Mayor of Baltimore v. Chase

756 A.2d 987, 360 Md. 121, 2000 Md. LEXIS 457

• Court: Court of Appeals of Maryland
• Decided: July 27, 2000
• Docket: 77, Sept. Term, 1999
• Status: Published

Opinions

BELL, Chief Judge.

The issue that we resolve in this opinion is the applicability of Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol., 1999 Cum Supp.) § 5-604(a),¹ which grants immunity to those within its coverage “from civil liability for any act or omission in the course of performing their duties,” to a paramedic in the Baltimore City Fire Department. Consistent with the conclusion reached by the Circuit Court for Baltimore City and contrary to that of the Court of Special Appeals, see Chase v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 126 Md.App. 427, 441-44, 730 A.2d 239, 246-48 (1999), we shall hold that this statute applies to municipal fire and rescue departments and their employees, as well as to volunteer fire and rescue companies and their employees. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the intermediate appellate court.²

Kevin D. Williams, one of the petitioners, is an emergency medical technician, a paramedic, employed by the Baltimore City Fire Department. In the performance of his duties, the petitioner, along with the ambulance driver responded to a 911 call for ambulance. Upon arrival at the address from which the call was made, he met the patient, Carlean Burley, the respondents’³ decedent. After her condition had been assessed and oxygen administered, the patient was placed in the ambulance for transport to the hospital. When the patient went into cardiac arrest, the petitioner, as a part of emergency treatment, attempted to intubate her — a procedure in which a tube is put into the treachea to assist in breathing. The patient was then transported to the hospital, where she died the next day.

The respondents filed suit in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City against the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore and the petitioner Kevin Williams, alleging that Williams improperly intubated Ms. Burley by inserting the tube in her esophagus instead of her trachea. They further alleged that the error was negligence and gross negligence and that it caused her death. Following a hearing, the Circuit Court granted summary judgment in favor of the petitioners, holding, inter alia, that § 5-604 was applicable, that the conduct of petitioner Williams was not grossly negligent and, as a result, that both Williams and the City were immune from civil liability. The respondents successfully appealed to the Court of Special Appeals. That court held that § 5-604 applied only to volunteer and private fire and rescue companies and their personnel and, therefore, was inapplicable to a paramedic employed by a municipal fire department.⁴ 126 Md.App. at 442-44, 730 A.2d at 247-48.

Since this case is about the meaning and, thus, the effect, of § 5-604, it is governed by well settled canons of statutory construction. The legislative history of Senate Bill 731, which became the Fire and Rescue Act, Maryland Code (1973, 1983 Replacement Volume) § 5-309.1 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article, see 1983 Laws, ch. 546, the predecessor of § 5-604 is confirmatory of the meaning discerned from the words of the statute itself. Section 5-604 has been before this Court previously for interpretation, but not on this issue.

In Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission v. Riverdale Heights Volunteer Fire Co., Inc., 308 Md. 556, 569, 520 A.2d 1319, 1326 (1987), we considered the legislative history of § 5-604, noting that it was before the General Assembly during the 1983 session and that:

“The file of the Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee ... reflects that the legislation was a response to Utica Mutual Insurance Co., Inc. v. Gaithersburg-Washington Grove Fire Department, Inc., 53 Md.App. 589, 455 A.2d 987 (1983). Utica Mutual was a negligence action brought by a fire insurance company, as subrogee of its insured, against a fire company for alleged negligence in failing properly to extinguish a fire which later reignited leading to a second fire. The circuit court had held that the fire company enjoyed governmental immunity but the Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that whether a fire company enjoyed governmental immunity was a question of fact on which the fire company in Utica Mutual had failed to produce sufficient evidence. The intermediate appellate court decided Utica Mutual on February 2, 1983, and on February 3, 1983, a member of the Maryland Senate requested the Department of Legislative Reference to prepare a bill granting immunity to volunteer firefighters. As introduced the bill provided that ‘[a] volunteer fire company is immune from liability in the same manner as a local government agency for any act or omission in the course of performing its duties if [ ] the act or omission is not one of gross negligence....’ The bill was amended in the course of passage to its present form.”

Because the issue presented in that case was the retrospective application of the statute, we contented ourselves with rejecting the Fire Company’s argument that its purpose was to restore the governmental immunity volunteer companies enjoyed before the Utica decision. Id. at 570, 520 A.2d at 1326-27. Thus, although we noted the statute’s genesis and its metamorphosis during its trek through the legislative process, we did not address the statute’s meaning, applied prospectively, and, indeed, had no need to do so.

Nevertheless, from the standpoint of statutory construction, it is important that the statute started with a narrow focus — to exempt volunteer fire companies — and ended worded much more broadly — referring simply to “a fire company or rescue company, and the personnel of a fire company or rescue company.” That most emphatically supports the argument that the petitioners make, that the Legislature, by enacting the statute, intended to immunize all fire and rescue companies and their personnel and that immunization is “from civil liability for any act or omission in the course of performing their duties.” In point of fact, the statute in this regard is quite clear and unambiguous. Reading the statute reveals not a bit of ambiguity as to the scope of its reach and, giving the words of the statute their ordinary meaning, as we are required to do, see Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Maryland. v. Director of Finance for Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567, 578, 683 A.2d 512, 517 (1996) (“we begin our inquiry with the words of the statute and, ordinarily, when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their commonly understood meaning, we end our inquiry there also”), even less as to its clarity. The statute is rendered even clearer when it is recalled that the Legislature knows how to differentiate between voluntary fire companies and municipal fire companies and has done so clearly whenever that is what it intended. See Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol., 1999 Cum.Supp.) § 5-603 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article.⁵

The goal with which we approach the interpretation of a statute is to determine the intention of the Legislature in enacting it. The rules governing the conduct of that search are well settled and have been stated by this Court on many occasions. In Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Maryland v. Director of Finance for Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 343 Md. 567, 578-79, 683 A.2d 512, 517-18 (1996), this Court said, on the subject:

“[W]e begin our analysis by reviewing the pertinent rules [of statutory construction]. Of course, the cardinal rule is to ascertain and effectuate legislative intent. Oaks v. Connors, 339 Md. 24, 35, 660 A.2d 423, 429 (1995); Montgomery County v. Buckman, 333 Md. 516, 523, 636 A.2d 448, 451 (1994); Condon v. State, 332 Md. 481, 491, 632 A.2d 753, 755 (1993). To this end, we begin our inquiry with the words of the statute and, ordinarily, when the words of the statute are clear and unambiguous, according to their commonly understood meaning, we end our inquiry there also. Oaks, supra, 339 Md. at 35, 660 A.2d at 429; Buckman, supra, 333 Md. at 523, 636 A.2d at 451; Condon, supra, 332 Md. at 491, 632 A.2d at 755; Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 145-46, 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993).

“Where the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, a court may neither add nor delete language so as to ‘reflect an intent not evidenced in that language,’ Condon, supra, 332 Md. at 491, 632 A.2d at 755, nor may it construe the statute with “ ‘forced or subtle interpretations’ that limit or extend its application.’ Id. (quoting Tucker v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., 308 Md. 69, 73, 517 A.2d 730, 732 (1986)). Moreover, whenever possible, a statute should be read so that no word, clause, sentence or phrase is rendered superfluous or nugatory. Buckman, supra, 333 Md. at 524, 636 A.2d at 452; Condon, supra, 332 Md. at 491, 632 A.2d at 755.”

This Court has pointed out that, in interpreting a statute, the context in which the statute appears must be considered. Moms v. Prince George’s County, 319 Md. 597, 604, 573 A.2d 1346, 1349 (1990); State v. 149 Slot Machines, 310 Md. 356, 361, 529 A.2d 817, 819 (1987); and that context may include related statutes, pertinent legislative history and “other material that fairly bears on the ... fundamental issue of legislative purpose or goal.... ” Kaczorowski v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 515, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987). On this subject, we have instructed:

“Where the statute to be construed is a part of a statutory scheme, the legislative intention is not determined from that statute alone, rather it is to be discerned by considering it in light of the statutory scheme. [State v.] Crescent Cities Jaycees, 330 Md. [460] at 468, 624 A.2d [955] at 959 [1993]. When, in that scheme, two statutes, enacted at different times and not referring to each other, Farmers & Merchants [National] Bank v. Schlossberg, 306 Md. 48, 56, 507 A.2d 172, 176 (1986); Management Personnel Serv. v. Sandefur, 300 Md. 332, 341, 478 A.2d 310, 314 (1984), address the same subject, they must be read together, State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 93, 581 A.2d 9, 12 (1990), ie., interpreted with reference to one another, Schlossberg, 306 Md. at 61, 507 A.2d at 178; Bridges v. Nicely, 304 Md. 1, 10, 497 A.2d 142, 146 (1985), and harmonized, to the extent possible, both with each other and with other provisions of the statutory scheme. Balto. Gas & Elec. [v. Public Service Com’n of Md.], 305 Md. [145] at 157, 501 A.2d [1307] at 1313 [1986]. Neither statute should be read, however, so as to render the other, or any portion of it, meaningless, surplus-age, superfluous or nugatory. Tracey v. Tracey, 328 Md. 380, 387, 614 A.2d 590, 594 (1992); D & Y, Inc. v. Winston, 320 Md. 534, 538, 578 A.2d 1177, 1179 (1990); Kindley v. Governor of Md., 289 Md. 620, 625, 426 A.2d 908, 912 (1981); Moberly v. Herboldsheimer, 276 Md. 211, 217, 345 A.2d 855, 858 (1975). In attempting to harmonize them, we presume that, when the Legislature enacted the later of the two statutes, it was aware of the one earlier enacted. Cicoria v. State, 382 Md. 21, 43, 629 A.2d 742, 752 (1993); Bricker, 321 Md. at 93, 581 A.2d at 12.”

Government Employees Ins. Co. and GEICO v. Insurance Com’r, 332 Md. 124, 131-32, 630 A.2d 713, 717-18 (1993).

Application of these rules produces a clear, logical and predictable result. As we have seen, § 5-604 speaks broadly both as to the immunity it bestows and with regard to its recipients. In this regard, as we have also seen, it is not at all ambiguous.

To be sure, a statute whose terms are unambiguous when the statute is considered by itself, may be rendered ambiguous when viewed in light of a related statute or when that statute is part of a larger statutory scheme. See Gardner v. State, 344 Md. 642, 648, 689 A.2d 610, 613 (1997) (statutes that are clear when viewed separately may well be ambiguous where their application in a given situation, or when they operate together, is not clear). That is not the case here, however.

Section 5-603 is relevant to the interpretation of § 5-604 and, therefore, was appropriately considered by the Court of Special Appeals in determining § 5-604’s meaning. It predated the enactment of § 5-604 and, thus, its existence and content are presumed to have been known to the Legislature when the later enacted statute was promulgated; it is in essence a part of the context in which § 5-604 must be viewed. Section 5-603 does not, however, affect the clarity of § 5-604; reading the two statutes together does not render § 5-604 ambiguous. Just the opposite is the case. By using the phrase, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law,” § 5-604 clearly and unambiguously states its relationship to § 5-603 and other statutes or laws on the same subject, prescribing different requirements, that the immunity it provides takes precedence over and prevails as against restrictions made applicable to fire and rescue companies by those other statutes, including § 5-603. It is difficult to imagine how that legislative intent could have been stated any clearer. Even more difficult to imagine is a more reasonable interpretation.

Without any regard to whether the statute is ambiguous and, indeed, without explicitly addressing the point, the respondents argue that when the legislative history is considered, it is apparent that § 5-604 applies to volunteer fire and rescue companies and to private fire companies and their personnel, but not to municipal fire and rescue companies. Aside from the fact that the legislative history on which it relies does not support the conclusion, the respondents misuse that history. It is true, of course, that our eases indicate that even when the language of a statute is free from ambiguity, “in the interest of completeness” we may, and sometimes do, explore the legislative history of the statute under review. E.g., Harris v. State, 331 Md. 137, 146, 626 A.2d 946, 950 (1993). We do so, however, to look at the purpose of the statute and compare the result obtained by use of its plain language with that which results when the purpose of the statute is taken into account. Id. In other words, the resort to legislative history is a confirmatory process; it is not undertaken to contradict the plain meaning of the statute. See Coleman v. State, 281 Md. 538, 546, 380 A.2d 49, 54 (1977) (“a court may not as a general rule surmise a legislative intention contrary to the plain language of a statute or insert exceptions not made by the legislature.”).

The respondents submit that it is apparent that the General Assembly intended to extend to non-governmental fire and rescue companies the same immunity that the common law conferred on their governmental counterparts. Curiously, they fail to explain why it is apparent. Nor, as we have seen, other than its reliance on the legislative history, do the respondents explain their disregard of § 5-604’s plain language.

The respondents offer yet another reason for interpreting § 5-604 as applicable only to volunteer and private fire and rescue companies: the word “company” is appropriately used only in connection with volunteer or private concerns; their municipal counterparts are referred to as “departments.” That is a slender reed on which to base a matter of statutory construction as important as this. Moreover, while that may be the usual and customary usage, it is not without exception and certainly it is not universally followed by the General Assembly. Indeed, in the very statute that the respondents urge in support of the interpretation they favor, § 5-603, the General Assembly referred to “voluntary fire departments.” See subsection (b)(2) and (b)(3). Having used terminology usually reserved for municipal entities in the prior section, nothing legitimately can be made of the Legislature’s use of terminology more common to references to private entities in § 5-604.

The interpretation of § 5-604 advocated by the respondents is inconsistent with most, if not all of the applicable canons of statutory construction. The respondents disregard, if not ignore, the fact that § 5-604 is not ambiguous at all, that its language is crystal clear. As already pointed out, § 5-604’s relationship to pre-existing law and statutes bearing on the immunity of fire and rescue companies is addressed head-on and without equivocation — whatever their provisions in that regard, ie. “Notwithstanding any other provision of law,” they do not affect, or survive, the immunity accorded fire and rescue companies by the provisions of § 5-604. That could not be clearer. Indeed, the interpretation the respondents favor and urge us to adopt renders the “notwithstanding” phrase essentially meaningless.

The breadth of § 5-604 can not be questioned; it specifically states that it applies to “any act or omission [of a fire or rescue company, or their personnel] in the course of performing their duties.” Nor is there any doubt as to who falls within its grant of immunity. The statute clearly and unequivocally refers to fire or rescue companies; there is no differentiation at all between public and private companies. Indeed, as we have seen, the statute started with that limitation, at its introduction it applied only to volunteer companies, but ended without it, indicating the Legislature’s intention, arrived at during the passage of the legislation through the General Assembly, to broaden its coverage. Of course failure to give effect to the real intention of the Legislature is a clear violation of the rules. Interpreting § 5-604 broadly is neither unreasonable nor illogical, nor a failure to bring common sense to the construction of the statute.

Indeed, an examination of the intent behind § 5-604 leads to the opposite conclusion than the respondents draw. The first amendment made to Senate Bill 731, as seen in notes from the Judicial Proceedings Committee, was the striking of the word “volunteer” as a modifier of fire and rescue companies. The decision to broaden the language of the subject, to simply “fire and rescue companies”, clearly indicates a conscious choice to grant immunity to all employed by such companies, and not restrict the grant to only those in volunteer companies. In addition, Senate Bill 731 was considered along with Senate Bill 659, which conferred immunity in negligence actions on operators of emergency vehicles. SB 659 included both government and volunteer vehicles under its grant of immunity. That perhaps provides some insight as to why, in SB 731, the limitation to “volunteer” fire and rescue companies, was dropped.

Thus, it is clear that, whether looking at the plain language of § 5-604, or looking at its legislative intent, § 5-604 grants, and was intended to grant, immunity to fire and rescue companies, be they municipal, or volunteer.

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS REVERSED. CASE REMANDED TO THAT COURT WITH DIRECTIONS TO DECIDE THE ISSUE OF GROSS NEGLIGENCE WHICH WAS NOT PREVIOUSLY RESOLVED. COSTS IN THIS COURT AND IN THE COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS TO BE PAID BY THE RESPONDENTS.

1 . Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl.VoL, 1999 Cum.Supp.) § 5-604(a) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article provides:

“(a) Immunity from civil liability. — Notwithstanding any other provision of law, except for any wilful or grossly negligent act, a fire company or rescue company, and the personnel of a fire company or rescue company are immune from civil liability for any act or omission in the course of performing their duties.”

2 . Included in the Petition for Writ of Certiorari, which we granted, was a second question, i.e.,

“Whether a paramedic employed by the Baltimore City Fire Department to provide emergency medical services is denied immunity under Section 5-603 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article because the City of Baltimore charges a fee for transportation to a hospital by a Baltimore City Fire Department ambulance.”

We need not now reach that issue and, therefore, neither intimate, nor express any opinion as to its answer.

3 . Sharon E. Chase, personal representative of the estate of Carlean Burley, and Darlene Burley, guardian and next friend of Richard Sturdivant, grandson of Ms. Burley, on whom, it was alleged, he was financially dependent.

4 . The Court of Special Appeals also addressed the petitioners’ entitlement to immunity under The Good Samaritan Act, Maryland Code (1973, 1998 Repl.Vol., 1999 Cum.Supp.) § 5-603 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. It concluded that statute did not immunize a paramedic employed by a municipal fire department when the city charges a fee for ambulance service. Chase v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 126 Md.App. 427, 437-40, 730 A.2d 239, 244-46 (1999). As previously indicated, we do not reach this issue.

5 . That section, headed “Liability for emergency medical care, "provides: "(a) A person described in subsection (b) of this section is not civilly liable for any act or omission in giving any assistance or medical care, if:

"(1) The act or omission is not one of gross negligence;

"(2) The assistance or medical care is provided without fee or other compensation; and

"(3) The assistance or medical care is provided:

"(i) At the scene of an emergency;

"(ii) in transit to a medical facility; or

"(iii) Through communications with personnel providing emergency assistance.

"(b) Subsection (a) of this section applies to the following:

"(1) An individual who is licensed by this State to provide medical care;

"(2) A member of any State, county, municipal, or volunteer fire department, ambulance and rescue squad or law enforcement agency or of the National Ski Patrol System, or a corporate fire department responding to a call outside of its corporate premises, if the member:

"(i) has completed an American Red Cross course in advanced first aid and has a current card showing that status;

"(ii) has completed an equivalent of an American Red Cross course in advanced first aid, as determined by the Secretary of Health and Mental Hygiene; or

"(iii) is certified or licensed by this State as an emergency medical services provider;

"(3) A volunteer fire department, ambulance and rescue squad whose members have immunity; and

"(4) A corporation when its fire department personnel are immune under paragraph (2) of this subsection.

"(c) An individual who is not covered otherwise by this section is not civilly liable for any act or omission in providing assistance or medical aid to a victim at the scene of an emergency, if:

"(1) The assistance or aid is provided in a reasonably prudent manner;

"(2) The assistance or aid is provided without fee or other compensation; and

"(3) The individual relinquishes care of the victim when someone who is licensed or certified by this State to provide medical care or services becomes available to take responsibility.”

It is interesting to note that in subsection (b)(2), the Legislature distinguished between "State, county, municipal, or volunteer fire department, ambulance and rescue squad” and in subsection (b)(4), it was explicit in describing the affected organizations as "a volunteer fire department, ambulance and rescue squad.”