruptcy Court entered another order on September 1, 2016,

denying Ms. Smith-Scott’s second Motion to Remove Trustee (“September 1 Order”) and

remarked, “the debtor has opposed every action by the Chapter 7 Trustee to administer this

case. . . [t]he instant motion to remove the Trustee is without merit.” (Ellipsis and

alterations in original). On September 6, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott noted an appeal to the

U.S. District Court of the August 11 Order and September 1 Order. Ms. Smith-Scott failed

23 to file the requisite appellate pleadings. On August 15, 2017, on the Trustee’s motion, the

U.S. District Court dismissed the appeal.

After the issuance of these orders, Mr. Shively, with the assistance of three Deputy

U.S. Marshals, went to 367 Main Street to secure possession. The Strategic Law Group

employees Mr. Shively encountered on April 12 were present at the office. After making

a phone call, the employees refused to vacate the premises. The U.S. Marshals advised the

employees that they would be handcuffed; ultimately, the employees vacated the property.

U.S. Marshals and the property manager packed the contents of Ms. Smith-Scott’s law

office and moved the packed boxes to a parking lot behind the building. Shortly thereafter,

Ms. Smith-Scott arrived with a moving truck. Mr. Shively observed Ms. Smith-Scott load

all the items from the parking lot into the moving truck and drive away.

On January 23, 2017, the Bankruptcy Court entered summary judgment in favor of

the U.S. Trustee in the Adversary Proceeding and found that “the Debtor in this case, did

willfully disobey lawful Orders of this Court.” The Bankruptcy Court further entered a

judgment denying Ms. Smith-Scott’s discharge (“Denial of Discharge Order”). On January

30, 2017, Ms. Smith-Scott again appealed the Denial of Discharge Order to the U.S.

District Court. See Smith-Scott v. U.S. Trustee, Case No. 17-cv-00267-ELH. The U.S.

District Court affirmed the Denial of Discharge Order on January 25, 2018. Ms. Smith-

Scott filed an appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit.

The Trustee filed a Motion of Sale of 367 Main Street on April 11, 2017 and an

amendment thereto on April 26, 2017. Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition. On June 11,

2017 the Bankruptcy Court approved the Trustee’s sale of 367 Main Street (“June 11

24 Order”). On June 27, 2017, Ms. Smith-Scott filed an untimely appeal to the U.S. District

Court of the June 11 Order. On August 22, 2017, on the Trustee’s motion, the U.S. District

Court dismissed the appeal due its untimeliness and Ms. Smith-Scott’s failure to file the

required appellate pleadings.

The U.S. Trustee approved the Trustee’s final accounting and final notice was sent

to all parties on August 31, 2017.

Bar Counsel Investigation I

Bar Counsel wrote to Ms. Smith-Scott on September 23, 2016 and requested an

explanation by October 14, 2016 for her failure to comply with the Bankruptcy Court’s

March 22 Order. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to respond to Bar Counsel in any manner. On

October 18, 2016, Bar Counsel again wrote to Ms. Smith-Scott and requested a response

to its September 23 letter within ten days. Ms. Smith-Scott informed Bar Counsel on

November 4, 2016, by telephone, that she would hand-deliver a response on November 7,

2016. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to do so.

Bar Counsel notified Ms. Smith-Scott on December 6, 2016 that the matter had been

docketed for further investigation and requested a response to the September 23 and

October 18 letters by December 21, 2016. Ms. Smith-Scott submitted a response to Bar

Counsel on January 17, 2017, wherein she knowingly and intentionally misrepresented the

following: “The Chapter 7 Trustee began to sale [sic] property by omitting facts and

misrepresenting other facts, which caused the Bankruptcy Judge to rule in [the Chapter 7

Trustee’s] favor which included an order of contempt and being threatened with

25 incarceration.” Ms. Smith-Scott provided no other explanation for the Bankruptcy Court’s

contempt finding or her refusal to comply with the March 22 Order.

Representation of Crystal Combs

Ms. Crystal Combs retained Ms. Smith-Scott and Strategic Law Group in October

2015. Ms. Combs sought to remove her ex-husband’s name from the deed to her home

(“2603 Vicarage Court”). At that time, Bank of America held the mortgage to the home,

which was in default. However, Bank of America offered Ms. Combs a loan modification

on the condition that Ms. Combs’ ex-husband—since his name remained on the deed—

either become a party to the modification or his name be removed from the deed.

Ms. Combs agreed to pay Ms. Smith-Scott on an hourly basis, at the rate of $225

per hour. On October 14, 2015, Ms. Combs paid Ms. Smith-Scott $2,500 for the

representation. Of that, $1,000 was for legal services Ms. Smith-Scott had already

provided. The remaining $1,500 constituted a retainer against which Ms. Smith-Scott

would bill future legal services. Ms. Combs paid Ms. Smith-Scott by credit card; Ms.

Smith-Scott entered the credit card number in Square and charged the card.12 Ms. Smith-

Scott failed to deposit and maintain the funds in an attorney trust account until earned for

fees or used for expenses. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to obtain Ms. Combs’ informed consent

in writing to deposit the funds in an account other than an attorney trust account.

On May 19, 2016, at Ms. Smith-Scott’s request, Ms. Combs’ paid an additional

$1,850 towards the representation by credit card. Therefore, by May 18, 2016, Ms. Combs

12 “Square” is a credit card processing service.

26 had paid Ms. Smith-Scott a total of $4,350. However, at no time during the representation

of Ms. Combs did Ms. Smith-Scott provide an invoice reflecting how such fees were

incurred. Ms. Smith-Scott successfully removed Ms. Combs’ ex-husband from the 2603

Vicarage Court deed and Ms. Combs successfully completed her Bank of America loan

modification.

At the time Ms. Combs retained Ms. Smith-Scott, Ms. Combs also owned an

investment property (“9904 Doubletree Lane”). Ms. Combs was defending a foreclosure

action against this property in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. See Brown,

et al. v. Combs, Case No. CAE10-20522. On August 9, 2016, the circuit court entered an

order permitting the secured creditor to proceed with the foreclosure (“Foreclosure

Order”). On August 12, 2016, Ms. Combs retained Ms. Smith-Scott to represent her in the

foreclosure action. That same day, Ms. Smith-Scott entered her appearance and filed an

Emergency Motion to Reconsider the Foreclosure Order. The secured creditor scheduled

a foreclosure sale for September 13, 2016.

On August 26, 2016, prior to the circuit court’s adjudication of the Emergency

Motion to Reconsider, Ms. Smith-Scott appealed the Foreclosure Order to the Court of

Special Appeals. Ms. Smith-Scott explained to Ms. Combs that an appeal of the

Foreclosure Order would delay the foreclosure. With the Notice of Appeal, Ms. Smith-

Scott filed in the circuit court a Motion to Stay the proceeding pending appeal. On

September 7, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott filed an unsigned Civil Appeal Information Report in

the Court of Special Appeals. On September 21, 2016, the Clerk of the Court of Special

Appeals requested Ms. Smith-Scott provide a signed copy of the report. Ms. Smith-Scott

27 failed to respond and otherwise failed to pursue Ms. Combs’ appeal in any manner. The

Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal on November 15, 2016.

Ms. Combs agreed to pay Ms. Smith-Scott on an hourly basis for her representation

in the circuit court and Court of Special Appeals. On August 15, 2016, Ms. Combs paid

Ms. Smith-Scott $1,000 by credit card. Ms. Combs paid another $500 by credit card on

August 25, 2016. Ms. Combs provided Ms. Smith-Scott with the credit card number either

over the phone or in person. Ms. Smith-Scott and Ms. Combs did not execute a written

retainer agreement for the representation. At no point throughout the representation or at

its conclusion did Ms. Smith-Scott provide Ms. Combs with an invoice reflecting the legal

fees that Ms. Combs incurred.

In early September 2016, with the September 13, 2016 foreclosure sale looming,

Ms. Combs elected to file for bankruptcy. On September 12, 2016, Ms. Combs retained

Ms. Smith-Scott to represent her in the bankruptcy proceedings and agreed to pay a flat fee

of $4,200 for the representation. That same day, Ms. Combs met with Ms. Smith-Scott

and made an initial payment of $1,500 by credit card. Ms. Smith-Scott advised Ms. Combs

that once Ms. Combs paid the bankruptcy filing fee, which she agreed to pay in four

monthly installments of $75 dollars, Ms. Combs could pay the remainder of Ms. Smith-

Scott’s legal fee. Ms. Combs paid the $300 bankruptcy filing fee. On September 12, 2016,

Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Voluntary Chapter 13 Petition in the Bankruptcy Court on behalf

of Ms. Combs. See In re: Crystal A. Combs, Case No. 16-22230. That same day, Ms.

Smith-Scott filed a Disclosure of Compensation of Attorney for Debtor, which disclosed

the fee arrangement Ms. Smith-Scott reached with Ms. Combs.

28 On October 7, 2016, the secured creditor for 9904 Doubletree Lane moved for relief

from the automatic stay. On October 17, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott filed an opposition to the

motion and the Bankruptcy Court scheduled a hearing for November 3, 2016. Prior to the

hearing date, Ms. Smith-Scott misinformed Ms. Combs that the hearing had been

rescheduled and that she need not appear on November 3. However, the hearing had not

been rescheduled. The Bankruptcy Court held the November 3 hearing and neither Ms.

Smith-Scott nor Ms. Combs appeared.

The Bankruptcy Court granted the secured creditor’s motion to lift the automatic

stay on November 10, 2016. The Bankruptcy Court entered the order on November 14,

2016, permitting the secured creditor to proceed with foreclosure proceedings. Ms. Combs

received a copy of the Bankruptcy Court’s order and immediately requested Ms. Smith-

Scott file a Motion for Reconsideration. Ms. Smith-Scott agreed to file the motion. Before

December 12, 2016, Ms. Smith-Scott represented to Ms. Combs that she had filed the

Motion for Reconsideration when she had not. On December 12, 2016, believing Ms.

Smith-Scott filed the motion, Ms. Combs emailed Ms. Smith-Scott and inquired whether

the court had issued a ruling. On December 28, 2016—six weeks after the Bankruptcy

Court lifted the automatic stay—Ms. Smith-Scott filed an untimely Emergency Motion for

Reconsideration. Ms. Smith-Scott filed an Amended Emergency Motion on January 4,

2017.

On January 9, 2017, the Bankruptcy Court denied Ms. Smith-Scott’s Amended

Emergency Motion (“January 9 Order”). Respondent then filed an appeal of the January 9

Order to the U.S. District Court. Yet, before Ms. Smith-Scott could complete any

29 substantive work, Ms. Combs elected to dismiss the appeal. On January 17, 2017, 9904

Doubletree Lane sold at a foreclosure sale. On February 1, 2017, the secured creditor filed

a Report of Sale in the circuit court foreclosure action. On February 2, 2017, Ms. Smith-

Scott filed Exceptions to the Foreclosure Sale.

Ms. Combs met with Ms. Smith-Scott at her law office on February 2, 2017. At

Ms. Smith-Scott’s request, Ms. Combs paid $2,500 toward the $4,200 flat fee for the

bankruptcy representation by credit card. Therefore, by February 2, Ms. Combs had paid

$4,000 of the agreed upon $4,200 flat fee. Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b) obligated Ms. Smith-

Scott to inform the Bankruptcy Court of her receipt of additional legal fees, yet she failed

to do so. At the February 2 meeting, Ms. Smith-Scott presented Ms. Combs with an invoice

for services purportedly rendered. Ms. Combs reviewed the invoice and noticed

inaccuracies. Ms. Combs requested Ms. Smith-Scott send a corrected invoice via email.

Ms. Smith-Scott failed to do so.

In February 2017, Ms. Combs and Ms. Smith-Scott began to disagree about the most

effective legal strategy to reclaim 9904 Doubletree Lane. Ms. Combs acquired sufficient

funds to reclaim the property and asked Ms. Smith-Scott to request permission from the

circuit court to deposit the funds in the court’s escrow account. Ms. Combs expressed a

desire to make the request promptly—i.e., before the circuit court ratified the foreclosure

sale. In an email on February 18, 2017, Ms. Combs memorialized her request and

suggested that Ms. Smith-Scott withdraw her appearance in the foreclosure action if she

declined to take the requested action. That same day, Ms. Smith-Scott notified Ms. Combs

30 by email that she would be withdrawing her appearance in both the foreclosure and

bankruptcy actions.

On February 21, 2017, unsure whether Ms. Smith-Scott continued to represent her,

Ms. Combs emailed Ms. Smith-Scott and alerted her to filing deadlines in the pending

bankruptcy appeal and a scheduled hearing in Bankruptcy Court. Ms. Smith-Scott agreed

to attend the hearing and stated to Ms. Combs, “I will need to be paid and I am withdrawing

from both cases.” Ms. Combs did not know how much she owed Ms. Smith-Scott because

she never received a revised invoice. Ms. Combs sent Ms. Smith-Scott a second email on

February 21 and requested that she dismiss the bankruptcy case and withdraw her

appearance in the foreclosure action. On February 22, 2017, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a

Motion to Dismiss Voluntary Chapter 13 Case in the bankruptcy action. The next day the

Bankruptcy Court dismissed and closed Ms. Combs’ bankruptcy action. On February 23,

2017, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Line striking her appearance in Ms. Combs’ foreclosure

On February 22, 2017, Ms. Smith-Scott emailed Ms. Combs two invoices. The

invoices showed that Ms. Combs owed Ms. Smith-Scott a total of $4,986.13. Ms. Smith-

Scott’s email further informed Ms. Combs that she had an outstanding balance of $1,686.13

and an additional $3,300 in legal fees had accrued. The first invoice, labeled “Invoice

#23,” was dated February 1, 2017 and contained twenty-six entries. Most of the entries

pertained to Ms. Smith-Scott’s work on the bankruptcy action, for which Ms. Smith-Scott

had already been paid $4,000 of the $4,200 total fee. Invoice #23 incorrectly reflected that

on February 1, 2017, Ms. Combs paid (1) $216.25 toward the balance; and (2) $2,283.76

31 toward another invoice, Invoice #22. Ms. Smith-Scott acknowledged to the hearing judge

below that Invoice #23 was entirely inaccurate. Likewise, Ms. Combs never owed Ms.

Smith-Scott the $1,686.13 balance.

The second invoice attached to Ms. Smith-Scott’s email, labeled “Invoice #31,” was

dated February 22, 2017 and contained entries related to the bankruptcy appeal in the U.S.

District Court. Despite agreeing to represent Ms. Combs on appeal for a flat fee, Invoice

#31 contained hourly billing entries for work purportedly performed on the appeal.

However, as noted supra, Ms. Combs elected to dismiss the appeal before Ms. Smith-Scott

undertook any substantive work. Prior to sending Invoice #31, Ms. Smith-Scott never

informed Ms. Combs that she would charge on an hourly basis if Ms. Combs chose not to

pursue the appeal. The billing entries in Invoice #31 were not accurate and Ms. Combs did

not owe the $3,300 balance to Ms. Smith-Scott.

Ms. Combs reviewed these invoices and emailed Ms. Smith-Scott on February 23,

2017 at 6:13 a.m., to express her concern that they contained inaccuracies and failed to

account for previous payments. At 7:55 a.m., Ms. Smith-Scott, without having addressed

any of Ms. Combs’ concerns, charged Ms. Combs’ credit card through Square in the

amount of $4,986.13. Twenty minutes later, Ms. Smith-Scott responded to Ms. Combs’

email. Ms. Smith-Scott made several threatening statements to Ms. Combs and threatened

to disclose confidential information about Ms. Combs to adverse parties. Ms. Smith-

Scott’s email concluded by stating, “But, don’t call me or prevent my payment in full. We

all have a day of reckoning!”

32 The hearing judge acknowledged that the issue of whether Ms. Combs authorized

Ms. Smith-Scott to charge her credit card presents two separate, but related questions.

First, did Ms. Combs give Ms. Smith-Scott her credit card information on February 23,

2017? Second, did Ms. Combs authorize payment in the amount of $4,986.13 on February

23, 2017? On the first question, the hearing judge found for Ms. Smith-Scott, i.e., that

there lacked clear and convincing evidence to show that Ms. Smith-Scott converted Ms.

Combs’ credit card number. On the second question, the hearing judge found that clear

and convincing evidence supported Bar Counsel’s account that Ms. Combs did not

authorize payment in the amount of $4,986.13.

On February 27, 2017, Ms. Combs disputed the charge with her bank, Wells Fargo.

That same day, Wells Fargo returned the full amount to Ms. Combs’ account and notified

Ms. Smith-Scott of the dispute. Wells Fargo conducted an investigation into the disputed

charge. As part of the investigation, Ms. Smith-Scott submitted a written explanation to

the bank (“Wells Fargo Letter”) in which she stated that Ms. Combs gave verbal

authorization over the phone to make the charge. With the Wells Fargo Letter, Ms. Smith-

Scott attached Invoice #23 and Invoice #31 for support, despite knowing the inaccuracies

in each invoice. Neither invoice reflected the $4,000 Ms. Combs had already paid toward

the bankruptcy case. Moreover, the hearing judge credited Ms. Combs’ testimony that she

spoke to Ms. Smith-Scott by telephone on February 28, 2017, and expressly informed her

that she did not authorize a charge in the amount of $4,986.13. After the call, Ms. Combs

emailed Ms. Smith-Scott and requested an invoice “on any unpaid balance as of” February

28, 2017. Ms. Combs stated, “[i]t is still my intent and desire to come to an agreement and

33 conclusion on this matter.” (Alteration in original). On March 1, 2017, Ms. Smith-Scott

emailed Ms. Combs and threatened to put her into an involuntary Chapter 7 bankruptcy

proceeding so that she could get paid as a creditor. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to provide Ms.

Combs with a revised invoice in response to Ms. Combs’ earlier requests.

On April 12, 2017, Ms. Combs paid Ms. Smith-Scott the remaining $200 installment

toward the $4,200 bankruptcy fee by money order. Ms. Combs testified that she made the

final installment payment because she wanted to make a good faith attempt to fulfill her

end of the contract with Ms. Smith-Scott to pay $4,200 for the bankruptcy representation.

At the time Ms. Combs made the $200 payment, Wells Fargo had returned the $4,986.13

to Ms. Combs’ account based on the February 27 dispute. However, after the investigation,

Wells Fargo ultimately resolved the dispute in Ms. Smith-Scott’s favor. Consequently,

Wells Fargo removed $4,986.13 from Ms. Combs’ account on May 18, 2017. On April

16, 2017, Ms. Smith-Scott sent Ms. Combs a letter acknowledging the $200 payment. In

the letter, Ms. Smith-Scott advised that, while Ms. Combs did not owe any legal fees, she

intended to keep the $200. In part, the letter read:

However, due to your attempt at disputing your payment and the hardship that I had to endure, the Two Hundred Dollars will be used to cover the expense of protecting myself from your manipulative behavior.

Ms. Smith-Scott never returned the $200 to Ms. Combs.

Ms. Smith-Scott testified that, despite the inaccuracies in Invoice #23 and Invoice

#31, Ms. Combs still owed at least $4,986.13 in unpaid legal fees, and that she

communicated that balance to Ms. Combs. The hearing judge did not credit this testimony.

In rejecting Ms. Smith-Scott’s testimony, the hearing judge noted that (1) Ms. Smith-Scott

34 did not present any documentary evidence to support her contention that Ms. Combs owed

$4,986.13; (2) much of Ms. Smith-Scott’s testimony regarding her billing of Ms. Combs

was contradicted by other testimony, the documentary record, or her statements to Bar

Counsel during its investigation; and (3) Ms. Smith-Scott admitted at the hearing that, were

she to do it all over again, she would have handled the billing of Ms. Combs’ account

differently. Specifically, the hearing judge discussed this example:

[Ms. Smith-Scott] testified at the hearing that Ms. Combs gave her explicit permission to charge her credit card in the amount of $4,986.13 and that Ms. Combs understood that the payment was “conditional.” But there is no contemporaneous evidence indicating that [Ms. Smith-Scott] advised Ms. Combs that the $4,986.13 payment was conditional and she never advised Wells Fargo that the disputed payment was “conditional.” Moreover, when given an opportunity to explain herself to Bar Counsel during its investigation, [Ms. Smith-Scott] did not make such a claim.

Bar Counsel Investigation II

Ms. Combs filed a complaint with the Commission against Ms. Smith-Scott on May

26, 2017. The focus of Ms. Combs’ complaint centered on Ms. Smith-Scott’s unauthorized

charge of Ms. Combs’ credit card. Ms. Smith-Scott responded to the complaint on July 5,

2017. Ms. Smith-Scott attached the Wells Fargo Letter to her response, which included

the false representation that Ms. Combs authorized her to charge the credit card in the

amount of $4,986.13. The Wells Fargo Letter did not indicate that the charge was

conditional. Additionally, Ms. Smith-Scott attached Invoice #23 and Invoice #31, which

she knew to be inaccurate. Ms. Smith-Scott’s response to Bar Counsel likewise omitted

35 any representation that Ms. Combs authorized her to charge the credit card in the amount

of $4,986.13 or that the charge was “conditional.”

Ms. Smith-Scott sought to intentionally mislead Bar Counsel into believing the

charge was authorized by submitting the Wells Fargo Letter. On October 19, 2017, Ms.

Smith-Scott submitted a second response to Bar Counsel wherein she intentionally gave

Bar Counsel the false impression that the $4,986.13 amount was accurate and owed, despite

her knowledge that it was not an accurate figure reflecting legal fees that Ms. Combs owed.

Again, Ms. Smith-Scott did not state in the second response that the $4,986.13 charge was

somehow “conditional.”

Representation of Angela Plater

In October 2014, foreclosure proceedings were instituted against Ms. Angela Plater

in the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. See WBGLMC v. Angela Plater, Case

No. CAEF14-27671. The foreclosure action related to Ms. Plater’s home. As a result, Ms.

Plater retained Ms. Smith-Scott to assist in saving the home from foreclosure. Ms. Plater

and Ms. Smith-Scott did not execute a written retainer agreement.

In early 2015, Ms. Smith-Scott represented Ms. Plater at a foreclosure mediation.

Ms. Smith-Scott failed to advise Ms. Plater of the basis or rate of her legal fee prior to the

start of the mediation. At the conclusion of the mediation, Ms. Smith-Scott requested

payment from Ms. Plater, which she promptly made. At no point during the representation

in the foreclosure action did Ms. Smith-Scott advise Ms. Plater of her hourly rate. The

mediation did not result in an agreement.

36 On March 24, 2015, the circuit court entered an order permitting the foreclosure of

Ms. Plater’s home. The creditor subsequently scheduled the foreclosure sale for October

20, 2015. Ms. Plater received notice of the sale and contacted Ms. Smith-Scott to inform

her that October 20 was her birthday. Ms. Plater asked that Ms. Smith-Scott assist in

postponing the foreclosure so that it would not occur on Ms. Plater’s birthday. To achieve

a postponement, Ms. Smith-Scott suggested that Ms. Plater file a bankruptcy petition. Ms.

Plater agreed to file for bankruptcy solely for the purpose of delaying the foreclosure sale,

but advised Ms. Smith-Scott that she had no intention of pursuing the bankruptcy through

to a liquidation or reorganization of her debts. Ms. Plater further agreed to pay Ms. Smith-

Scott a flat fee of $1,500 to file the bankruptcy petition.

Ms. Plater met Ms. Smith-Scott at her law office to prepare the bankruptcy petition

on October 19, 2015. Aware that Ms. Plater did not actually intend to pursue bankruptcy,

Ms. Smith-Scott advised that she could file a “skeleton form.” By “skeleton form,” Ms.

Smith-Scott meant that she could file the bare minimum bankruptcy petition and

intentionally omit other required documentation. Ms. Smith-Scott advised Ms. Plater that

without the required documentation, the Bankruptcy Court would dismiss the petition

within two to three weeks. With Ms. Plater in the office, Ms. Smith-Scott prepared a

Disclosure of Compensation of Attorney for Debtor form, 13 in which Ms. Smith-Scott

13 The Disclosure of Compensation of Attorney for Debtor is filed contemporaneously with a bankruptcy petition. In completing the form, an attorney certifies the “compensation paid . . . within one year before the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, or agreed to be paid . . . , for services rendered or to be rendered on behalf of the debtor.” See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Disclosure of Compensation of Attorney for

37 represented that Ms. Plater agreed to pay a flat fee of $4,200 for the representation. Ms.

Plater questioned Ms. Smith-Scott about the $4,200 figure because it did not comport with

her understanding of the agreed upon fee arrangement. Ms. Smith-Scott responded by

misrepresenting to Ms. Plater that the form must be submitted to the Bankruptcy Court in

that format. On October 19, 2015, Ms. Plater paid Ms. Smith-Scott $1,500 to file the

petition.

That same day, Ms. Smith-Scott filed Ms. Plater’s Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition.

See In re: Angela M. Plater, Case No. 15-24508-TJC. The bankruptcy petition was without

substantial justification because Ms. Smith-Scott filed it solely for the purpose of

preventing the foreclosure sale from occurring. Ms. Smith-Scott had no intention of

completing the required filings to ensure that the case would move forward. Moreover,

Ms. Smith-Scott filed the Disclosure of Compensation of Attorney for Debtor with a

knowingly false statement that Ms. Plater agreed to pay a flat fee of $4,200.

On October 20, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court notified Ms. Smith-Scott that Ms.

Plater’s petition lacked several required documents. The Bankruptcy Court further

explained that if the documents were not submitted by November 2, 2015, the case would

be dismissed. Because Ms. Smith-Scott knew that Ms. Plater did not intend to pursue

bankruptcy relief, she took no action in response to the notice and did not discuss the notice

with Ms. Plater. On November 6, 2015, the Bankruptcy Court dismissed Ms. Plater’s

Debtor, https://www.uscourts.gov/forms/bankruptcy-forms/disclosure-compensation- attorney-debtor-0 (last visited June 26, 2020) archived at https://perma.cc/636P-YZCG.

38 bankruptcy case for failure to file the required documents. As a result of the dismissal, the

automatic stay lifted. Ms. Smith-Scott did not discuss the dismissal with Ms. Plater.

On December 9, 2015, Ms. Smith-Scott entered her appearance in Ms. Plater’s

pending foreclosure case. That same day, Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion to Stay and/or

Dismiss the Foreclosure Proceedings. The circuit court denied the Motion on January 5,

2016 because it (1) failed to state a valid defense or present a meritorious argument; (2)

was not submitted under oath or supported by affidavit as required by Maryland Rule (“Md.

Rule”) 14-211(a)(3)(A); and (3) failed to comply with Md. Rule 14-211(a)(3)(C). Ms.

Plater’s home sold at a foreclosure sale on January 5, 2016.

Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Motion to Vacate Foreclosure Sale on February 5, 2016.

Ms. Plater, acting pro se, filed Exceptions of Sale on February 22, 2016. The circuit court

denied both motions on March 22, 2016. Ms. Plater then retained Ms. Smith-Scott to file

an appeal of the circuit court’s two orders to the Court of Special Appeals. Ms. Smith-

Scott agreed to handle the appeal for a flat fee of $4,000. Ms. Smith-Scott advised Ms.

Plater that she could pay the fee in installments, but did not provide a date by which the

total fee became due. Ms. Plater and Ms. Smith-Scott did not execute a written retainer

agreement for the representation.

Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Notice of Appeal and a Motion to Stay Proceedings Pending

Appeal in the circuit court on April 19, 2016. For these filings, Ms. Smith-Scott charged

and received an additional $500. Ms. Plater paid this amount by check on April 7, 2016.

Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Civil Appeal Information Report in the Court of Special Appeals

39 on May 2, 2016. For this filing, Ms. Smith-Scott charged and received an additional $50.

Ms. Plater paid this amount by check on April 22, 2016.

On July 5, 2016, the circuit court granted Ms. Plater’s Motion to Stay on the

condition that she post a supersedeas bond in the amount of $25,000. Ms. Smith-Scott

convinced Ms. Plater that there existed a meritorious legal argument that would obviate the

need for Ms. Plater to post a bond. Accordingly, Ms. Smith-Scott argued to the circuit

court that, since Ms. Plater was a bona fide purchaser, she was not required to post a bond.

For this filing, Ms. Smith-Scott charged and received an additional $250. Ms. Plater paid

this amount by check on July 12, 2016 when the Motion to Reconsider had been completed.

Ms. Smith-Scott did not advise Ms. Plater that she had an outstanding balance or that future

legal fees would accrue.

In late August 2016, one of Ms. Smith-Scott’s employees contacted Ms. Plater and

asked whether she wanted to pursue her appeal. Ms. Plater confirmed that she wanted to

pursue the appeal. By that time, the Court of Special Appeals had notified Ms. Smith-Scott

that Ms. Plater’s appellate brief must be submitted by September 29, 2016. Ms. Smith-

Scott’s employee informed Ms. Plater about the filing deadline. On September 7, 2016,

Ms. Plater paid Ms. Smith-Scott the first installment for the appeal in the amount of $1,000.

Ms. Plater paid by check; the notation “toward brief” appeared in the memo line. Ms.

Smith-Scott failed to deposit and maintain the funds in an attorney trust account until

earned or expenses incurred. On September 22, 2016, Ms. Plater paid Ms. Smith-Scott a

second installment for the appeal in the amount of $1,000. Ms. Plater again paid by check;

the notation “payment toward appeal” appeared in the memo line. Ms. Smith-Scott failed

40 to deposit and maintain the funds in an attorney trust account until earned or expenses

incurred.

After Ms. Smith-Scott received Ms. Plater’s funds, Ms. Smith-Scott did not perform

any meaningful legal work on Ms. Plater’s appeal. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to prepare or

submit Ms. Plater’s appellate brief by the September 29 filing deadline. Ms. Smith-Scott

failed to request an extension of time. During a conversation with Ms. Smith-Scott in the

first week of October 2016, after the deadline had expired, Ms. Smith-Scott intentionally

misrepresented to Ms. Plater that she intended to file the appellate brief within one week.

Ms. Smith-Scott failed to file the brief and intentionally concealed her inaction from Ms.

Plater.

The Court of Special Appeals dismissed Ms. Plater’s appeal on October 19, 2016 as

a result of Ms. Smith-Scott’s failure to file an appellate brief. Thereafter, for approximately

six weeks, Ms. Smith-Scott concealed the dismissal order from Ms. Plater. Throughout

early October, Ms. Plater attempted to contact Ms. Smith-Scott on several occasions to find

out the status of the appeal, but Ms. Smith-Scott failed to respond. Ms. Plater reached out

in the middle of October and scheduled a meeting with Ms. Smith-Scott for the end of the

month. On the day of the meeting, Ms. Smith-Scott called Ms. Plater and cancelled. Still,

in that conversation, Ms. Smith-Scott did not inform Ms. Plater that the appeal had been

dismissed.

Ms. Plater emailed Ms. Smith-Scott on November 14, 2016 requesting a copy of her

appellate brief. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to respond. Ms. Plater emailed Ms. Smith-Scott

again on November 30, 2016, again requesting a copy of her appellate brief. Ms. Smith-

41 Scott failed to respond. By November 30, neither Ms. Smith-Scott, nor any member of her

staff, had informed Ms. Plater that the appeal had been dismissed. In late November, Ms.

Plater contacted the Court of Special Appeals and learned, for the first time, that her appeal

had been dismissed.

Ms. Plater spoke with Ms. Smith-Scott by telephone in early December 2016.

During the conversation, Ms. Smith-Scott still did not inform Ms. Plater of the dismissal.

Ms. Plater scheduled a meeting with Ms. Smith-Scott for the middle of December. On the

day of the appointment, Ms. Plater went to Ms. Smith-Scott’s law office, yet Ms. Smith-

Scott failed to appear. An employee called Ms. Smith-Scott so that she could speak with

Ms. Plater. On this call, six weeks after the dismissal of Ms. Plater’s appeal, Ms. Smith-

Scott informed Ms. Plater of the dismissal for the first time. Ms. Plater immediately

requested that Ms. Smith-Scott return her money. Ms. Smith-Scott agreed, but explained

that she would need three weeks to do so.

A few weeks later, Ms. Plater went to Ms. Smith-Scott’s law office to collect her

refund. Ms. Smith-Scott was not there. An employee informed Ms. Plater that Ms. Smith-

Scott went to the bank to get a check. Ms. Plater waited approximately thirty minutes to

an hour for Ms. Smith-Scott to return; however, Ms. Smith-Scott never arrived. In January

2017, Ms. Plater returned to Ms. Smith-Scott’s office a second time to collect her refund.

While Ms. Smith-Scott was present in the office, an employee presented Ms. Plater with a

check in the amount of $1,025. Ms. Plater immediately disputed the amount of the check

and requested a full refund of $2,000. Despite having performed no meaningful work on

Ms. Plater’s appeal, Ms. Smith-Scott refused to refund the full $2,000. Ms. Smith-Scott

42 failed to describe the legal work or otherwise provide Ms. Plater with an invoice detailing

the legal services purportedly rendered that justified Ms. Smith-Scott retaining $975. Ms.

Plater did not deposit the $1,025 check.

Bar Counsel Investigation III

Ms. Plater filed a complaint with the Commission against Ms. Smith-Scott on

November 2, 2017. Bar Counsel wrote to Ms. Smith-Scott on November 9, 2017 and

requested a response to Ms. Plater’s complaint. Ms. Smith-Scott, through counsel, filed a

response on January 19, 2018. Ms. Smith-Scott attempted to justify her failure to refund

all of Ms. Plater’s funds by explaining that she had “met with Ms. Plater; identified the

legal issues to pursue on appeal; prepared the Civil Information Sheet; filed a motion to

stay the foreclosure pending the appeal; and filed a motion to mitigate the necessity of a

supersedeas bond.”

Ms. Smith-Scott concealed from Bar Counsel that she had received additional funds

from Ms. Plater to prepare each of these documents. Moreover, in her response, Ms. Smith-

Scott stated that she had incurred $825 in legal fees for “legal work performed for Ms.

Plater while the matter was pending on appeal.” With her response, Ms. Smith-Scott

provided a refund check to Ms. Plater in the amount of $1,140. Ms. Plater did not deposit

the check because she believed she was owed the full $2,000 she paid toward the appeal.

43 Representation of Furrah Deeba

Ms. Smith-Scott filed a bankruptcy petition on behalf of Ms. Furrah Deeba in the

Bankruptcy Court on January 31, 2017.14 See In re: Furrah Deeba, Case No: 17-11325.

In the petition, Ms. Smith-Scott inadvertently used a different client’s social security

number. This error prompted a notice of a prior bankruptcy filing. Consequently, pursuant

to the Bankruptcy Code, the automatic stay imposed only lasted thirty days.

For this reason, Ms. Smith-Scott filed Debtor’s Motion to Extend Automatic Stay

on February 8, 2017. The Bankruptcy Court scheduled a hearing on the motion for April

17, 2017. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to appear at the hearing and failed to notify the

Bankruptcy Court or the trustee that she would not appear. Therefore, on April 17, the

court denied the motion and noted on the order, “failure to appear at the hearing held on

April 17, 2017 and prosecute the motion.” The Bankruptcy Court subsequently dismissed

Ms. Deeba’s case without the entry of a discharge on July 24, 2017 for failure to file the

required financial management course certification.

In Ms. Smith-Scott’s Answer to Bar Counsel, she admitted to the facts set forth

regarding Ms. Deeba, but alleged that she would provide mitigation before the hearing

judge. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to present any mitigation as it pertains to Ms. Deeba.

Representation of Benjamin Thomas, Jr.

Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on behalf of Mr. Benjamin

Thomas Jr., in the Bankruptcy Court on April 3, 2017. See In re: Benjamin Thomas, Jr.,

14 The hearing judge’s findings of fact indicate that Ms. Deeba’s petition was filed on December 31, 2017; however, the record reveals a filing date of January 31, 2017.

44 Case No. 17-14620. The Bankruptcy Court scheduled a plan confirmation hearing in Mr.

Thomas’ case for August 8, 2017. Ms. Smith-Scott intentionally failed to appear at the

hearing. Ms. Smith-Scott further failed to notify the court or the Chapter 13 Trustee that

she would not appear. As a result, the Bankruptcy Court denied the confirmation of Mr.

Thomas’ Chapter 13 plan without leave to amend. Ms. Smith-Scott testified that she had

Mr. Thomas’ permission not to attend the hearing. Further, Ms. Smith-Scott testified that

Mr. Thomas is still her client. Bar Counsel failed to present any evidence to the contrary.

Representation of John Thomas Jones, Jr.

Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on behalf of Mr. John

Thomas Jones, Jr., in the Bankruptcy Court on October 7, 2016. See In re: John Thomas

Jones, Jr., Case No. 16-23509. The Bankruptcy Court scheduled a plan confirmation

hearing in Mr. Jones’ case for January 31, 2017. Ms. Smith-Scott intentionally failed to

appear at the hearing. Ms. Smith-Scott further failed to notify the court or the Chapter 13

Trustee that she would not appear. As a result, the Bankruptcy Court denied the

confirmation of Mr. Jones’ Chapter 13 plan without leave to amend. In Ms. Smith-Scott’s

Answer to Bar Counsel, she admitted to the facts set forth regarding Mr. Jones, but alleged

that she would provide mitigation before the hearing judge.

Representation of Theresa Saunders

Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition on behalf of Ms. Theresa

Saunders in the Bankruptcy Court on May 19, 2017. Ms. Saunders filed a pro se

Motion/Request for Release of Attorney on December 27, 2017. In the motion, Ms.

Saunders requested that the Bankruptcy Court “release” Ms. Smith-Scott as her attorney

45 “based upon unsatisfactory actions and irreconcilable differences in miscommunication

that have affected her bankruptcy process and may impact the outcome of [her] case.” Ms.

Saunders further alleged that Ms. Smith-Scott submitted an amended bankruptcy plan on

December 12, 2017 without Ms. Saunders’ review or approval.

Ms. Smith-Scott filed a Response in Support of Debtor’s Motion/Request for

Release of Attorney on December 29, 2017. Ms. Smith-Scott stated in her response that

“it is this Legal Counsel’s belief that the Debtor is no longer protected by Attorney-Client

Privilege and has provided the court with e-mails that contradict statements made by the

Debtor and allows the Court to get a better understanding of the actions of Legal Counsel.”

Ms. Smith-Scott cited no legal authority to support her position. Without obtaining Ms.

Saunders’ informed consent, Ms. Smith-Scott attached to the filing several confidential

email communications between Ms. Smith-Scott and Ms. Saunders that occurred between

August 4, 2017 and December 20, 2017. Ms. Smith-Scott did not communicate her intent

to publicly disclose the emails to Ms. Saunders in advance of the filing. Moreover, Ms.

Smith-Scott did not file the confidential communications under seal or take any other

measures to prevent the public disclosure.

Ms. Saunders emailed Ms. Smith-Scott on January 29, 2018 and confronted her

about the disclosure of the confidential emails. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to take any remedial

action to have the confidential communications sealed or otherwise protected from public

review.

46 STANDARD OF REVIEW

In an attorney discipline proceeding, this Court reviews for clear error a hearing

judge’s findings of fact, and reviews without deference a hearing judge’s conclusions of

law. See Md. Rule 19-741(b)(2)(B) (“The Court [of Appeals] shall give due regard to the

opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.”); Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Chanthunya, 446 Md. 576, 588 (2016) (“[T]his Court reviews for

clear error a hearing judge’s findings of fact . . . .”); Md. Rule 19-741(b)(1) (“The Court of

Appeals shall review de novo the [hearing] judge’s conclusions of law.”). This Court

determines whether clear and convincing evidence establishes that a lawyer violated a rule

of professional conduct. See Md. Rule 19-727(c) (“Bar Counsel has the burden of proving

the averments of the petition [for disciplinary or remedial action] by clear and convincing

evidence.”).

Either party may file “exceptions to the findings and conclusions of the hearing

judge.” Md. Rule 19-728(b). If exceptions to the findings of fact are filed, the Court “shall

determine whether the findings of fact have been proved by the requisite standard of proof

set out in Rule 19-727(c).” Md. Rule 19-741(b)(2)(B); see also Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. Mahone, 435 Md. 84, 104 (2013). We may confine our review to the findings

of fact challenged by the exceptions, mindful though, that the hearing judge is afforded due

regard to assess the credibility of witnesses. Id. A hearing judge’s findings of fact are not

clearly erroneous “where ‘there is any competent evidence to support the’ finding of fact.”

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Donnelly, 458 Md. 237, 276 (2018) (quoting Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Merkle, 440 Md. 609, 633 (2014)). “If the hearing judge’s factual

47 findings are not clearly erroneous and the conclusions drawn from them are supported by

the facts found, exceptions to conclusions of law will be overruled.” Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. Tanko, 408 Md. 404, 419 (2009).

DISCUSSION

Bar Counsel does not except to any of the hearing judge’s findings of fact. Bar

Counsel excepts only to the absence of the hearing judge’s conclusion of law regarding

Rule 1.15. Ms. Smith-Scott notes several exceptions to both the hearing judge’s findings

of fact and conclusions of law. We shall address each in turn.

A. Exceptions to the Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact

Ms. Smith-Scott excepts to the hearing judge’s failure to make the following factual

findings: (1) Ms. Smith-Scott’s filings in her personal bankruptcy case were done in good

faith and were not frivolous at the time of filing; (2) Ms. Smith-Scott represented Ms.

Combs in five separate legal matters beginning in October 2015; (3) Ms. Smith-Scott

performed a significant amount of legal work in Ms. Combs’ five matters; (4) Ms. Smith-

Scott performed legal work totaling $11,087.75 for Ms. Combs, yet wrote the total amount

down to $7,501.13; and (5) Ms. Smith-Scott earned the full amount of legal fees paid by

Ms. Combs.

A hearing judge is entitled to “a great deal of discretion in determining which

evidence to rely upon.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Miller, 467 Md. 176, 195 (2020).

Indeed, “[a]s far as what evidence a hearing judge must rely upon to reach his or her

conclusions, we have said that the hearing judge ‘may pick and choose what evidence to

believe.’” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Woolery, 462 Md. 209, 230 (2018) (internal

48 citation and some quotations omitted). “We reiterate this point in light of [Ms. Smith-

Scott’s] numerous exceptions to findings of facts in which [s]he suggests that the hearing

[judge] should have made certain findings of fact . . . .” Id. (emphasis in original).

Accordingly, because we decline to overrule a hearing judge’s findings of fact absent clear

error, we overrule Ms. Smith-Scott’s “generalized exceptions as to what findings of fact

the hearing [judge] failed to make.” Id.

Next, Ms. Smith-Scott excepts to five of the hearing judge’s findings of fact. First,

Ms. Smith-Scott contends that the hearing judge should not have found that Ms. Smith-

Scott intentionally misrepresented to Bar Counsel that “[t]he Chapter 7 Trustee began to

sale [sic] property by omitting facts and misrepresenting other facts, which caused the

Bankruptcy Judge to rule in [the Chapter 7 Trustee’s] favor which included an order of

contempt and being threatened with incarceration,” because Ms. Smith-Scott “sincerely

and honestly believed” that she acted in good faith in contesting the seizure of her law

office. Second, Ms. Smith-Scott asserts that the hearing judge should not have found that

Ms. Smith-Scott willfully misrepresented to Ms. Combs that she had filed a Motion for

Reconsideration in December 2016. For support, Ms. Smith-Scott suggests that her

hospitalization in December of 2016 negates the willfulness of her misrepresentation to

These first two exceptions turn largely on Ms. Smith-Scott’s intent in making

statements to Bar Counsel and Ms. Combs. We have already said that this Court “shall

give due regard to the opportunity of the hearing judge to assess the credibility of

witnesses.” Md. Rule 19-741(b)(2)(B). Doing just that, we determine that the hearing

49 judge did not err in finding that Ms. Smith-Scott’s statements contained in her response to

Bar Counsel and Ms. Combs were knowing, intentional, and willful.

Third, Ms. Smith-Scott maintains that the hearing judge should not have found that

Ms. Combs did not authorize payment in the amount of $4,986.13 on February 23, 2017.

This exception necessarily urges the Court to make credibility decisions based on

testimony at the hearing. We decline to do so. Ms. Combs testified at the hearing that she

spoke to Ms. Smith-Scott on February 28, 2017 and informed her that she did not authorize

the $4,986.13 charge. Ms. Smith-Scott testified that, despite the inaccuracies in Invoice

#23 and Invoice #31, Ms. Combs owed her $4,986.13. The hearing judge explicitly stated

that he credited Ms. Combs’ testimony and rejected Ms. Smith-Scott’s testimony.

Moreover, Ms. Smith-Scott’s testimony was contradicted by other testimony, the

documentary record, and Ms. Smith-Scott’s own statements to Bar Counsel during its

investigation. The hearing judge did not clearly err in finding that Ms. Combs did not

authorize the charge. Therefore, we overrule Ms. Smith-Scott’s exception.

Fourth, Ms. Smith-Scott avers that the hearing judge should not have found that Ms.

Plater’s bankruptcy filing was without substantial justification. She contends that “it can

be a legitimate legal strategy to file a Chapter 13 bankruptcy with the reasonable

expectation that the lenders may engage in meaningful financial negotiations.” Yet, Ms.

Plater’s hearing testimony eviscerates this argument. Ms. Plater testified that she “didn’t

have any intention[] of going through with the bankruptcy” and she “informed [Ms. Smith-

Scott] of that.” To be sure, Ms. Plater reiterated this point, testifying

50 I didn’t have any intention of going through with the bankruptcy, I just wanted to stop the [foreclosure] sale. [Ms. Smith-Scott] indicated that the filing would stop the sale. So that’s all I intended to do. And I made it clear to her that’s all I intended to do.

Indeed, this is confirmed by Ms. Smith-Scott’s filing of a “skeleton form,” notably missing

required documents for a legitimate bankruptcy petition. The hearing judge did not err in

determining that Ms. Smith-Scott filed a bankruptcy petition on behalf of Ms. Plater

without substantial justification.

Fifth, Ms. Smith-Scott argues that the hearing judge should not have found that Ms.

Smith-Scott made a knowingly false statement that Ms. Plater agreed to pay $4,200 as the

total legal fee for bankruptcy representation. At the hearing, Bar Counsel showed Ms.

Plater a copy of the bankruptcy petition Ms. Smith-Scott filed on her behalf. Bar Counsel

directed Ms. Plater to the portion of the petition disclosing Ms. Smith-Scott’s

compensation. The following exchange occurred:

[BAR COUNSEL]: What is that?

[MS. PLATER]: This indicates the amount, the price which is – okay. Compensation for attorney from debtor.[15] It has on here $4,200 and it has $1,[5]00 and $2,700. But there was no discussion of me paying $4,200. I did give her the $1,[5]00 on that date.

***

[MS. PLATER]: I did question her on that date when I saw that on the document because it shocked me because it’s, like, okay, where did the $4,200 come from. She indicated that that’s what she had to do to submit the

15 The Disclosure of Compensation of Attorney for Debtor reads:

For legal services, I have agreed to accept: $4,200.00 Prior to the filing of this statement I have received: $1,500.00 Balance Due: $2,700.00

51 form, that it had to be done in this format. But I knew I wasn’t paying $4,200. I gave her what she told me the $1,500 and that was it.

The form also contained a section entitled “CERTIFICATION,” which reads “I certify that

the foregoing is a complete statement of any agreement or arrangement for payment to me

for representation of the debtor[] in this bankruptcy proceeding.” Ms. Smith-Scott’s

signature appears directly below this statement. The hearing judge did not err in

determining that Ms. Smith-Scott made a knowingly false statement, and we overrule this

exception.

Having overruled Ms. Smith-Scott’s exceptions, and having determined that those

findings of fact are supported by clear and convincing evidence, we turn to the hearing

judge’s conclusions of law.

B. Conclusions of Law

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4,

1.5, 1.6, 1.15, 1.16, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 8.1, 8.4, and 19-404.

Bar Counsel excepts to the hearing judge’s failure to find that Ms. Smith-Scott’s

conduct, regarding her representation of Ms. Plater, violated Rule 1.15. Ms. Smith-Scott

excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusions of law that she violated the following Rules:

1.5, 1.6, 1.15, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 8.1, 8.4, and 19-404. Based upon our independent review of

the record, we sustain Bar Counsel’s exception as to Rule 1.15 and uphold the remainder

of the hearing judge’s conclusions of law.

52 1. Rule 1.1 (Competence).

Rule 1.1 requires that an attorney “provide competent representation to a client.

Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and

preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” A violation of Rule 1.1 occurs

when an attorney “fails to act or acts in an untimely manner, resulting in harm to his or her

client.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Maldonado, 463 Md. 11, 38 (2019) (quoting

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Brown, 426 Md. 298, 319 (2012)). An attorney’s failure

to appear on behalf of a client without explanation is an egregious violation of this Rule.

See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Edwards, 462 Md. 642, 694–95 (2019). “Evidence of

a failure to apply the requisite thoroughness and/or preparation in representing a client is

sufficient alone to support a violation of Rule 1.1.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Guida,

391 Md. 33, 54 (2006). Furthermore, the “failure to maintain [client] funds in a proper

trust account demonstrates incompetence.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Maignan, 390

Md. 287, 296–97 (2005).

The hearing judge found that Ms. Smith-Scott’s conduct violated Rule 1.1 in a

variety of ways. In Ms. Smith-Scott’s representation of Ms. Combs, she violated the Rule

by: (1) failing to deposit and maintain the unearned portion of Ms. Combs’ October 14,

2015 payment in an attorney trust account until earned or expenses incurred; (2) failing to

competently represent Ms. Combs before the Court of Special Appeals when she neglected

to provide the clerk of that court with a signed Civil Appeal Information Report, even after

being contacted to do so, thereby causing the court to dismiss Ms. Combs’ appeal; (3)

misinforming Ms. Combs that her November 3, 2016 Bankruptcy Court hearing had been

53 rescheduled and that their appearance was not required when the hearing had not been

rescheduled; (4) acting without the required thoroughness and preparation by filing an

untimely Emergency Motion for Reconsideration six weeks after Ms. Combs requested she

file the motion; and (5) refusing to provide timely or accurate billing statements to Ms.

Combs.

The hearing judge further found that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 1.1 in her

representation of Ms. Plater by: (1) failing to deposit and maintain the unearned portion of

Ms. Plater’s September 2016 payments in an attorney trust account until earned or expenses

incurred; and (2) failing to competently represent Ms. Plater before the Court of Special

Appeals by neglecting to file an appellate brief or request an extension of time, causing the

court to dismiss Ms. Plater’s appeal. Finally, the hearing judge concluded that Ms. Smith-

Scott violated Rule 1.1 by failing to appear at hearings in the course of her representation

of Ms. Deeba and Mr. Jones.

Ms. Smith-Scott does not except to these conclusions of law. Moreover, our

independent review of the record confirms that clear and convincing evidence supports the

hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms. Smith-Scott’s conduct violated Rule 1.1.

2. Rule 1.2 (Scope of Representation and Allocation of Authority).

Rule 1.2(a) provides, in pertinent part:

[A]n attorney shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and, when appropriate, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be pursued. An attorney may take such action on behalf of the client as is impliedly authorized to carry out the representation. An attorney shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a matter.

54 Under this Rule, an attorney must “‘inform a client of the status of his or her case’

so the client has the ‘ability to make informed decisions.’” Edwards, 462 Md. at 697

(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Hamilton, 444 Md. 163, 182 (2015)). A Rule

1.2(a) violation may occur when an attorney fails to prosecute his or her client’s case and

fails to communicate the status of the case to the client. Id. (citing Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. Bellamy, 453 Md. 377, 394 (2017)); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.

Brown, 426 Md. 298, 320 (2012) (concluding that an attorney’s inaction leading to the

dismissal of two clients’ cases—combined with the attorney’s failure to communicate as

much and ignorance of the clients’ request for information—constituted a violation of Rule

1.2(a)).

Clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms.

Smith-Scott violated Rule 1.2 by failing to prepare or file an appellate brief in her

representation of Ms. Plater. Ms. Plater retained Ms. Smith-Scott to prosecute an appeal

in her foreclosure action. Ms. Plater and Ms. Smith-Scott agreed on a flat fee of $4,000,

toward which Ms. Plater made two installment payments totaling $2,000. The Court of

Special Appeals imposed a filing deadline of September 29, 2016. Yet, Ms. Smith-Scott

failed to prepare or file an appellate brief, or even request an extension of time to

accomplish Ms. Plater’s sole objective in the representation. See Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. Ucheomumu, 462 Md. 280, 311 (2018) (concluding that an attorney’s failure to

prepare and file appellate brief constituted “a failure to accomplish the objectives of [the]

representation”).

55 Ms. Smith-Scott does not except to the hearing judge’s conclusion regarding Rule

1.2. Based on our independent review, we agree with the hearing judge that Ms. Smith-

Scott violated Rule 1.2 in her representation of Ms. Plater.

3. Rule 1.3 (Diligence).

Rule 1.3 provides that “[a]n attorney shall act with reasonable diligence and

promptness in representing a client.” Rule 1.3 “can be violated by failing to advance the

client’s cause or endeavor; failing to investigate a client’s matter; and repeatedly failing to

return phone calls, respond to letters, or provide an accounting for earned fees[.]” Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Bah, 468 Md. 179, 208–09 (2020) (quoting Edwards, 462 Md. at

699 (alteration in original)). Notably, the same justifications for finding a violation of Rule

1.1 can support a Rule 1.3 violation. Id. at 209.

The hearing judge concluded that based on Ms. Smith-Scott’s conduct, discussed in

reference to Rule 1.1, supra at 53–54, and Rule 1.4, infra at 56–60, Ms. Smith-Scott

violated Rule 1.3. Ms. Smith-Scott does not except to these conclusions. Our independent

review of the record reveals that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 1.3.

4. 1.4 (Communication).

Rule 1.4 provides:

(a) An attorney shall:

(1) promptly inform the client of any decision or circumstance with respect to which the client’s informed consent, as defined in Rule 19- 301.0 (f) (1.0), is required by these Rules; (2) keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the matter; (3) promptly comply with reasonable requests for information; and (4) consult with the client about any relevant limitation on the attorney’s conduct when the attorney knows that the client expects

56 assistance not permitted by the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.

(b) An attorney shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the representation.

Pursuant to Rule 1.4, an attorney is required “to communicate with their clients and

keep them reasonably informed of the status of their legal matters.” Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. Planta, 467 Md. 319, 349 (2020). A violation of this Rule occurs when a client

repeatedly attempts to contact the attorney, but the attorney fails to respond. Id. Moreover,

Rule 1.4 is violated “when an attorney ‘fails to communicate crucial information about the

status of the case,’” or where “the attorney fails to comply promptly with a client’s

reasonable requests for information, which may include a general status update or for

documents pertaining to the case.” Id. (quoting Hamilton, 444 Md. at 185).

Ms. Combs

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 1.4(a)(2)–(3) and

(b) by failing to provide Ms. Combs with timely or accurate billing statements, despite Ms.

Combs’ repeated requests. The hearing judge reasoned that Ms. Combs could not have

made informed decisions regarding the representation without knowing the extent of the

legal fees that had accrued.

At the meeting between Ms. Smith-Scott and Ms. Combs on February 2, 2017, Ms.

Smith-Scott provided an invoice with apparent inaccuracies. Ms. Combs requested a

corrected invoice, yet Ms. Smith-Scott failed to provide one. On February 22, 2017, Ms.

Smith-Scott emailed Ms. Combs two more inaccurate invoices, which sought nearly $5,000

of fees Ms. Combs did not actually owe. Ms. Combs reviewed the invoices and informed

57 Ms. Smith-Scott that the invoices contained inaccuracies and failed to account for

payments already made. Again, on February 28, 2017, Ms. Combs emailed Ms. Smith-

Scott and requested an invoice “on any unpaid balance” to date. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to

provide a corrected invoice.

Additionally, the hearing judge concluded that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule

1.4(a)(2) and (b) when she (1) failed to adequately communicate about the November 3,

2016 hearing; and (2) intentionally misrepresented to Ms. Combs that she had filed the

Motion for Reconsideration in Ms. Combs’ case before December 28, 2016.

The Bankruptcy Court set a hearing for November 3, 2016 to hear arguments on

whether to lift the automatic stay pertaining to Ms. Combs’ investment property. Prior to

the hearing, Ms. Smith-Scott misinformed Ms. Combs that the hearing had been

rescheduled and she need not appear on that date. The hearing had not been rescheduled.

It occurred on November 3, and Ms. Smith-Scott and Ms. Combs failed to appear.

The Bankruptcy Court entered an order lifting the automatic stay on November 14,

2016. Ms. Combs immediately requested Ms. Smith-Scott file a Motion for

Reconsideration, to which Ms. Smith-Scott agreed. Ms. Combs emailed Ms. Smith-Scott

on December 12, 2016 to inquire if the court had issued a ruling. Before this date, Ms.

Smith-Scott informed Ms. Combs that she had filed the motion, when in fact she had not.

On December 28, 2016, more than two weeks later—six weeks after the Bankruptcy Court

lifted the automatic stay—Ms. Smith-Scott filed an untimely Emergency Motion for

Reconsideration.

58 Accordingly, we agree with the hearing judge that clear and convincing evidence

supports the conclusion that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 1.4(a) and (b) in her

representation of Ms. Combs.

Ms. Plater

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 1.4(a)(2)–(3) and

(b) in her representation of Ms. Plater before the Court of Special Appeals.

In late August 2016, Ms. Plater confirmed her interest in pursuing an appeal related

to her foreclosure action; specifically, the circuit court’s denial of her Motion to Vacate

Foreclosure Sale. The Court of Special Appeals established a filing deadline of September

29, 2016. To advance the appeal, Ms. Plater paid Ms. Smith-Scott $1,000 on September

7, 2016 and $1,000 on September 22, 2016. However, after agreeing to the representation

and accepting Ms. Plater’s payments, Ms. Smith-Scott determined that she would not file

the appellate brief by its filing deadline. Yet, Ms. Smith-Scott did not inform Ms. Plater.

In early October, after the filing deadline passed, Ms. Smith-Scott spoke with Ms. Plater

over the phone. During that conversation, Ms. Smith-Scott neglected to inform Ms. Plater

that the filing deadline passed and that she had failed to seek an extension. Instead, Ms.

Smith-Scott represented that she intended to file the brief in one week. Ms. Smith-Scott

did not author the appellate brief, file it within the one-week period, or inform Ms. Plater

of her inaction.

The Court of Special Appeals dismissed Ms. Plater’s appeal for the failure to file an

appellate brief. Ms. Smith-Scott concealed the dismissal for approximately six weeks. Ms.

Smith-Scott ignored several of Ms. Plater’s attempts to learn about the status of the appeal.

59 Additionally, Ms. Plater twice requested a copy of the appellate brief she believed Ms.

Smith-Scott filed on her behalf. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to respond in any manner. Only

in December 2016 did Ms. Smith-Scott first notify Ms. Plater that the Court of Special

Appeals dismissed Ms. Plater’s appeal. Therefore, we agree with the hearing judge that

this conduct—failing to communicate about the status of a client’s appeal and intentionally

concealing the dismissal of the same—violates Rule 1.4(a) and (b).

The hearing judge further found that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 1.4(a)(2) and

(b) when she intentionally misrepresented to Ms. Plater that she completed additional legal

work on the appeal to justify keeping a portion of the $2,000 in installment payments. Ms.

Smith-Scott performed no substantive legal work on Ms. Plater’s appeal. Ms. Smith-Scott

failed to specify the legal services she allegedly provided and failed to provide an invoice.

Accordingly, clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion that

Ms. Smith-Scott’s conduct violated Rule 1.4(a)(2) and (b).

5. Rule 1.5 (Fees).

Rule 1.5 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) An attorney shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee include the following:

(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client, that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other employment of the attorney; (3) the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services; (4) the amount involved and the results obtained;

60 (5) the time limitations imposed by the client or by the circumstances; (6) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; (7) the experience, reputation, and ability of the attorney or attorneys performing the services; and (8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.

(b) The scope of the representation and the basis or rate of the fee and expenses for which the client will be responsible shall be communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or within a reasonable time after commencing the representation, except when the attorney will charge a regularly represented client on the same basis or rate. Any changes in the basis or rate of the fee or expenses shall also be communicated to the client.

Rule 1.5 obligates an attorney to charge a reasonable fee. “An advance fee given in

anticipation of legal service that is reasonable at the time of the receipt can become

unreasonable if the attorney does not perform the agreed-upon services.” Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Blair, 440 Md. 387, 403 (2014); see also Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. Garrett, 427 Md. 209, 224 (2012) (“The reasonableness of a fee is not measured

solely by examining its value at the outset of the representation; indeed[,] an otherwise-

reasonable fee can become unreasonable if the lawyer fails to earn it.”). In Garrett, we

concluded that a Rule 1.5 violation occurred where the attorney (1) failed to earn his legal

fee; (2) failed to appeal at his client’s court proceedings; (3) failed to pursue the interests

of his clients; and (4) above all, refused to return the unearned fees to his clients. 427 Md.

at 224–25.

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 1.5(a) when she

charged Ms. Combs’ credit card in the amount of $4,986.13—some of which Ms. Combs

had already paid—without Ms. Combs’ authorization. The hearing judge further found

61 that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 1.5(b) when she charged Ms. Combs on an hourly basis

for services Ms. Combs never agreed to pay. Ms. Smith-Scott generally excepts to the

hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated Rule 1.5. She asserts that her acceptance and

retention of Ms. Combs’ payment related to legal work already performed or performed

within a “very short time” after receiving the payment.

Ms. Combs retained Ms. Smith-Scott and agreed to pay a flat fee of $4,200 to

represent her in Bankruptcy Court. Ms. Combs paid $4,000 by two installment payments:

$1,500 on September 12, 2016 and $2,500 on February 2, 2017. Ms. Smith-Scott emailed

Ms. Combs two invoices on February 22, 2017. The first invoice, Invoice #23, contained

twenty-six billing entries, most of which related to services rendered in the bankruptcy case

for which Ms. Combs had already paid. Still, Ms. Smith-Scott demanded Ms. Combs pay

$4,986.13 for work related to bankruptcy fees already charged and collected by Ms. Smith-

Scott.

On January 10, 2017, Ms. Smith-Scott appealed an order of the Bankruptcy Court

to the U.S. District Court of Ms. Combs’ behalf. Ms. Combs agreed to pay Ms. Smith-

Scott a flat fee to pursue the appeal. However, before Ms. Smith-Scott completed any

substantive work, Ms. Combs elected to forgo the appeal. Despite the flat fee agreement,

Ms. Smith-Scott’s second invoice, Invoice #31, contained hourly billing entries for legal

work purportedly performed on the appeal. Ms. Smith-Scott did not advise Ms. Combs

that she would charge on an hourly basis if she chose not to pursue the appeal. This conduct

runs afoul of Rule 1.5(b). Nevertheless, Ms. Smith-Scott demanded that Ms. Combs pay

for services to which she never agreed, in the amount of $3,300.

62 Ms. Combs emailed Ms. Smith-Scott on February 23, 2017 and raised concerns

about inaccuracies in Invoice #23 and Invoice #31. Ms. Smith-Scott did not review or

revise these invoices. Instead, she proceeded to charge Ms. Combs’ credit card in the

amount of $4, 986.13. This charge occurred without Ms. Combs’ authorization. Moreover,

Ms. Smith-Scott was keenly aware that Ms. Combs disputed the amount and pursued

collection of the charge even after Ms. Combs disputed the same with her credit card

company. Therefore, Ms. Smith-Scott collected an unreasonable fee in violation of Rule

1.5(a) when she charged Ms. Combs’ credit card in the amount of $4,986.13.

The hearing judge also concluded that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 1.5 as it relates

to Ms. Plater. Ms. Smith-Scott excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion and makes

identical arguments as those in reference to Ms. Combs’ payments. Ms. Plater paid Ms.

Smith-Scott $2,000 to prosecute an appeal before the Court of Special Appeals.

Specifically, Ms. Smith-Scott agreed to author and file an appellate brief on Ms. Plater’s

behalf. However, after collecting Ms. Plater’s payments, Ms. Smith-Scott failed to perform

any meaningful legal work on the appeal. Ms. Smith-Scott then refused to provide Ms.

Plater a full refund. Instead, Ms. Smith-Scott twice offered Ms. Plater approximately half

of the amount actually due to Ms. Plater.

Ms. Smith-Scott attempted to justify her retention of Ms. Plater’s payment by

claiming that she provided Ms. Plater with additional legal services. Ms. Smith-Scott did

not specify the legal services performed or provide Ms. Plater with an invoice. The hearing

judge specifically rejected Ms. Smith-Scott’s testimony that she performed additional legal

63 services in Ms. Plater’s foreclosure action—i.e., related to Ms. Plater’s Motion for

Reconsideration. The hearing judge did, however, credit Ms. Plater’s testimony that she

paid for the preparation of the Motion for Reconsideration on July 12, 2016.

We agree with the hearing judge’s conclusions and overrule Ms. Smith-Scott’s

exception. Clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that Ms. Smith-Scott’s conduct

vis-à-vis Ms. Combs and Ms. Plater violated Rule 1.5.

6. Rule 1.6 (Confidentiality).

Rule 1.6 provides:

(a) An attorney shall not reveal information relating to representation of a client unless the client gives informed consent, the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the representation, or the disclosure is permitted by section (b) of this Rule.

(b) An attorney may reveal information relating to the representation of a client to the extent the attorney reasonably believes necessary:

(5) to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the attorney in a controversy between the attorney and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal charge, civil claim, or disciplinary complaint against the attorney based upon conduct in which the client was involved or to respond to allegations in any proceeding concerning the attorney’s representation of the client[.]

Comment 6 to Rule 1.6 addresses the manner in which an attorney may, to the extent

necessary, disclose confidential information adverse to the client. Comment 6 provides, in

pertinent part:

Where practicable, the attorney should first seek to persuade the client to take suitable action to obviate the need for disclosure. In any case, a disclosure adverse to the client’s interest should be no greater than the attorney

64 reasonably believes necessary to accomplish the purpose. If the disclosure will be made in connection with a judicial proceeding, the disclosure should be made in a manner that limits access to the information to the tribunal or other persons having a need to know it and appropriate protective orders or other arrangements should be sought by the attorney to the fullest extent practicable.

In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Powers, we noted the “broad ethical duty not

to divulge information about a client.” 454 Md. 79, 94 (2017) (quoting Charles W.

Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics § 6.1.1, at 242 (1986) (emphasis in original)). There, we

concluded that an attorney violated Rule 1.6 by disclosing confidential information without

the client’s informed consent in a lawsuit brought in federal court—i.e., a public forum—

to recover money the attorney believed the client owed. Id.

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 1.6 when she

intentionally attached, as exhibits, confidential email communications exchanged with Ms.

Saunders in a motion filed with the Bankruptcy Court. Ms. Smith-Scott neither attempted

to obtain Ms. Saunders’ permission to disclose these confidential communications nor take

any preventative measures to limit the disclosure, such as filing the motion under seal. Ms.

Smith-Scott excepts to this conclusion and argues that under Rule 1.6(b) generally, and

(b)(5) in this case, an attorney is not required to obtain informed consent or place a

confidential disclosure under seal.

Ms. Saunders filed a pro se Motion/Request for Release of Attorney requesting that

the Bankruptcy Court “release” Ms. Smith-Scott as her attorney “based upon unsatisfactory

actions and irreconcilable differences in miscommunication that may have affected [Ms.

Saunders’] bankruptcy process and may impact the outcome of [her] case.” Ms. Smith-

65 Scott filed a Response in Support of Debtor’s Motion/Request for Release of Attorney.

With this filing, Ms. Smith-Scott attached confidential email exchanges with Ms. Saunders

that occurred between August 4, 2017 and December 20, 2017. Even after confronted by

Ms. Saunders about the disclosure of confidential material, Ms. Smith-Scott failed to take

any remedial action.

We overrule Ms. Smith-Scott’s exception based on a plain reading of Rule 1.6(b)(5).

We pause to emphasize that Ms. Smith-Scott supported Ms. Saunders’ motion to remove

Ms. Smith-Scott as counsel. Clearly then, Ms. Smith-Scott did not disclose the

communications “to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the attorney.” Rule 1.6(b)(5).

Indeed, Ms. Smith-Scott herself indicated the reason for the disclosure: to “allow[] the

Court to get a better understanding of the actions of Legal Counsel.” Rule 1.6(b) does not

permit an attorney to indiscriminately disclose confidential communications simply for

context—especially where an attorney disregards the protective measures contemplated in

the comments to Rule 1.6 in the event a disclosure is necessary. Therefore, we agree with

the hearing judge that clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that Ms. Smith-Scott

violated Rule 1.6 during her representation of Ms. Saunders.

7. Rule 1.15 (Safekeeping Property) & Rule 19-404 (Trust Account—Required Deposits).

Rule 1.15 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) An attorney shall hold property of clients or third persons that is in an attorney’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the attorney’s own property. Funds shall be kept in a separate account maintained pursuant to Title 19, Chapter 400 of the Maryland Rules, and

66 records shall be created and maintained in accordance with the Rules in that Chapter.[16]

(c) Unless the client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a different arrangement, an attorney shall deposit legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance into a client trust account and may withdraw those funds for the attorney’s own benefit only as fees are earned or expenses incurred.

Simply put, when an attorney is entrusted with a client’s money, “[s]uch funds are to be

placed in an attorney trust account in accordance with Maryland Rule 19-404.” Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Singh, 464 Md. 645, 673 (2019). An attorney violates Rule 1.15

“when the attorney ‘does not deposit trust funds into an attorney trust account and does not

obtain the client’s informed consent to do otherwise.’” Planta, 467 Md. at 352 (quoting

Hamilton, 444 Md. at 189–90). An attorney may also violate this Rule by depositing a

client’s money into his or her personal or operating account before the money is earned.

Guida, 391 Md. at 53.

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 1.15 and Rule 19-

404 by failing to deposit and maintain the unearned portion of Ms. Combs’ $2,500 payment

16 Rule 19-404 provides:

Except as otherwise permitted by rule or other law, all funds, including cash, received and accepted by an attorney or law firm in this State from a client or third person to be delivered in whole or in part to a client or third person, unless received as payment of fees owed the attorney by the client or in reimbursement for expenses properly advanced on behalf of the client, shall be deposited in an attorney trust account in an approved financial institution. This Rule does not apply to an instrument received by an attorney or law firm that is made payable solely to a client or third person and is transmitted directly to the client or third person.

67 on October 14, 2015 in an attorney trust account until earned as fees or used for expenses.

Ms. Smith-Scott did not obtain Ms. Combs’ informed consent in writing to deposit the

funds in a non-attorney trust account.

In its conclusions of law, the hearing judge noted “Bar Counsel represented . . . that

it was withdrawing, among other things, its allegations pursuant to [Rule] 1.15 . . . with

respect to Ms. Plater. Accordingly, the Court does not find that [Ms. Smith-Scott] violated

[Rule 1.15] as to Ms. Plater.” Bar Counsel excepts to the hearing judge’s failure to

conclude that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 1.15 with respect to Ms. Plater’s property.

Bar Counsel argues that it withdrew the Rule 1.15 charge in connection with Ms. Plater’s

payments before July 2016 and not after July 2016. Moreover, the hearing judge found

that Ms. Smith-Scott failed to deposit and maintain Ms. Plater’s two September 2016

installment payments of $1,000 each in an attorney trust account until earned.

Ms. Smith-Scott excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated Rule

1.15 and Rule 19-404. She reiterates the same argument she asserted in relation to Rule

1.5 and adds that “her failure to correctly deposit the fees was not intentional

misappropriation of fees; rather[,] it was negligent management.” However, a violation of

Rule 1.15 does not turn on an attorney’s intent. A violation of this Rule plainly occurs

when an attorney fails to deposit a client’s funds into an attorney trust account.

Ms. Combs paid Ms. Smith-Scott $2,500 on October 14, 2015. Of this lump sum,

Ms. Combs paid $1,000 for legal services already provided; the remaining $1,500

constituted a retainer against which Ms. Smith-Scott would bill future legal services. Ms.

Smith-Scott did not deposit the unearned portion—$1,500—in an attorney trust account.

68 Ms. Plater paid two $1,000 installments to Ms. Smith-Scott on September 7, 2016 and

September 22, 2016 to advance an appeal before the Court of Special Appeals. Ms. Smith-

Scott failed to deposit and maintain Ms. Plater’s checks in an attorney trust account.

Based on our independent review, we sustain Bar Counsel’s exception and overrule

Ms. Smith-Scott’s exception. Clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that Ms. Smith-

Scott violated Rule 1.15 with respect to both Ms. Combs and Ms. Plater.

8. Rule 1.16 (Declining or Terminating Representation).

Rule 1.16 provides, in pertinent part:

(d) Upon termination of representation, an attorney shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client’s interests, such as giving reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for employment of another attorney, surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled and refunding any advance payment of fee or expense that has not been earned or incurred. The attorney may retain papers relating to the client to the extent permitted by other law.

“The failure to return unearned fees and documents regarding the representative matter

violates this Rule.” Planta, 467 Md. at 354 (citing Hamilton, 444 Md. at 1921).

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 1.16 by (1) failing

to refund to Ms. Combs the unearned portion of the $4,986.13 charge on February 23,

2017, some or most of which Ms. Combs did not owe; (2) failing to refund Ms. Combs the

$200 payment made on April 12, 2017 that Ms. Smith-Scott conceded Ms. Combs did not

owe; and (3) failing to refund Ms. Plater unearned legal fees totaling $2,000.

Ms. Smith-Scott does not except to this conclusion. Our independent review of the

record confirms that clear and convincing evidence supports the hearing judge’s conclusion

that Ms. Smith-Scott’s conduct violated Rule 1.16.

69 9. Rule 3.1 (Meritorious Claims and Contentions).

Rule 3.1 provides:

An attorney shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes, for example, a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law. An attorney may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the moving party’s case be established.

Comment 2 to Rule 3.1 states that an “action is frivolous . . . if the attorney is unable either

to make a good faith argument on the merits of the action taken or to support the action

taken by a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.”

In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Kane, we recognized a violation of Rule 3.1 in

connection to an attorney’s serial bankruptcy filings, which were all designed to delay the

proceedings and frustrate the creditors. 465 Md. 667, 716–17 (2019).

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 3.1 when she filed

numerous baseless pleadings, motions and appeals in her personal bankruptcy action.

Moreover, the hearing judge found that Ms. Smith-Scott’s “sole objective in her

bankruptcy case after April 8, 2015—the date the Chapter 7 Trustee was appointed—was

to obstruct, delay and frustrate the Chapter 7 Trustee’s ability to administer the estate in a

timely and orderly fashion.” Ms. Smith-Scott’s actions over the two-year bankruptcy

action were not supported by law or fact, and in most instances, were not legally permitted.

Evidence of Ms. Smith-Scott’s frivolous litigation includes: (1) several motions and

appeals in her federal lawsuit against U.S. Bank, including two appeals to the U.S. Court

of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, despite the Trustee’s admonishment that she lacked

70 standing; (2) motions to alter or amend in the Bankruptcy Court when that court had no

jurisdiction to adjudicate the matters because of Ms. Smith-Scott’s own actions; (3)

motions to re-appeal Bankruptcy Court orders that had already been affirmed on appeal;

(4) filings that opposed the Trustee’s attempts to sell real property despite a lack of

standing; (5) the filing of appeals and other pleadings and then intentionally failing to

prosecute the matters; (6) the filing of untimely appeals and motions; (7) the continuous

advancement of arguments that were meritless; and (8) the numerous unfounded

allegations of misconduct against all involved parties, including the court, that Ms. Smith-

Scott knew, or should have known, to be false.

Ms. Smith-Scott does not except to this conclusion. The hearing judge’s conclusion

that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 3.1 is abundantly supported by clear and convincing

evidence.

10. Rule 3.2 (Expediting Litigation).

Rule 3.2 provides that “[a]n attorney shall make reasonable efforts to expedite

litigation consistent with the interests of the client.” Rule 3.2 applies with equal force to

an attorney who represents himself or herself. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Trye,

444 Md. 201, 216–17 (2015) (concluding that the language of Rule 3.2 “does not except

attorneys who represent themselves from the obligation to make reasonable efforts to

expedite litigation”). This Court has noted that “[a]n attorney violates this rule by delaying

to take fundamental litigation steps in pursuit of the client’s interest.” Garrett, 427 Md. at

226. Indeed, we have found a violation of this Rule when an attorney fails to file an

71 appellate brief and appendix, causing a significant delay in the resolution of an appeal. See

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Allenbaugh, 450 Md. 250, 271 (2016).

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 3.2 when she (1)

failed to file Ms. Plater’s appellate brief by the filing deadline or otherwise prosecute Ms.

Plater’s appeal; and (2) intentionally hindered—for two years—the Chapter 7 Trustee’s

ability to administer her bankruptcy case in a timely fashion.

Ms. Smith-Scott does not except to this conclusion. Based on our independent

review of the record, we agree with the hearing judge that Ms. Smith-Scott’s conduct

violated Rule 3.2.

11. Rule 3.3 (Candor Toward the Tribunal).

Rule 3.3 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) An attorney shall not knowingly:

(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the attorney; (2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client[.]

We have observed that “the requirement of candor towards the tribunal . . . requires every

attorney to be fully honest and forthright.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Dore, 433 Md.

685, 703 (2013) (quoting In re Discipline of Wilka, 638 N.W.2d 245, 249 (S.D. 2001)).

This is because “[e]very court . . . has the right to rely upon an attorney to assist it in

ascertaining the truth of the case before it. Therefore, candor and fairness should

characterize the conduct of an attorney at the beginning, during, and at the close of

litigation.” Id. (quoting In re Discipline of Wilka, 638 N.W.2d at 249. Accordingly, an

72 attorney violates Rule 3.3(a)(1) “when he or she knowingly provides the court with false

information . . . or fails to correct any false information previously provided.” Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Steinhorn, 462 Md. 184, 195 (2018) (citations omitted).

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 3.3 when she (1)

indicated that Ms. Plater agreed to pay a flat fee of $4,200 on a Disclosure of Compensation

of Attorney for Debtor, yet Ms. Plater actually agreed to pay a flat fee of $1,500; and (2)

knowingly made numerous false statements of fact in motions and appeals before the

Bankruptcy Court and U.S. District Court throughout the course of her personal bankruptcy

action. Ms. Smith-Scott generally excepts to this conclusion. As best we can tell, she

argues that she had “competency and diligence issues caused by personal involvement and

inexperience, but the record does not support a conclusion that Ms. Smith-Scott was

knowingly and intentionally dishonest.”

However, as to the misrepresentation made on the Disclosure of Compensation of

Attorney for Debtor, Ms. Smith-Scott knew the statement to be false at the time she filed

the disclosure. Ms. Plater even challenged Ms. Smith-Scott’s decision to list $4,200 as the

agreed upon fee, because that did not comport with their agreement. Nonetheless, Ms.

Smith-Scott filed the petition fully aware of the misrepresentation.

As to Ms. Smith-Scott’s false statements in her personal bankruptcy action, Ms.

Smith-Scott knowingly made false statements of fact in motions and appeals before the

Bankruptcy Court and U.S. District Court. Specifically, she falsely alleged that Mr.

Shively engaged in criminal conduct when he acted to secure 367 Main Street and had

committed perjury at the May 16, 2017 contempt hearing.

73 Consequently, we agree with the hearing judge and overrule Ms. Smith-Scott’s

exceptions. Clear and convincing evidence demonstrates that Ms. Smith-Scott violated

Rule 3.3.

12. Rule 3.4 (Fairness to Opposing Party and Attorney).

“An attorney shall not . . . knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a

tribunal except for an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists.”

Rule 3.4(c). On this point, Attorney Grievance Commission v. Byrd is particularly

instructive. 408 Md. 449 (2009). In Byrd, we concluded that a Rule 3.4(c) violation

occurred where the attorney “contravened the bankruptcy court’s order . . . after already

having been found in contempt for violating” a prior order of the court. Id. at 469. We

found an additional violation of the Rule in Byrd’s failure to vacate his property, as ordered

by the bankruptcy court. We recognized then, and because of its applicability here we

reiterate today, “that we will not ‘go behind’ the bankruptcy court’s finding of contempt”

and we accept the hearing judge’s “findings concerning those rulings.” Id. at 482.

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 3.4 when she (1)

knowingly and intentionally disobeyed several orders of the Bankruptcy Court; and (2)

failed to disclose to the Bankruptcy Court the receipt of additional fees related to her

representation of Ms. Combs in violation of Bankruptcy Rule 2016(b). Again, Ms. Smith-

Scott generally excepts without offering any degree of specificity as to why the hearing

judge’s conclusion is erroneous.

Ms. Smith-Scott intentionally defied the following: (1) the October 29 Order

prohibiting Ms. Smith-Scott’s use of cash collateral—which resulted in a contempt finding;

74 (2) the September 24 Order compelling Ms. Smith-Scott to attend the § 341 meeting of

creditors; (3) the Bankruptcy Court’s September 29, 2015 Order compelling Ms. Smith-

Scott to turn over documentation related to her tenancies, security deposits, and taxes; and

(4) the Bankruptcy Court’s May 16, 2016 Order directing that Ms. Smith-Scott pay the

Trustee sanctions as a result of her contempt. Most egregious of all, Ms. Smith-Scott

openly defied the Bankruptcy Court’s March 22, 2016 Order compelling her to vacate 367

Main Street, which resulted in a second contempt finding. Indeed, Ms. Smith-Scott only

vacated the premises after U.S. Marshals accompanied Mr. Shively to 367 Main Street and

explained to Ms. Smith-Scott’s employees that they would be handcuffed if they did not

vacate the property.

We overrule Ms. Smith-Scott’s exception. Clear and convincing evidence supports

the hearing judge’s conclusion that Ms. Smith-Scott’s conduct violated Rule 3.4.

13. Rule 4.1 (Truthfulness in Statements to Others).

Rule 4.1 provides, in pertinent part:

(a) In the course of representing a client an attorney shall not knowingly:

(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a third person; or (2) fail to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by a client.

This Rule is exceedingly straightforward. The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Smith-

Scott violated Rule 4.1 when she falsely stated in her August 3, 2015 letter to the tenants

of her Laurel Properties that Patapsco Bank did not have a court order to collect rents. On

June 25, the Bankruptcy Court issued orders permitting Patapsco Bank to foreclose on the

properties and collect rent. Ms. Smith-Scott intentionally concealed the existence of these

75 orders so that the tenants would continue to pay rent to her directly. Ms. Smith-Scott

generally excepts to this conclusion. We shall overrule it because we agree with the hearing

judge; clear and convincing evidence exists to support its conclusion that Ms. Smith-Scott

violated Rule 4.1.

14. Rule 8.1 (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters).

Rule 8.1 provides, in pertinent part:

An applicant for admission or reinstatement to the bar, or an attorney in connection with a bar admission application or in connection with a disciplinary matter, shall not:

(a) knowingly make a false statement of material fact; or

(b) fail to disclose a fact necessary to correct a misapprehension known by the person to have arisen in the matter, or knowingly fail to respond to a lawful demand for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority, except that this Rule does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 19-301.6 (1.6).

“Rule 8.1(b) compels attorneys to demonstrate candor and cooperation with the

disciplinary authorities of the Bar.” Planta, 467 Md. at 356. A violation of Rule 8.1(b)

occurs if an attorney “does not ‘answer timely requests from the Attorney Grievance

Commission regarding a complaint in a potential disciplinary matter.’” Id. (quoting

Hamilton, 444 Md. at 192).

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 8.1 when she (1)

attached a knowingly false statement, originally made to Wells Fargo, in her response to

Bar Counsel regarding the $4,986.13 charge to Ms. Combs’ credit card; (2) intentionally

misrepresented to Bar Counsel that she justifiably withheld fees in Ms. Plater’s

representation, when in fact she intentionally concealed the fact that Ms. Plater had paid

76 separately for that legal work; (3) knowingly misrepresented to Bar Counsel that the

Chapter 7 Trustee intentionally omitted and misrepresented facts to the Bankruptcy Court;

and (4) failed to timely and completely respond to Bar Counsel’s inquiries. Ms. Smith-

Scott generally excepts to these conclusions.

Ms. Combs filed a complaint against Ms. Smith-Scott with the Commission in

relation to the unauthorized $4,986.13 credit card charge. Ms. Smith-Scott submitted a

response to the complaint and attached (1) the written submission she sent to Wells Fargo

during its independent investigation and (2) two invoices Ms. Smith-Scott knew to be

inaccurate. The written statement included false representations concerning Ms. Combs’

authorization. Ms. Smith-Scott thereby intentionally gave Bar Counsel the false

impression that Ms. Combs owed the $4,986.13 amount, despite knowing that it was not

an accurate figure. Ms. Smith-Scott relied on her knowingly false statements in the Wells

Fargo statement to intentionally mislead Bar Counsel into believing the invoices were

accurate and the charge was authorized. Ms. Smith-Scott submitted a second response to

Bar Counsel intentionally misrepresenting that Invoice #23 and Invoice #31 were accurate,

despite knowing full well that they were not.

Ms. Plater also filed a complaint against Ms. Smith-Scott with the Commission. Ms.

Smith-Scott’s response intentionally misrepresented that she earned $825 for legal work

performed during the pendency of Ms. Plater’s appeal. The response further claimed that

Ms. Smith-Scott “met with Ms. Plater; identified legal issues to pursue on appeal; prepared

a Civil Information Sheet; filed a motion to stay the foreclosure pending the appeal; and

77 filed a motion to mitigate the necessity of a supersedeas bond.” Ms. Smith-Scott

intentionally concealed from Bar Counsel that Ms. Plater paid separately for those fillings.

We therefore agree with the hearing judge that clear and convincing evidence

supports a conclusion that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 8.1. We overrule Ms. Smith-

Scott’s exception.

15. Rule 8.4 (Misconduct).

Rule 8.4 provides, in pertinent part:

It is professional misconduct for an attorney to:

(a) violate or attempt to violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist or induce another to do so, or do so through the acts of another;

(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the attorney’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as an attorney in other respects;

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation;

(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]

An attorney violates Rule 8.4(a) when he or she violates other Rules of Professional

Conduct. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Foltz, 411 Md. 359, 195 (2009). Regarding

the criminal act in Rule 8.4(b), “[i]t is well established that a conviction is not required to

find a violation.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Agbaje, 438 Md. 695, 729 (2014).

Instead, in determining if an attorney violated Rule 8.4(b), we consider “whether an

attorney’s criminal act reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or

fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” Id. at 729–30 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n

78 v. Thompson, 367 Md. 315, 324 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Rule 8.4(c)

encompasses a “broad universe of mis-behavior.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.

McDonald, 437 Md. 1, 39 (2014). The Rule “is violated by making misrepresentations to

the client, which includes the concealment of material information from the client.”

Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rand, 445 Md. 581, 640 (2015); see Brown, 426 Md. at

324 (finding a violation of Rule 8.4(c) where an attorney concealed the dismissal of client’s

case by misrepresenting status as pending); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Bleecker, 414

Md. 147, 168 (2010) (finding a violation of Rule 8.4(c) where an attorney failed to disclose

that the court dismissed client’s case with prejudice).

“[C]onduct prejudicial to the administration of justice” is that which “reflects

negatively on the legal profession and sets a bad example for the public at large.” Attorney

Grievance Comm’n v. Goff, 399 Md. 1, 22 (2007). An attorney’s failure “to appear in court

at a hearing on behalf of his or her client constitutes conduct prejudicial to the

administration of justice.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Thomas, 440 Md. 523, 556

(2014). Indeed, this is because “[a]n attorney plays such an integral role in the judicial

process that without his [or her] presence the wheels of justice must, necessarily, grind to

a halt.” Id. (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Walker-Turner, 428 Md. 214, 232

(2012)). Furthermore, we have said that

[an attorney’s] failure to promptly, completely and truthfully respond to Bar Counsel’s requests for information, to keep his client advised of the status of the representation and to diligently represent the complainant constitutes conduct which tends to bring the legal profession into disrepute and is therefore prejudicial to the administration of justice.

79 Brown, 426 Md. at 324–25 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rose, 391 Md. 101,

111 (2006)).

The hearing judge concluded that Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 8.4 in a plethora

of ways:

• Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 8.4(b) and (c) when she charged Ms. Combs’ credit card in the amount of $4,986.13 without Ms. Combs’ authorization and with knowledge that Ms. Combs disputed the balance.

• Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 8.4(c) when she refused to provide Ms. Combs with accurate billing statements and then intentionally misappropriated Ms. Combs’ fees that were not yet earned.

• Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 8.4(c) when she misrepresented to Ms. Combs that she had filed the Motion for Reconsideration in the Bankruptcy Court.

• Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 8.4(c) when she accepted Ms. Plater’s payments, did not complete any substantive work toward Ms. Plater’s appeal, and misappropriated a portion of Ms. Plater’s funds for her personal use and benefit.

• Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 8.4(c) and (d) when she made several knowing and intentional misrepresentations to Bar Counsel discussed in relation to Rule 8.1.

• Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 8.4(c) when she knowingly and intentionally disobeyed court orders in her personal bankruptcy case and interfered with Patapsco Bank’s efforts to collect rent from the tenants of the Laurel Properties.

• Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 8.4(c) when she repeatedly and intentionally made arguments in bad faith and filed documents without substantial justification in her personal bankruptcy case for the sole purpose of retaining her property and obscuring her creditors’ rights to collect on debts owed to them.

80 • Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 8.4(c) when she intentionally misrepresented to the Bankruptcy Court that Mr. Shively (1) engaged in criminal activity while taking possession of 367 Main Street; and (2) perjured himself at the May 16, 2016 contempt hearing.

• Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 8.4(c) when she was dishonest in her communications with Bar Counsel.

• Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 8.4(d) because her conduct, taken as a whole, brings the legal profession into disrepute, and is therefore prejudicial to the administration of justice.

• Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 8.4(d) when she filed several actions or motions on behalf of Ms. Combs, Ms. Plater, and Ms. Deeba and then intentionally failed to prosecute the matters.

• Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 8.4(d) when she failed to attend court hearings on behalf of Ms. Combs, Ms. Deeba, Mr. Jones, and herself in her personal bankruptcy case.

• Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 8.4(d) when she engaged in a vexatious and harassing litigation strategy in her personal bankruptcy case with the objective of frustrating and obstructing the orderly resolution of the case; specifically, Ms. Smith-Scott (1) filed bad faith pleadings, motions and appeals; and (2) failed to appear at several hearings, defied and ignored several court orders, and was held in civil contempt on two occasions.

• Ms. Smith-Scott violated Rule 8.4(a) because she violated Rules 1.1, 1.2, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5, 1.6, 1.15, 1.16, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.4, 4.1, 8.1, 8.4, and 19-404.

Ms. Smith-Scott generally excepts to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated Rule

8.4. Based on our independent review, a majority of which has already been discussed in

relation to other rule violations, we agree with the hearing judge. We overrule her

exception because clear and convincing evidence exists to support violations of Rule

8.4(a), (b), (c) and (d).

81 SANCTION

As we have often stated, the purpose of attorney disciplinary proceedings is to

protect the public and deter other lawyers from engaging in misconduct rather than simply

to punish the lawyer. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Mollock, 450 Md. 133, 158 (2016).

The public is protected when sanctions are “commensurate with the nature and gravity of

the violations and the intent with which they were committed.” Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. Pennington, 387 Md. 565, 596 (2005) (citing Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.

Ellison, 384 Md. 688, 714 (2005)).

Bar Counsel recommended that we disbar Ms. Smith-Scott for her “persistent course

of dishonest and deceitful conduct with her clients, the courts, her tenants, and bar

Counsel.” Ms. Smith-Scott, instead, argues that a reprimand is a more appropriate sanction

because she has no “prior record of discipline” and there is “no evidence of improper

motive.”

“In fashioning an appropriate sanction in attorney disciplinary proceedings, ‘[w]e

determine the appropriate sanction by considering the facts of the case, as well as balancing

any aggravating or mitigating factors.’” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sanderson, 465

Md. 1, 67 (2019) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kremer, 432 Md. 325, 337

(2013)). An attorney bears the burden of proving evidence of mitigation by a

preponderance of the evidence. See Md. Rule 19-727(c).

82 We have noted that “[a]ggravating factors[17] militate in favor of a more severe

sanction[.]” Sanderson, 465 Md. at 67 (alterations in original) (quoting Kremer, 432 Md.

at 337). The hearing judge found the following aggravating factors: (1) a dishonest or

selfish motive; (2) a pattern of misconduct; (3) multiple violations of the MLRPC and

MARPC; (4) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices

during the attorney discipline proceeding; and (5) an indifference to making restitution or

rectifying the misconduct’s consequences.

Ms. Smith-Scott contends that the hearing judge should not have found a dishonest

or selfish motive, submission of false evidence, or an indifference to making restitution.

The record, however, belies Ms. Smith-Scott’s arguments. Mindful of Ms. Smith-Scott’s

cursory arguments as to why we should part ways with these factors found by the hearing

judge, we decline to do so. We believe Bar Counsel proved the existence of these factors

in accord with the standards of Md. Rule 19-727(c).

17 Aggravating factors include:

(1) prior attorney discipline; (2) a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) a pattern of misconduct; (4) multiple violations of the [rules of professional conduct]; (5) bad faith obstruction of the attorney discipline proceeding by intentionally failing to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; (6) submission of false evidence, false statements, or other deceptive practices during the attorney discipline proceeding; (7) a refusal to acknowledge the misconduct’s wrongful nature; (8) the victim’s vulnerability; (9) substantial experience in the practice of law; (10) indifference to making restitution or rectifying the misconduct’s consequences; (11) illegal conduct, including that involving the use of controlled substances; and (12) likelihood of repetition of the misconduct.

Allenbaugh, 450 Md. at 277.

83 Unlike aggravating factors, “the existence of mitigating factors[18] tends to lessen or

reduce the sanction an attorney may face.” Id. at 70 (citing Kremer, 432 Md. at 338). The

hearing judge found the following mitigating factors: (1) the absence of prior attorney

discipline; (2) personal or emotional problems; (3) inexperience in the practice of law; (4)

remorse; and (5) the unlikelihood of repetition of the misconduct.

Ms. Smith-Scott asserts that the hearing judge should have found the following

additional mitigating factors: (1) the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (2) timely

good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify the misconduct’s consequences; (3) a

cooperative attitude toward the attorney discipline proceeding; and (4) character or

reputation. Ms. Smith-Scott failed to establish the existence of these mitigating factors by

a preponderance of evidence. See Md. Rule 19-727(c). Aside from excerpts of witness

18 Mitigating factors include:

(1) the absence of prior attorney discipline; (2) the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (3) personal or emotional problems; (4) timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify the misconduct’s consequences; (5) full and free disclosure to Bar Counsel or a cooperative attitude toward the attorney discipline proceeding; (6) inexperience in the practice of law; (7) character or reputation; (8) a physical disability; (9) a mental disability or chemical dependency, including alcoholism or drug abuse, where: (a) there is medical evidence that the lawyer is affected by a chemical dependency or mental disability; (b) the chemical dependency or mental disability caused the misconduct; (c) the lawyer’s recovery from the chemical dependency or mental disability is demonstrated by a meaningful and sustained period of successful rehabilitation; and (d) the recovery arrested the misconduct, and the misconduct’s recurrence is unlikely; (10) delay in the attorney discipline proceeding; (11) the imposition of other penalties or sanctions; (12) remorse; (13) remoteness of prior violations of the [rules of professional conduct]; and (14) unlikelihood of repetition of the misconduct.

Allenbaugh, 450 Md. at 277–78.

84 testimony regarding her character, Ms. Smith-Scott does not, and cannot, point to evidence

contained in the record to show the existence of these mitigating factors.

In Attorney Grievance Commission v. Vanderlinde, we stated that

in cases of intentional dishonesty, misappropriation cases, fraud, stealing, serious criminal conduct and the like, we will not accept, as “compelling extenuating circumstances,” anything less than the most serious and utterly debilitating mental or physical health conditions, arising from any source that is the “root cause” of the misconduct and that also result in an attorney’s utter inability to conform his or her conduct in accordance with the law and with the [Rules of Professional Conduct.] Only if the circumstances are that compelling, will we even consider imposing less than the most severe sanction of disbarment in cases of stealing, dishonesty, fraudulent conduct, the intentional misappropriation of funds or other serious criminal conduct, whether occurring in the practice of law, or otherwise.

364 Md. 376, 413–14 (2001). We further explained that disbarment is often the appropriate

sanction in these types of cases because “[u]nlike matters relating to competency, diligence

and the like, intentional dishonest conduct is closely entwined with the most important

matters of basic character to such a degree as to make intentional dishonest conduct by a

lawyer almost beyond excuse.” Id. at 418.

We have also held that “the misappropriation of entrusted funds ‘is an act infected

with deceit and dishonesty, and, in the absence of compelling extenuating circumstances

justifying a lesser sanction, will result in disbarment.’” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.

Cherry-Mahoi, 388 Md. 124, 161 (2005) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. James,

385 Md. 637, 666 (2005)). “Fiduciaries in general, and attorneys in particular, must

remember that the entrustment to them of the money and property of others involves a

responsibility of the highest order.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Owrutsky, 322 Md.

334, 345 (1991). An attorney “must carefully administer and account for those funds.

85 Appropriating any part of those funds to their own use and benefit without clear authority

to do so cannot be tolerated.” Id.

In this case, we have concluded that Ms. Smith-Scott engaged in intentional

dishonest conduct and that she misappropriated client funds entrusted to her. While this

conduct is troubling in its own right, the magnitude of Ms. Smith-Scott’s misconduct is

exacerbated by the fact that she violated sixteen different rules of professional conduct,

often numerous times and across the representation of multiple clients. Ms. Smith-Scott’s

conduct in her personal bankruptcy case further compounds the problematic nature of this

case. Ms. Smith-Scott willfully disregarded lawful orders of the Bankruptcy Court and

U.S. District Court and was found in civil contempt by those courts.

One order of the Bankruptcy Court fittingly describes much of the vexatious, three-

year bankruptcy proceeding: allegations replete with “unsupported, irrational, [and] highly

tenuous speculation.” Or, another by the U.S. District Court, describing one of Ms. Smith-

Scott’s motions, devoid of factual predicate, as “rely[ing] upon the sheer audacity of her

[own] allegations.” Surely, this misuse of the judicial system and misconduct of this sort

is that which “casts our noble profession in a most unfavorable light.” Attorney Grievance

Comm’n v. Collins, ___ Md. ___, ___ (2020). It follows, then, that a reprimand or

suspension would not be sufficient to protect the public or serve as a deterrent to other

attorneys.

CONCLUSION

Based on our assessment of Ms. Smith-Scott’s wide-ranging misconduct, the

existence of aggravating factors, and the limited mitigating factors present here, we agree

86 with Bar Counsel and hold that the appropriate sanction is disbarment. For the above

reasons, we disbarred Ms. Smith-Scott and awarded costs against her by per curiam order

dated January 10, 2020.