HARRELL, J.
Pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-709(a)1, Bar Counsel, on behalf of the Attorney Grievance Commission (Petitioner) and at the direction of the Review Board, filed with this Court a petition for disciplinary action against Gary E. Thompson, Esquire (Respondent). In the petition, Bar Counsel alleged violations only2 of Rules 8.4(b) and (c) of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct (MRPC)3. This Court referred the [318]*318matter to a judge of the Circuit Court for Montgomery County to conduct an evidentiary hearing and make findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with Maryland Rules 16-709(b)4 and 16-711(a)5. After an evidentiary hearing, the hearing judge was unable to find by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent violated MRPC 8.4(b) or (c). Petitioner filed with this Court exceptions to the findings of fact and conclusions of law, and a recommendation for sanction. Respondent filed a brief reply to Petitioner’s exceptions.
From the evidentiary record made below, the hearing judge made the following findings of fact:
Respondent is a 47-year old male who is married and has two sons. He was admitted to the Maryland bar in November 1978 and has practiced law exclusively in the state of Maryland for over 21 years. Respondent’s law practice consists primarily of estates and trusts, business law and elder law. He also devotes a substantial amount of time to pro bono representation of the elderly.
On March 24, 1998, Bar Counsel filed a Complaint' with Petitioner against Respondent based upon a charge brought against the Respondent on February 1, 1998 in the District Court of Maryland [sitting in] Montgomery County. On August 27, 1998, Respondent pled guilty to the offense of [319]*319stalking, in violation of section 32-20 of the Montgomery County Code, which provides in pertinent part:
Sec. 32-20 Stalking, (a) In this section to stalk means to engage in a persistent pattern of conduct which:
(1) alarms, annoys, intimidates, frightens, or terrorizes a person; and
(2) causes the person to reasonably fear for his or her safety, or that of any third person.
Respondent was sentenced to six months incarceration with all time suspended, three years probation1, one hundred hours of community service and a[n] $1,000.00 fine.
The stalking charge stemmed from Respondent’s interactions with a 13-year old boy he met at a Montgomery County swim center in October 1997. Pursuant to one of their conversations approximately one month after their initial meeting, Respondent made an inappropriate sexual remark to the boy.2 Subsequently, Respondent spoke to the boy at a shopping mall, called him on the telephone and on one occasion, appeared uninvited at the boy’s home. Charges were then filed against Respondent. Respondent testified that it was only after being charged that he learned that the boy had been very upset as a result of Respondent’s conduct with him.
Although Respondent has no previous sanctions for professional misconduct, his testimony revealed that he was previously acquitted of charges arising out of his conduct with another teenage boy in 1995. Respondent acknowledged that he has been sexually attracted to pubescent boys since he was in his late teens. After being charged with the stalking offense, Respondent sought treatment from Dr. Fred S. Berlin, M.D., Ph.D.3, who diagnosed Respondent with [320]*320nonexclusive homosexual Ephebophilia4. Since his evaluation by Dr. Berlin, Respondent has enrolled in a treatment program, which includes therapy sessions and antiandrogenic medication (which has the effect of lowering Respondent’s sex drive). Progress letters from Dr. Berlin indicate that Respondent has been highly motivated and diligent in his efforts to maximize the effect of his treatment. Furthermore, Dr. Berlin reports that Respondent is doing well thus far. Dr. Berlin further indicates that Respondent’s prognosis for continued abstinence from improper sexual behavior “will remain good” so long as he continues to maintain his high level of motivation and continues to adhere to his treatment regimen.
In August 1999, Respondent entered into a “Monitor’s Contract” with Robert H. Metz, a prominent member of the Maryland Bar who agreed to monitor Respondent’s activities as a practicing lawyer. Pursuant to the contract, Respondent agrees to limit his practice to estates and trusts, business law, elder law, real estate and other similar legal practice areas not involving issues pertaining to or involving contact with minor children. Mr. Metz agrees to act as Respondent’s monitor conferring monthly with both Respondent and Dr. Berlin to confirm that Respondent is maintaining his treatment as well as adhering to all other protective stipulations in the contract.
Based on these findings of fact, the hearing judge concluded that Respondent had not violated MRPC 8.4(b) or (c). Under [321]*321his interpretation of the requirements for a MRPC 8.4(b) violation, and relying in part on our decision in Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Post, 350 Md. 85, 710 A.2d 935 (1998), the hearing judge concluded that Respondent’s conduct did not “evince a character trait relevant or critical to the practice of law” and, therefore, did not “reflect[ ] adversely on his fitness as a lawyer.” He also determined Respondent’s conduct had not violated MRPC 8.4(c), as he found no evidence in the record suggesting Respondent “engaged in any conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation.”
Petitioner filed with this Court exceptions challenging the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent had not violated MRPC 8.4(b)6,7, and recommended a sanction of indefinite suspension from the practice of law. Respondent, in proper person, filed a reply to Petitioner’s exceptions arguing fundamentally that the hearing judge’s findings of fact “should serve as the basis for consideration of this matter.” Respondent did not appear at oral argument.
I. MRPC 8.4(b)
Maryland Rule of Professional Conduct 8.4(b) — Misconduct.
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(b) commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.
The hearing judge, in his Conclusions of Law, opined that Respondent’s misconduct in this case did not reflect “adversely on his fitness as a lawyer” and, therefore, did not violate MRPC 8.4(b). Petitioner excepts to this and maintains the hearing judge “erred” in concluding “Respondent’s stalking of [322]*322[a] teenage boy was not conduct adversely reflecting on his fitness as an attorney.” Petitioner contends that “[w]here a lawyer’s misconduct involves sexual misconduct with children, that misconduct reflects adversely on the lawyer’s fitness.” Respondent, in his Reply, urges us to adopt the reasoning of the hearing judge.8
It is well settled that this Court has original jurisdiction over all attorney disciplinary proceedings. See Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Zdravkovich, 362 Md. 1, 20, 762 A.2d 950, 960 (2000) (citing Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Sheridan, 357 Md. 1, 17, 741 A.2d 1143, 1152 (1999); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Glenn, 341 Md. 448, 470, 671 A.2d 463, 473 (1996)). The hearing judge’s findings of fact, which are “prima facie correct,” Zdravkovich, 362 Md. at 21, 762 A.2d at 960 (quoting Glenn, 341 Md. at 470, 671 A.2d at 474), are unexcepted to in this case, as we noted earlier. As to his conclusions of law, however, “our consideration is essentially de novo,” Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Briscoe, 357 Md. 554, 562, 745 A.2d 1037, 1041 (2000), as “[t]he ultimate determination ... as to an attorney’s alleged misconduct is reserved for this Court.” Glenn, 341 Md. at 470, 671 A.2d at 474 (citing Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Bakas, 323 Md. 395, 402-03, 593 A.2d 1087, 1091 (1991)). After thoroughly reviewing the record and discovered case law, we sustain Petitioner’s exceptions and overrule the hearing judge’s conclusion that Respondent’s conviction of the crime of stalking, under section 32-20 of the Montgomery County Code, resulting from his actions involving a thirteen year old boy, does not reflect adversely on his trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer in other respects.
The Comment to MRPC 8.4 provides that “[m]any kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on [the] fitness to practice [323]*323law....” As we explained in Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Post, 350 Md. 85, 97, 710 A.2d 935, 941 (1998),
Rule 8.4(b) recognizes, by its reference to character traits, rather than enumerating specific crimes, that commission of some crimes evidence or demonstrate a character flaw that, were the person committing them applying for admission to the bar, would constitute a significant impediment, if not outright prohibition, to his or her admission or, having been admitted, could result in his or her disbarment. The rule identifies two such traits. In addition to those traits, however, it includes as a catchall object, “fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” Since the Rule is specific in the requirement that the criminal act reflect adversely on the character traits or fitness as a lawyer, it follows that what the Rule contemplates is that the criminal act evidence another character trait, which, like honesty and trustworthiness, is relevant or critical to the practice of law.
The hearing judge, purportedly applying this explanation, reasoned that Respondent’s misconduct was not a violation of MRPC 8.4(b), “at least so far as to the types of law which Respondent has practiced in the past and those which he has agreed to practice in the future.”9 We disagree.
We acknowledge, as did the hearing judge, that Respondent’s proffered areas of practice emphasis tend to minimize the potential for interactions with children directly as clients. Additionally, it must be conceded Respondent’s misconduct did not involve or occur during the representation of a client. Under MRPC 8.4(b), however, an attorney’s criminal misconduct need not involve the class of persons the attorney typically represents, nor occur within his or her practice of law, to be a violation of the rule. In fact, unlawful acts of violence, sex offenses, and drug and alcohol offenses, [324]*324wholly unrelated to an attorney’s practice of law, have been recognized across the country as categories of criminal conduct violative of the provisions of the analogue to this or a similarly framed rule.10 See ABA/BNA Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Conduct, at 101:303-101:304 (citing, for example, In re Kearns, 991 P.2d 824 (Colo.1999) (censuring an attorney for conviction of vehicular assault and driving under the influence); Florida v. Kandekore, 766 So.2d 1004 (Fla.2000) (disbarring an attorney for assaulting law enforcement officer); In re Conn, 715 N.E.2d 379 (Ind.1999) (suspending an attorney for conviction of sexual exploitation of minors); In re Sutton, 265 Kan. 251, 959 P.2d 904 (1998) (censuring an attorney following criminal and civil charges for his disobeying a stop sign at construction site, confronting' a construction worker, and throwing a soda bottle at him); In re Robertson, 256 Kan. 505, 886 P.2d 806 (1994) (censuring an attorney for his admitted possession of cocaine); In re McEnaney, 718 A.2d 920 (R.I.1998) (suspending an attorney following plea of nolo contendré to possession of cocaine and marijuana)). The crux of any MRPC 8.4(b) analysis is, as the language of the rule states, whether an attorney’s criminal act “reflects adversely on the lawyer’s honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness as a lawyer in other respects.” It does not depend on whether the misconduct occurred while representing a client or, as the hearing judge suggested, whether the misconduct involved an individual from the class of persons the attorney typically represented. We are not suggesting that such factors may never be considered in a MRPC 8.4(b) analysis; indeed, there are many instances in which we may consider their existence [325]*325or nonexistence to be important factors. In the present case, however, their nonexistence does not direct our decision.
According to the hearing judge’s findings of fact and Respondent’s testimony in this case, Respondent had a “number of conversations” with the victim (a thirteen year old boy) at a local swim center. In one of those conversations, Respondent made an inappropriate sexual remark to him regarding premature ejaculation. Respondent also spoke to the child at a shopping mall, called him on the telephone once or twice, and, ultimately, appeared uninvited at the child’s home. This conduct led to his being charged with, and pleading guilty to, the offense of stalking. As he acknowledged in his testimony before the hearing judge, Respondent’s actions caused the child to be “very frightened” and “very scared,” feeling that Respondent “had pursued him inappropriately.” In our opinion, these actions, considered together, do not resemble, by any standard, those of a responsible, mature, and trustworthy adult, and clearly violated the unquestioned limits of appropriate adult-child interaction.
It is well established in Maryland that children, by nature of their youth, require different levels of protection and care than most adults (excepting perhaps adults under disabilities). In many areas of the law, we have enumerated the inherent differences between children and adults which necessitate that protection. As we explained in Stebbing v. State, 299 Md. 331, 473 A.2d 903 (1984),
... youth is more than a chronological fact. It is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage. Our history is replete with laws and judicial recognition that minors, especially in their earlier years, generally are less mature and responsible than adults. Particularly ‘during the formative years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment’ expected of adults.
Id. at 368, 473 A.2d at 921 (quoting Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115-16, 102 S.Ct. 869, 877, 71 L.Ed.2d 1, 11-12 (1982)) (citation and footnotes omitted). See also Johns Hop[326]*326kins Hosp. v. Pepper, 346 Md. 679, 692, 697 A.2d 1358, 1364 (1997) (explaining that there is a “presumption that unequal bargaining power always exists between the two, with the power, and therefore the potential for overreaching, inuring to the adult.”). The General Assembly, presumably in recognition of those differences, has enacted a number of statutes placing the responsibility on adults to protect and promote the welfare of children.11 We too have acknowledged similarly the importance of protecting children.12
It naturally follows, considering the inherent vulnerability of children, that interaction between children and adults be viewed with close scrutiny. Because of the disparities of power, intellect, maturity, and judgment between the two, children are often without the resources and capabilities, both mentally and physically, to protect themselves from harm. The burden, therefore, is on the adult to act responsibly in his [327]*327or her interactions with children to preserve their best interests, not to prey on their innocence. That implicit trust and duty is placed upon all adults, even those outside the home and school, including strangers coming into contact with a child in public. These are values we hold as a society, which are not novel to humanity generally.
As stated earlier, Respondent’s behavior in pursuing the child/victim in this case grossly overstepped the boundaries of appropriate adult-child relationships. In so doing, Respondent demonstrated, and even acknowledged to himself, that he may not be trusted around children in general.13,14 Although adult-child interactions are not related directly to Respondent’s practice of law, the concept of trust is an inseparable element of any attorney’s practice. It is inconceivable, therefore, how we presently may authorize and entrust Respondent with the enumerable confidential, fiduciary, and trust-based relationships that attorneys, by their profession, are required to maintain in their dealings with their clients or the public.
We acknowledge Respondent’s diagnosis and apparent affirmative response to his treatment regimen, but do not find that determinative here.15 Regardless of his present “high level of motivation” not to repeat the misconduct that led to the present charges, the fact remains that Respondent stalked a child, and that criminal act undermines our view of his present trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer.
Many courts in other jurisdictions have found, as we do here, that sexually-motivated attorney misconduct involving [328]*328children can be within the purview of the type of misconduct encompassed by MRPC 8.4(b) or its analogue.16 Respondent suggested in his Reply to Petitioner’s Exceptions that such cases involving the sexual exploitation of a minor “bear[ ] no factual resemblance” to his case involving mere stalking of a child. We do not agree.
Admittedly, the offense of stalking contemplates different behavior than the offenses committed against minors in the many MRPC 8.4(b)-type cases enumerated in note 16, supra. The purpose of stalking laws, however, such as the one implicated in this case, is to protect the general public and to prevent harm, such as molestation, from occurring to the stalking victim.17 Therefore, in determining whether a crimi[329]*329nal act constitutes a MRPC 8.4(b) violation, it makes no difference that Respondent merely stalked a thirteen year old boy, without consummating an act of sexual abuse or other misdeed. Any such act violates the implicit trust the public and we expect from adults interacting with children. Respondent’s failure to act-out even worse misconduct, under the circumstances, does not remove him from the scope of MRPC 8.4(b).18
II. Sanctions
Having concluded that Respondent violated MRPC 8.4(b), we must now address the issue of the proper sanction. When considering sanctions, it is well settled that
[t]he purpose of disciplinary proceedings against an attorney is to protect the public rather than to punish the erring attorney. The public is protected when sanctions are imposed that are commensurate with the nature and gravity of the violations and the intent with which they were committed. The severity of the sanction depends upon the facts and circumstances of the case before this Court. Imposing a sanction protects the public interest because it demonstrates to members of the legal profession the type of conduct which will not be tolerated. Zdravkovich, 362 Md. at 31-2, 762 A.2d at 966 (citations omitted).
See also Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Mooney, 359 Md. 56, 96, 753 A.2d 17, 38 (2000); Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Brown, 353 [330]*330Md. 271, 295, 725 A.2d 1069, 1080 (1999) (quoting Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Ober, 350 Md. 616, 631-32, 714 A.2d 856, 864 (1998)).
Bar Counsel recommends that Respondent be suspended indefinitely from the practice of law, that his reinstatement be conditioned upon his continuing to receive treatment and counseling for his disorder, and that, if reinstated, his law practice be monitored consistent with the conditions previously recommended by Petitioner and Respondent.19 Respondent urges us to adopt the conclusions of law of the hearing judge, which would result in our imposing no sanction.
In determining an appropriate sanction under the Rules of Professional Conduct, we have considered the following factors:
absence of a prior disciplinary record; absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; personal or emotional problems; timely good faith efforts to make restitution or to rectify consequences of misconduct; full and free disclosure to disciplinary board or cooperative attitude toward proceedings; inexperience in the practice of law; character or reputation; physical or mental disability or impairment; delay in disciplinary proceedings; interim rehabilitation; imposition of other penalties or sanctions; remorse; and finally, remoteness of prior offenses.
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Jaseb, 364 Md. 464, 481-82, 773 A.2d 516, 526 (2001) (quoting Glenn, 341 Md. at 488-89, 671 A.2d at 483 (citations omitted)). See also Standard 9.0 of the ABA Standards for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions, reprinted in ABAJBNA Lawyer’s Manual on Professional Conduct, at 01:838-01:840. The ABA Standards provide for the consider[331]*331ation of the “vulnerability of victim” as an aggravating consideration. Id.
There are both mitigating and aggravating factors in this case. In Respondent’s favor, he apparently has maintained a cooperative attitude throughout the proceedings, displayed remorse for his actions, and has no prior disciplinary record. Additionally, he finally made an effort to seek treatment for his disorder and to limit his contact with children.20 These considerations prevented disbarment. In aggravation, Respondent’s victim, due to his age alone, was vulnerable to harm. As we noted earlier, childhood “is a time and condition of life when a person may be most susceptible to influence and to psychological damage.” Stebbing, 299 Md. at 368, 473 A.2d at 921 (citation omitted).
After careful consideration of all of these factors, we conclude that indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction. Even though Respondent has sought treatment for his disorder and has made efforts toward prevention of similar misconduct in the future, his misconduct in this case erodes our present level of confidence in his trustworthiness and fitness to be a lawyer.21 We do not reject the possibility that, at some [332]*332point in the future, Respondent may be able to demonstrate to us a track record sufficient to restore a level of trustworthiness and fitness to practice law, but, until that is shown to the Court’s satisfaction, an indefinite suspension to commence thirty days from the date of the filing of this opinion is required to protect the public interest.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST GARY E. THOMPSON.
BELL, C.J., RAKER, and CATHELL, JJ., dissent.