BELL, C.J.
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, the petitioner, acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,
approved the filing by Bar Counsel of a Petition For Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Shuan H.M. Rose, the respondent. In the petition, Bar Counsel charged that the respondent engaged in misconduct, as defined by Maryland Rules 16-701(i),
and 16-812, and consisting of violations of various of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by the latter Maryland Rule, violations of other Maryland rules, and a violation of a Maryland statute. Specifically, he alleged that the respondent violated Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, Competence,
1.2, Scope of Representation,
1.3, Diligence,
1.4, Communication,
1.15, Safekeeping Property,
1.16,
Declining or Terminating Representation,
3.2, Expediting Litigation,
8.1, Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters,
and 8.4, Misconduct,
Rules 16-604, Trust Account—Required Deposits,
16-607, Commingling of Funds,
16-609, Prohibited Transactions,
and Maryland Code (1957, 2004 Repl.Vol.)
§ 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article, Misuse of trust money.
We referred the case to the Honorable Evelyn Omega Cannon, of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, for hearing pursuant to Rules 16-752(a)
and 16-757(c).
Following a hearing at which the respondent participated and presented mitigating evidence,
the hearing court made findings of fact, by clear and convincing evidence, as follows:
“There is clear and convincing evidence to support the following findings of fact:
“Respondent was admitted to the Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland on March 4, 1985. On October 14, 2004, this Court indefinitely suspended Respondent from the practice of law with the right to apply for reinstatement after six months. During times relevant to the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, Respondent maintained an office for the practice of law in Baltimore City, Maryland.
“On or about June 16, 2003, Respondent was engaged by William Horne, (hereafter ‘Horne’ or ‘Complainant’) to represent him in a divorce action. At the time of the engagement, Respondent informed Horne that he would represent him in an uncontested divorce for a flat fee of $500. On or about June 16, 2003, Horne paid Respondent $500. It was agreed that Respondent would immediately file a Complaint for Divorce for the Complainant. Respondent did not deposit any portion of the prepaid fee received from Horne to an attorney/escrow account. Respondent failed to maintain the unearned portion of the fee paid by Horne in trust until earned.
“About three weeks after Respondent was engaged, Horne contacted Respondent by telephone to determine the status of his case. Respondent informed Horne that he had not yet filed the Complaint of Divorce and that Horne would have to pay an additional $100 for the filing fee. Thereafter, Horne paid Respondent $100. Respondent did not deposit these funds to an attorney/escrow account.
“On July 29, 2003, Respondent filed the Complaint for Absolute Divorce in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The court issued a Writ of Summons to Horne’s spouse. Respondent, however, did not inform Horne that the complaint had been filed. Thereafter, between July 30, 2003 and December 2, 2003, Respondent took no action to further the Complainant’s divorce action and did not obtain service on the defendant in the action.
“During the representation, Respondent moved his office and failed to notify Horne of his current address or telephone number. Approximately three weeks after Horne paid Respondent the $100 filing fee, he called Respondent’s telephone
and left messages on the answering machine. The messages were not returned. In September, 2003, Horne went to Respondent’s office in an attempt to locate him. Horne found the door unlocked. He went in and waited alone for about 15 minutes. He left without seeing Respondent. In October, 2003, Horne called ’411’ in an effort to locate Respondent. Horne obtained a new address for Respondent’s office. Horne went to this address and a receptionist for another business at that location gave Horne Respondent’s cell phone number.
“Respondent also failed to notify the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of the change of address. The address contained on the docket entries is North Charles Street. The Motion for Default Judgment and Order of Default and Request to Reissue Summons bear a Greenmount Avenue address.
“Orí or about December 3, 2003, Respondent contacted Horne by telephone and informed Horne that the complaint for divorce had been filed. On or about December 3, 2003, Respondent made a request to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for the summons to be reissued. In January 2004, Horne received an Affidavit prepared by Respondent. Horne signed this document, had it notarized on February 2, 2004, and then returned it to Respondent.
“On or about March 1, 2004, Respondent filed an Affidavit of Service on the defendant in the Horne litigation, which incorrectly indicated that service had been accomplished by certified mail on January 15, 2003. On or about March 1, 2004, Respondent filed a Motion for an Order of Default, which included the Affidavit signed by Horne. On or about March 17, 2004, the court issued an Order of Default. On or about March 9, 2004, Horne’s spouse filed a Counter-complaint for Absolute Divorce. On or about April 26, 2004, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City vacated the Order of Default.
“In March or April 2004, Respondent and Horne met. Horne testified that Respondent told him that his office was in the District of Columbia and that Respondent asked for more money. Horne asked Respondent for his address, which
Respondent did not provide. Horne refused to pay Respondent any additional money.
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BELL, C.J.
The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, the petitioner, acting pursuant to Maryland Rule 16-751,
approved the filing by Bar Counsel of a Petition For Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Shuan H.M. Rose, the respondent. In the petition, Bar Counsel charged that the respondent engaged in misconduct, as defined by Maryland Rules 16-701(i),
and 16-812, and consisting of violations of various of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct, as adopted by the latter Maryland Rule, violations of other Maryland rules, and a violation of a Maryland statute. Specifically, he alleged that the respondent violated Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1, Competence,
1.2, Scope of Representation,
1.3, Diligence,
1.4, Communication,
1.15, Safekeeping Property,
1.16,
Declining or Terminating Representation,
3.2, Expediting Litigation,
8.1, Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters,
and 8.4, Misconduct,
Rules 16-604, Trust Account—Required Deposits,
16-607, Commingling of Funds,
16-609, Prohibited Transactions,
and Maryland Code (1957, 2004 Repl.Vol.)
§ 10-306 of the Business Occupations and Professions Article, Misuse of trust money.
We referred the case to the Honorable Evelyn Omega Cannon, of the Circuit Court for Baltimore City, for hearing pursuant to Rules 16-752(a)
and 16-757(c).
Following a hearing at which the respondent participated and presented mitigating evidence,
the hearing court made findings of fact, by clear and convincing evidence, as follows:
“There is clear and convincing evidence to support the following findings of fact:
“Respondent was admitted to the Bar of the Court of Appeals of Maryland on March 4, 1985. On October 14, 2004, this Court indefinitely suspended Respondent from the practice of law with the right to apply for reinstatement after six months. During times relevant to the Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action, Respondent maintained an office for the practice of law in Baltimore City, Maryland.
“On or about June 16, 2003, Respondent was engaged by William Horne, (hereafter ‘Horne’ or ‘Complainant’) to represent him in a divorce action. At the time of the engagement, Respondent informed Horne that he would represent him in an uncontested divorce for a flat fee of $500. On or about June 16, 2003, Horne paid Respondent $500. It was agreed that Respondent would immediately file a Complaint for Divorce for the Complainant. Respondent did not deposit any portion of the prepaid fee received from Horne to an attorney/escrow account. Respondent failed to maintain the unearned portion of the fee paid by Horne in trust until earned.
“About three weeks after Respondent was engaged, Horne contacted Respondent by telephone to determine the status of his case. Respondent informed Horne that he had not yet filed the Complaint of Divorce and that Horne would have to pay an additional $100 for the filing fee. Thereafter, Horne paid Respondent $100. Respondent did not deposit these funds to an attorney/escrow account.
“On July 29, 2003, Respondent filed the Complaint for Absolute Divorce in the Circuit Court for Baltimore City. The court issued a Writ of Summons to Horne’s spouse. Respondent, however, did not inform Horne that the complaint had been filed. Thereafter, between July 30, 2003 and December 2, 2003, Respondent took no action to further the Complainant’s divorce action and did not obtain service on the defendant in the action.
“During the representation, Respondent moved his office and failed to notify Horne of his current address or telephone number. Approximately three weeks after Horne paid Respondent the $100 filing fee, he called Respondent’s telephone
and left messages on the answering machine. The messages were not returned. In September, 2003, Horne went to Respondent’s office in an attempt to locate him. Horne found the door unlocked. He went in and waited alone for about 15 minutes. He left without seeing Respondent. In October, 2003, Horne called ’411’ in an effort to locate Respondent. Horne obtained a new address for Respondent’s office. Horne went to this address and a receptionist for another business at that location gave Horne Respondent’s cell phone number.
“Respondent also failed to notify the Circuit Court for Baltimore City of the change of address. The address contained on the docket entries is North Charles Street. The Motion for Default Judgment and Order of Default and Request to Reissue Summons bear a Greenmount Avenue address.
“Orí or about December 3, 2003, Respondent contacted Horne by telephone and informed Horne that the complaint for divorce had been filed. On or about December 3, 2003, Respondent made a request to the Circuit Court for Baltimore City for the summons to be reissued. In January 2004, Horne received an Affidavit prepared by Respondent. Horne signed this document, had it notarized on February 2, 2004, and then returned it to Respondent.
“On or about March 1, 2004, Respondent filed an Affidavit of Service on the defendant in the Horne litigation, which incorrectly indicated that service had been accomplished by certified mail on January 15, 2003. On or about March 1, 2004, Respondent filed a Motion for an Order of Default, which included the Affidavit signed by Horne. On or about March 17, 2004, the court issued an Order of Default. On or about March 9, 2004, Horne’s spouse filed a Counter-complaint for Absolute Divorce. On or about April 26, 2004, the Circuit Court for Baltimore City vacated the Order of Default.
“In March or April 2004, Respondent and Horne met. Horne testified that Respondent told him that his office was in the District of Columbia and that Respondent asked for more money. Horne asked Respondent for his address, which
Respondent did not provide. Horne refused to pay Respondent any additional money. Thereafter, Horne engaged new counsel, and, on or about April 22, 2004, Horne delivered a letter to Respondent advising that Respondent was discharged and requesting that Respondent provide the file to new counsel. On or about April 26,2004, Respondent’s appearance was stricken.
“Respondent failed to refund the unearned portion of the fee paid by Horne. Respondent failed to withdraw from representing Horne when Respondent knew that his physical or mental condition materially impaired his ability to do so.
“On or about December 9, 2003, the Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland received a complaint from Horne concerning Respondent’s conduct. In his Complaint, Horne requested a refund of the fees paid to Respondent.
“On or about December 29, 2003, Bar Counsel sent Respondent a letter notifying Respondent of the Complaint and requesting a written response within 15 days. Respondent failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s letter and on or about January 20, 2004, Bar Counsel sent a second letter to Respondent notifying him of the Horne Complaint and requesting a written response. On or about January 26, 2004, Bar Counsel received a letter dated January 21, 2004, from Respondent, in which Respondent represented that Horne’s divorce Complaint was filed on December 3, 2003.
“On or about February 3, 2004, Bar Counsel sent another letter to Respondent seeking additional information about the Horne Complaint. Respondent failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s letter of February 3, 2004 and on or about February 10, 2004, Petitioner’s investigator, Dennis Biennas, sent Respondent a letter requesting that he provide certain documents relating to his representation of Horne. This letter was sent to Respondent’s last known address as provided in Respondent’s letter to Bar Counsel dated January 21,2004. Biennas’ letter was returned by the United States Postal Service. The February 10, 2004, letter was sent by facsimile to the number appearing on Respondent’s letterhead.
“On or about March 1, 2004, Biennas went to the address provided by Respondent however, he was unable to locate Respondent. On or about March 1,2004, Biennas spoke by telephone with Respondent. Respondent provided a new address and facsimile number. Biennas then sent his letter of February 10, 2004, to the address provided by Respondent. Respondent still failed to respond to the investigator’s letter of February 10, 2004.
“On or about April 15,2004, Petitioner received a letter from G. Elliott Rose, M.D., which pertained to Respondent’s medical condition. On or about May 5, 2004, Bar Counsel received a letter from Respondent which included what purported to be a copy of Respondent’s file for his representation of Horne. On May 6, 2004, Petitioner’s counsel sent Respondent a letter acknowledging the letter from Dr. Rose and seeking additional information. Respondent did not respond to this letter.
“During times relevant to this Petition, Respondent failed to notify the Client Protection Fund of the Bar of Maryland of his change/changes of address.
“At the hearing on May 23, 2005, Respondent made a refund of $250 to Horne.”
From these findings, the hearing court concluded that the respondent had, in fact, committed most of the Rules violations charged.
Specifically, it was satisfied that the respondent acted incompetently, in violation of Rule 1.1, did not abide by his client’s representation objectives, in violation of Rule 1.2, failed to act diligently in providing the requested representation, in violation of Rule 1.3 and Rule 3.2, did not keep his client reasonably informed about the status of his case or promptly comply with reasonable requests for infor
mation, in violation of Rule 1.4(a), by not depositing the fees advanced in connection with the representation in an attorney trust account, in violation of Rule 16-604, failed to keep the client’s funds separate from his owm funds, in violation of Rule 1.15(a) and to promptly return unearned fees to the client in violation of Rule 1.15(b) and Rule 1.16(d) and did not respond to the reasonable demands for information made by Bar Counsel, in violation of Rule 8.1(b). In addition, the hearing court found a violation of Rule 8.4(d):
“Respondent’s failure to promptly, completely and truthfully respond to Bar Counsel’s requests for information, to keep his client advised of the status of the representation and to diligently represent the complainant constitutes conduct which tends to bring the legal profession into disrepute and is therefore prejudicial to the administration of justice....”
The hearing court “[wa]s not convinced that Respondent knowingly made a false statement of material fact to Bar Counsel in violation of MRPC 8.1(a), believing that his error with respect to when he filed the Complaint for Absolute Divorce “was the result of sloppiness and lack of care and not a purposeful lie.’ ” In addition, the court did not find a violation of Rule 1.4(b) and Rule 16-607, noting that the petitioner did not contend that there was clear and convincing evidence to establish either.
The respondent raised his mental health, as testified by Dr. Jeffrey S. Janofsky, retained by the petitioner to conduct the assessment, as a mitigating factor. As to that issue, the hearing court opined:
“This Court finds, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Respondent suffered from a serious and debilitating psychiatric disorder, major depression, during his representation of Horne and the investigation by Petitioner’s office and that this condition affected his ability in normal day to day activities to a substantial degree, and that these conditions contributed to Respondent’s professional misconduct.
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Vanderlinde,
364 Md. 376, 417-418, 773 A.2d 463, 488 (2001). As such, this Court finds
Respondent’s mental condition to be a mitigating and/or extenuating factor. This Court also finds the fact that Respondent did not act with a dishonest or selfish motive to be another mitigating factor.”
The respondent’s efforts at restitution and his cooperation, notwithstanding both being belated and untimely, the court determined to be other mitigating factors. In addition, it concluded:
“There is some evidence that Respondent has attempted to rehabilitate himself as a result of these proceedings. He is being treated for depression. Respondent indicated that he is currently exploring aids for professionals with physical problems and now recognizes and feels motivated, willing and able to address his shortcomings. Respondent, however, presented no evidence of a specific plan or course of action.”
Neither the petitioner nor the respondent has taken exceptions to the hearing court’s findings of fact or conclusions of law. The petitioner has, however, filed
Petitioner’s Recommendation for Sanctions,
in which, acknowledging and accepting the hearing court’s mitigation findings, but noting its observation that the respondent did not present “evidence of a specific plan or course of action,” it recommends that the respondent be indefinitely suspended from the practice of law.
The respondent, by order dated October 14, 2004, having been found to have violated Rules 1.15(a), 8.1(b) and 8.4(d) of the Rules of Professional Conduct, was suspended indefinitely from the practice of law, with the right to seek reinstatement
in six months.
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Rose,
383 Md. 385, 859 A.2d 659 (2004). He has not applied for reinstatement. The respondent appeared at oral argument and confirmed to the Court that he had been suffering from depression, that he had sought, and was continuing, treatment for that disorder. He also confirmed that he was not, and had not been practicing law since his suspension.
We adopt the petitioner’s recommendation and order the respondent indefinitely suspended from the practice of law. Like the petitioner, we are persuaded that this is the appropriate sanction, given the mitigating factors the hearing court found and the fact that the respondent’s rehabilitation efforts, although ongoing and, we believe sincere, are not clearly defined or particularly specific. As in the prior case,
Attorney Griev. Comm’n v. Rose,
383 Md. at 392, 859 A.2d at 663, we note that there is no allegation of dishonesty or misappropriation. Indeed, the hearing court specifically concluded that the respondent’s misconduct relating to the advanced fee was not the result of, or motivated by, dishonesty.
In the prior case, we offered a word of caution,
id.
at 393, 859 A.2d at 663: “The respondent is reminded that, having introduced the subject of depression, admitting to suffering from it, any petition for reinstatement will have to address the respondent’s then present mental condition, as well as his overall fitness to resume the practice of law.” That caution remains operative.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT, INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 16-761, FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST SHUAN H.M. ROSE.