Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland v. Marnitta Lanette King, AG No. 27, September Term, 2023.
ATTORNEY DISCIPLINE – SANCTION – INDEFINITE SUSPENSION
The Court indefinitely suspended an attorney who (1) failed to keep her clients reasonably informed about the status of their cases; (2) failed to perform meaningful legal services in furtherance of their cases; (3) improperly collected a flat fee; (4) failed to recognize a conflict of interest and contributed to that conflict by filing suit against a client; and (5) failed to comply with Bar Counsel’s investigations. The attorney’s conduct violated Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4 (Communication), 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7 (Conflict of Interest), 1.15(a) & (c) (Safekeeping Property), 1.16(a) (Declining or Terminating Representation), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a) & (d) (Misconduct). The attorney is permitted to apply for reinstatement six months from her date of suspension conditioned on her agreement to a probationary period of not less than one year that will include a practice monitor and other appropriate conditions. Circuit Court for Prince George’s County Case No. C-16-CV-24-000273 Argued: June 5, 2025 IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF MARYLAND
AG No. 27
September Term, 2023 ______________________________________
ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION OF MARYLAND
v.
MARNITTA LANETTE KING ______________________________________
Fader, C.J., Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Harrell, Glenn T. (Senior Justice, Specially Assigned), Getty, Joseph M. (Senior Justice, Specially Assigned),
JJ. ______________________________________
Opinion by Fader, C.J. ______________________________________
Filed: July 18, 2025
Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic.
2025.07.18 '00'04- 08:25:51 Gregory Hilton, Clerk The Attorney Grievance Commission of Maryland, acting through Bar Counsel,
filed a Petition for Disciplinary or Remedial Action against Marnitta Lanette King, a
member of the Bar of this State, arising out of her separate representations of Antoneo
Young and Renika Watson.
The Commission alleged that Ms. King violated the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of
Professional Conduct (“MARPC”) as a result of her: (1) failure to keep her clients
reasonably informed about the status of their cases; (2) failure to perform meaningful legal
services in furtherance of their cases; (3) improper collection of a flat fee; (4) failure to
recognize a conflict of interest and contributing to that conflict by filing suit against a
client; and (5) non-compliance with Bar Counsel’s investigations. The Commission
asserted that Ms. King’s conduct violated MARPC 19-301.1 (Competence) (Rule 1.1),
MARPC 19-301.3 (Diligence) (Rule 1.3), MARPC 19-301.4 (Communication) (Rule 1.4),
MARPC 19-301.5(a) (Fees) (Rule 1.5(a)), MARPC 19-301.7 (Conflict of Interest) (Rule
1.7), MARPC 19-301.15(a) and (c) (Safekeeping Property) (Rule 1.15(a) & (c)), MARPC
19-301.16(a) (Declining or Terminating Representation) (Rule 1.16(a)), MARPC
19-308.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters) (Rule 8.1(b)), and MARPC
19-308.4(a) and (d) (Misconduct) (Rule 8.4(a) & (d)).1
The hearing judge assigned to this matter found by clear and convincing evidence
that Ms. King violated those provisions. The hearing judge also determined the existence
of six aggravating and three mitigating factors. Ms. King filed exceptions, taking issue
1 Throughout this opinion, we will use shortened references to the Rules as identified in this paragraph in the parentheticals following each rule. with the hearing judge finding three aggravating factors and not finding three additional
mitigating factors. Bar Counsel recommends disbarment. Ms. King recommends a
suspension stayed in favor of a term of probation.
We will accept the hearing judge’s findings of fact, concur with the hearing judge’s
conclusions of law, accept the mitigating and aggravating factors the hearing judge found,
sustain Ms. King’s exception to the hearing judge not finding the mitigating factor of
absence of a dishonest or selfish motive, otherwise overrule Ms. King’s exceptions, and
issue a sanction of indefinite suspension with the ability to apply for reinstatement after six
months. As we will explain, Ms. King’s ability to apply for reinstatement is conditioned
on her agreement to a probationary period of not less than one year that will include a
practice monitor and other appropriate conditions.
BACKGROUND
The allegations of misconduct against Ms. King stem from two complaints, one
concerning Ms. King’s representation of Antoneo Young and the other concerning her
representation of Renika Watson and Keona Holmes. The complaints proceeded together
before a hearing judge of the Circuit Court for Prince George’s County. We will begin by
summarizing the hearing judge’s findings of fact, none of which were the subject of
exceptions.
2 A. The Hearing Judge’s Findings of Fact2
Ms. King was admitted to the Maryland Bar in 2001. At all relevant times, she
maintained a law office in Prince George’s County.
1. Representation of Antoneo Young
Antoneo Young, an incarcerated individual serving a 36-year sentence, retained
Ms. King in December 2020. Mr. Young’s mother, Veronica Young, signed the retainer
fee agreement as guarantor and agreed to pay a $2,500 flat fee for Ms. King’s services.
The scope of the services Ms. King agreed to provide was disputed at the hearing.
The retainer fee agreement identified the scope as: “We agree to provide legal services to
the defendant to include all pre-charging matters, pre-trial matters, one trial, post-trial
motions and sentencing matters resulting from that respective trial.” The agreement also
stated that the final fee was due in full “one week before the scheduled trial.” As
Mr. Young had already been tried and convicted, no one contends that the description of
the scope of representation in the agreement is accurate.
Mr. and Ms. Young alleged that in exchange for the $2,500 flat fee, Ms. King agreed
to review Mr. Young’s case and then file on his behalf, based on her assessment of what
would be more advantageous, either (1) a motion for reconsideration of sentence or (2) a
petition for evaluation for substance abuse treatment under § 8-505 of the Health-General
Article. Ms. King, by contrast, testified that she was retained only to review Mr. Young’s
2 This summary contains findings of fact made in the section of the hearing judge’s opinion labeled “Findings of Fact” as well as additional factual findings made in the section labeled “Conclusions of Law.”
3 case file. The hearing judge found Ms. King’s testimony incredible, noting that it was
inconsistent with several of her prior statements, filings, and actions. The hearing judge
concluded that Ms. King was retained to file either a § 8-505 petition or, in the alternative,
a motion for reconsideration, and that she charged a flat fee of $2,500 for that service.
Ms. Young paid the agreed $2,500 fee in four separate installments between
December 2020 and January 2021. Ms. King initially deposited each payment in her
attorney trust account. However, within days of each deposit, Ms. King withdrew the
entire amount as an earned fee.
After a single initial call, Ms. King did not communicate with Mr. Young in writing
or schedule a subsequent call or videoconference with him.3 At the time, due to the
COVID-19 pandemic, Ms. King was permitted to contact Mr. Young only by telephone or
videoconference. The hearing judge credited records reflecting that Ms. King never
requested to speak with Mr. Young in either of those ways.
Ms. King did not file a § 8-505 petition, a motion for reconsideration, a post-
conviction petition, or anything else on Mr. Young’s behalf. Mr. Young eventually
terminated the representation, and Ms. Young initiated a complaint with the Commission.
In June 2021, after that complaint was filed, Ms. King issued Ms. Young a full refund.
3 As reflected in an exhibit introduced at the hearing, Ms. King did have text exchanges with Ms. Young between February and April 2021 in which, among other things: (1) Ms. Young complained that Ms. King had not been in communication with Mr. Young and asked for a refund; (2) Ms. King stated that she was waiting to hear in which of Mr. Young’s two cases he “wanted a reconsideration filed”; and (3) Ms. Young indicated a preference for filing a post-conviction petition instead. Ms. King did not respond to Ms. Young’s final text messages, and Ms. Young testified that she was unable to reach Ms. King by phone despite several attempts.
4 2. Representation of Renika Watson and Keona Holmes
On January 11, 2018, Renika Watson and her passenger, Keona Holmes, were
injured in an automobile accident when another driver, Kevin Morris, rear-ended them.
Five days later, Ms. Watson and Ms. Holmes visited Ms. King’s office and met with her
assistant. Ms. King was not present. Both Ms. Watson and Ms. Holmes retained Ms. King
to represent them in connection with their claims arising from the accident. At that time,
there was no discussion about an actual or potential conflict of interest, and neither
Ms. Watson nor Ms. Holmes were presented with a written conflict waiver.
The same day, Ms. King notified Mr. Morris’s insurance company that she was
representing Ms. Watson and Ms. Holmes. Three days later, the insurance company denied
liability on the ground that Ms. Watson was contributorily negligent. Notwithstanding that
assertion of Ms. Watson’s liability, Ms. King continued to represent both her and
Ms. Holmes, although for nearly three years she did little additional work on the matter.
On January 12, 2021, three years and one day following the accident, Ms. King filed
two lawsuits. The first was filed on behalf of Ms. Watson against Mr. Morris. The second
was filed on behalf of Ms. Holmes against both Ms. Watson and Mr. Morris. Both lawsuits
were filed without consulting Ms. Watson or Ms. Holmes, purportedly out of concern about
the statute of limitations. Nonetheless, Ms. Watson’s case was ultimately dismissed for
being filed one day past the statute of limitations period.4 The hearing judge found no
4 It is undisputed that Ms. Watson’s case was dismissed based on missing the statute of limitations, and Ms. King has not excepted to the hearing judge’s factual finding that the complaint was filed late. As a result, we will not address that finding further.
5 evidence explaining Ms. King’s delay in filing suit, ostensibly missing the statute of
limitations, or filing suit against her client.
The hearing judge credited testimony from Ms. Watson and Ms. Holmes that
Ms. King never discussed a conflict of interest with them and did not communicate with
them at all following an initial conversation soon after the accident until after she filed the
lawsuits on January 12, 2021. The hearing judge did not find credible Ms. King’s contrary
testimony that she discussed the conflict of interest with both Ms. Watson and Ms. Holmes.
3. Bar Counsel’s Investigations
a. Investigation of Ms. Young’s Complaint
Ms. Young filed a complaint with the Commission on May 20, 2021. Bar Counsel
requested a response to the allegations on or before June 24, 2021. Ms. King responded
on July 15, 2021. Bar Counsel thereafter requested a complete client file for Mr. Young
and copies of all communications with Mr. Young and Ms. Young. After obtaining and
missing a series of extensions, Ms. King responded. Ms. King sat for a statement under
oath in May 2022.
b. Investigation of Ms. Watson’s Complaint
Ms. Watson filed a complaint with the Commission on June 30, 2022. Between
July 13, 2022, when Bar Counsel forwarded the complaint to Ms. King with a request for
a response, and at least May 15, 2023, Ms. King engaged in an extensive pattern of either
delayed responses or non-responses to Bar Counsel’s legitimate inquiries. The hearing
judge highlighted two specific instances in which Ms. King knowingly failed to respond to
Bar Counsel’s demands.
6 First, after initially being uncooperative in setting a date for her statement under
oath, Ms. King agreed to a date. However, she appeared “completely unprepared” for the
statement, had failed to review any documents ahead of time, purported not to know or
remember basic information about her legal education, credentials, and experience and her
representation of Ms. Watson, and was in a moving vehicle for at least some portion of the
statement.
Second, following the statement under oath, Bar Counsel requested various
documents and information that Ms. King had been unable to provide during that statement.
In spite of multiple instances of Bar Counsel granting extensions and Ms. King missing
them, Ms. King never provided any of the additional requested documents or information
except for an unsubstantiated timeline of her efforts to obtain counsel.
B. The Hearing Judge’s Conclusions of Law
The hearing judge concluded by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. King had
violated Rules 1.1 (Competence), 1.3 (Diligence), 1.4 (Communication), 1.5(a) (Fees), 1.7
(Conflict of Interest), 1.15(a) and (c) (Safekeeping Property), 1.16(a) (Declining or
Terminating Representation), 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters), and 8.4(a)
and (d) (Misconduct). We will discuss the specific bases for the hearing judge’s
conclusions concerning each of those rules in our discussion section below.
7 C. The Hearing Judge’s Findings Concerning Mitigating and Aggravating Factors
1. Mitigating Factors
The hearing judge found that Ms. King established three mitigating factors by a
preponderance of the evidence: (1) personal or emotional problems; (2) physical disability;
and (3) good character or reputation.
With respect to personal or emotional problems, the hearing judge found that
Ms. King had demonstrated “she was enduring serious personal issues, specifically
domestic abuse.” Although the hearing judge did not go into any further detail, Ms. King
testified at length at the hearing about domestic violence from which she suffered during
at least part of the time periods relevant to the Young and Watson matters. Ms. King
testified that she was subjected to domestic abuse by her ex-husband, resulting in injuries
including scars, a dislocated jaw, a ruptured bicep, a torn rotator cuff, and damage to her
wrist that prevented her from being able to write for a substantial period. Ms. King testified
that she obtained several protective orders against her ex-husband; that he regularly stalked
her, including coming to her office “on a regular basis” to find her; that being stalked
prevented her from coming to the office at times when others were not present; and that
she was forced to stay at a safe house for a period of time for protection. The hearing judge
credited at least some of that unrebutted testimony.
The hearing judge also found that Ms. King proved the mitigating factor of physical
disability, crediting her testimony that she was unable to write for a significant period of
8 time and had difficulties walking because of injuries she sustained due to the domestic
violence.
With respect to character and reputation, the hearing judge credited two character
witnesses who testified positively about Ms. King’s public service work, involvement in
the community, and “dedication to helping people.”
2. Aggravating Factors
The hearing judge found that Bar Counsel established the existence of six
aggravating factors by clear and convincing evidence: (1) prior disciplinary history; (2) a
pattern of misconduct; (3) multiple violations; (4) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary
proceeding; (5) substantial experience in the practice of law; and (6) likelihood of
repetition. The hearing judge identified the following reasons supporting those findings:
• With respect to prior discipline, Ms. King had been disciplined twice before, in 2018 and 2021.
• With respect to both a pattern of misconduct and multiple violations, Ms. King exhibited “a protracted failure to adequately communicate with and keep three of her clients, Mr. Young, Ms. Watson, and Ms. Holmes, abreast about the status of her representation of them[.]”
• With respect to bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding, Ms. King delayed or failed to respond to Bar Counsel’s legitimate investigatory demands.
• With respect to substantial experience in the practice of law, Ms. King had been a member of the Bar since 2001.
• With respect to likelihood of repetition, Ms. King had a history of receiving sanctions for violations of many of the same rules at issue here, and her misconduct here spanned multiple clients and matters.
9 DISCUSSION
I. THE HEARING JUDGE’S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE NOT CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
“This Court has original and complete jurisdiction in attorney discipline
proceedings and conducts an independent review of the record.” Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Bonner, 477 Md. 576, 584 (2022). “The hearing judge’s findings of fact are
left undisturbed unless those findings are clearly erroneous or either party successfully
excepts to them.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Fineblum, 473 Md. 272, 289 (2021)
(quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Ambe, 466 Md. 270, 286 (2019)). When there are
no exceptions filed, we may treat the hearing judge’s factual findings as established.
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Wescott, 483 Md. 111, 120 (2023); Md. Rule
19-740(b)(2)(A).
Bar Counsel did not file any exceptions and Ms. King’s exceptions do not relate to
the hearing judge’s findings of fact. Having reviewed the record thoroughly, we will accept
the hearing judge’s findings of fact and treat them as established.
II. THE HEARING JUDGE’S CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE.
We assess the hearing judge’s legal conclusions without deference, Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. O’Neill, 477 Md. 632, 658 (2022); Md. Rule 19-740(b)(1), and
independently determine whether Bar Counsel established a violation of the rules by clear
and convincing evidence, Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Silbiger, 478 Md. 607, 617
(2022). The hearing judge concluded by clear and convincing evidence that Ms. King
violated Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4, 1.5(a), 1.7, 1.15(a) and (c), 1.16(a), 8.1(b), and 8.4(a) and (d).
10 Upon our independent analysis, we conclude that there is clear and convincing evidence
that Ms. King violated those same rules.
A. Rule 1.1 (Competence)
Rule 1.1 states that “[a]n attorney shall provide competent representation to a client.
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and
preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.” MARPC 19-301.1.
The hearing judge concluded that Ms. King violated Rule 1.1 in her representation
of Mr. Young by “failing to advance his interest in any appreciable way.” That conclusion
was based on the hearing judge’s findings of fact that Ms. King had: (1) agreed to file
either a § 8-505 petition or a motion for reconsideration on Mr. Young’s behalf in exchange
for a flat fee of $2,500; (2) failed to file either document or anything else on Mr. Young’s
behalf; and (3) failed to communicate with Mr. Young at all after an initial conversation.
The hearing judge concluded that Ms. King also violated Rule 1.1 in her
representation of Ms. Watson “by either failing to recognize the conflict of interest between
Ms. Watson and Keona Holmes, or simply ignoring it and continuing to represent two
individuals whose interests clearly did not align.” In addition, the hearing judge found that
Ms. King violated Rule 1.1 when she: (1) failed to file Ms. Watson’s claim within the
statute of limitations; (2) did little to advance Ms. Watson’s interests for nearly three years;
(3) offered no explanation for either the lengthy delay or missing the statute of limitations;
and (4) filed suit against her client, Ms. Watson, on behalf of another client, Ms. Holmes.
Ms. King did not except to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated Rule
1.1. Based on the undisturbed findings of fact, we agree with that legal conclusion for the
11 reasons identified by the hearing judge. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Framm, 449
Md. 620, 646 (2016) (failing to recognize an inherent conflict of interest fell “below the
minimum standard of competence”).
B. Rule 1.3 (Diligence)
Rule 1.3 demands that “[a]n attorney shall act with reasonable diligence and
promptness in representing a client.” MARPC 19-301.3.
The hearing judge concluded that Ms. King violated Rule 1.3 in the Young matter
by both failing and refusing to respond to Ms. and Mr. Young’s “repeated attempts to
communicate with her over a protracted period of time.”
The hearing judge also concluded that Ms. King violated Rule 1.3 in the Watson
matter for the same reasons as those supporting her violation of Rule 1.1 in that matter.
Ms. King did not except to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated Rule
1.3. Based on the undisturbed findings of fact, we agree with that legal conclusion for the
reasons identified by the hearing judge.
C. Rule 1.4 (Communication)
Among other required communications, an “attorney shall: . . . keep the client
reasonably informed about the status of the matter” and “explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed decisions regarding the
representation.” MARPC 19-301.4(a), (b).
The hearing judge concluded that Ms. King violated Rule 1.4 in her representation
of Mr. Young by failing to attempt to meet or speak with Mr. Young after an initial
12 conversation, failing to respond to his attempts to contact her, and failing to respond to
many of Ms. Young’s attempts to contact Ms. King.
The hearing judge concluded that Ms. King violated Rule 1.4 in connection with her
representation of Ms. Watson by failing to obtain Ms. Watson’s informed waiver of a
conflict of interest and failing to communicate with Ms. Watson or Ms. Holmes for nearly
three years.
Ms. King did not except to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated Rule
1.4. Based on the undisturbed findings of fact, we agree with that legal conclusion for the
D. Rules 1.5(a) (Fees) & 1.15(a) & (c) (Safekeeping Property)
Rule 1.5(a) requires that “[a]n attorney shall not make an agreement for, charge, or
collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable amount for expenses.” MARPC
19‑301.5(a). Rule 1.15(a) requires attorneys to “hold property of clients or third persons
that is in an attorney’s possession in connection with a representation separate from the
attorney’s own property[,]” and to keep “[c]omplete records of the account funds and of
other property[.]” MARPC 19-301.15(a). And Rule 1.15(c) provides that, absent
“informed consent, confirmed in writing, to a different arrangement, an attorney shall
deposit legal fees and expenses that have been paid in advance into a client trust account
and may withdraw those funds for the attorney’s own benefit only as fees are earned or
expenses incurred.” MARPC 19-301.15(c).
The hearing judge concluded that Ms. King violated both Rule 1.5(a) and Rule
1.15(a) and (c) in connection with her representation of Mr. Young. The hearing judge
13 concluded that Ms. King violated Rule 1.5(a) by “fail[ing] to provide any appreciable
services of value.” That conclusion was premised on the hearing judge’s factual finding
that Ms. King agreed to file a § 8-505 petition or a motion for reconsideration on
Mr. Young’s behalf for a flat fee of $2,500. Ms. King failed to do so and failed to file
anything else on his behalf. Thus, although the $2,500 flat fee was not unreasonable when
charged, it became unreasonable when Ms. King failed to perform the service for which
she was retained. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Gray, 444 Md. 227, 254 (2015)
(stating that a fee that is initially reasonable can become unreasonable if the attorney fails
to perform the services for which the attorney was retained).
Relatedly, the hearing judge concluded that Ms. King also violated Rule 1.15(a) and
(c) in the Young matter by withdrawing all $2,500 paid by Ms. Young without performing
the primary service for which she had been retained, i.e., the filing of a § 8-505 petition or
a motion for reconsideration. The hearing judge recognized that Ms. King “may have
earned a portion of the retainer advanced to her by reviewing Mr. Young’s file, [but] she
would not have earned the entire amount as the representation was not completed.”
A flat fee, such as the $2,500 charged to Ms. Young, is a type of advance payment,
which “remains the client’s property until earned by the attorney.” Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Jones, 484 Md. 155, 199 (2023). A flat fee cannot be fully earned until the
representation is complete. Id. at 204. It was thus impermissible for Ms. King to transfer
the entire amount of the flat fee from her attorney trust account before filing one of the
documents the hearing judge found she was hired to file.
14 Ms. King did not except to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated Rules
1.5(a) and 1.15(a) and (c). Based on the undisturbed findings of fact, we agree with that
legal conclusion for the reasons identified by the hearing judge.
E. Rule 1.7 (Conflict of Interest)
An attorney “shall not represent a client if the representation involves a conflict of
interest. A conflict of interest exists if: (1) the representation of one client will be directly
adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk that the representation of one or
more clients will be materially limited by the attorney’s responsibilities to another client[.]”
MARPC 19-301.7(a). An attorney may nonetheless represent a client if:
(1) the attorney reasonably believes that the attorney will be able to provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client; (2) the representation is not prohibited by law; (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client against another client represented by the attorney in the same litigation or other proceeding before a tribunal; and (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
MARPC 19-301.7(b).
The hearing judge concluded that Ms. King violated Rule 1.7 in the Watson matter
by representing both Ms. Watson and Ms. Holmes when she knew or should have known
that they potentially had competing interests; not discussing the conflict with Ms. Watson
or Ms. Holmes; and filing suit against Ms. Watson while still representing her. The hearing
judge also noted that Ms. King did not obtain a written waiver of the conflict of interest,
but observed, correctly, that a waiver was not a viable option here because Ms. King
15 asserted an unwaivable “claim by one client against another client” she represented “in the
same litigation[.]” See MARPC 19-301.7(b)(3).
Here, there was “significant risk” of a conflict from the outset in representing both
Ms. Watson, as the driver, and Ms. Holmes, as the injured passenger. That conflict became
more obvious when the other driver’s insurance company denied liability due to
Ms. Watson’s alleged contributory negligence. And even if Ms. King could have navigated
that conflict at the outset by obtaining informed consent in writing from both clients:
(1) she failed to do so; and (2) the conflict became unwaivable. See MARPC 19-
301.7(b)(3); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Olszewski, 441 Md. 248, 267 (2015) (filing
suit against one’s own client is an unwaivable conflict).
Ms. King did not except to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated Rule
1.7. Based on the undisturbed findings of fact, we agree with that legal conclusion for the
F. Rule 1.16(a) (Declining or Terminating Representation)
Rule 1.16(a)(1) requires an attorney who has commenced representation of a client
to withdraw if “the representation will result in violation of the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules
of Professional Conduct[.]” MARPC 19-301.16(a)(1).
The hearing judge concluded that Ms. King violated Rule 1.16(a) in connection with
her representation of Ms. Watson by not declining or terminating representation of
Ms. Watson once Ms. King realized or should have realized that the representation would
result in a violation of Rule 1.7.
16 Ms. King did not except to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated Rule
1.16(a). Based on the undisturbed findings of fact, we agree with that legal conclusion for
the reasons identified by the hearing judge. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Neverdon,
473 Md. 631, 686 (2021) (holding that an attorney’s “continued representation, without
withdrawal, of the Clients despite the conflict of interest, in violation of [Rule] 1.7, as the
hearing judge concluded, constitutes a violation of [Rule] 1.16(a)(1)”).
G. Rule 8.1(b) (Bar Admission and Disciplinary Matters)
An attorney “shall not,” subject to exceptions not relevant here, “knowingly fail to
respond to a lawful demand for information from a[] . . . disciplinary authority[.]” MARPC
19-308.1(b).
The hearing judge concluded that Ms. King violated Rule 8.1(b) in connection with
Bar Counsel’s investigation into the Watson matter by failing to respond to lawful demands
for information. Over the course of Bar Counsel’s investigation, Ms. King frequently
missed deadlines, even after multiple extensions; failed to provide important requested
documentation; and was unprepared for her statement under oath, including professing a
lack of knowledge or recollection of basic facts concerning her legal education, credentials,
and experience and representation of Ms. Watson.
Ms. King did not except to the hearing judge’s conclusion that she violated Rule
8.1(b). Based on the undisturbed findings of fact, we agree with that legal conclusion for
the reasons identified by the hearing judge. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Rossbach,
17 485 Md. 563, 585, 599 (2023) (finding Rule 8.1(b) violation for failing to timely respond
and provide documents requested by Bar Counsel).5
H. Rule 8.4(a) & (d) (Misconduct)
Rule 8.4 provides that “[i]t is professional misconduct for an attorney to: (a) violate
or attempt to violate the Maryland Attorneys’ Rules of Professional Conduct . . . ; [or]
(d) engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice[.]” MARPC
19‑308.4(a), (d).
The hearing judge concluded that Ms. King violated Rule 8.4(a) by violating other
rules of professional conduct, as already described. Ms. King does not except to that
conclusion, and we agree with it.
The hearing judge concluded that Ms. King violated Rule 8.4(d) in connection with
her representation of Ms. Watson “by failing to communicate with her for nearly three
years, filing a lawsuit on her behalf without consultation and after the statute of limitations
had expired, and simultaneously filing a claim against her.” The hearing judge concluded
that Ms. King violated Rule 8.4(d) in connection with her representation of Mr. Young “by
accepting an advance fee and not consulting with her client to define the scope of the
representation and then failing to perform any work of value.” In both cases, the hearing
judge concluded that Ms. King’s conduct was “prejudicial to the administration of justice.”
5 The Commission charged Ms. King with a violation of Rule 8.1(a), but the hearing judge did not address that provision and Bar Counsel did not except. Consequently, we will not find a violation of Rule 8.1(a).
18 Again, Ms. King does not except to that conclusion, and again, we agree. The
conduct in which the hearing judge found Ms. King engaged “is likely to impair public
confidence in the profession, impact the image of the legal profession and engender
disrespect for the court[.]” See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Agbaje, 438 Md. 695, 717
(2014).6
III. MITIGATING FACTORS, AGGRAVATING FACTORS, MS . KING’S EXCEPTIONS, AND THE SANCTION
In an attorney discipline case, we select a sanction with the purpose of protecting
the public and deterring future misconduct, not punishing the attorney. Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Woolery, 456 Md. 483, 497-98 (2017). When fashioning the appropriate
sanction, we evaluate each attorney grievance matter on its own merits, taking into
consideration the particular facts and circumstances, including any mitigating or
aggravating factors. See Wescott, 483 Md. at 127.
The hearing judge found the existence of three mitigating factors and six
aggravating factors. Ms. King filed exceptions to the hearing judge: (1) not finding three
additional mitigating factors; (2) not affording sufficient importance to one of the
mitigating factors the hearing judge found; and (3) finding three of the six aggravating
factors. We will address each of those exceptions as relevant below.
6 The Commission charged Ms. King with a violation of Rule 8.4(c), but the hearing judge did not address that provision and Bar Counsel did not except. Consequently, we will not find a violation of Rule 8.4(c).
19 A. Mitigating Factors
“The existence of mitigating factors tends to lessen or reduce the sanction an
attorney may face.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Pierre, 485 Md. 56, 121 (2023)
(alteration omitted) (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Johnson, 472 Md. 491, 548
(2021)); see also Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kalarestaghi, 483 Md. 180, 242 (2023)
(providing a list of recognized mitigating factors). The respondent bears the burden of
establishing mitigating factors by a preponderance of the evidence. Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Smith-Scott, 469 Md. 281, 364 (2020).
As noted, the hearing judge found that Ms. King established three mitigating factors
by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) personal or emotional problems; (2) good
character or reputation; and (3) physical disability. We agree that the record supports all
three.
Ms. King excepts to the hearing judge not finding three additional mitigating
factors: (1) the absence of a dishonest or selfish motive; (2) delay in her disciplinary
proceedings; and (3) remorse.
We will sustain Ms. King’s exception concerning the absence of a dishonest or
selfish motive. Of the violations found, the underlying conduct that is most likely to
involve a dishonest or selfish motive is the conduct underlying the violations of Rules 1.5
and 1.15: accepting an unearned $2,500 fee and withdrawing it prematurely from her
attorney trust account. And yet, as to that conduct specifically, the hearing judge noted
“that there were no allegations of a dishonest motive.” Beyond the facts related to her
handling of that fee, we see nothing in the record, in any inferences that can reasonably be
20 drawn from the record, or in the hearing judge’s findings and conclusions that would
support a finding that Ms. King had a dishonest or selfish motive. Accordingly, we will
sustain Ms. King’s exception and find that she has proven by a preponderance of the
evidence the mitigating factor of absence of a dishonest or selfish motive.
We will, however, overrule Ms. King’s exceptions as to remorse and delay.
Although Ms. King expressed some degree of remorse, admitting that she had “failed” and
“disappointed” her clients, she did not even acknowledge, much less express remorse for,
much of the misconduct found by the hearing judge. At the hearing, Ms. King steadfastly
maintained that she had agreed only to review Mr. Young’s file. As a result, she never
expressed remorse for not filing anything on his behalf or for prematurely withdrawing
from her trust account the money paid by Ms. Young. Ms. King also denied the extent of
communication problems found by the hearing judge in both matters, maintained that she
had counseled Ms. Watson and Ms. Holmes concerning her conflict of interest, and does
not seem to have understood that the conflict became unwaivable. As a result, she never
expressed remorse for any of that misconduct. Moreover, the hearing judge was in the best
position to determine Ms. King’s credibility with respect to her expressions of remorse.
See Md. Rule 19-740(b)(2)(B) (“The Court shall give due regard to the opportunity of the
hearing judge to assess the credibility of witnesses.”); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Bonner, 477 Md. 576, 613-14 (2022) (“We will not substitute our judgment for the
judgment of the hearing judge with regard to credibility determinations.”). We overrule
Ms. King’s exception concerning the mitigating factor of remorse.
21 As to delay, Ms. King contends that the hearing judge should have found that
mitigating factor due to the delay between the initiation of the Commission’s investigations
and the filing of charges. To be sure, there was a somewhat substantial gap in time between
the docketing of each matter and the filing of the single petition for disciplinary or remedial
action that addressed both matters (two years in the Young matter and 15 months in the
Watson matter). But much of that “delay” can be explained by Ms. King’s own actions
and the overlap of the matters. During the investigation of Ms. Watson’s complaint in
particular, Ms. King repeatedly failed to meet deadlines and produce records. Although
some periods of delay may be attributable to Bar Counsel’s office, we overrule her
exception concerning the mitigating factor of delay because of the responsibility Ms. King
bears for the delays overall.
We now turn to a primary focus of Ms. King’s exceptions, which is her contention
that the hearing judge did not give sufficient consideration to her testimony about the
domestic violence she faced.7 The hearing judge found the mitigating factor of personal
or emotional problems based on Ms. King’s testimony about suffering from domestic
violence. However, Ms. King contends that the hearing judge should have given greater
7 In her exceptions, Ms. King suggests that the hearing judge improperly prevented her from introducing evidence concerning the domestic violence she suffered. Specifically, Ms. King argues that the hearing judge “failed to allow [Ms. King’s] witnesses to provide testimony of [her] character as it relates to how she survived and overcame domestic violence.” We disagree. While the hearing judge did limit other witnesses from testifying about Ms. King’s domestic violence, it was because they lacked first-hand knowledge of it. And when one of her witnesses was permitted to testify about it, that witness suggested that Ms. King’s client interactions were “normal” and that she continued to “take care of her business” despite the domestic violence. And, importantly, the hearing judge permitted Ms. King to testify extensively about the domestic violence she suffered.
22 attention to that testimony. Although we agree that the hearing judge could have included
more information about Ms. King’s domestic violence testimony, he found that it
constituted a mitigating factor, which is all that is necessary to tee her experience up for
our consideration in determining an appropriate sanction. But because there seemed to be
some degree of confusion at the hearing and again at oral argument concerning the proper
treatment of allegations of domestic violence as a mitigating factor, we will provide some
additional guidance.
Credible allegations of domestic violence, as the hearing judge clearly found to exist
here, can support finding the mitigating factor of personal or emotional problems. Neither
the prevalence of domestic violence nor the debilitating effects it can have on those who
suffer from it can be subject to doubt.8 We have no hesitation in recognizing that domestic
violence can be a contributing factor in misconduct that leads to a violation of the MARPC.
We similarly have no hesitation in recognizing that where it is a contributing factor in such
misconduct, it is an appropriate mitigating factor.
8 See, e.g., About Intimate Partner Violence, Ctrs. for Disease Control (May 16, 2024), https://www.cdc.gov/intimatepartnerviolence/about/index.html [https://perma.cc/5 LAR-CP34] (discussing the personal and societal consequences of intimate partner violence including injuries, death, sustained physical and mental health problems, and risk of harmful addictive behaviors, and noting that “[p]eople from groups that have been marginalized, such as people from racial and ethnic minority groups, are at higher risk for worse consequences”); C. Nadine Wathen, Jennifer C. D. MacGregor & Barbara J. MacQuarrie, The Impact of Domestic Violence in the Workplace, 57 J. Occupational & Env’t Med. 65, 67-68 (2015) (noting the impact of domestic violence on workers, including disrupted work history, lower incomes, physically being unable to get to work, and negative effects on work performance); Coburn v. Coburn, 342 Md. 244, 251-52 (1996) (discussing the problem of domestic abuse and summarizing the early legislative and executive responses thereto).
23 The degree to which the experience of domestic violence should be weighed in our
consideration of an appropriate sanction will necessarily depend on the role it played in the
misconduct at issue and whether it presents a risk going forward. As noted, our paramount
concern in imposing attorney discipline is protecting the public. Woolery, 456 Md. at
497-98. If domestic violence played a significant role in contributing to the misconduct at
issue and there is little risk of it contributing to future misconduct, that factor may play a
substantial role in determining what discipline is appropriate. On the other hand, if
domestic violence played a minimal role in the misconduct at issue, or if there is reason to
believe it will continue to interfere with the attorney’s ability to provide competent and
diligent representation of clients, the public will remain at risk and, in spite of our having
great sympathy for the victim, that factor may play little role in identifying an appropriate
sanction. Accordingly, where an attorney contends that domestic violence was a
contributing factor in alleged misconduct, hearing judges should consider evidence relating
to that factor and make findings, by a preponderance of the evidence, concerning whether
it has been proven, the effect it had on the misconduct at issue, and whether it is likely to
contribute to future misconduct.
As applied to Ms. King, the hearing judge found that she suffered domestic violence
and therefore found the mitigating factor of personal or emotional problems. The hearing
judge did not make any findings concerning the degree to which domestic violence
contributed to the misconduct or whether it was likely to contribute to future misconduct.
In a different case, we might be inclined to return this to the hearing judge to make such
findings. Here, however, Ms. King did not tie the domestic violence she suffered to any
24 particular instance of misconduct. To the contrary, she largely denied many of the
allegations of misconduct in ways that are inconsistent with such an explanation. Among
other things, she testified that her communication failures were not as extensive as the
hearing judge found, that she never agreed to file anything on Mr. Young’s behalf in return
for the $2,500 flat fee, that she withdrew that fee from her trust account because she had
fully earned it, and that she recognized the conflict of interest between Ms. Watson and
Ms. Holmes and counseled both of them about it. On all of those points, the hearing judge
found Ms. King’s testimony to lack credibility. Ms. King could not and did not introduce
evidence that the domestic violence she suffered contributed to misconduct she denied
occurred.9 We overrule Ms. King’s exception.
In sum, we recognize the following mitigating factors: personal or emotional
problems, physical disability, good character or reputation, and absence of a dishonest or
selfish motive.
B. Aggravating Factors
Aggravating factors “militate in favor of a more severe sanction.” Bonner, 477 Md.
at 608 (quoting Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Miller, 467 Md. 176, 233 (2020)); see also
Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Malone, 482 Md. 82, 120 (2022) (providing a list of
9 In a case involving allegations of incidents of domestic violence contributing to alleged misconduct, we would also expect Bar Counsel to take those allegations into account in determining how to proceed, just as it would when faced with allegations of substance use or mental health concerns. Here, perhaps due to Ms. King’s discovery failures—which caused the hearing judge to grant Bar Counsel’s request for sanctions and preclude Ms. King from introducing evidence other than as to her character—and refusal to cooperate with the investigation, it does not appear that the Assistant Bar Counsel assigned to this matter was aware of those allegations until the hearing.
25 recognized aggravating factors). Bar Counsel bears the burden of proving the existence of
aggravating factors by clear and convincing evidence. Attorney Grievance Comm’n v.
Weinberg, 485 Md. 504, 556 (2023); Md. Rule 19-727(c).
The hearing judge found by clear and convincing evidence the existence of six
aggravating factors: (1) prior disciplinary history; (2) pattern of misconduct; (3) multiple
violations; (4) bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding by intentionally failing
to comply with rules or orders of the disciplinary agency; (5) substantial experience in the
practice of law; and (6) likelihood of repetition. Ms. King excepts to three of those factors:
prior disciplinary history, bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceeding, and
likelihood of repetition. Because the record supports the hearing judge’s findings, we will
overrule Ms. King’s exceptions.
1. Prior Disciplinary History
The hearing judge concluded that Ms. King has a history of discipline, including an
April 2018 warning for violation of Rule 1.3 and a November 2021 reprimand for
violations of Rules 1.1, 1.3, 1.4(a), 1.5(a), 1.15(a), 3.4(d), 8.1(b), and 8.4(a) and (d). The
record supports the hearing judge’s findings with respect to this aggravating factor.
Ms. King does not dispute these incidents of prior discipline but contends that it is
inappropriate to consider the November 2021 reprimand as an aggravating factor because
her conduct at issue in this proceeding predated the imposition of that discipline. However,
we have previously upheld the use of “prior disciplinary offense[s] as an aggravating
factor, where the sanction for the prior offense was imposed after the attorney performed
26 the acts at issue in the case under review.” Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Sperling, 472
Md. 561, 617-18 (2021) (discussing cases). Ms. King’s exception is overruled.
2. A Pattern of Misconduct
The hearing judge concluded that Ms. King had demonstrated a pattern of
misconduct by failing to communicate with multiple clients over several years and failing
to perform the services for which she was retained. The record supports the hearing judge’s
finding. See Rossbach, 485 Md. at 601 (finding this factor for failures of communication
and performance).
3. Multiple Violations
We have found that Ms. King committed multiple rule violations. This aggravating
factor is established.
4. Bad Faith Obstruction of the Disciplinary Proceeding
The hearing judge concluded that Ms. King engaged in bad faith obstruction for
essentially the same reasons that she violated Rule 8.1(b): ignoring deadlines; providing
incomplete information, if any at all; and lack of preparation for her statement under oath.
The record supports the hearing judge’s findings.
Without support, Ms. King broadly excepts to this finding, arguing that it “fails to
meet the legal standard established by the case law.” To the contrary, this Court has
regularly treated repeated failures to respond timely and sufficiently to Bar Counsel’s
lawful requests as sufficient to satisfy the aggravating factor of bad faith obstruction. See,
e.g., Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Yeatman, 489 Md. 211, 236 (2024) (“Respondent
engaged in bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings by failing to respond to
27 several letters from Bar Counsel and requests by Bar Counsel to provide his client files in
both matters.” (emphasis omitted)); Rossbach, 485 Md. at 601-02 (“Ms. Rossbach engaged
in bad faith obstruction of the disciplinary proceedings in both matters by failing to timely
respond to Bar Counsel’s letters on multiple occasions and by failing to provide Bar
Counsel’s requested documentation.”). Ms. King’s exception is overruled.
5. Substantial Experience in the Practice of Law
Ms. King acknowledges that the aggravating factor of substantial experience in the
practice of law applies as she has been a member of the Maryland Bar since December
2001. We agree.
6. Likelihood of Repetition
The hearing judge concluded that Bar Counsel proved a likelihood of repetition of
misconduct by Ms. King because of her history of being sanctioned previously for
violations of many of the same rules at issue here and because her misconduct spanned
multiple clients and matters. The record supports the hearing judge’s findings.
Ms. King argues that certain aspects of the misconduct at issue are unlikely to be
repeated because she has adopted changes to her practice, including implementing a case
management system and leading regular reviews of cases with staff. She also stated at oral
argument that she would be willing to take on a mentor and take any continuing legal
education courses the Court concludes she should take. To be sure, Ms. King’s new office
practices are a positive development. Her openness to a practice mentor and to taking
appropriate continuing legal education courses is also welcome, although it would be more
convincing if she had already taken steps toward both, as opposed to waiting for them to
28 be required as a component of a sanction. In any event, although Ms. King has taken
positive steps, the record supports the hearing judge’s finding concerning the aggravating
factor of likelihood of repetition. Ms. King’s exception is overruled.
C. The Sanction
Citing Attorney Grievance Commission v. Hamilton, 444 Md. 163 (2015), and
Attorney Grievance Commission v. Garrett, 427 Md. 209 (2012), Bar Counsel recommends
that we disbar Ms. King. Ms. King recommends a suspension stayed in favor of a term of
probation.
The cases on which Bar Counsel relies involve conduct that was more severe than
here. In Hamilton, the attorney showed a disregard for timely filing documents and a
disregard for his clients’ wishes. 444 Md. at 199-200. We highlighted, however, that
“most significantly” and “[m]ost intolerably,” he misappropriated client funds and
misrepresented his actions to his clients. Id. We found no mitigating factors. Id. And in
Garrett, the attorney failed to communicate with clients, improperly converted unearned
fees, and failed to return the fees. 427 Md. at 227-28. The attorney failed to respond in
any way to the disciplinary proceedings, and he offered no evidence of remorse or
mitigation. Id. at 228.
Ms. King’s actions, although negligent, sustained, and repeated, do not rise to the
level of the misconduct in Hamilton or Garrett. There is no suggestion in this record of a
dishonest or selfish motive and Ms. King proved significant mitigating factors. In
particular, we do not take lightly the suffering that Ms. King endured because of domestic
violence. Such violence affected her physically and emotionally, and we do not rule out
29 the possibility that it contributed to some aspects of her misconduct. See Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. West, 378 Md. 395, 408-09 (2003) (mitigating, in part, due to
attorney’s concurrent hospitalization).
We conclude that an indefinite suspension is the appropriate sanction. Our cases
are replete with similar conduct leading to this sanction, particularly in cases where an
attorney failed to cooperate with Bar Counsel combined with violations not involving
dishonesty. See Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Green, 441 Md. 80, 101-02 (2014)
(collecting cases); Attorney Grievance Comm’n v. Kirwan, 450 Md. 447, 466 (2016) (citing
Green for the proposition that “where the attorney’s disciplinary violations do not involve
dishonesty, the sanction has often been indefinite suspension”); see also Attorney
Grievance Comm’n v. Moore, 447 Md. 253, 265, 274 (2016) (suspending indefinitely an
attorney with prior similar misconduct, and highlighting that it was “necessary” for him
“to stop practicing law while he resolves his personal issues[,]” including severe emotional
issues stemming from, among other things, domestic violence).
It is also appropriate sometimes to state a minimum “sit out” period that an
indefinitely suspended attorney must wait before applying for reinstatement to the Bar.
See, e.g., Green, 441 Md. at 102. And, often, we impose conditions on an attorney’s ability
to reapply, including a requirement to engage a practice monitor. See Attorney Grievance
Comm’n v. Taniform, 482 Md. 272, 325-26 (2022) (imposing an 18-month sit out period
with conditions that the attorney (1) was approved by a mental health professional and
(2) engaged an attorney monitor for a one-year period upon reinstatement). Ms. King shall
have the right to apply for reinstatement six months from her date of suspension. See
30 Olszewski, 441 Md. at 271 (imposing a sanction of indefinite suspension with the right to
reapply after six months in the case of a similar conflict of interest in violation of Rule 1.7).
A condition of her reinstatement shall be agreement to a probationary period of not less
than one year that will include a practice monitor and other appropriate conditions.
The suspension will commence 30 days after the date on which this opinion is filed.
IT IS SO ORDERED; RESPONDENT SHALL PAY ALL COSTS AS TAXED BY THE CLERK OF THIS COURT INCLUDING COSTS OF ALL TRANSCRIPTS, PURSUANT TO MARYLAND RULE 19-709(d), FOR WHICH SUM JUDGMENT IS ENTERED IN FAVOR OF THE ATTORNEY GRIEVANCE COMMISSION AGAINST MARNITTA LANETTE KING.