The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division. Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
SUMMARY December 26, 2024
2024COA128
No. 24CA0190, Al-Hamim v. Star Hearthstone, LLC — Landlords and Tenants — Warranty of Habitability — Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment; Technology — Artificial Intelligence — Generative AI Tools — Hallucinations; Colorado Rules of Appellate Procedure — Briefs — Citation to Authorities — Sanctions for Non-Compliance
Since the use of generative artificial intelligence (GAI) tools has
become widespread, lawyers and self-represented litigants alike
have relied on them to draft court filings. Because the most
commonly used GAI tools were not designed to create legal
documents, a person unfamiliar with the limitations of GAI tools,
such as the appellant in this case, can unwittingly produce text
containing fictitious legal citations, known as “hallucinations.” A
division of the court of appeals considers the novel question in
Colorado of the appropriate sanction when a self-represented
litigant files a brief peppered with hallucinations. Under the facts of this case, the division declines to impose sanctions against the
appellant, but it puts lawyers and self-represented parties on notice
that future filings containing GAI-generated hallucinations may
may result in sanctions. COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2024COA128
Court of Appeals No. 24CA0190 Arapahoe County District Court No. 23CV198 Honorable Elizabeth Beebe Volz, Judge
Alim Al-Hamim,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
Star Hearthstone, LLC, and IRT Living,
Defendants-Appellees.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I Opinion by JUDGE LIPINSKY J. Jones and Sullivan, JJ., concur
Announced December 26, 2024
Alim Al-Hamim, Pro Se
Gordon Rees Scully Mansukhani LLP, John R. Mann, Greg S. Hearing II, Brittney T. Bulawa, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellees ¶1 The recent advances in artificial intelligence (AI), and
particularly generative artificial intelligence (GAI), technology have
impacted nearly every aspect of our lives, including the creation of
text. A GAI tool can produce output that resembles the work of a
human author. It is becoming increasingly difficult to determine
whether a human or a GAI tool created a particular document.
¶2 Despite their uncanny writing skills, most commonly used GAI
tools are currently unable to draft motions, briefs, and other legal
documents because they were not designed for this purpose and
cannot conduct legal research. For this reason, a person unfamiliar
with the limitations of GAI tools can unwittingly rely on them to
produce what appears to be text filled with citations to legal
authorities. But these citations may be fictitious. Case names and
citations that a GAI tool makes up are known as “hallucinations.”
Snell v. United Specialty Ins. Co., 102 F.4th 1208, 1230 (11th Cir.
2024) (Newsom, J., concurring) (A GAI tool “‘hallucinates’ when, in
response to a user’s query, it generates facts that, well, just aren’t
true — or at least not quite true.”); Matthew R. Caton, Lawyers:
Rely on ‘Generative AI’ at Your Peril, 39 Me. Bar J. 48, 48 (2024) (A
1 GAI hallucination “occurs when an AI system provides information
that is inaccurate or, more bluntly, fake.”).
¶3 Some self-represented litigants, including plaintiff, Alim
Al-Hamim, have relied on GAI tools to draft court filings, only to
discover later to their chagrin that their filings contained
hallucinations. Al-Hamim’s opening brief in this appeal contained
hallucinations, as well as bona fide legal citations. This case
provides the first opportunity for a Colorado appellate court to
address the appropriate sanction when a self-represented litigant
files a brief peppered with GAI-produced hallucinations.
¶4 Al-Hamim appeals the district court’s dismissal of his claims
for breach of the warranty of habitability and the implied covenant
of quiet enjoyment for failure to state a claim under C.R.C.P.
12(b)(5) that he asserted against defendants, Star Hearthstone, LLC
and IRT Living (jointly, the landlords). We affirm the court’s
judgment against Al-Hamim and put him, the bar, and
self-represented litigants on notice that we may impose sanctions if
a future filing in this court cites “non-existent judicial opinions with
fake quotes and citations.” Mata v. Avianca, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 3d
443, 448 (S.D.N.Y. 2023) (holding that attorneys “abandoned their
2 responsibilities when they submitted non-existent judicial opinions
with fake quotes and citations created by the artificial intelligence
tool ChatGPT”).
I. Background
¶5 Star Hearthstone rented an apartment to Al-Hamim and his
cotenants in April 2020. Al-Hamim alleged in his complaint that
IRT Living managed the apartment complex for a portion of the time
he rented the apartment.
¶6 Al-Hamim pleaded that, in early 2021, shortly after he moved
into the apartment, he “noticed a full cannister of dander and cat
hair after vacuuming both bedrooms.” He “surmised it was cat or
some other animal hair when [he] began to show signs of an allergic
reaction.” Al-Hamim also alleged that “the wooden carpet tack
strips around the edges in [his] bedroom closet, as well as the
actual carpet pad and carpet underside were visibly stained from
cat urine.”
¶7 Al-Hamim said in his complaint that he reported the condition
of his carpet to the property manager, who had the carpet cleaned.
Al-Hamim alleged that, following the cleaning, he noticed “the
strong ammonia smell of cat urine” in his bedroom and “suggested
3 to management that the carpet may need replacement.” Although
the property manager responded that the carpet “would be
replaced, as soon as possible,” the carpet was not replaced.
¶8 Al-Hamim asserted that “[n]early an entire year passed with no
action on the part of [the landlords]” and that he “still had not
actually moved into and settled into the premises.” However,
despite his concerns about the cat urine odor and carpet stains,
Al-Hamim renewed his lease through mid-2023.
¶9 Al-Hamim pleaded claims for (1) breach of the warranty of
habitability; (2) breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment;
(3) violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 12101-12213; (4) violation of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x; and (5) violation of the Equal Protection and
Due Process Clauses of the United States and Colorado
Constitutions, U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, §§ 6, 25.
The landlords filed a motion to dismiss under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) for
failure to state claims upon which relief can be granted. The court
granted the motion.
4 II. The Court Did Not Err by Dismissing the Case
¶ 10 Al-Hamim contends that the court erred by granting the
landlords’ motion to dismiss. Specifically, he argues that the court
erred by determining that the landlords did not breach the warranty
of habitability and the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.
Additionally, he asserts that the court improperly failed to consider
four of his other claims.
A. Standard of Review
¶ 11 Because Al-Hamim represented himself throughout the case,
we must liberally interpret his complaint and response to the
landlords’ dismissal motion. See People v. Bergerud, 223 P.3d 686,
697 (Colo. 2010). But Al-Hamim’s status as a self-represented
litigant does not excuse his noncompliance with the procedural
rules that all parties, whether or not represented by counsel, must
follow. See In re Marriage of Wright, 2020 COA 11, ¶ 33, 459 P.3d
757, 764.
¶ 12 “We review a C.R.C.P. 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss de novo and
apply the same standards as the trial court.” Norton v. Rocky
Mountain Planned Parenthood, Inc., 2018 CO 3, ¶ 7, 409 P.3d 331,
334. In doing so, we accept all factual allegations in the complaint
5 as true and view them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party to determine whether the plaintiff has alleged “sufficient facts
that, if taken as true, show plausible grounds to support a claim for
relief.” Jagged Peak Energy Inc. v. Okla. Police Pension & Ret. Sys.,
2022 CO 54, ¶ 25, 523 P.3d 438, 446 (citing Warne v. Hall, 2016
CO 50, ¶¶ 9, 24, 373 P.3d 588, 591, 595). “[W]e are not required to
accept bare legal conclusions as true.” Norton, ¶ 7, 409 P.3d at
334. As a general rule, “[w]e will uphold the grant of a C.R.C.P.
12(b)(5) motion only when the plaintiff’s factual allegations do not,
as a matter of law, support the claim for relief.” Id.
B. Warranty of Habitability
¶ 13 “In every rental agreement, the landlord is deemed to warrant
that the residential premises is fit for human habitation.”
§ 38-12-503(1), C.R.S. 2023. (The Colorado General Assembly
amended the warranty of habitability statute in 2024. See Ch. 158,
secs. 3, 5, §§ 38-12-503, -505, 2024 Colo. Sess. Laws 704-17. We
cite the version of the statute in effect when Al-Hamim filed his
complaint. Because the General Assembly considers “premises” to
be a singular noun, so do we.)
6 ¶ 14 A landlord breaches the warranty of habitability if the
residential premises is (1) “[u]ninhabitable,” as defined in section
38-12-505, C.R.S. 2023, § 38-12-503(2)(a)(I); or (2) “[i]n a condition
that materially interferes with the tenant’s life, health, or safety,”
§ 38-12-503(2)(a)(II). Section 38-12-505(1) lists the conditions that
render a residential premises “uninhabitable.” These conditions
include lack of heating, lack of running water, and lack of working
locks, but not animal odors or urine stains.
¶ 15 Al-Hamim argues in his opening brief that the landlords
breached the warranty of habitability by failing to replace the
carpeting in his apartment. Specifically, he asserts that his
“inability to use his bedroom due to severe allergies” constituted the
breach. In his complaint, however, he did not allege that he was
unable to use the bedroom. Further, in his opening brief,
Al-Hamim does not cite any authority indicating that the problems
he experienced at the apartment made it “uninhabitable” within the
meaning of sections 38-12-503(2)(a)(I) and 38-12-505(1).
¶ 16 Nor did Al-Hamim allege a plausible claim that the conditions
at the apartment materially interfered with his “life, health, or
safety.” § 38-12-503(2)(a)(II). We focus on the “health” prong of the
7 statute because Al-Hamim did not allege that the cat odor or urine
stains affected his life or safety. Viewing the allegations in the
complaint in the light most favorable to Al-Hamim, see Jagged Peak
Energy Inc., ¶ 25, 523 P.3d at 446, his allegation that the cat urine
smell and stains impacted his health rested on his assertion that he
“began to show signs of an allergic reaction when emptying the
[vacuum] canister” on the day he moved in. He did not allege in his
complaint that the “signs of an allergic reaction” materially
impacted his health, that the allergic reaction continued past the
day he vacuumed the carpet, or that the smell and stains impacted
his health in any other manner. Cf. Anderson v. Shorter Arms Invs.,
LLC, 2023 COA 71, ¶ 29, 537 P.3d 831, 837 (recognizing that
unremedied mold can interfere with a tenant’s life, health, or safety
under section 38-12-503(2)(a)(II)); Kekllas v. Saddy, 389 N.Y.S.2d
756, 758 (Nassau Cnty. Dist. Ct. 1976) (holding that an odor of cat
urine that permeated the entire premises, forcing the tenant to
vacate the premises due to nausea and burning eyes, combined
with rusty water, leaks, and stuck windows, resulted in a breach of
the warranty of habitability).
8 ¶ 17 For these reasons, we hold that the court did not err by
concluding that Al-Hamim failed to plead an actionable claim for
breach of the warranty of habitability.
C. Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment
¶ 18 “[I]n the absence of an agreement to the contrary, there is an
implied covenant for the quiet enjoyment of the leased premises and
the tenant is entitled to the possession of the premises to the
exclusion of the landlord.” Radinsky v. Weaver, 460 P.2d 218, 220
(Colo. 1969). The covenant of quiet enjoyment is breached by “any
disturbance of a lessee’s possession by his lessor which renders the
premises unfit for occupancy for the purposes for which they were
leased, or which deprives the lessee of the beneficial enjoyment of
the premises, causing him to abandon them.” W. Stock Ctr., Inc. v.
Sevit, Inc., 578 P.2d 1045, 1051 (Colo. 1978) (quoting Radinsky,
460 P.2d at 220). Although “abandonment is not a required
element of the breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment,” Isbill
Assocs., Inc. v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 666 P.2d 1117, 1120 (Colo.
App. 1983), disapproved of on other grounds by Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Holmes, 193 P.3d 821 (Colo. 2008), to establish a
breach of the covenant, the plaintiff must establish that the
9 “disturbance of [the] lessee’s possession by his lessor” rendered the
premises “unfit . . . for the purposes for which they were leased.”
W. Stock Ctr., Inc., 578 P.2d at 1051 (quoting Radinsky, 460 P.2d at
220).
¶ 19 Al-Hamim alleged that “[t]he landlord[s’] refusal to replace the
cat-urine-stained carpet, despite repeated complaints . . . , resulted
in a significant disruption to [his] quiet enjoyment of the
apartment.” He asserted that the landlords breached the implied
covenant of quiet enjoyment because the issues involving the carpet
resulted in “inconvenience and strain” on his friendships with his
cotenants, and that he and his cotenants “had not actually moved
into and settled into the premises” during the first year of the lease.
¶ 20 It is unclear from Al-Hamim’s complaint the extent to which
the condition of the carpet interfered with his quiet enjoyment of
the premises, as opposed to his relationship with his cotenants,
however. Al-Hamim did not allege that he was unable to use any
part of the premises due to the carpet’s condition. Rather,
Al-Hamim said that he refrained from moving items into his
apartment because he did not want to have to move them again
when the carpet was replaced, not because any room was unfit for
10 occupancy. (In his response to the landlords’ motion to dismiss and
in the opening brief, Al-Hamim argued that the carpet problems
prevented him from using his bedroom. However, he did not
include this allegation in his complaint and, therefore, we do not
consider it. See Norton, ¶ 7, 409 P.3d at 334 (“When considering a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we may consider the
facts alleged in the pleadings, documents attached as exhibits or
incorporated by reference, and matters proper for judicial notice.”).)
¶ 21 Further, Al-Hamim does not cite any legal authority holding
that a strain on cotenants’ relationships can result in a breach of
the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment. Nor did Al-Hamim allege
that the carpet odor and staining resulted in a constructive eviction.
To the contrary, Al-Hamim conceded in his complaint that he
renewed the lease despite his complaints about the carpet. For
these reasons, Al-Hamim did not allege the type of “disturbance
of . . . possession” that could render the apartment unfit for “the
purposes for which [it was] leased.” W. Stock Ctr., Inc., 578 P.2d at
1051 (quoting Radinsky, 460 P.2d at 220).
¶ 22 Accordingly, we conclude that Al-Hamim failed to state a claim
for breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.
11 D. Other Issues
¶ 23 Al-Hamim raises the following claims for the first time in his
opening brief:
• The landlords “breached the lease agreement and the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing
to resolve maintenance issues and by conducting
arbitrary credit checks.”
• “[T]he leasing agent made fraudulent representations
regarding the credit check process and the legality of a
durable power of attorney used by [Al-Hamim] to sign for
his guarantors.”
• Al-Hamim “suffered considerable harm as a result of the
landlord[s’]” negligence.
• The landlords’ replacement of the carpet “constitute[d] an
implicit acknowledgement by the landlord[s] of their
responsibility to address the habitability issue initially
reported by the tenant.”
¶ 24 We do not consider these claims, however, because Al-Hamim
did not plead them in his complaint. “It is axiomatic that in civil
cases, issues not raised in or decided by the trial court generally
12 will not be addressed for the first time on appeal.” Brown v. Am.
Standard Ins. Co. of Wis., 2019 COA 11, ¶ 21, 436 P.3d 597, 600.
III. Court Filings with GAI-Produced Hallucinations
A. The Hallucinations in Al-Hamim’s Opening Brief
¶ 25 Al-Hamim’s opening brief contains citations to the following
fake cases:
• Beck v. Tibbetts, 967 P.2d 150 (Colo. 1998);
• Jankowski v. Cross, 672 P.2d 1178 (Colo. App. 1983);
• L&M Inv. Co. v. Morrison, 469 P.2d 516 (Colo. App. 1970);
• Jaramillo v. Cowen, 768 P.2d 1378 (Colo. App. 1989);
• In re Estate of Henry, 2012 COA 169, 301 P.3d 107 (Colo.
App. 2012);
• Jaramillo v. Steiner, 212 P.3d 1188 (Colo. App. 2009);
• Rojas v. Lindsay Mfg. Co., 108 Cal. App. 4th 530 (2003);
and
• Robinson v. Lennox Hill Hospital, 513 N.Y.S.2d 607 (App.
Div. 1987).
¶ 26 After we attempted, without success, to locate these cases, we
ordered Al-Hamim to provide complete and unedited copies of the
cases, or if the citations were GAI hallucinations, to show cause
13 why he should not be sanctioned for citing fake cases. In his
response to our show cause order, Al-Hamim admitted that he
relied on AI “to assist his preparation” of his opening brief,
confirmed that the citations were hallucinations, and that he “failed
to inspect the brief.” He did not address why he should not be
sanctioned.
B. The Risks of Relying on a GAI Tool to Draft a Court Filing
¶ 27 To explain why a GAI tool can produce legal documents filled
with hallucinations, we briefly review the large language model
(LLM) underlying GAI technology.
¶ 28 GAI tools are trained using LLMs that, “through a form of
machine learning known as deep learning, teach the program how
characters, words, and sentences function together.” Maria E.
Berkenkotter & Lino S. Lipinsky de Orlov, Can Robot Lawyers Close
the Access to Justice Gap? Generative AI, the Unauthorized Practice
of Law, and Closing the Access to Justice Gap, 53 Colo. Law. 40, 42
(2024) (hereinafter, Access to Justice). An LLM “learns what words
are most likely to appear where, and which ones are most likely to
precede or follow others — and by doing so, it can make
probabilistic, predictive judgments about ordinary meaning and
14 usage.” Snell, 102 F.4th at 1226 n.7 (Newsom, J., concurring).
This training allows the GAI tool to “generate content, such as
words, images, and a command in a line of code, autonomously in
response to prompts.” Access to Justice, 53 Colo. Law. at 42.
¶ 29 The limitations of and biases contained in the materials used
to train an LLM can produce outputs that reflect the shortcomings
in the LLM’s training. As of mid-2024, popular GAI tools, such as
OpenAI’s GPT-4, were not “trained with data sets containing
comprehensive, accurate legal resources.” Id. These widely used
resources are “not consistently reliable legal research tools because
they do not always provide the correct answers to legal queries and
may even make up case names and citations when they do not
know the answer to a question.” Id.
¶ 30 A GAI system “can generate citations to totally fabricated court
decisions bearing seemingly real party names, with seemingly real
reporter, volume, and page references, and seemingly real dates of
decision[].” Caton, 39 Me. Bar J. at 49 (quoting Smith v. Farwell,
No. 2282CV01197, at *1, 9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Feb. 12, 2024)
(unpublished order), https://perma.cc/59CV-C77W). These
hallucinations “can relate, in whole or in part, to the case name,
15 case citation, and/or the content or holding of a fake case or a real
judicial decision.” Id.; see also Eve Ross & Amy Milligan, What Can
ChatGPT Do, and Should We Let It?, 34 S.C. Law. 34, 36 (2023)
(“ChatGPT may confidently include authorities in its responses that
are misleading, incorrect or simply made up. . . . Unfortunately,
ChatGPT doesn’t always specify what sources it relies on for its
responses.”); Nicole J. Benjamin, Artificial Intelligence and the
Future of the Practice, 72 R.I. Bar J. 3, 3 (2024) (“AI
‘hallucinations’ — including the unforgiveable creation of case
law — and the generation of inaccurate answers are enough to give
us all pause when it comes to the adoption of artificial intelligence
in the practice.”); Sadie O’Connor, Generative AI, 8 Geo. L. Tech.
Rev. 394, 401 (2024) (“Since GAI algorithms are capable of
‘hallucinating’ false information, users must be cautious of its
limitations.”).
¶ 31 “Many harms flow from the submission of fake opinions.”
Mata, 678 F. Supp. 3d at 448. These include wasting the opposing
party’s “time and money in exposing the deception,” taking the
court’s time “from other important endeavors,” and potentially
harming the reputations of “judges and courts whose names are
16 falsely invoked as authors of the bogus opinions” and the
reputation of “a party attributed with fictional conduct.” Id.
Moreover, “a future litigant may be tempted to defy a judicial ruling
by disingenuously claiming doubt about its authenticity.” Id. at
448-49.
¶ 32 Accordingly, using a GAI tool to draft a legal document can
pose serious risks if the user does not thoroughly review the tool’s
output. Reliance on a GAI tool not trained with legal authorities
can “lead both unwitting lawyers and nonlawyers astray.” Access to
Justice, 53 Colo. Law. at 43. A self-represented litigant may not
understand that a GAI tool may confidently respond to a query
regarding a legal topic “even if the answer contains errors,
hallucinations, falsehoods, or biases.” Id. (In 2023 and 2024,
various companies introduced GAI tools trained using legal
authorities. Those legal GAI tools are not implicated in this appeal,
and we offer no opinion on their ability to provide accurate
responses to queries concerning legal issues.)
¶ 33 For these reasons, individuals using the current generation of
general-purpose GAI tools to assist with legal research and drafting
must be aware of the tools’ propensity to generate outputs
17 containing fictitious legal authorities and must ensure that such
fictitious citations do not appear in any court filing.
¶ 34 Even if Al-Hamim lacked actual knowledge that GAI tools can
produce fake citations, “[a] pro se litigant who chooses to rely upon
his own understanding of legal principles and procedures is
required to follow the same procedural rules as those who are
qualified to practice law and must be prepared to accept the
consequences of his mistakes and errors.” Rosenberg v. Grady, 843
P.2d 25, 26 (Colo. App. 1992). (We note that Al-Hamim filed his
opening brief on June 24, 2024 — more than one year after media
outlets throughout the country reported on the attorneys’
submission of a brief filled with ChatGPT-generated hallucinations
in Mata. See, e.g., Benjamin Weiser, Here’s What Happens When
Your Lawyer Uses ChatGPT, N.Y. Times (May 27, 2023),
https://perma.cc/H4DC-JWH2; Larry Neumeister, Lawyers
Submitted Bogus Case Law Created by ChatGPT. A Judge Fined
Them $5,000, Associated Press (June 22, 2023),
https://perma.cc/2B27-PHJN. By mid-2024, GAI tools’ propensity
to produce hallucinations in response to queries regarding legal
18 issues was not arcana known only to members of the bar and
judges.)
¶ 35 C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B) requires that an appellant’s opening brief
provide “a clear and concise discussion of the grounds upon which
the party relies in seeking a reversal . . . of the judgment . . . of the
lower court or tribunal, with citations to the authorities . . . on
which the appellant relies.” The submission of a brief containing
GAI-produced hallucinations runs afoul of this rule.
C. Appropriate Sanctions When a Self-Represented Litigant Submits a Court Filing Containing Hallucinations
¶ 36 This court has the authority to “dismiss an appeal” or “impose
other sanctions it deems appropriate, including attorney fees,” if a
party fails to comply with the Colorado Appellate Rules. C.A.R.
38(a), 39.1. Until today, no Colorado appellate court has
considered the consequences for a self-represented litigant who
submits a brief containing hallucinations.
¶ 37 Other courts, however, have considered an appropriate
sanction under these circumstances. In Anonymous v. New York
City Department of Education, the self-represented plaintiff
submitted a filing containing hallucinations. No. 24-cv-04232,
19 2024 WL 3460049, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 18, 2024) (unpublished
opinion). The court noted that “[s]anctions may be imposed for
submitting false and nonexistent legal authority to the [c]ourt.” Id.
However, the court declined to impose sanctions due to the
plaintiff’s status as a self-represented litigant and, instead, warned
the plaintiff and other self-represented litigants that future
submissions of false citations would likely result in sanctions. Id.
Other courts have taken a similar approach. See, e.g.,
Transamerica Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, No. CV-24-00379, 2024 WL
4108005, at *2 n.3 (D. Ariz. Sept. 6, 2024) (unpublished order)
(warning a self-represented litigant whose filings were “replete with
citations to nonexistent caselaw and legal authorities that do not
correspond to her claims, suggesting that [she] may be using AI,
such as ChatGPT, to draft her briefs,” and that “[a]ny future filings
with citations to nonexistent cases may result in sanctions”);
Dukuray v. Experian Info. Sols., No. 23-cv-9043, 2024 WL 3812259,
at *11 (S.D.N.Y. July 26, 2024) (unpublished report and
recommendation) (advising the self-represented plaintiff that future
filings containing false citations may result in sanctions), adopted,
2024 WL 3936347 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2024) (unpublished order);
20 Morgan v. Cmty. Against Violence, No. 23-cv-353-WPJ/JMR, 2023
WL 6976510, at *8 (D.N.M. Oct. 23, 2023) (unpublished opinion)
(asserting that the self-represented status of a plaintiff who “cited to
several fake or nonexistent opinions” will “not be tolerated by the
[c]ourt as an excuse for failing to adhere to this [c]ourt’s rules” and
warning that “[a]ny future filings with citations to nonexistent cases
may result in sanctions”); N.E.W. Credit Union v. Mehlhorn, No.
2023AP2187, 2024 WL 3770741, at *2 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 13,
2024) (unpublished opinion) (admonishing the appellant for
submitting false citations but declining to dismiss the appeal as a
sanction).
¶ 38 The Missouri Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal where the
self-represented appellant submitted a filing containing false
citations, among other violations of the court’s rules. Kruse v.
Karlen, 692 S.W.3d 43, 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 2024). The appellant’s
violations included his failure “to file an Appendix,” to provide “an
[]adequate Statement of Facts,” and to include a “Points Relied On”
section in her brief. Id. at 47-48. The court concluded that
dismissal was an appropriate remedy because the “[a]ppellant ha[d]
21 substantially failed to comply with [the] court rules.” Id. at 53
(emphasis added).
¶ 39 While we conclude that Al-Hamim’s submission of a brief
containing hallucinations violated C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B), this deviation
from the Appellate Rules was not as serious as the self-represented
appellant’s misconduct in Kruse. Further, in his response to our
show cause order, Al-Hamim acknowledged his use of AI, apologized
for his mistake, and accepted responsibility for including
hallucinations in his opening brief. (We rejected his request to
submit an amended opening brief that only cited real cases,
however. While we do not impose sanctions against Al-Hamim, his
inclusion of hallucinations in his original brief does not entitle him
to a second opportunity to file an opening brief.)
¶ 40 Because until now, no Colorado appellate court has
considered appropriate sanctions for a self-represented litigant’s
submission of a brief containing GAI-derived hallucinations, and
because the record does not show that Al-Hamim previously filed
court documents containing fake citations, we conclude that
imposing monetary sanctions or dismissing this appeal would be
disproportionate to Al-Hamim’s violation of the Appellate Rules.
22 Further, in their answer brief, the landlords failed to alert this court
to the hallucinations in Al-Hamim’s opening brief and did not
request an award of attorney fees against Al-Hamim. Under the
circumstances, we exercise our discretion not to order Al-Hamim to
pay the landlords’ attorney fees or to impose another form of
sanction against him. See Auxier v. McDonald, 2015 COA 50, ¶ 29,
363 P.3d 747, 754.
¶ 41 However, we warn Al-Hamim, as well as lawyers and
self-represented parties who appear in this court, that we will not
“look kindly on similar infractions in the future.” Anonymous, 2024
WL 3460049, at *7. A lawyer’s or a self-represented party’s future
filing in this court containing GAI-generated hallucinations may
result in sanctions.
IV. Disposition
¶ 42 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE J. JONES and JUDGE SULLIVAN concur.